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1 Introduction
In this opening chapter I introduce the context of conflict management
in argumentative reality, particularly in sessions of mediation. Next,
locating it in a topography of (paradigms in) argumentation research I
introduce the research program of pragma-dialectics. I show in which
sense pragma-dialecticians aim at an integration of pragmatic with dialectical
insights. Their research program consists of several modules, some of which I
– throughout the dissertation – spell out, scrutinize, characterize, and modify
or extend, and use in order to illustrate the reach of my findings.
I introduce the module of the five components – which initially was
intended as a means to chain normative and descriptive perspectives
on argumentation – and consequently suggest the five role models
of argumentation researchers (philosopher, theorist, analyst, empiricist,
practitioner). Then I present the module of the four meta-theoretical
principles which facilitates the integration of pragmatic with dialectical
insights. I apply (the relationships between) the four meta-theoretical
principles to the pragma-dialectical definition of “argumentation.” I introduce
the pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion. I apply the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research to the context of sessions of mediation and I
spell out my research questions. Eventually, I define four terms that I use in
my research (“to facilitate,” “to manage,” “to aim at,” “to arrive at”) before I
present the layout of this dissertation.
1.1 Managing conflict in argumentative reality
Where people communicate conflicts arise. Conflicts arise in social
contexts such as the family, in political contexts such as the neighborhood
administration, in environmental contexts such as the construction of plants,
in technological contexts such as the media or in commercial contexts such as
the workplace. Conflicts are a part of everyday life.
It is unlikely that there is a conflict that does not bring about an actual
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difference of opinion. Depending on the very context certain topics become
relevant to the content of opinions, and when opinions differ then conflicts
are facilitated. However, obscurity and misunderstandings – for example due
to talking at cross purposes – are some of the other factors that facilitate
conflicts.
Actual differences of opinion can be considered “an interesting illustration
of the cultural pluriformity which exists in the microcosm” (vEG84: 1). One
of the options to manage an actual difference of opinion is to aim at resolving
it. In their everyday management of the variety of topics, and the respective
differences of opinions, people can thus find opportunities to stabilize or
extend cultural pluriformity. Not resolving such differences might prevent,
for instance, intellectual progress (vEG84: 2).
In their The Millennium Development Goals Report the United Nations
state that “Conflicts remain the biggest threat to human development”
(Uni15). So, apparently, properly managing conflicts is thus to be put
on the worldwide agenda of “human development.” Consequently, various
organizations concern themselves with the management of conflicts. In
Germany, for example, there is the “Bundesverband MEDIATION e.V.” The
headquarter of another organization facilitating conflict management, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),1 is in Switzerland, the
International Mediation Institute is located in the Netherlands. The exemplary
list of national and international organizations facilitating to properly manage
conflicts could be extended. So, one of the means to manage a conflict is to
enter a session of mediation.
Sessions of mediation are one of the alternative dispute resolution practices
(cf. GM08: 30-39). Greco Morasso writes that “[m]ediation, in fact, aims
at possibly ending a solution to the conflict, and not, for example, at
investigating its origins or at evaluating responsibilities and establishing
relative sanctions. The latter kind of concern is associated, for example, to
the intervention of therapists or judges (see par. 6.1.2.3.)” (GM08: 299).
It is characteristic of a session of mediation that any solution to the conflict
is based on “a mutual decision” (cf. vEGJJ93: 128). People can engage in
sessions of mediation to manage the conflicts they have in social, political,
environmental, technological or commercial contexts.
A mediator should facilitate a proper management of a conflict. He appears
neutral when he “guides disputants in a cooperative search for a resolution to
1The World Intellectual Property Organization is an agency of the UN.
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a conflict that they have been unable to resolve on their own” (vEGJJ93: 118).
Various techniques – which can be configured strategically – can be used
to facilitate a proper management of conflicts. For example, in order to
manage a hostility that is at stake in a session of mediation, a mediator can
employ the strategy of non-violent communication. By applying non-violent
communication a mediator optimizes the conflict management in the sense
that he spells out the relevance between a mere description of a phenomenon
and an interpretation of it, and he aims at transparency in the discourse
with respect to the emotions, needs and desires of the persons in conflict
(Ros05). Applying the strategy of non-violent communication this mediator
instantaneously facilitates a management of the “social relations that are
endangered by conflict” (GM08: 131).
In fact, a mediator strategically facilitates a solution to the conflict. For
instance, mediators who employ the strategy of non-violent communication
facilitate a management of a discourse with the aim to “establish a flow
of communication” in accordance with, e. g., the “rule of thumb, it is
safe to assume that speakers express[ing] intensely emotional messages”
(Ros05: 98). Communicating non-violently means to actualize four speech
acts, or the respective illocutionary force: “[We] articulate this observation
without introducing any judgment or evaluation” before people turn to “state
how we feel,” to “say what needs of ours are connected to the feelings” and
to finally “address[es] what we are wanting” (Ros05: 7, 6). The first utterance
brings about the actualization of the illocutionary force of an assertive by
which the speaker merely describes the phenomena he has perceived. The
second utterance brings about the actualization of the illocutionary force of
an expressive by which the speaker expresses a feeling. The third utterance
brings about the actualization of the illocutionary force of a declarative
by which the speaker explains what facilitates a very feeling. The fourth
utterance brings about the actualization of the illocutionary force of a directive
by which the speaker aims at making the listener do something.2
So, focussing simply and solely on the insights from psychology – e. g.
by means of non-violent communication which recently was particularly
advocated by the clinical psychologist Rosenberg – may prompt researchers
to neglect other factors relevant to the management of conflicts, e. g. the
2For an introduction to speech act theory cf. Searle (Sea71), and the pragmatic conception of the argumentative
moves as speech acts in pragma-dialectics cf. this chapter. For a brief scrutiny of a pragma-dialectical speech
act theory account in sessions of mediation cf. Stewart and Maxwell (SM10: 17-18), and this dissertation
(cf. chapter 3: issues and contentions).
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relevance of types of speech acts. For Greco Morasso sessions of mediation
are one of the contexts in which actual differences of opinion are resolved
(GM08). Likewise, Aakhus writes that “mediators [...] participate in the
settlement of disagreements and controversies by attempting to ‘make talk
work’ as a means to resolve conflict through reason rather than force (Kolb
and Kressel, 1994)” (Aak03: 269). So, Aakhus suggests the resolution of an
actual difference of opinion as a means to the solution to a conflict. That
the mediator employs reason rather than force points to the first of the values
that a mediator actualizes: Mediators are “neutral, impartial and independent”
(WIP09: 9). Making talk work neutrally means, for instance, to facilitate the
actualization of a certain procedure of resolving the difference of opinion, or
the application of certain speech acts.
In mediation there are three characters, two of which are the parties in
conflict, the other is the impartial and independent mediator. Referring to
a session of mediation in an academic context the argumentation researcher
Greco Morasso writes:
Philip is the direct addressee of the mediator’s argumentation; he
therefore is to be considered as the main antagonist [one party] of
the critical discussion, while the mediator is the protagonist [the
other party] (GM08: 217-218).
However, in order to illustrate the impartiality and independence of the
mediator it is particularly relevant to distinguish between the parties and
the mediator. Though on the one hand a mediator appears impartial with
respect to the content managed,3 on the other hand he must also be considered
independent with respect to the roles of protagonist and antagonist who
resolve the difference of opinion. It is the very task of the mediator to
facilitate both that he appears impartial towards the content of the mediation
and independent from the parties yet not disrespectful (cf. GM08: 163). In
fact this task is one of the results from the mediator’s “paradoxical role.”
For argumentation researchers it is particularly relevant to elaborate clarity
to the matters in a session of mediation because clarity to a matter, such as
certain roles that are actualized in the discourse, facilitates the acceptance
of that matter which in turn facilitates that the persons in conflict make
proper use of it. About the goal of argumentation researchers van Eemeren
3Greco Morasso points to the “mediator’s lack of direct interest in one or another specific outcome”
(GM08: 163).
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writes that they “should not make matters more complicated than necessary”
(vE90: 43). For example, a technique inspired by argumentation research that
mediators can make use of is to ask for an actualization of the speech act usage
declarative. On the one hand, “[q]uestions [...] expand the informational base
of the discussion” and “this can be done by the mediator without taking a
stand on the status of any issue” (Jac02: 1410), on the other hand by thus
facilitating clarity to the very issue a mediator makes use of a means to
arrive at acceptance of the speech act related to that issue: “The purpose
of usage declaratives [...] is to enlarge or facilitate the listener’s or reader’s
understanding of other speech acts” (vEG04: 66).
So, because mediators are supposed to focus on the facilitation of the
discourse in which an actual difference of opinion is managed they need to
employ their argumentative competence. Though “[m]uch of the practice of
mediation is formally trained, explicitly codified in manuals, and reflectively
applied by practitioners” (Jac02: 1423) mediators need to employ their
intuition in order to sense, for instance, in which sense certain social relations
are endangered by conflict, and which of the strategic actions is most
desirable to be employed.4 Making talk work with a focus on argumentation
means that the mediator’s strategic actions refer to clarity to matters managed
by argumentation researchers, such as types of standpoints, issues or
contentions. Such strategic actions of a mediator thus correspond to certain
rules for argumentation and with the purpose to optimize the argumentative
performance of the persons in conflict.5 The argumentative performance is
the entirety of those forms of actions which are actualized in argumentative
reality, and argumentative reality is the entirety of contexts including the
respective form(s) of action that can be researched in argumentation research.
For example, van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93), Jacobs (Jac02) and Greco
Morasso (GM08) refer to the paradoxical role of mediators and to certain
forms of actions – and certain “argumentative techniques,” i. e. “tools used
in maintaining the equilibrium between effectiveness and reasonableness”
(vE10: 41) – which mediators have shown to actualize in the argumentative
reality of different sessions of mediation.
4Besides the manuals on non-violent communication, another example of a collection of techniques is the
chapter on “Basistechniken in der Mediation” by Rabe and Wode (RW14).
5An exemplary technique to arrive at an optimal argumentative performance in correspondence to a rule for
argumentation about the “conclusive attack and defense of standpoints” is to “reasonably weigh up the
arguments for and against the standpoints at issue” (vEG04: 7, 50).
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As shown, a session of mediation can take place in the argumentative reality
of an academic context. In the example that Greco Morasso shows the
persons manage the accusation of harassment by the student Ann towards
the university professor Philip (GM08: 189, 198-203). However, when, for
instance, argumentation researchers discuss with each other they are certainly
also acting in the argumentative reality of an academic context. So, just like
“[t]he lack of clarity between Philip and Ann is, indeed, the very problem that
has given rise to the conflict” (GM08: 189), obscurity – or, for that matter,
a lack of clarity – can also give rise to a conflict between argumentation
researchers. Clarity to the matters is one of the goals in a mediation session.
An example of a conflict between argumentation researchers is the
one between authors from the pragma-dialectical approach and those
from an epistemic approach. In 1992, against the background of an
epistemic approach Siegel and Biro suggested that the pragma-dialectical
management of certain matters is troublesome. For instance, they state
that the pragma-dialectical take on “premises” is troublesome because
those premises are actualized by means of actually “agreeing” on them.6
Participating in the same conflict Lumer (cf. Lum10: 61) writes – against
the background of an epistemic approach – if certain “questions are up to
the discussants’ agreement” then pragma-dialecticians “simply have not done
their homework” in the sense of building a theory and Siegel and Biro likewise
spell out that an actualization of a premise can be “pragma-dialectically
rational – but patently irrational from the epistemic point of view” (cf.
SB10: 458).
Siegel and Biro (SB08), again, raised issues in the conflict. Those issues
were managed by the pragma-dialecticians Garssen and van Laar (GvL10).
Siegel and Biro (SB10) responded to Garssen and van Laar. In those three
articles the conflict turns out to be about philosophical matters revolving the
terms “criticism” and “justificationism.” The conflict becomes apparent when
the authors have a discourse on, for instance, the matter of “reasonableness.”
Siegel and Biro state that different authors from the pragma-dialectical
approach have different views on reasonableness and that there is thus an
“in-house dispute” within the pragma-dialectical research program. The
obscurity that Siegel and Biro thus spell out has consequences on the various
theoretical, analytical and empirical matters that pragma-dialecticians are
faced with. A proper conflict management with respect to such obscurity to
6Cf. the list of speech acts (vEG04: 68).
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certain matters within argumentation research is needed in order to facilitate
acceptable conclusions from research projects. Against the background of
obscurity in pragma-dialectical research and the mediator’s paradoxical role
in the context of mediation in a case study I act as a mediator who manages the
conflict between Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar in order to arrive
at the strategic goal to neutrally facilitate the acceptance of certain matters
relevant to argumentation research (standpoint, issues, contentions, usage
declaratives). As a mediator I thus optimize argumentative reality within the
academic context of argumentation research.
1.2 Argumentation research: An introduction to
pragma-dialectics
I aim at contributing to argumentation research. Argumentation researchers
elaborate the relationship between cultural diversity and matters they show
to be relevant to argumentative reality. Argumentation is researched from
the perspective of philosophy and theory, e. g. Toulmin (Tou58), Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (POT69), Hamblin (Ham70), from the perspective of
analyses of discourse, e. g. Walton (Wal07), and from the perspective of
empirical research, e. g. O’Keefe (O’K02). Moreover, there are certain
suggestions from argumentation researchers with respect to the use of the
findings in applied research, e. g. Freeley and Steinberg (FS08).
Locating it in a topography of (paradigms in) argumentation research I
introduce the research program of pragma-dialectics. In order to make use
of the different “kinds of research” van Eemeren and Grootendorst present
a “topography of argumentation studies” (vEG04: 9, 11). There are the
aforementioned five components of the “Realm of Argumentation Studies,”
of “the study of argumentation”:7 philosophical, theoretical, analytical,
empirical and practical research. Within the different components research
is conducted against the background of a certain “approach” or “paradigm”:
Like other disciplines, argumentation theory can benefit greatly
from mutual rivalry between different schools, each of them
having its own research program. In this way, different types of
research and eventually different paradigms are developed. They
7Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: v, 9, 11) for the use of the “Realm of Argumentation Studies”
and “the study of argumentation.”
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can be characterized with the help of the general framework we
have just presented (vEG04: 41).
The framework that van Eemeren and Grootendorst are writing about is
the distinction between the five components. The authors employ various
synonymous for “component”: “estate” (e. g. vEG04: 11), “constituent”
(vEG04: 11), “task” (vEGJJ93: 25), and “domain” (vEG04: 40). However,
against the background of clarity to the matters it is troublesome that
pragma-dialecticians do not stick to the established (synonymous) meanings
of the terms: “each of the estates refers to a specific domain that should
be represented in a research program that is to lead to a fully fledged
argumentation theory” (vEG04: 39). Apparently, in this case the terms
“estate” and “domain” are not synonymous. Besides the term “component” is
used not only to refer to the layout of the Realm of Argumentation Studies.8
I employ the term “layout” variably in a sense of natural language to refer
to a somewhat structured configuration of matters. Aiming at a layout to
characterize different research projects of argumentation researchers in their
topography pragma-dialecticians introduce not only the distinction between
the five components. They also make use of the terms “fields,” “branches”
and “research programs.” For example, “pragma-dialectics” is a research
program (vEGSH96: 275),9 “the study of argumentation” – i. e. the Realm of
Argumentation Studies – is a branch of normative pragmatics (vEG04: 10),
and normative pragmatics is a field (vEGJJ93: 2). Though by introducing the
concepts of the five components, of fields, branches and research programs
argumentation researchers facilitate a general framework, those concepts
have, to date, not been widely used by argumentation researchers. For
example, no other fields, branches and research programs than the ones
mentioned are spelled out. However, the distinction between the five
components is used, indeed.10 In order to arrive at clarity to the matters I aim
8The authors write about, e. g., “various components of argumentative discourse,” a “component of the
difference of opinion” and a “component of verbal acting” (vEG04: 52, 55, 61, 82).
9Hence, I employ the term “pragma-dialectical” to refer to the research program of pragma-dialectics (cf.
vEGSH96: 276: “pragma-dialectical research program”).
10In their article The Development of the Pragma-dialectical Approach to Argumentation van Eemeren and
Houtlosser employ the layout of the five components to illustrate the history of the pragma-dialectical
research program (vEH03). Besides, the pragma-dialectician Feteris suggests, parallel to the distinction
between the five components, to distinguish research projects on Argumentation in the Field of Law. She is
concerned with a distinction between a logical, a rhetorical and a dialogical “approach” to research (Fet01).
At times she employs the term “approach” in the sense of a paradigm. However, she uses the term “field”
most certainly in a manner different from, e. g., van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 2).
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at facilitating clarity to the topography, to a layout, of argumentation research.
I add the terms “paradigm,” and “approach” to the layout.
So, I suggest, first, that researchers of the same field, branch and research
program work in accordance with a certain approach, or paradigm.11 So, it
makes sense, for instance, to speak about a “pragma-dialectical approach.”
A pragma-dialectician works in accordance with the pragma-dialectical
approach, i. e. the research program. Another approach – though
to date the respective authors have not located the approach in the
topography of argumentation research as a field, branch or research
program – is the “epistemic approach” (GvL10: 123).12 So, apparently
not only pragma-dialecticians contribute to the intellectual progress within
argumentation research.
Exemplarily pragma-dialecticians present three ways to distinguish
paradigms. First, paradigms can be distinguished due to their historical
inspirations, on “empirical-historical grounds” (vE10: 54). Second, the
cultural background is an option to characterize an approach (cf. vEG04: 21).
Third, van Eemeren spells out a certain manner, or degree, of “formalization”
(vE10: 88). In fact, there is little elaboration on those criteria. Therefore, just
like that they are not “ready” to be used. In this dissertation I present criteria
to distinguish paradigms.
Second, in order to make it “clear what progress can be made on the various
levels of research” (vE90: 44) I suggest to characterize approaches by means
of the five components. Then in the previous quote the term “research”
refers to argumentation research. A “level” is a certain paradigm or a certain
component, and the goal of clarity (“clear”) to the (intellectual) “progress”
refers to the result of connecting fields, branches, research programs and the
five components, and consequently my first and second suggestion can be
chained: Indeed, different paradigms can be characterized with the help of a
general framework, or layout, of the topography of argumentation research
(cf. figure 1.1).13
The research program pragma-dialectics is being developed since the late
1970’s. The paradigm is inspired particularly by analytic philosophers and by
11Introducing the layout of the five components, van Eemeren uses both terms (vE90: 37).
12For example, the pragma-dialecticians Garssen and van Laar write about “Biro and Siegel, who make it clear
that they conceive of their epistemic approach and the pragma-dialectical approach as complementary [...].”
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Figure 1.1: The topography of argumentation research.
insights into verbal communication. Pragmatic and dialectical insights are
supposed to be integrated in one approach:
[P]ragma-dialectics as it was initially developed [...] can be
regarded as an attempt to create a dialectical approach to
argumentation that keeps an open eye for the rhetorical aspects of
argumentative reality by studying argumentative discourse from
a pragmatic perspective (vEH03: 401).
The dialectical conception of argumentative reasonableness is
inspired by critical rationalists and other analytic philosophers,
such as Karl Popper, Hans Albert, and Arne Naess, and by formal
dialectical logicians, such as Charles Hamblin, Paul Lorenzen
cum suis, Else M. Barth and Erik C. W. Krabbe. [...] The
pragmatic conception of the argumentative moves as speech acts
in a discursive exchange is firmly rooted in John L. Austin and
John R. Searle’s philosophy of verbal communication, Paul H.
Grice’s theory of conversational rationality, and other studies of
verbal communication by discourse and conversation analysts
(vEH03: 387).
In the following I elaborate, first, the dialectical, then the pragmatic
conception before I point to “rhetorical aspects.” In that way I characterize
the main features of pragma-dialectics.
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Van Eemeren and Grootendorst write that the ideal model of critical
discussion “is dialectical because it is premised on two parties who try
to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a methodical exchange of
discussion moves” (vEG04: 22). They say that this can be traced back
to Aristotle’s conception of dialectics: “For Aristotle, dialectics is about
conducting a critical discussion that is dialectical because a systematic
interaction takes place between moves for and against a particular thesis”
(vEG04: 43). Likewise, Johnstone writes in the introduction to an article
by van Eemeren and Grootendorst that “Frans van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst [are] developing a concept of reason at once pragmatic and
dialectical in their article ‘Rationale for a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective.’ In
using the term ‘Dialectic’ they seem primarily to have in mind the technique
of question and answer expounded by Aristotle in the Topics” (Joh88: 155).14
Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument (1958) and his Knowing and Acting
(1979) influenced pragma-dialectics in respect of the pragma-dialectical
concept of reasonableness. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst elucidate
that in the latter book Toulmin presents the distinction between three
conceptions of reasonableness: the “geometrical,” the “anthropological” and
the “critical.” Geometrical philosophers “try to prove their claims by showing
step by step that these claims ultimately derive from something that is an
incontrovertible certainty” whereas anthropological philosophers consider
reasonableness as “a function of the group and the time concerned – that
is, it is specific to particular people in a particular historical situation.”
The critical philosopher combines the geometrical and the anthropological
views by suggesting reasonableness to be elicited by two types of validity:
Problem-solving validity refers to a procedure – a step by step – facilitating
to “solve the problem at hand” whereas conventional validity refers to
reasonableness depending on space and time and “a specific group of people”
(vEG04: 13-17). Besides Toulmin, the Polish-Belgian authors Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (POT69) are mentioned as “predominant in the study
of argumentation” (vEG04: 7) because of the influence of their book La
nouvelle rhétorique: traité de l’argumentation. In respect of the three
types of reasonableness van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not mention an
advocate of the geometrical philosophy, though they say that Perelman and
14Aristotle is also discussed when van Eemeren and Grootendorst introduce the pragma-dialectical concept of
fallacies (vEG04: 158-160).
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Olbrechts-Tyteca opt for the anthropological philosophy while both Toulmin
and pragma-dialecticians opt for the critical conception.
The authors’ discussion of the three types of reasonableness gives rise
to a juxtaposition of a “anthropologico-relativistic view of reasonableness”
and a “critical-rationalistic view of reasonableness.” The pragma-dialectical
concept of reasonableness can be exemplified by the influence of critical
rationalism. Critical rationalism, developed and advanced by Popper, means
that any claim to knowledge – including scientific theories – can and
should be subjected to critical scrutiny, especially attempts at falsification.15
Pragma-dialecticians have adopted Popper’s notion of “critical testing.” They
characterize the research program in the sense of a dialectical approach: The
pragma-dialectical concept of reasonableness can be traced back to critical
rationalism (vEG84: 16-17).
Next, Searle’s concept of speech acts (cf. Sea71) influenced the “pragmatic
conception of argumentative moves” in pragma-dialectics. It is the basis
for van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s elaboration on “Argumentation as an
illocutionary act complex” and on “Argumentation and the perlocutionary
act of convincing” (vEG84: 19-74). Pragma-dialecticians do not particularly
illustrate the relevance of Austin’s work to their research.
From Grice pragma-dialecticians get the insight that verbal behavior
of language users is guided by a “cooperative principle” and a list of
conversational maxims (Gri75). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst state to
integrate the conversational maxims by Grice with Searle’s speech acts when
the former are “rephrased in a Searlean way” (cf. vEG88: 499, 501).
Metaphorically speaking, the pragma-dialectical research program consists
of several modules. In order to illustrate the reach of my findings throughout
the dissertation I spell out, scrutinize, characterize, and modify or extend,
and use some of them – particularly the five components (cf. below) and the
four meta-theoretical principles (cf. this chapter). Furthermore, I introduce
eight modules myself. I introduce the modules of the four languages (cf.
chapter 2), the troublesome matters (cf. chapter 2), the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) (cf. chapter 2), definitions of strategy and strategic action
(cf. chapter 2), a quartet of terms (cf. chapter 2) to prevent conflicts in
15“Der Fortschritt des Wissens besteht aus Vermutungen und Widerlegungen”; “Neue Ideen kommen zur
Sprache, und sie verdanken ihren Ursprung der offenen Kritik”; “[...] dass Kritik und kritische Diskussion
die einzigen Mittel sind, die uns der Wahrheit näherbringen” (Pop05: 10, 6, 8). For falsificationism cf.
Popper (Pop05: 127-134, 139).
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the academic context of argumentation research, an ontological framework to
analyze mediation sessions (cf. chapter 3), the terms issues and contentions
(cf. chapter 3), and an integration of role models (cf. chapter 3).
However, next I briefly introduce the module of the five components. As
with any introduction of a module, I spell out relevant relationships between
the various modules in boxes framed in black .
I use the five components and the module of the four languages to
develop and apply a novel methodical means in argumentation research
(cf. chapter 2). The module of the five components facilitates to spell out
the module of the quartet of terms (the functions fulfilled by the quartet
of terms are traced back to different components) (cf. chapter 2). I also
use the five components, together with the module of my definitions of
strategy and strategic action to arrive at the module of the integration of
role models (cf. chapter 3).
Initially the module of the five components was intended as a means to chain
normative and descriptive perspectives on argumentation (vE90: 38) – and
sketch the respective foci in the development of pragma-dialectical research.
In the philosophical component “termini technici,” and the fashion to use
them are defined. One of the relevant concepts discussed in pragma-dialectics
is reasonableness.16 The pragma-dialectical philosopher takes a stance
according to critical rationalism.
In the theoretical component – van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 21) call it
the normative component – the termini technici are configured in the fashion
defined by the philosopher. For example, the concept of reasonableness is
employed to build a grid to analyze fragments from argumentative reality.17
The research results from a pragma-dialectical theorist are thus based on the
philosophy of critical rationalism.18 However, pragma-dialecticians are also
allowed to employ their intuition in conducting research.19
16“The different meanings attributed to the words reasonable and rational in everyday language are not always
clearly delineated, nor do they need to be, but if we are going to use them as termini technici in argumentation
theory, a more precise delineation of their scope is needed” (vEG94: 11).
17“[N]otions of reasonableness acquire a specific theoretical shape” (vEG04: 18). That means, for example,
“On the theoretical level, scholars of argumentation [...] give shape to their ideals of reasonableness by
presenting a particular model [...]” (vE90: 39).
18For example, one of the most prominent topics of pragma-dialectical research are the four stages of the
pragma-dialectical ideal model which is labelled critical discussion (1984, 2004).
19For example, one the one hand, a pragma-dialectical theorist uses Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts (Sea79)
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Pragma-dialectical analysts aim at an “analytic overview” (vEGJJ93).20
They apply theoretical insights, for example the dialectical transformations,
in order to test in which sense certain fragments from argumentative
reality correspond to the pragma-dialectical termini technici. For example,
the concept of reasonableness is relativized onto the very fragment.21
Analytical research is, apparently, based on the research results from the
pragma-dialectical theorist.22
In the empirical component pragma-dialecticians check in which sense
the pragma-dialectical termini technici are proper means to test certain
fragments from argumentative reality.23 Taking into account Popper’s term of
falsifications it becomes apparent in which sense in pragma-dialectics “[t]he
critical-rationalistic philosophy of reasonableness also applies to the rules
themselves and their epistemological status” (vEG04: 35).24
The practical component in pragma-dialectics represents the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research to optimize argumentative reality.25 In
his article The study of argumentation as normative pragmatics van
Eemeren distinguishes practical research in a dialectical approach to be
“reflection-minded” and in a rhetorical approach to be “prescription-minded”
(vE90: 42-43).
From the literature – such as van Eemeren and Houtlosser about the
development of pragma-dialectics (vEH03) – the pragma-dialectical research,
first and foremost, appears to be instrumental to arrive at analytical and
practical research results. Based on van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s Speech
acts in argumentative discussions: a theoretical model for the analysis of
discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion (vEG84) which
van Eemeren and Houtlosser consider to be “strongly philosophical and
to characterize the ideal model of critical discussion, on the other hand van Eemeren writes about critical
discussion: “[T]he model could not have been developed without a certain understanding, based on
experience, of the organization and proceeding of argumentative discourse” (vE10: 6).
20Also cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04).
21If analysts focus on the research on fallacies in pragma-dialectics they refer to the ten commandments and
the 1992 book mentioned (also cf. vEGSH96: 304-306).
22In fact, van Eemeren and Grootendorst write about matters “within our theoretical scope” (vEG04: 27).
23“Good empirical research should enable the analyst to address questions of whether or not people are arguing
as they should and what factors facilitate or inhibit meeting normative standards” (vEGJJ93: 23).
24“Falsifizierungen [...] lehren uns, daß unsere Theorien, obwohl sie von uns selbst aufgestellt wurden, obwohl
sie unsere eigenen Erfindung sind [...] sie können mit etwas zusammenstoßen, sie können an etwas scheitern,
das wir nicht selbst erfunden haben” (Pop05: 149).
25In that respect “[a]ll kinds of argumentative capacities and skills that play a part in the oral and written
production of argumentative discourse and texts, as well as in their interpretation and evaluation, are
important” (vEG04: 32).
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theoretical” (vEH03: 388), the book on Argumentation, communication, and
fallacies: a pragma-dialectical perspective by van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(vEG92) is said to be, as well, aimed at theoretical, analytical and
practical research results (cf. vEH03). The 1993 contribution Reconstructing
argumentative discourse by van Eemeren et al. particularly illustrates the
focus on analytical research.
Before van Eemeren et al. published Argumentative indicators in
discourse: a pragma-dialectical study (vEHSH07) – which is, again,
particularly relevant to pragma-dialectical analyses – in A systematic theory
of argumentation: the pragma-dialectical approach from 2004 van Eemeren
and Grootendorst can certainly be said to concern themselves with all of the
five components of the research program. However, against the background
of empirical research in pragma-dialectics van Eemeren et al. published
Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness: empirical research concerning
the pragma-dialectical discussion rules (vEGM09).
In the late 1990’s pragma-dialecticians startet their “systematic integration
of rhetorical considerations in a dialectical theoretical framework”
(vEH03: 391) resulting in van Eemeren’s Strategic maneuvering in
argumentative discourse: extending the pragma-dialectical theory of
argumentation (vE10). The book ends with a discussion on the five
components with respect to strategic maneuvering. So, talking about
pragma-dialectics as an approach – or paradigm – with five components
which integrate dialectical with rhetorical insights focussing on analyses
and optimizations of argumentative reality means that “[...] research
concerned is not isolated [...] but can be construed as being an integral
part of a more-encompassing research program” (vE90: 43). Currently, the
most prominent pragma-dialecticians are F. H. van Eemeren, A. F. Snoeck
Henkemans, B. Garssen, E. T. Feteris, B. Meuffels and J. H. M. Wagemans.
In aiming at the integration of pragmatic with dialectical insights the module
of the four meta-theoretical principles26 is the basis for research conducted
in a pragma-dialectical fashion. They are “point[s] of departure from other
contemporary approaches,” they are a pragma-dialectician’s “methodological
26This term is used by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04). A synonym used by van Eemeren et al. is
“metatheoretical premises” (vEGSH96: 276). I opt for the former term to prevent obscurity. To date, in
pragma-dialectics “premise” – rather than “principle” – is one of the termini technici (cf. e. g. vEG04: 68).
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starting points” (vEGSH96: 276).27 After spelling out how they relate to the
other modules I introduce them one by one. Then I apply them to show
the integration of pragmatic with dialectical insights in the context of the
pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion.
I use the four meta-theoretical principles, together with the module of
strategy and the ontological framework to introduce the module of issues
and contentions (cf. chapter 3). Besides, the four meta-theoretical
principles facilitate my integration of pragma-dialectical role models
(cf. below) by means of the module of the definitions of strategy and
strategic actions (cf. chapter 2).
The meta-theoretical principle of externalization is, first and foremost, a
means to prevent researching person’s personal thoughts, ideas, motivations
and psychological dispositions. Instead pragma-dialecticians research what
the persons can be held committed to against the background of their publicly
made utterances (vEGSH96: 276-277). Externalization is thus conducive to
arriving at the purpose of pragma-dialectics to optimize (the argumentative
performance in) argumentative reality, to optimize the “efforts to resolve
disputes about expressed opinions by verbal means” (vEG84: 6). This
“methodological starting point” can be traced back to Popper. Quoting his
Objective Knowledge van Eemeren and Grootendorst spell out that they aim
at an “objectivization” similar to Popper’s suggestion that only a formulated
theory can be properly discussed:
One of my principal methods or approach, whenever logical
problems are at stake, is to translate all the subjective
psychological terms, especially “belief”, etc., into objective
terms. Thus, instead of speaking of a “belief”, I speak, say, of
a “statement” or of an “explanatory theory”: and instead of the
claim of the “justification of a belief”, I speak of “justification of
the claim that a theory is true”, etc. (1972:6) (vEG84: 6-7).
The meta-theoretical principle of functionalization means to elaborate
argumentation as an aim-oriented action. Tracing back their suggestions
27In this case the term “starting points” is not to be understood like the “starting points” in critical discussion
(cf. e. g. vEG04: 99).
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to Grice’s comments on a “formalistic approach”28 pragma-dialecticians
particularly concern themselves with functions of argumentation, rather than
solely with argumentation in the sense of a certain relationship between
premise(s) and conclusion(s).29 To pragma-dialecticians, argumentation is
a form of action aimed at convincing the other party of the acceptability of a
standpoint (vEG84: 7-9) and the ideal model of critical discussion is intended
to depict a context of those speech acts that are relevant to that aim.
The meta-theoretical principle of socialization means to consider
argumentation in the context of a dialogue. Argumentation research
against the background of interactional roles is particularly relevant to the
integration of dialectical with pragmatic insights (vEGSH96: 277, 279).
Argumentation is characterized as a form of action which is particularly
social, a characteristic which van Eemeren and Grootendorst trace back to
the “dialogic logic theory of argumentation” by Barth and Krabbe (1982)
(vEG84: 13-14). Since the interactional roles are chained to different speech
acts – which are means to coming up to certain rights and obligations in the
dialogical procedure – they represent different functions in critical discussion.
For example, if requested by the other party the role of the protagonist brings
about the obligation to apply certain speech acts to defend the standpoint,
while the role of the other party – the antagonist – does not bring about such
obligation.
The meta-theoretical principle of dialectification is based on a “dialectical
approach” suggested by Wenzel (1979).30 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
quote him when they spell out that “argumentation must be regarded as ‘a
systematic management of discourse for the purpose of achieving critical
decisions’ (1979:84)” (vEG84: 17). The forms of action that are configured in
critical discussion thus elicit the pragma-dialectical concept of reasonableness
in the context of a “dialectical procedure” that is “attentive to a set of critical
standards” (vEGSH96: 278). For example, his actions make the antagonist a
“reasonable critic” (vEG04: 1). Critical discussion is considered “an idealized
28Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG84: 8).
29The pragma-dialectical conception of fallacies is “functionalized” as well, i. e. pragmatic insights are
particularly brought to bear. For example, even though the relationship between a premise and a conclusion
in “If A, then A” is valid in the sense of syllogistic logic, as an instance of “circular reasoning” it traditionally
has been suggested as a fallacy. By recasting the example in pragmatic terms the fallaciousness can be
illustrated: If the goal is to convince a language user of the acceptability of an expressed opinion A, then
using A as a premise in support of itself will not further that aim.
30Wenzel distinguishes “argument as process, argument as procedure, and argument as product” and traces back
this distinction to “the rhetorical perspective,” “[t]he dialectical perspective” and “the logical perspective”
(Wen92: 124-125).
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activity type” (vEGSH96: 280) in which the parties act goal-oriented in
accordance with a set of rules.31
By introducing the pragma-dialectical definition of argumentation I aim
at illustrating the relationship between the four meta-theoretical principles.
I put them in brackets to illustrate that the pragma-dialectical definition of
argumentation rests on the “methodological starting points” of the approach:
Argumentation is a verbal [functionalization], social
[socialization], and rational [dialectification] activity
[functionalization] aimed at [functionalization, dialectification]
convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a
standpoint [socialization, dialectification] by putting forward
[functionalization, externalization] a constellation of propositions
justifying or refuting the proposition [dialectification] expressed
in the standpoint [externalization, dialectification] (vEG04: 1).
Apparently, the pragma-dialectical definition is steered towards a very fashion
of approaching argumentation. Other definitions do not take into account the
four meta-theoretical principles as I show next by means of two examples.
For example, according to the free online encyclopedia Wikipedia
“Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisciplinary study of
how conclusions can be reached through logical reasoning; that is, claims
based, soundly or not, on premises” (Wika). That definition brings about
argumentation as a synonym for argumentation theory whereas I aim at
showing methodically why it is desirable to consider pragma-dialectics as a
research program summing up the five components, one of which entails the
matter of an “argumentation theory” against the background of a particular
approach.32 However, pragma-dialecticians do focus on “logical reasoning”
in a sense of soundness (dialectification), though they do not talk about
the concept of “claim” but against the background of functionalization
pragma-dialecticians talk about the protagonist who applies the speech act
“[e]xpressing a standpoint” (vEG04: 68). Furthermore, the definition of
Wikipedia – that is likely to be referred to by laymen – does not point to
an influence of socialization and externalization.
As a second case in point, the argumentation researchers Freeley and
Steinberg define argumentation as “reason giving in communicative situations
31The rules are presented, e. g., by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 123-157).
32Likewise, for instance, an argumentation analysis refers to the analytical component against the background
of a particular approach (cf. chapter 2: the scaffold).
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by people whose purpose is the justification of acts, beliefs, attitudes, and
values” (FS08: 5). The authors point to the meta-theoretical principle of
socialization, they spell out the option of differences between communicative
situations. Freeley and Steinberg also refer to the goal-orientation (“purpose”)
which is pragma-dialectically spelled out by functionalization. However,
taking into account dialectification the pragma-dialectical definition of
argumentation is apparently broader by referring to justifying and refuting.
And though it seems that Freeley and Steinberg’s definition can be reconciled
with the pragma-dialectical departure from externalization, note that
pragma-dialecticians do not limit opinions to be about acts, beliefs, attitudes
or values.33 A standpoint in pragma-dialectics is an (externalized) attitude
on the part of a language user in respect of an expressed opinion where an
expressed opinion can be positive or negative in referring to facts, ideas,
theories, as well as to actions, “and so on” (cf. vEG84: 5).34 The relevance
of externalization to the matter of attitude becomes particularly apparent
in respect of those pragma-dialectical higher-order conditions which are
chained to the cognitive dispositions of the persons who actualize the
interactional roles of protagonist and antagonist.35
Next, the ideal model of critical discussion consists of four stages, each
of which is characterized by certain speech acts (assertives, commissives,
directives, declaratives).36 Every speech act is representative of a certain
function in the procedure of resolving the difference of opinion. In that
sense, the distribution of the speech acts is “pragma”-“dialectical” because
it illustrates the relationships between speech act classes and functions in the
procedure of resolving the difference of opinion (cf. vEGJJ93: 28-30).
First, in the confrontation stage the difference of opinion becomes apparent
by means of the protagonist’s expression of the standpoint (assertive). The
standpoint is thus accepted or not accepted by the antagonist (commissive).
Second, in the opening stage the protagonist accepts (commissive) the
33This limitation may be traced back to Freeley and Steinberg’s departure from the relationship between
“argumentation and debate” (FS08: xii). Pragma-dialecticians do not solely research this relationship which
is somewhat typical for political gatherings where acts and values are of particular relevance.
34In fact, the pragma-dialectical rule 1a. of critical discussion reads that “[s]pecial conditions apply neither to
the propositional content of the assertives by which a standpoint is expressed, nor to the propositional content
of the negation of the commissive by means of which a standpoint is called into question” (vEG04: 136).
35“[T]he rules can only constitute a sufficient condition for resolving a difference of opinion in conjunction
with the fulfillment of the appropriate ‘higher-order conditions’ pertaining to the attitudes and dispositions
of the discussants and the circumstances of discussion” (vEG95: 135).
36Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 68).
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antagonist’s challenge to defend the standpoint (directive). The parties agree
on starting points and decide to enter the next stage (commissives). Third,
in the argumentation stage the parties spell out certain issues and thus
put forth contentions, i. e. they request (directive) and advance (assertive)
argumentation. The argumentation is accepted or not accepted (commissive).
I refer to the third stage as the argument stage.37 In the concluding stage the
standpoint is accepted or not accepted (commissive). The protagonist upholds
or retracts the standpoint (assertive). Hence the parties establish the result of
the procedure (assertive). In order to facilitate clarity to the propositional
content and/ or communicative force of the speech acts in any of the four
stages the parties can request (directive) and apply (declarative) a “usage
declarative,” e. g. a definition.
Against the background of the four meta-theoretical principles the
pragmatic insights into speech acts are thus integrated with the dialectical
insights into the dialogic exchange of speech acts. The pragma-dialectical
theorist “gives shape” to the pragma-dialectical ideal term argumentation
within the configuration – i. e. the elements, relationships and contexts –
characterized by the four stages of the ideal model of critical discussion
(cf. this chapter). As a result from that “sentences cannot of themselves
constitute an argumentation; they only become an argumentation in relation
to a particular opinion” (vEG82: 5).
The purpose of pragma-dialectical research is the optimization of
argumentative reality. One means to optimize argumentative reality is to
optimize argumentative performance.38 As argumentative performance is
based on argumentative competence (“skills”)39 van Eemeren and Houtlosser
spell out the same means-end-relationship when they write that the “practical
improvement of argumentative procedures and skills – [is] the alpha and
37Since the pragma-dialectical definition of “argumentation” refers to the entirety of the stages any of the four
stages could be called an “argumentation stage.” Therefore it is less unfortunate to label the third stage,
in which arguments are accepted the “argument stage.” Consequently, the speech acts in this stage must
not be called “requesting, advancing, acceptance or non-acceptance of argumentation” but “requesting,
advancing, acceptance or non-acceptance of an argument.” In line with the four meta-theoretical principles,
particularly dialectification, the definition of an “argument” in pragma-dialectics is thus characterized in the
context of the four stages in which argumentation is defined: For example, the pragma-dialectical concept
of the “argument schemes” (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 94-102; van Eemeren et al., 2002:
96-104; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 4) points to certain relationships between the matters from
the confrontation, opening, and argument stage (cf. vEG04: 149).
38The argumentative performance is the entirety of those forms of action which are actualized in argumentative
reality.
39Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 32).
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omega of argumentation studies” (vEH03: 392). For a pragma-dialectical
practitioner enhancing the argumentative competence of persons is thus based
on reflection- and prescription-minded research.
In a mediation session clarity to the matters – such as the matters of the
standpoint, the issues or the contentions – is a goal in properly managing the
actual conflict.40 Whether or not the goal of clarity to the matters is arrived
at can be determined against the background of pragma-dialectical matters
solely, for instance with respect to the actualization of acceptance. In an
exemplary analysis of a session of mediation van Eemeren et al. spell out
“Tamroy’s answers as providing closure” (vEGJJ93: 138), and “[i]n practice,
it is usually only one of the parties that puts the conclusion into words, but
if the other party does not accept this conclusion, no resolution has been
achieved” (vEG04: 62). In fact, the mediator can “provide a groundwork for
concluding” (cf. vEGJJ93: 138), i. e. he facilitates clarity to certain matters
which facilitate the end, the closure, of the mediation. This example points to
the fact that a mediator can act against the background of pragma-dialectics,
i. e. in a pragma-dialectical fashion. Since he facilitates acceptance
in the sense of pragma-dialectics this mediator can be characterized as
a pragma-dialectical mediator. Mediation is a context worthwhile to be
researched pragma-dialectically in order to optimize argumentative reality.
1.3 Against backgrounds: Aims of the dissertation
The contents of this dissertation are built upon each other one by one
“against the background” of previous insights that are relevant respectively.
Therefore I opted for the term “modules,” and therefore the phrase “against
the background” is likely to be very prominent. On the one hand the phrase
means that I make use of the backgrounds of either research results from
argumentation research – particularly pragma-dialectics –, or of the findings I
have presented in the respectively preceding text. Managing a matter against
a “background” thus means to manage this matter relative to previously
managed elements, relationships or contexts (cf. chapter 2). On the other
hand, the phrase against the background points to my aim to consequently
develop my findings one by one in order to facilitate the integration of the
modules in the concluding case study. For example, when I introduce a
40For instance, van Eemeren et al. write that in sessions of mediation “disputants clearly express standpoints”
(vEGJJ93: 141).
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module in a box framed in black I spell out in which sense it is relevant to
the phrase against the background (cf. the modules of the five components
(cf. this chapter) and the four meta-theoretical principles (cf. this chapter)).
Against the background of the relevant literature the term
“pragma-dialectics” is employed flexibly. For van Eemeren and Grootendorst
pragma-dialectics is a term to refer to a “system of descriptive and/or
normative rules for the performance of the communicative act complex of
argumentation and the communicative act of acceptance” (vEG88: 506).
For van Eemeren et al. it refers to “an argumentation theory,” and
also to a “research program” (vEGSH96: 274, 275). For van Eemeren
and Grootendorst pragma-dialectics is a part of the “study of verbal
communication also known as ‘discourse analysis’” (vEG04: 52). So, it
is particularly relevant to spell out that I understand pragma-dialectics
as a research program. In order to facilitate clarity to the context of my
research I characterize argumentation research as a part of the study of
verbal communication, or discourse analysis. To mention only a few of
them, researchers from linguistics, from semantics or pragmatics, as well
as conversation analysts will most certainly be familiar with many of the
matters concerned in argumentation research, e. g. with the configuration of
sequential speech acts in the communicative context of sessions of mediation.
I employ the term argumentation research to sum up all the matters that
can become relevant to researchers who depart from a particular paradigm
when they concern themselves with argumentation. Now, the decision to
consider pragma-dialectics as a “research program” means to include the
entire research that is conducted in accordance with the pragma-dialectical
approach, or the pragma-dialectical paradigm. For instance, talking about
pragma-dialectics as – especially an –“argumentation theory” may spark
off obscurity whether or not, e. g., analyses of, or empirical research on
discourse are included as well. Furthermore, the distinction I suggested
between research programs, branches and fields facilitates to distinguish the
pragma-dialectical approach from other paradigms within argumentation
research, e. g. such approach whose advocates do not manage normative
rules for the performance of communicative acts. So, talking about a very
pragma-dialectical research the understanding of pragma-dialectics as a
research program consisting of the five components facilitates to consider
(the scopes of) the respective research project in its relationships to, first,
other pragma-dialectical research projects, and second, other research
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projects in argumentation research which may be conducted against the
background of a different approach – indeed, “each component of the
research program [or, I suggest, branch, or field] can be a legitimate and
useful specialization by itself” (vEG04: 39) –, as well as, third, other research
projects in the study of verbal communication.
The purpose of pragma-dialectical research is to optimize argumentative
reality. Since the late 1990’s the research in accordance with
the pragma-dialectical approach is particularly characterized by an
integration that van Eemeren suggested at the beginning of that decade:
Pragma-dialecticians aim at an integration of the insights from a dialectical
approach with those from a rhetorical approach. With their “emphasis
on stimulating independent thinking about argumentative discourse,” van
Eemeren states, “[d]ialecticians aim for better understanding of the problems
involved” and thus “can be characterized as reflection-minded”; because they
“aim for providing cut-and-dried drills for handling argumentative discourse”
researchers from “the rhetorical approach [...] can be characterized as
prescription-minded” (vE90: 42-43).
Characterizing prescription-minded research two decades later van
Eemeren writes that “an understanding of argumentative reality can be
achieved that constitutes a sound basis for practical intervention by proposing
alternative formats and designs for argumentative practices [...] and
developing methods for improving productive, analytic, and evaluative
argumentative skills” (vE15: 18). So, one of the means to fulfill the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research is to research the matter of design, another
means is to enhance the argumentative skills of persons in argumentative
reality, or their “argumentative competence” (cf. vEG04: 32). Since
the argumentative competence of persons is actualized in discourses by
means of their argumentative performance, optimizing the argumentative
performance is a means to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose. I aim
at furthering argumentation research, particularly by means of furthering
pragma-dialectical research.
Against the background of the integration of reflection- with
prescription-minded research this goal brings about the need to reflect
on matters that result in obscurity, and prescribe options to manage them in
a purposeful fashion. Such matters can refer to the concepts employed to
depict the topography of argumentation research, e. g. “field,” or to matters in
one or more of the five components of research in accordance with a certain
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paradigm. For example, it is typical of sessions of mediation in argumentative
reality that the discourse is rule-governed. Since pragma-dialecticians
concern themselves with rule-governed discourse contexts of sessions of
mediation are worthy of pragma-dialectical research. Still, in theoretically
creating her ideal context of the “mediation framework” Greco Morasso
does not refer to a particular set of rules from argumentative reality. She
does not show an accordance between the rules governing a certain session
of mediation and the pragma-dialectical ideal context of critical discussion.
However, if there is no context in argumentative reality that the ideal –
supposedly “pragma-dialectical” – mediation framework can be applied
to, how can the mediation framework be checked by means of empirical
research? Consequently, the value of the mediation framework for analytical
research is questionable, too. Researchers in the theoretical, the analytical
and the empirical component are faced with the creation and management
of ideal contexts and require options to manage the matters in a purposeful
fashion. However, in order to manage those matters – and others – I show
that, metaphorically speaking, they can be traced back to one and the same
core: the methodical gap.
The methodical gap illustrates the relationship between argumentative
reality and concepts about argumentative reality. Apparently, the meaning of a
term used in a discourse in argumentative reality is different from the meaning
of the – morphologically – same term in a theory in argumentation research.
So, for instance in case studies in an analytical component in accordance with
a certain paradigm the methodical gap is relevant to depicting the relationship
between the words used in a certain discourse and the ideal terms that are
defined in accordance with the respective approach. Now, it is state of the
art that ideal terms from the context of the pragma-dialectical ideal model
of critical discussion cannot be immediately related to words in a discourse
from argumentative reality. Amjarso, for instance, emphasizes that there is
an “actual practice opposed to the ideal context of critical discussion” (cf.
Amj07: 7). The purpose of pragma-dialectical research in the five components
of the research program, e. g. with respect to the ideal model of critical
discussion, is to optimize “actual practice.”
Similar to other contexts obscurity in the academic context of
argumentation research can furnish conflicts. Conflicts in argumentation
research may, for instance, be traced back to certain methodical questions
chained to the management of the methodical gap. For example, because it
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means to relate the context of an actual practice to an ideal context – which
is opposed to it – an analysis of sessions of mediation, as van Eemeren et
al. suggest (vEGJJ93), by means of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of
critical discussion is methodically questionable. The respective obscurity can
result in conflicts. But how can an ideal model in argumentation research
be of use to analyze discourse from argumentative reality? In fact, that the
methodical gap is relevant to the management of conflicts in argumentation
research means that it is certainly relevant to fulfilling the pragma-dialectical
purpose inside argumentation research.
Argumentation researchers recurrently state to be aiming at managing the
methodical gap by bridging it. For example, Kvernbekk devotes her article
Argumentation in Theory and Practice: Gap or Equilibrium? to questions –
and answers – revolving the methodical gap between ideal contexts and actual
contexts (Kve12). However, the fact that certain troublesome matters are
recurrent, and can thus recurrently create conflicts, in argumentation research
calls for a new methodical means to manage the methodical gap. It has
become apparent that one of the matters that recurrently generates obscurity
in the pragma-dialectical research program is the notion of “ideal model.” The
term “ideal model” needs to be reconsidered.
Though already introduced in 1990, the distinction between the five
components has to date not been used methodically with respect to the
management of the methodical gap. I aim at employing the layout of the
five components to develop a methodical means for argumentation researchers
who work in the different approaches – with different goals and means
in their research –, and who aim at bridging the methodical gap. Unlike
argumentation researchers in the past I particularly take into account that
the language configured by ideal terms is different from the language in
actual practice. I aim at showing the consequences of that fundamental
distinction for the characterization of the relationships – both the association
and dissociation – between the five components. For example, what does
it mean for research on, and with, a pragma-dialectical ideal model when
Kvernbekk writes that “theory as an academic pursuit should be regarded
as worthwhile in itself” (Kve12: 299)? And how can that be applied by an
argumentation researcher who aims at optimizing argumentative reality – e. g.
in actual conflicts within the academic context of argumentation research?
Against the background of the integration of reflection- with
prescription-minded research I aim at making transparent, and for some of
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them suggest how to manage, troublesome matters that can be traced back
to the creation and use of the aforementioned ideal language and actual
language, and to the respective management of the methodical gap in the
different components. Based on an overview of those troublesome matters
I aim at elaborating troublesome matters in pragma-dialectical research
particularly. By means of the overview of recurrent troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) I aim at facilitating clarity to the matters in future
philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical and practical research in the
research program.
The layout of the five components was developed with the intent to provide
a means to arrive at clarity to the matters in argumentation research. But
besides the exemplary open questions as to the very layout of the five
components – e. g. the relationships between the components – and the
troublesome matters in the different components – e. g. with respect to the
term “ideal model” –, questions as to how to make use of the layout in order
to, indeed, facilitate clarity to the matters have remained open. Most certainly,
that is another reason why, to date, the module of the five components has
rarely been used by argumentation researchers. However, I aim at filling in
that open space in order to facilitate future research including a proper use of
the five components.
The concept of the five components is a means for orientation as to the
“state of the art” in argumentation research:41 Different researchers manage
different matters by different means and with different aims. For example,
concerning the matter of a reconstruction van Eemeren and Grootendorst
write that the layout of the five components “brings greater clarity to the
matters in which argumentation theorists are interested” (vEG04: 24, my
italics). However, it is remarkable that with respect to a reconstruction the
matters that argumentation theorists are interested in are different from the
matters that, for instance, argumentation analysts are interested in.
Against the background of the five components researchers cannot only
actualize the role model of an “argumentation theorist.”42 Therefore, for sake
of clarity to the matters I suggest that the five components bring about five
role models of argumentation researchers: the philosopher, the theorist, the
41Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 41).
42Note, however, that van Eemeren writes about a “research program I envisage argumentation theorists to
carry out” (vE10: 273). Apparently, he thus considers “argumentation theorists” to work in any of the five
components, not only in the theoretical component. I spelled out in which sense that understanding of
argumentation theorist is troublesome.
27
analyst, the empiricist and the practitioner. Regardless of the approach(es)
concerned – according to the topography of argumentation research, there
may the role model of a philosopher in normative pragmatics, or a practitioner
in the Realm of Argumentation Studies –, I assume that the goal of any
argumentation researcher is clarity to those matters that he manages in the
respective research project. For example, Garssen and van Laar whose article
I present in the case study (cf. chapter 4) state that “In response to the
second objection we argue [...]” (GvL10: 122). Against the background of
the pragma-dialectical meta-theoretical principle of socialization it becomes
apparent that the argumentation researchers in the case study aim at clarity to
the matters as they are writing “in response to an objection.” Also note, that
they furthermore say that in their discourse inside argumentation research they
opt for the means of arguing.
Against the background of the pragma-dialectical research program, an
argumentation researcher’s intent to fulfill a certain purpose calls for the
concepts of “strategy,” and “strategic action” which facilitate to assign to
the various components of different approaches the different endeavors of
argumentation researchers. For example, writing about the speech act of
directives in their “system of descriptive and/or normative rules” for certain
communicative acts van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 64) apply a
research strategy of the role model of the theorist in pragma-dialectics.
They particularly aim at arriving at clarity to the matter of directives in the
theoretical component in order to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose.
Now, in the state of the art, conflicts within argumentation research may
be traced back to the fact that different researchers actualize different role
models. For example, Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar manage the
Münchhausen Münchhausen Trilemma against the backgrounds of different
approaches. The Münchhausen Trilemma illustrates that no actual standpoint
can be ultimately justified. Either first, one is faced with backing up every
argument with another argument which gives rise to an infinite regress, or
second, instead of giving in to the infinite regress one stops the progress of
justifying at a certain point though this very point will not be justified, or third,
backing up arguments results in an instance of circular reasoning. In the first
two cases one can never be committed to a certain number of contentions that
justify that an issue – raised to justify the standpoint – is managed properly. In
the third case the relationship between an issue raised to justify the standpoint
and the contentions used to manage the issue is troublesome.
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Lumer depicts how pragma-dialecticians manage the Münchhausen
Münchhausen Trilemma. For example, he writes that they consequently “give
up the idea of positive justification” at all and opt for a critical-rationalistic
conception of reasonableness. Then he states how researchers from an
epistemic approach can manage the Münchhausen Münchhausen Trilemma.
He writes that the Münchhausen Trilemma “rests on a hidden and false
premise, namely that deduction from true premises is the only form of
acceptable justification” and thus “there is no need to give up justificationism”
(Lum10: 51-52). So, argumentation researchers from different approaches
manage the same matter of the Münchhausen Trilemma in different fashions.
Like other pragma-dialectically inspired concepts the notions in the
topography of argumentation research facilitate to optimize argumentative
reality. That is why I manage the methodical gap against the background of
the five components. Also, I develop and make use of concepts of strategy and
strategic action and apply them to a pragma-dialectical approach in order to
enhance the argumentative competence, to thus optimize the argumentative
performance and hence facilitate proper conflict management inside, and
outside argumentation research.
Inside the academic context of argumentation research making purposeful
use of the explicated relationship between the distinction between ideal and
actual contexts and the five components as well as the concepts of strategy and
strategic action is an option for argumentation researchers to arrive at their aim
of clarity to the matters. Outside the academic context, however, mediators
can benefit from purposeful pragma-dialectical research, particularly on the
concept of strategy. I aim at facilitating an enhancement of the argumentative
competence of mediators, and thus of their argumentative performances. For
the other persons in a mediation session, though, a mediator’s argumentative
performance can particularly prevent any further “expert determination of one
or more particular issues” (WIP09: 11).
So, against the background of the pragma-dialectical purpose I make
use of the concepts strategy and strategic actions to chain the context of
mediation with the academic context of matters from argumentation research
in order to optimize argumentative reality inside, and outside argumentation
research. Though they do not write about a reflexive conflict management
(i. e. the management of a conflict in argumentation research), in their chapter
Mediation as Critical Discussion van Eemeren et al. concern themselves
with sessions of mediation against the background of pragma-dialectical
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research results (vEGJJ93). In her dissertation Greco Morasso deals with
Argumentative and other communicative strategies of the mediation practice.
She also spells out to be using the pragma-dialectical approach. Departing
from an “ontological framework” she develops the aforementioned mediation
framework (cf. GM08: 150) which she chains to certain matters from
pragma-dialectics. Unfortunately, on the one hand van Eemeren et al.
particularly suggest to analyze sessions of mediation by means of the ideal
model of critical discussion, and they present respective analyses of fragments
from argumentative reality. On the other hand, it is also unfortunate
that Greco Morasso suggests to pragma-dialectically analyze sessions of
mediation by means of the mediation framework. In order to facilitate an
optimization of the argumentative competence outside their academic context,
pragma-dialecticians should, at first, aim at clarity to the matters inside their
academic context.
Against the background of the methodical gap and the need to reconsider
the function of ideal models, the pragma-dialectical analyst’s target of a
reconstruction and evaluation of discourse from mediation sessions calls for
the facilitation of a pragma-dialectical ideal context that can be employed to
analyze discourse. As a philosopher I aim at spelling out the “ontological
framework” of such an ideal context. I respectively show the consequences
of managing such an ideal context in theoretical, analytical, empirical and
practical research. Making use of this ideal context turns out to be a fortunate
decision because it is different, for instance, from the mediation framework:
It is developed by means of an integration of the context of mediation with
the pragma-dialectical research program and it thus facilitates argumentation
research that is properly in accordance with the pragma-dialectical approach.
In his article Neither Naïve nor Critical Reconstruction: Dispute
Mediators, Impasse and the Design of Argumentation Aakhus, as well,
spells out to be opting for a pragma-dialectical approach. He writes about
the relationship between mediators and their paradoxical (“neither nor”)
role and about argumentative strategies. With respect to the paradoxical
role of mediators, he states, “[a]rgumentative strategy raises important
questions about reconstructing argumentative discourse” (Aak03: 269).
Likewise, Jacobs writes about mediators that their “questioning implicates
a horizon of possibilities and a background of understandings” (Jac02: 1413).
He thus also suggests the need for research revolving the matter of
strategy, or certain exploitations of opportunities (“horizon of possibilities”).
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However, he specifically points to research on the mediator’s actions in a
pragma-dialectical fashion: The “background of understandings” in a session
of mediation can be chained to the pragma-dialectical opening stage.
Thus far, argumentation researchers have not employed the layout of the
five components of pragma-dialectics to characterize (the paradoxical role of)
the mediator. Thus, in argumentation research there is no characterization
of the paradoxical role of mediators in a pragma-dialectical fashion. One
of the characterizations suggested by Greco Morasso, however, is that the
mediator is a “heuristic advisor” (GM08: 264), another one is the mediator as
an “architect of an argumentative discussion” (cf. GM08: 14). Now, in order
to avoid that the development of the characterization of the mediator “hangs
in the air”43 inside argumentation research I aim at elaborating whether the
mediator can be shown to apply such strategic actions that are similar to the
strategic actions of pragma-dialectical role models. Hence rather than a loose
– if any – connection to a paradigm in argumentation research I aim at a
pragma-dialectical characterization of the mediator.
Hence I aim, for instance, at showing what it means both reflection-minded
in, and prescription-minded for a pragma-dialectical fashion when mediators
actualize a “clarification check” (Jac02: 1421). By arriving at clarity to first,
the character of the mediator and second, how he consequently manages his
paradoxical role in order to arrive at his very strategic goal I facilitate to
enhance the argumentative competence of mediators. The dissertation is thus
a means to optimize their argumentative performance, and thus another means
to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose. Put differently, I aim at depicting
the relevance of pragma-dialectical research results to the optimization of
argumentative reality outside argumentation research.
So, apparently, the topics of obscurity (and clarity) and strategic actions
inside argumentation research are interwoven with the topics of mediation
and the paradoxical role of the mediator. Their relationship is relevant to the
research in any of the five components, particularly, of pragma-dialectics:
To date, however, obscurity relates to the philosophical component (e. g.
the scopes of ideal terms), the theoretical component (e. g. “mediation
framework”) and thus the empirical component, to the analytical component
(e. g. van Eemeren et al., 1993) and the practical component (e. g. paradoxical
role).
Obscurity to matters furnishes conflicts inside argumentation research.
43Cf. Jacobs (Jac02: 1412).
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However, oftentimes the obscurity can be traced back to the application of
certain strategic actions by argumentation researchers which, in turn, can
be traced back to a certain management of the methodical gap. Still, if
researchers continue to not properly manage the methodical gap then the
troublesome matters are likely to reoccur and they will thus result in further
conflicts within argumentation research.
Conflicts in argumentative reality can be managed by means of mediation
sessions. Against the background of the insights gained on first, the relevance
of clarity and obscurity to both argumentation research and to fulfilling the
pragma-dialectical purpose in particular – e. g. with respect to bridging
the methodical gap between ideal and actual contexts –, and on second,
mediation and the paradoxical role of the mediator in particular, and third,
on the term strategy and its relationship to the matters mentioned here as
first and second, I aim at presenting a case study on the conflict between four
argumentation researchers. Two of those argumentation researcher represent a
pragma-dialectical approach, the other two represent an epistemic paradigm.
So, by means of my case study I aim at integrating the previous research
findings.
My case study is thus reflexive. Both Siegel and Biro on the one hand, as
well as Garssen and van Laar on the other hand are argumentation researchers.
Their discourse, though, is suitable to facilitate clarity to the matters inside
argumentation research, and thus optimize argumentative reality inside this
academic context. In fact, I aim at showing that and how the authors manage
matters that are chained, particularly, to the opposition between ideal and
actual contexts. Against the background of the strategic actions taken into
account to pinpoint the paradoxical role in the case study I aim at showing
how to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose as a mediator. I particularly
aim at illustrating that, and in which sense pragma-dialectical concepts
facilitate the fashion in which I, for instance, prevent the actualization of
certain troublesome matters. However, I also aim at presenting my – or, for
that matter, a mediator’s – intuitive “efforts to realize the ideal in practice”
(vEGJJ93: 174) as an integration of pragma-dialectical role models. So, in
order to arrive at the strategic target I apply the respective strategic actions
to facilitate that the authors in conflict arrive at, metaphorically speaking, the
core of their conflict.
If I succeed then the case study about the troublesome matters, and
troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) will exemplify that conflicts in the
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argumentative reality of the academic context of argumentation research can
be managed by making use of the topography of argumentation research.
Against the background of a management of their conflict in accordance
with a pragma-dialectical approach the case study will also be an example
of showing how a mediator actualizes his argumentative competence by
means of an argumentative performance that is in line with pragma-dialectical
strategic actions. The strategic actions spelled out in the case study will thus
facilitate an optimization of argumentative reality – with respect to (conflicts
in) the future inside, and outside argumentation research. The research
questions to be answered are:
1. How can modules be applied to optimize the management of the
methodical gap in argumentation research, particularly in order to arrive
at the pragma-dialectical purpose to optimize argumentative reality?
2. How do the ideal model of critical discussion and the module of
the definitions of strategy and strategic action facilitate to fulfill the
pragma-dialectical purpose?
3. How can a mediator’s paradoxical role be characterized by means of
the pragma-dialectical research program (i. e. the modules of the five
components and the four meta-theoretical principles)?
4. How can the module of the five components in pragma-dialectics be
applied purposefully and reflexively to unwrap, and solve, paradigmatic
conflicts in argumentation research, particularly the conflict between
Siegel and Biro (2008, 2010) and Garssen and van Laar (2010)?
1.4 Layout of the dissertation
In this section I spell out how I aim at enhancing the argumentative
competence, e. g. of pragma-dialecticians, in order to enhance the
argumentative performance, e. g. of mediators, and to optimize argumentative
reality, e. g. inside argumentation research. In general, in order to
further argumentation research, and to particularly further pragma-dialectical
research against the background of integrating dialectical with rhetorical
insights, in this dissertation I particularly argue (cf. Garssen and van Laar)
about matters that are likely to be recurrently relevant to reflection- and
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prescription-minded research with the purpose to optimize argumentative
reality. Throughout the entire dissertation I rely on the following terms as
the basis of my research on the different modules, “X” can be instantiated by
any term.44
– “To manage X” means to configure what is relevant to X.45
– “To facilitate X” means to arrive at a groundwork for X.46
– “To arrive at X” means to effect that the sequence resulting in X is at its
end.47
– “To aim at X” means to live up to the intention to arrive at X.48
In order to face the matters that result in obscurity – particularly with respect
to the modules I scrutinize –, and in order to suggest options to manage them
in a purposeful fashion in chapter 2 I depict the relevance of the methodical
gap to argumentation research. I then develop the methodical means of
the scaffold when I connect a distinction, i. e. the module, between four
languages – which are relevant to any argumentation researcher, particularly
in respect of the management of the opposition of ideal and actual contexts
– with the module of the five components. Irrespective of their approach,
the scaffold illustrates a new option for argumentation researchers to bridge
the methodical gap. I thereby facilitate to conclude two modules: my
overview of the troublesome matters, and my overview of the troublesome
matters in pragma-dialectics. The development of the scaffold, the overviews
of matters that are relevant to facilitate – or for that matter prevent –
conflicts in argumentation research as well as their relevance to fulfilling the
pragma-dialectical purpose I facilitate to answer the first research question.
Against the background of research findings, mostly from
pragma-dialectics, I develop the module of my definitions of strategy
and strategic action. I apply those concepts to depict the tasks of different
role models in argumentation research. I use the scaffold as the background
against which I reconsider the concept of “ideal model”; I consequently
reconsider how an ideal model is of use in respect of, for example, theoretical,
analytical and empirical endeavors in argumentation research. By introducing
the concept of strategy and researching its relationship to the module of
44Cf. chapter 2: figure 2.2.
45Cf. van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 126, 138).
46Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 66).
47Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 114).
48Cf. van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 48) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 183).
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the five components – of pragma-dialectical purposeful research against the
background of the methodical gap, hence the reconsideration of the concept
of an ideal model – I facilitate an answer to the second research question.
In chapter 3 I chain the findings on the theoretical management of the
methodical gap with the module of strategy, as well as with the context of
mediation. In order to make use of the ideal model of critical discussion, and
unlike the mediation framework by Greco Morasso I facilitate to build an ideal
context which can be employed to analyze fragments from argumentative
reality: I pragma-dialectically integrate elements of the ideal contexts of
mediation, characterized by the WIPO (WIP09), with critical discussion,
characterized by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04). The “integration”
amounts to spelling out the relationships between the terms from mediation
and the terms characterizing critical discussion. However, I also present an
“integration” of the articles of mediation with the rules of critical discussion.
The result of my integration is the module of an ontological framework, which
facilitates to build an ideal context of critical discussion (m) – the “m” points
to the context of mediation. The integration of the articles with the rules
turns out to be particularly relevant to the next module: I integrate the terms
“issues” and “contentions” – both of which, to date, characterize mediation
but not critical discussion – with the pragma-dialectical notions of requesting
and advancing an argument. I thus use the articles and rules also to illustrate
that the concepts of strategy and strategic action were applicable to critical
discussion (m), e. g. with respect to the pragma-dialectical strategic action of
applying the speech act usage declarative.
I make use of the module of the ontological framework for critical
discussion (m), and the concept of role models as the backgrounds against
which I characterize the mediator in a pragma-dialectical fashion. I
particularly pinpoint the paradoxical role of the mediator by characterizing
it by means of such strategic actions that are pragma-dialectical. As results,
for example, I first depict his strategic goal, and second, argumentative
strategy turns out to “raise important questions about reconstructing and
evaluating argumentative discourse” (cf. Aak03: 269). So I conclude the next
module, the integration of role models: In accordance with the respective
rules in line with the ontological framework for critical discussion (m) the
mediator – as an integration of the pragma-dialectical critical analyst with
the pragma-dialectical practitioner (in the sense of a designer of acceptance)
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– facilitates the acceptance of matters from the opening stage. He acts as a
pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance.
Against the background of the pragma-dialectical purpose my reflection-
and prescription-minded pragma-dialectical research on the module of the
ontological framework for critical discussion (m) and on the character of the
mediator facilitates an enhancement of mediators’ argumentative competence,
and thus an optimization of their argumentative performances. Therefore,
chapter 3 not only facilitates an answer to the third research question. In fact,
it is an example of how to facilitate an optimization of argumentative reality
both inside, and outside argumentation research.
However, in order to facilitate the integration of the findings in my
pragma-dialectical analysis, i. e. in the case study in chapter 4, I particularly
take into account the scaffold and the various modules from the chapters 2
and 3. For instance, I particularly relate the fragments from argumentative
reality to the ontological framework for critical discussion (m) which I employ
as the theoretical context in the analysis. Or, preventing a troublesome
matter in pragma-dialectics I spell out the translation criteria that I employ
in reconstructing the articles by Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar.
Moreover, in order to show that and how the authors manage in their discourse
such matters that are chained, particularly, to the methodical gap as a mediator
I make use of the overviews of the troublesome matters and of the troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics). Managing the paradoxical role I apply the
strategic actions of the integration of the pragma-dialectical role models and
thus arrive at the strategic goal by, for instance, preventing that troublesome
matters are actualized in the discourse.
I rather facilitate clarity to the matters that are managed by the authors:
I employ the module of the (new pragma-dialectical) concepts of issues
and contentions in line with proven pragma-dialectical concepts such as
standpoint, the acceptance of an argument, and the speech acts of usage
declaratives to facilitate that the authors arrive at the matters that are at the
core of their conflict. For example, the Münchhausen Trilemma turns out
to be one of the matters relevant to the actual conflict management between
Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar. So, by applying in the case study
the topography of argumentation research as well as the concepts of strategy
and strategic action I fulfill as a mediator the pragma-dialectical purpose as
an integration of role models.
All in all, in order to facilitate an answer to the fourth research question
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(in the case study about a conflict inside argumentation research) I make
use of the various backgrounds, and modules, I establish in the preceding
text. My conflict management as a mediator is thus in accordance with
the pragma-dialectical paradigm solely: At first, I show how to arrive at
an integration of various matters from argumentation research, such as the
respective modules which contribute to a pragma-dialectical fashion, and
then I aim at exemplifying by means of the case study how a mediator can
actualize certain strategic actions in a pragma-dialectical fashion. Thus, by
illustrating how a mediator actualizes the character of the pragma-dialectical
critical designer of acceptance the reflexive case study facilitates to enhance
the argumentative competence of mediators in general – inside, or outside the
context of argumentation research.
2 Method
In this chapter I elaborate the methodical gap in argumentation research
by tracing it back to the application of different contexts of language
(ideal language vs. actual language). I show why any attempt to
use the pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion to manage
the methodical gap fails. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988, 2004)
underestimate the methodical gap when they bluntly purport that the rules of
critical discussion are the rules governing argumentative discourse “anyway.”
I show the obscurity that results with respect to analyses of actual language.
Based on a novel understanding of its function I employ the module of the
five components to develop a methodical means to manage the methodical
gap in argumentation research: The five components facilitate to structurally
determine paradigms in argumentation research without constraining their
flexible management of different content matters; I thus introduce a third, and
a fourth context of language (describing language, natural language) – hence
the module of the four languages – to scaffold the elements, relationships and
contexts chained to the management of the methodical gap in the – hence
complexly related – five components of the paradigms. The scaffold, the
methodical means developed, facilitates to associate and dissociate – and
potentially integrate – different paradigms.
Making use of the scaffold – and illustrating its universal applicability
in argumentation research – I present the module of the troublesome
matters which I trace back to the (creation and use) of the four languages
in argumentation research. Eight matters are thus troublesome because,
independent from a certain paradigm, they are likely to spark off obscurity; I
offer options to manage some of them. Next, I relate the modules of the four
languages and the five components to research the creation and use of the
languages in the five components of pragma-dialectics: I spell out the module
of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). I trace back the fourteen




Making use of the scaffold I refer to the use of the different contexts
of language in the different pragma-dialectical components to show why
the term “ideal model” is troublesome. I particularly use the module of
the (relationships between the) five components to recast the explanatory
functions of “strong and weak theories” (Kvernbekk, 2012), and show how
the term ideal model should be understood – in line with the concept of
reasonableness in, and the purpose of pragma-dialectics – in order to manage
the aforementioned obscurity in analyses (without sacrificing its functionality,
as a “template,” in the theoretical component).
I introduce against the background of the elicitation of the concept of
reasonableness in critical discussion – e. g. with respect to the speech acts
of requesting an argument, and advancing an argument – the module of my
definitions of strategy and strategic action. I employ the scaffold when I
pinpoint the use of natural language to spell out the applicability of the module
to pragma-dialectical purposeful research.
Integrating the aforementioned I make use of the modules of the five
components and strategy when I conclude the module of the quartet of terms:
“ideal model,” “stencil,” “blueprint” and “grid.” I show why building stencils
– which function as theoretical blueprints, and analytical and empirical grids
– is possible in pragma-dialectics (cf. template), and that it is in line with
both the use of languages shown in the scaffold, and with the purpose of the
research program, e. g. in analytical endeavors which I particularly emphasize
to be analytical-intuitive in nature.
I foster the understanding of the practical component of pragma-dialectics
by referring to the aim and the (intuitive) use of languages and I show
why the pragma-dialectical designer is a practitioner. I conclude the
chapter by exemplarily applying the module of my definition of strategy to
pragma-dialectical research projects in order to facilitate that argumentation
researchers associate and dissociate their research projects.
2.1 Four languages of argumentation researchers
In line with the module of the five components there are five role models
(cf. chapter 1) who manage the matters in argumentation research. However,
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facilitating to arrive at clarity to a “matter,” what do I mean by “matter?”49
By answering that question I particularly facilitate to introduce the module of
the four languages, and hence the methodical means, I use: An argumentation
researcher manages a single element (ε), a relationship (r) or a context (c).
These are three kinds of “matters” I distinguish.
A c is a configuration of particular εs and rs.50 An example of a c is a
language. In accordance with Carnap I take a language to consist of single εs
and rs, such as words, or rules to manage those words (Car86: 66).
2.1.1 Two, three and four languages
Since the late 1950s argumentation researchers have repeatedly been faced
with the matter of the relationship between argumentative reality and theories
about argumentative reality. Toulmin purported that “logic becomes a
theoretical study on its own, as free from all immediate practical concerns
as is some branch of pure mathematics” (Tou58: 2). Though one may wonder
what she, and likewise her colleagues in argumentation research, means by
“formal logic” Govier spells out that “[f]ormal logic makes no provision for
taking context into account; nor does it make any provision for relativity to
persons [...]” (Gov99a: 83). Kvernbekk states that managing the relationship
between theories about reality and the respective reality is a usual matter
for any scientific endeavor: “All professions have what is generally termed
a theory-practice problem” (Kve12: 288).
When Siegel and Biro spell out matters they perceive as troublesome in
pragma-dialectics by referring to the “Münchhausen Trilemma” they talk
about the status of the rules of a pragma-dialectical stencil (cf. chapter 4).51
A stencil, indeed, may be applied to analyze a discourse from argumentative
reality. That means, there is a potential connection between an ideal
context (ci) represented by a stencil and an actual context (ca) represented
by the discourse at hand. However, in their response to Siegel and Biro’s
49Note that van Eemeren and Grootendorst employ the term “matters” in different senses: matters as points of
views, matters as troublesome things that may generate obscurity in a discourse, or matters as utterances
that may prevent the resolution of a disagreement (cf. vEG04: 14, 40, 108, 11).
50I take “context” to be a term of natural language (cf. this chapter: four languages). A pragma-dialectical take
on “context” that van Eemeren presents is in line with this meaning, e. g.: “Context is sometimes wrongly
taken to be something permanent and fixed, but in practice the context changes continually [...]” (vE10: 18).
The change of a context can be traced back to the change of the respective εs and rs.
51Without showing a “non-ideal model” authors in pragma-dialectics write about the “ideal model.” They
employ the term “theoretical model” synonymously (vEG04: 19). I aim at making sense of the term ideal
model. I demarcate it from the term stencil (cf. this chapter: quartet of terms).
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2008 criticism pragma-dialecticians Garssen and van Laar talk about critical
discussion, the ideal model in the pragma-dialectical research program. As
an ideal model critical discussion is a ci with no immediate connection to
any phenomenon from argumentative reality: “It is not, of course, a model
of any actual phenomenon [...]” (vEGJJ93: 38, 30). A “phenomenon” is an
element (ε), a relationship (r) or a context (c). An ideal model, of course, is
never immediately related to a phenomenon from argumentative reality. An
ideal model is an ideal context (ci), made of ideal elements (εis) and ideal
relationships (ris); argumentative reality is an actual context (ca), made of
“actual phenomena” (εas and ras). Due to the methodical gap between them,
the relationship between languages as ideal contexts, ci, and languages as
actual contexts, ca, is troublesome. So, next I facilitate to scaffold the matters
that are relevant to the methodical gap.
The language used in a discourse in argumentative reality (a ca) is different
from the language used by a researcher who talks about the discourse
(a ci), for instance, in a pragma-dialectical fashion, i. e. instantiating
pragma-dialectical role models. Next, I spell out two reasons why,
metaphorically speaking, the meaning of a term is imprisoned in the context
of its language, thus why a methodical means is required to bridge the gap
between languages as ci and languages as ca in order to fulfill the purpose to
optimize argumentative reality.
First, terms are created in the context of a language in a certain manner.
In argumentative reality more often than not the meaning(s) of terms is (are)
not explicated by the interlocutors. However, argumentation researchers van
Eemeren and Grootendorst write about defining a term in an ideal language:
“The definition that is given is stipulative in the sense that it introduces a
specific, and to some extent new, convention of language use contrived to
enable students of argumentation to deal with this concept in an adequate
way” (vEG04: 1). In an ideal language new elements, relationships and
contexts (εis, ris and cis) are stipulated. Also, the requirements for including
new terms (which can be considered to be new εs) in the ci of an ideal
language are different from those in including new terms in the ca of an actual
language: In ideal language a new term acquires its meaning via “a logical
route” (in the sense of a considerate explication) into the configuration of
the ideal language; in the configuration of a language as a ca the way that a
new term is positioned, e. g. in colloquial language among the youth, is less
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explicitly articulated (cf. Kve12: 292) in regards to the rules that govern the
positioning.
Second, the use of terms is different in languages as ci from the use of terms
in languages as ca. That can be traced back to the conditions that facilitate the
use of language in the different contexts. The use of terms from a language
as a ci is limited in the sense that the terms can only be used when certain
conditions are fulfilled. Then, users of a language as a ci cannot not apply
certain rules that are set in the respective (conditions which characterize the)
ci. Unlike critical discussion, in a language as a ca the use of the respective
terms is not limited to the fulfillment of certain conditions: The users of a
language as a ca can not apply certain rules.
In order to facilitate to optimize argumentative reality by means of this
dissertation I refer to any εi, ri and ci by means of an ideal language. Critical
discussion is a configuration of terms from ideal language. I consider any εa,
ra and ca to be referred to by means of actual language. This distinction
between the two languages illustrates the gap between ca and ci. Figure
2.1 is a scaffold of elements, relationships and contexts (εs, rs and cs), the
methodical gap and the two languages.





Figure 2.1: The methodical gap between ci and ca.
The use, and some of the creation (cf. this chapter), of the ideal language rests
on the explication of the respective εi, ri and ci. Argumentation researchers
can use terms from ideal language to create an r between two concepts and, for
instance, build a stencil, i. e. a ci. Building a stencil then means that they “[...]
give shape to their ideals of reasonableness by presenting a particular model
[...]” (vE90: 39). Note here that, when van Eemeren writes “presenting”
he talks about applying the terms from an ideal language. Apparently, the
stencil is thus built upon a framework of terms from ideal language. This,
already, is limiting the framework of the blueprint: Only certain elements and
relationships (εis and ris) are configured as a context (ci).
However, any attempt to use an ideal model to manage the methodical
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gap fails. Argumentation researchers like van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1988: 508; 2004: 189) underestimate the methodical gap when they bluntly
purport that the rules of their ideal model of critical discussion are the
rules governing argumentative discourse “anyway.” As shown, the ideal
model in pragma-dialectics, of course, is not – and cannot be – immediately
related to any setting that is a ca. So, it is troublesome that Garssen and
van Laar, similarly, suggest that the rules of the ideal model of critical
discussion are “applicable to argumentation in all settings” (GvL10: 127).
A stencil in argumentation research can be used to represent a certain part of
argumentative reality, in a certain fashion. By nature the scopes and functions
of an ideal model, as well as of its derivates (stencils),52 are restricted. In
the building of a stencil its scopes and functions should be depicted. For
sake of clarity those matter(s) that are relevant to the scopes and functions
of a particular stencil are to be defined. The better the scopes and functions
of a stencil (e. g. which goal[s] it facilitates to arrive at) are presented by
a theorist, the better those scopes and functions can be brought to bear by,
e. g., an analyst or empiricist (cf. this chapter). In this way actualizations of
those role models can arrive at clarity to their expectations about applying the
stencil for a particular target of their research. Hence they can facilitate to
optimize argumentative reality.
Amjarso emphasizes the distinction between ideal contexts and actual
contexts: “what is in actual practice (as opposed to the ideal context of critical
discussion)” (Amj07: 7). Against the background of the meta-theoretical
principle of externalization there is a methodically relevant opposition
between ideal elements, relationships and contexts and actual elements,
relationships and contexts. This methodical gap can be pinpointed: A ci
consists of εis and ris; a ca consists of εas und ras. Kvernbekk points out that
“[i]t is common, in argumentation and in various professions, to diagnose a
‘gap’ between theory and practice, often followed by arguments that gaps are
problematic and should be overcome” (Kve12: 288). I suggest that “everyday
life [...] arguments [i. e. from a ca] can be translated into formal terms [from
a ci]” (Gov99a: 83). What is needed, though, is a language by which matters
from actual language and matters from ideal language, and vice versa, can be
connected – a language by which the methodical gap can be bridged.
Toulmin asks “what bearing the science and its discoveries have on
anything outside itself – how they apply in practice [cas]” (Tou58: 2). The
52Cf. this chapter: quartet of terms.
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purpose of work in the five components of the pragma-dialectical research
program is to optimize argumentative reality (cas). However, similarly to
Toulmin I aim at assessing what bearing pragma-dialectics and its discoveries
have on those troublesome matters that are to be localized inside the research
program. As it is functioning as a ca I aim at optimizing argumentative reality
within the research program. I thus examine in this section of the dissertation
whether, and how, the argumentative reality of argumentation research does
provide argumentation researchers with concepts to manage the methodical
gap.
Thus far the layout of the five components has not been made use
of in order to bridge the methodical gap between ci and ca, between
ideal language and actual language, between the pragma-dialectical ideal
model of critical discussion and argumentative reality. So, at first, I
recast what pragma-dialecticians say about the relationships between the five
components. I interpret the findings with respect to the methodical gap
between ideal and actual language. Then I show in which way the five
role models in pragma-dialectics (cf. chapter 1) illustrate how argumentation
researchers can manage the methodical gap by means of a third language –
describing language – which is used to create an r between terms from ideal
language and actual language.
On the one hand, van Eemeren and Grootendorst state that the components
of a research program are distinct: “[...] all the components are relatively
autonomous and have their own standards and intellectual backgrounds”
(vEG04: 39). So, just like the contexts of ideal language and actual language
are assorted, every component of the Realm of Argumentation Studies is a
separate context, having its “own standards.”
On the other hand, the components of a research program are chained:
“There is a mutual dependence among the five components of the research
program” (vEG04: 39). Yet note the following three examples which illustrate
that there seem to be different readings of how the components are chained.
First, van Eemeren and Grootendorst divide the components into three:
They distinguish the pair of the philosophical and the theoretical component
from the pair of the empirical and the practical component of the Realm of
Argumentation Studies. They say the analytical component has a “bridging
function” between those pairs in the Realm of Argumentation Studies
(vEG04: 40). The term “bridging function” shows that pragma-dialecticians
do have an understanding of the fact that there is a gap (to be bridged). In
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configuring my methodical means at a later point I relate this understanding
to the methodical gap between ideal language and actual language.
Second, somewhat consecutively the philosophical, theoretical, analytical,
empirical and practical components of the Realm of Argumentation Studies
rest upon each other. Pragma-dialecticians van Eemeren and Grootendorst
conclude their paragraphs about the distinct five components of the Realm
of Argumentation Studies by introducing the need to present the “next”
component respectively: “What exactly argumentation theory stands to gain
from this philosophical wisdom depends on how it is put to good use in the
theoretical estate” (vEG04: 18); “[...] a methodical interpretation [...] has
to be carried out before it is clear what practical significance the insights
provided by the use of a model may have. This methodical interpretation takes
place in the analytical estate” (vEG04: 22); “[...] whether these interpretations
lend support to the reconstruction. This requires meticulous qualitative
and quantitative empirical research [...] This brings us to the empirical
estate” (vEG04: 26); “[...] the relevance of empirical research is easiest to
demonstrate if this research is directly concerned with practical problems.
This brings us to the practical estate” (vEG04: 31). Here, role models in
argumentation research somewhat rely on another. All the same, none of the
components has a bridging function in the Realm of Argumentation Studies.
Third, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 33) consider a cluster of
four components of the Realm of Argumentation Studies instrumental to
optimize argumentative reality in the fifth component: “[...] when developing
methods or proposals for achieving practical improvements, optimal use will
have to made of the insights [...] that have been acquired in research carried
out in the philosophical, theoretical, analytical, and empirical estates. These
insights must be translated into recommendations that satisfy the divergent
criteria that apply to argumentative discourse in the various fields.” If there
was no research in the cluster of the “first four components” there is nothing to
be “translated” into “practical improvements.” In this understanding research
in the philosophical, theoretical, analytical, and empirical component is
instrumental to optimize argumentative reality, i. e. actual language, in the
practical component of the Realm of Argumentation Studies. The layout
of the five components hence represents the purpose of pragma-dialectical
research.
The aim of considering the five pragma-dialectical components as an option
to manage the methodical gap in argumentation research is to facilitate
45
clarity to how to manage matters in such a manner that argumentation
researchers arrive at a groundwork for clarity to their (both descriptive and
normative) endeavors. Pragma-dialecticians manage the methodical gap in
a pragma-dialectical fashion, i. e. they manage matters from cas and cis by
means of pragma-dialectical research in the five components.
Next, I further facilitate the introduction of the module of the four
languages, and of the methodical means I use. I extend the distinction between
ideal language and actual language. In fact, against the background of this
extension I present my own take on how the components of the Realm of
Argumentation Studies are chained. I introduce the concept of a describing
language that fulfills a bridging function. As suggested, each language is,
first, created and second, used.
A philosopher of the Realm of Argumentation Studies creates an ideal
language.53 The ideal language is used either by a philosopher of the Realm
of Argumentation Studies to create – or “stipulate” (vEG04: 1) – more terms
in the ideal language, or by a theorist of the Realm of Argumentation Studies
to create an ideal model, or a stencil.
A theorist of the Realm of Argumentation Studies creates a describing
language. A describing language is used to link ideal elements, relationships
and contexts (εis, ris and cis) with actual elements, relationships and contexts
(εas, ras and cas)54 – which gives rise to bridging elements, relationships and
contexts, i. e. εias, rias and cias and – vice versa – εais, rais and cais. A
describing language thus consists of relational terms such as “reconstruct,”
“evaluate,” “actualize,” or “optimize” in the sense of εia, ria, cia, and “check”
in the sense of εai, rai, cai.55 Now, just as Carnap states that it is “not
possible to give explicit definitions for theoretical terms on the basis of LO”
(Car56: 42) the need for a describing language can be illustrated by taking into
consideration the pragma-dialectical term “analyze”: An “analysis” consists
of a reconstruction and an evaluation (vEG04: 95-118). The term “analyze”
thus includes the terms “reconstruct” and “evaluate” – two terms from the
describing language – and thus cannot be traced back to a term from ideal
53The “kinds of entities referred to” as ideal elements, relationships and contexts (εis, ris and cis) are
“properties, relations, or quantitative magnitudes ascribed to certain space-time regions” (Car56: 46).
54I consider εas, ras and cas to be what Kant calls “Objekte [...], wie sie uns (unseren Sinnen) erscheinen
können, nicht, wie sie an sich sein mögen” (Kan01: 40). Employing a pragma-dialectical ideal language
means to refer to εas, ras and cas as actualizations of pragma-dialectical εis, ris and cis.
55For instance, to “actualize” a pragma-dialectical element, relationship and context (εi, ri or ci) means
managing to arrive at an actualization of this ideal element, relationship and context.
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language or actual language. Describing language is a third distinct context
of terms.
– The three languages consist of the ideal language, the actual language
and the describing language.
A theorist of the Realm of Argumentation Studies uses the ideal language and
the describing language, as well as the relationship between ideal language
and describing language to build and characterize a stencil (blueprint). Recast,
that an ideal model – also built by a theorist – cannot fulfill an explanatory
function. A stencil is a derivative of the ideal model. It is configured as a
“blueprint” in the theoretical component, and used as a “grid” by an analyst
or empiricist. However, managing the relationship between ideal language
and describing language is a matter of only the theoretical component.
So, the relationship between an εi, ri or ci and an εa, ra and ca (and
vice versa) is “indirect” (Car56: 53), because a describing language is
needed to arrive at a link. In that regard, metaphorically speaking, the
relationship between an ideal language and actual language cannot be a
closer relationship than a relationship of correspondence. An analyst of the
Realm of Argumentation Studies uses the ideal language (configured in the
grid), and the describing language to test a particular discourse, i. e. actual
language. An empiricist of the Realm of Argumentation Studies uses a
particular discourse, i. e. actual language, the describing language, and the
ideal language (configured in the grid) to check the blueprint. Thus both role
models do research that is connected to the correspondence.56
In the analytical component of the Realm of Argumentation Studies the
correspondence between an ideal language and actual language is managed
plausibly only when the conditions from the grid are determined to come
out in the discourse: “First of all, however, it must be established to
what extent, in a certain speech event, the discourse can be regarded as
argumentative” (vE90: 41). (Recast that the conditions of an ideal model
cannot be actualized.) However, an analyst has no qualms whether the
conditions spelled out in the grid are plausible. Metaphorically speaking,
the analyst has been given the conditions by the theorist in whom the analyst
has “blind faith”: An analyst “relativizes onto” the fragment (from ca) those
56Carnap introduces “Correspondence Rules” to chain εis, ris and cis with εas, ras and cas, and vice versa.
He states that “without them the terms of VT [i. e. ideal language] would not have any observational
significance” (Car56: 46-47).
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conditions (from ci).57 Yet before the analyst uses the grid to test fragments
from actual language in an analysis in the Realm of Argumentation Studies
he must relativize onto the fragment the conception of reasonableness that
is characterized in the grid. The goal striven for in this relativizing of
the characterization of reasonableness is to fulfill the purpose to optimize
argumentative reality by means of bridging the methodical gap, though the
actual relativizing may be controversial.
The goal in empirical research is to check the chain between actual
language and ideal language. This chain is plausible only when conditions
from the grid are determined to come out in argumentative reality. However,
an empiricist does have qualms whether the conditions provided by the
theorist in creating the blueprint are plausible with respect to a particular
discourse. Advisably from those qualms an actualization of the empiricist
suggests empirical research to check the grid.58 For instance, the translation
criteria of the grid – used by an analyst to bridge the methodical gap – are
checked: “This kind of research [empirical research] can also make it clear
when precisely a listener or reader takes an utterance to be a standpoint, an
argument, or some other relevant speech act” (vEG04: 28).59
In sum, both the analyst and the empiricist of the Realm of Argumentation
Studies use the ideal language and the actual language, as well as the
describing language. An analyst has no qualms towards the grid (ci) yet
towards the fragment from argumentative reality (ca) whereas an empiricist
does have qualms towards the grid (ci) and no qualms towards the fragment
from argumentative reality (ca). The analyst uses the ideal language and
the describing language to test the actual language whereas the empiricist
uses the actual language and the describing language to check the ideal
language. Both analyst and empiricist seek to chain an ideal language with
an actual language, though they start from different positions: “Analytic
research assesses the individual case in light of argumentation theory rather
than assessing normative or descriptive models in light of empirical cases [...]”
(vEGJJ93: 24).60 Hence the authors here illustrate the different departures in
the role models’ bridging of the methodical gap.
57Cf. relationship between ideal language and actual language by means of a term from describing language.
58Testing the grid may result in amending the ideal model (cf. this chapter: empirical component
(pragma-dialectics)).
59Pragma-dialecticians suggest several translation criteria and strategies for analysts (cf. this chapter: analytical
component (pragma-dialectics)).
60Both “argumentation theory” and “normative or descriptive models” refer to what I call the “grid.”
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The practical component of the Realm of Argumentation Studies contains
all of the “[...] places where the inhabitants of the realm can have their
exchanges – from official deliberations in law courts and political gathering
to unofficial get-togethers and encounters in offices, pubs, at home, or at the
proverbial village pump” (vEG04: 31-32). Thus “practically” every dispute
may be a matter in the practical component of the Realm of Argumentation
Studies. Every participant of any dispute belongs to the “inhabitants” of
this component, not only argumentation researchers. It seems that there are
no borders to what the practical component of the Realm of Argumentation
Studies contains: It may be a dispute about a stencil which suggests to use
terms from ideal language; it may be a dispute about a an analysis conducted
which suggests to use terms from describing language; it may be a dispute
about how to teach argumentation at the university which suggests to use
terms from actual language. So, for the role model of a practitioner in the
Realm of Argumentation Studies it is appropriate to employ terms from any
of the three languages, and to talk about any of the other four components
of the Realm of Argumentation Studies. Results from a research project in
the practical component of a particular research program, branch or field
may be relevant not only to this research program, branch or field. In fact,
the results may be relevant to any element, relationship and context from
argumentative reality, be it a single person, a bond between several people,
or an organization. This, in turn, suggests that the practical component can –
for example in a pragma-dialectical fashion – influence the creation of actual
language.
The example of the paradigm of the Realm of Argumentation Studies
reveals that the module of the five components thus facilitates to structurally
determine paradigms in argumentation research without constraining their
flexible management of different content matters. Each paradigm is
characterized by the relationships between the different languages and the
five components, though its very terms in the different contexts of language
are different (cf. “analyze” in pragma-dialectics).
Next, I introduce a fourth context of language – hence the module of
the four languages – to facilitate to scaffold the elements, relationships and
contexts (εs, rs and cs) chained to the management of the methodical gap
in the – hence complexly related – five components of different paradigms.
By means of the example of pragma-dialectics it becomes apparent against
the background of the module of the four meta-theoretical principles that a
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fourth language is needed in order to facilitate a complete picture of the use
of the three languages in argumentation research. Indeed, writing about those
three languages – and employing the three language to write, e. g., about the
mediator – I employ terms that belong neither to ideal, nor to describing or
actual language.
Though I do not explicate every one of those terms from this fourth
language, note that I do need them in order to convey my intentions: “A [?]
mediator [ideal language] as [describing language] a [?] pragma-dialectical
critical designer of acceptance [ideal language] reconstructs [describing
language] the discourse [?].” So, the c of terms that are marked with an “?”
I call (the author’s) natural language: “A [natural language] mediator [ideal
language] as [describing language] a [natural language] pragma-dialectical
critical designer of acceptance [ideal language] reconstructs [describing
language] the discourse [natural language].”
In accordance with the pragma-dialectical literature I employ the term
“discourse” as one of the terms from natural language. The term is not
defined in the pragma-dialectical ideal language but, apparently, it is most
prominently employed to refer to instances of fragments from argumentative
reality that are researched in the different components which are related to
the use of describing language, e. g.: There can be “theoretically relevant
clues provided in the discourse” (theoretical component), there can be an
“analysis of oral and written discourse,” or of “the original discourse,” or
a “reconstruction of a discourse” (analytical component), and certain “kinds
of questions are tackled by empirical researchers concerned with producing
descriptions of argumentative discourse” (empirical component) (vEG04: 27,
6, 24, 26, 31, my italics). Other examples of terms from that fourth c of terms
that I employ are “relationship,” “relevant” and “configure.”61 Figure 2.2 is
a scaffold of elements, relationships and contexts (εs, rs, cs), the methodical
gap, the four languages, the five components and the four meta-theoretical
principles.62
An author can make use of his natural language in a pragma-dialectical
fashion, i. e. he manages element, relationship and context in the sense of
the pragma-dialectical role models. In pragma-dialectics there is an ideal
61When I refer to “intuition” I refer to a use of natural language (cf. appendix).
62Abbreviations in figure 2.2: Ph = philosopher, Th = theorist, An = analyst, Em = empiricist, Pr = practitioner,
































Figure 2.2: Four languages to manage the methodical gap
pragma-dialectically.
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language containing terms such as “standpoint.” In pragma-dialectics there
is also a describing language which contains terms such as “analyze.” So,
the contexts of language (ca and ci) – comprising their respective elements
and relationships (εs and rs) – are distinct, though εis and εas, ris and ras
and cas and cis can be related pragma-dialectically by means of a describing
language. Since a bridging element, relationship and context (εia, ria, cia,
εai, rai, and cai) solely refers to a relation, describing language facilitates the
bridging between ideal language and actual language.63
– In a pragma-dialectical research project the module of the four
languages that can be employed consists of the pragma-dialectical
ideal language, the pragma-dialectical actual language, the
pragma-dialectical describing language and the author’s natural
language.
The four languages facilitate to depict and localize the modules of the
troublesome matters (cf. this chapter), the definitions of strategy and
strategic action (cf. this chapter) and (in scrutinizing the module of an
ontological framework) the terms issues and contentions (cf. chapter 3).
Together with the modules of the five components (cf. chapter 1) and the
definitions of strategy and strategic action the four languages facilitate
to pinpoint the differences between the five role models, e. g. with
respect to the module of the quartet of terms (cf. this chapter). The four
languages facilitate to characterize (the mediator as) an integration of
role models by taking into account the modules of the five components,
the definitions of strategy and strategic action, the quartet of terms, the
ontological framework and the terms issues and contentions (cf. chapter
3).
In the following I refer to the methodical means of the configuration of
element, relationship and context (ε , r, c), the methodical gap, the four
63That means, unlike the εs, rs and cs in ideal and actual language where the index points to a particular
location, in the case of describing language the index points to a relationship between locations.
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languages,64 the five components and argumentative reality as (the layout
called) “the scaffold.” However, I particularly make use of the scaffold in a
pragma-dialectical approach, i. e. adding the four meta-theoretical principles
(cf. figure 2.2). Figure 2.2 can thus be considered to show the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics).
As a methodical means the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) facilitates –
for instance – the integration of existing pragma-dialectical terms, and it
facilitates clarity to the bridging function that can be traced back to the
methodical gap. Other pragma-dialectical ideas, that the five components
somewhat rely on each other and that practitioners fulfill the purpose of
the research program are, as well, represented in the layout of the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics). Work by a theorist with ideal language relies on
the work by a philosopher, and analyst and empiricist cannot bridge the
methodical gap without referring to the research results from the theoretical
component. With respect to pragma-dialectics, practical research helps to
optimize argumentative reality and a practitioner can make use of those
research results from the cluster of the other four components that he needs in
the case at hand.
In accordance with the scaffold, except for the philosophical component
every component is linked to more than one of the languages. Obviously, the
distinction between the three languages reveals the relationships between the
five components in argumentation research. For instance, as they use the same
languages, there is a potential interaction between the role models of analyst
and empiricist. For instance, in line with the scaffold (pragma-dialectics)
every pragma-dialectical analysis can support empirical research, and vice
versa.65 However, the distinction between the three languages also facilitates
clarity to the allocation of matters in respective components in argumentation
research. Hence it facilitates that researchers can transparently present their
endeavors (cf. this chapter: research strategies).
The scaffold (pragma-dialectics) is – particularly against the background
of the methodical gap – apparently relevant to optimize argumentative reality.
Analyzing a fragment from a session of mediation Greco Morasso suggests
that “the mediator evokes an endoxon” (GM08: 262). The concept of
“endoxon” is considered as a part of an ideal language. A mediator in a
64As shown, the layout of the four languages can be traced back to the layout of (the creation and use of) the
three languages. The three languages, in turn, can be traced back to the distinction between two languages.
65Cf. this chapter: empirical component.
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mediation session, i. e. in a ca, can “evoke” the matter of “endoxon” in the
sense of “actualizing” it. “Actualizing” is a term from describing language,
because it points to an ria, considering an ideal element, relationship and
context (εi, ri or ci) as an actual element, relationship and context (εa, ra
or ca). In that sense a mediator in argumentative reality manages to bridge the
methodical gap.
So, this example illustrates three matters. First, the scaffold is suitable
to arrive at clarity how to manage the methodical gap. In fact, the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics) facilitates that due to the layout of the five components
the pragma-dialectical research program becomes an example of how
to bridge the methodical gap between cis and cas. Second, mediation
is a suitable context to be managed in order to optimize argumentative
reality pragma-dialectically. Though the conclusion in this example
– that actualizing means to manage the relationship between an ideal
language and actual language – seems to be trivial, its relevance becomes
obvious by considering its connection to the ca of argumentation research,
particularly to the module of troublesome matters (cf. this chapter). Third,
counter to the pragma-dialectical suggestion that the rules of critical
discussion are applicable to all contexts in argumentative reality, the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics) facilitates to understand that persons in a ca, e. g. a
mediator, apply concepts from particular cis, e. g. “endoxa,” and do not apply
concepts from other cis. Likewise, applying a stencil means applying an
option to represent a particular part of argumentative reality.66
Now, there are some further implications of making use of the scaffold.
Though the purpose of the application of a certain research strategy may
be, e. g., to optimize argumentative reality in argumentation research, if the
layout of the five components is not employed the very research strategy can
furnish obscurity (cf. chapter 1). I show that not taking into account the
layout of the five components in a research strategy sparks off disagreement in
argumentation research (cf. chapter 4). The five components are an option to
arrive at clarity to the matters: The scaffold facilitates clarity to a new way of
managing the connection between the matters associated with the methodical
gap and the matters associated with the layout of the five components. It is a
66Carnap states that “meaningfulness must be relative to a theory T” (Car56: 48), i. e. relative to certain εis and
ris configured in a stencil.
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new way of managing to optimize argumentative reality within argumentation
research.
Nonetheless, clarity to the matters can be achieved without employing the
module of the five components. Also, obscurity in argumentation research
may be caused by other purpose-, or rule-related matters, or certain possible
forms of action than those actualized by means of the research strategy to not
employ the module of the five components. So there may, apparently, also
be other options to arrive at clarity to particular matters that instantiations of
role models are faced with. For instance, more conferences with face-to-face
conversations between argumentation researchers may support arriving at
clarity to, and preventing disagreements about, the matters. In fact, other
options may prevent other causes that bring on obscurity in argumentation
research.
The scaffold facilitates to associate and dissociate – and potentially
integrate – different paradigms. By means of this methodical means
argumentation researchers can make use of the distinction between the five
components as a means to arrive at clarity to the matters (vEG04: 24: “clarity
to the matters in which argumentation theorists are interested”). The layout is
an option to take into account the distinction between the three languages, and
to associate and dissociate research projects from the different components
in a “cluster” (cf. vEG04: 41). The research in a particular component is
characterized by its goals and means. Both these criteria can be used to
allocate matters in their respective components. Having the same purpose in
mind, with respect to the methodical gap and the distinction between the three
languages an argumentation researcher can employ his awareness of how to
use different terms. For instance, as there are relational terms in describing
language the use of a particular relational term such as “reconstruct” may
point at a research project in the analytical component.67
Drawing the bow to the beginning of this section clarity to the relationship
between argumentative reality and theories about argumentative reality is of
great significance in argumentation research. Van Eemeren rightly writes
“[...] scholars of argumentation should try to make themselves understood by
as many interested fellow-scholars as possible and should not make matters
more complicated than necessary” (vE90: 43). I understand “should try to
67However, relational terms are relevant means of not just analysts. Apparently, for instance, a theorist, too,
makes use of relational terms in order to build a stencil. Obviously, arriving at clarity to a research strategy of
an instantiated role model involves more than considering only the purpose, rules, and the means employed
(cf. this chapter: research strategies).
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make themselves understood” as trying to arrive at clarity to the matter(s)
that an argumentation researcher is faced with, e. g. the relationship between
argumentative reality and theories about argumentative reality. I understand
“should not make matters more complicated than necessary” as part of a
research strategy including the target to prevent obscurity. My research
strategy is characterized by the purpose to optimize argumentative reality
in argumentation research by making use of the scaffold. The distinction
between three languages is an exemplary means to manage the matters at
hand. It prevents obscurity, e. g. with respect to the use of terms. Amongst
clarity to other matters, it facilitates that “as many fellow-scholars as possible”
arrive at clarity to managing the relationship between argumentative reality
and theories about argumentative reality.
Note, that proposing a route to arrive at clarity to one matter can
simultaneously support those argumentation researchers who face “similar”
matters in other fields, branches, or research programs. Research projects
can support other research projects in the same or other research programs,
branches, or fields. So, the scaffold facilitates the development of research
projects in argumentation research. However, while for argumentation
researchers arriving at clarity to the matters and preventing obscurity are
desirable as both facilitate “to get an overall picture of the state of the
art” (vEG04: 41), plausibly managing the methodical gap in argumentation
research may help other “professions” in their endeavor to manage the
“theory-practice problem” (Kve12: 288) as well.
All the same, another target of the distinction between three languages
is to support the reader achieve clarity to my points of view, i. e. to have
orientation with respect to the liabilities I am acknowledging. Hence I employ
the scaffold when I reflect on the relevant literature. I also use it to spell
out my claims about matters concerning mediation. I elucidate, for instance,
that by means of the scaffold argumentation researchers can distinguish types
of practitioners: Considering the broadness in the characterization of the
practical component it is desirable to understand in which way a certain type
of practitioner is guided by the means and goals of other role models, and that
he is thus dependent on a proper understanding of the distinction between
the three languages. I employ the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) to introduce
the term “issue” to the ideal language of the pragma-dialectical research
program. In the reflexive case study I aim at showing how to apply the
scaffold (pragma-dialectics) as a mediator who is characterized by means of
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the scaffold (pragma-dialectics). I act in accordance with the strategic goal of
mediators in order to facilitate a solution to a conflict in argumentative reality
about matters which I show to be troublesome with respect to the methodical
gap in pragma-dialectics.
The distinction between four languages offers a layout by which the
very terms that I employ are assigned to particular contexts of terms (ideal
language, describing language, natural language). So, in the appendix I
provide a list of terms to exemplarily show how to contribute to clarity to
the matters by means of the scaffold. The list is a means to elucidate how
I use particular terms in this dissertation. So, when I write about a matter
from a ci I employ a term from ideal language e. g. pragma-dialectical terms
such as “standpoint,” or terms that I introduce such as “strategy.”68 The list
also shows terms that I employ in talking about the relationship between ideal
and actual language. As shown in the respective introduction of describing
language, in this regard I list relational terms such as “actualize.” An example
of the terms from natural language is “relationship.” All the same, though I
aim at explicating as much terms as needed to arrive at clarity to my points
of view, the reader may keep in mind that in pragma-dialectics it oftentimes
helps to take into account one’s natural language, or the context of the use of
a specific term in order to understand a term respectively.69
2.1.2 Troublesome matters
The matters of the module that I introduce next I call troublesome matters
because – independently from a certain paradigm – they may prevent clarity
in argumentation research. The methodical gap is relevant to the management
of the module of the five components, not only in pragma-dialectical research.
So, making use of the scaffold – and thereby illustrating its universal
applicability in argumentation research – I spell out the module of the
troublesome matters.
I trace back this module to the previous scrutiny of the four languages in
argumentation research. In my intuitive scrutiny of the creation and use of
terms I focus on the meaning of terms in argumentation research, though I
68Yet note, that – apparently – it is not my goal to explicate all the pragma-dialectical terms that have (not) been
established within the past decades.
69Not only theorists may apply their intuition, e. g. when they interpret concepts from an ideal model to build
blueprints. With respect to one’s specific endeavor any person who makes use of a grid is asked to employ
his natural language, as well (cf. this chapter: intuition, analytical-intuitive component).
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also take into account, e. g., their scopes. I point at examples of – and offer
options to manage – some of the troublesome matters.
The troublesome matters facilitate to illustrate – by taking into account
the creation and use of the different contexts of language – the complex
relationships between the five components (cf. chapter 1). By taking
into consideration the module of the four languages (cf. this chapter:
the scaffold) the troublesome matters facilitate to spell out the module
of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) (cf. this chapter). The
troublesome matters, together with the modules of the quartet of terms
and the definitions of strategy and strategic action, also facilitate that
the five role models manage the methodical gap purposefully (cf. this
chapter). I particularly exemplify how to use the troublesome matter D
in introducing the module of issues and contentions (cf. chapter 3). At
last, in the case study I use the troublesome matters in order to actualize
the character of the mediator in line with the module of the integration
of role models (cf. chapter 4).
At first I elucidate five troublesome matters chained to the creation of
languages (A-E). Then I elucidate troublesome matters chained to the use
of languages (F-H).
First, it is a troublesome matter that, in general, every term from natural
language can become defined as part of an ideal or describing language (A).
Philosophers, for instance, decide which of the terms from natural language
make sense to be defined in an ideal language. Though he might explicate his
decision, for instance in which sense the decision is chained to the purpose of
a certain research program, his making sense in the creation of the term may
give rise to obscurity in argumentative reality.
Second, it is a troublesome matter when in the creation of a language no
meaning is established for particularly relevant terms (B).70 I refer to this
troublesome matter when I present the relationship between ideal models
and stencils, the relationship of “template” and “derivative.” Note here, that
in the creation of an ideal language argumentation researchers may restrict
70I show instances of this troublesome matter among the potential, and actual issues in the case study (cf.
chapter 4).
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themselves to define only such terms which are relevant to, e. g., the functions
of both template and derivative, such as the purposeful use of describing
language (cf. this chapter: “fallacy”).
Third, it is a troublesome matter that the creation of a language results in a
meaning for a term that is unclear (C).71 A term’s meaning can be “unclear”
(realize obscurity), e. g., when there is more than one meaning for the term. It
may thus be wise to stipulate meanings for such terms in ideal language which
are not already “theory-loaded terms” (Tou58: 7). In that regard, Toulmin
sets out to avoid the use of the term “deductive” and instead determines the
term “candid” to signal that he is not talking about “the formal analysis of
theoretical logic” (Tou58: 6, 8). A meaning of a term may be “unclear” when
the established meaning is presented as a metaphor (cf. chapter 1: mediator
as “architect”).72
Fourth, it is a troublesome matter that new terms must be related to terms
that already have been created in the respective context of terms (D). That
means, first, that particularly relevant terms from the existing context must be
taken into account. I show how to prevent this instance of D when I introduce
the module of the terms “issues” and “contentions” in the pragma-dialectical
ideal language (cf. chapter 3). However, second, relating new terms to
previously defined terms may be unclear. For instance, determining the
r between two terms by means of a term from natural language the very
relational term may have one particular meaning for one reader and another
meaning for another reader. Therefore, for example, it may be wise for a
philosopher to create relational terms before he uses them to define terms.
Fifth, the scopes of the created terms should be shown. Though, for
instance in an analysis, describing language may be employed properly, the
terms created to depict an element, relationship or context in ideal language
(εi, ri, ci) can be no more than corresponding to the terms to depict an
element, relationship or context from argumentative reality (εa, ra, ca). As
correspondences can be depicted as analogies it can be controversial in what
ways elements, relationships and contexts that are compared differ from each
other (E).73
71I show instances of this troublesome matter among the potential, and actual issues in the case study (cf.
chapter 4).
72Note, however, that using a metaphor can also facilitate clarity to the matters in an analysis (cf. this chapter:
cream on the milk).
73The correspondences refer to the relationship (r) between an εa, ra or ca and an εi, ri or ci, and vice versa.
Also cf. the “correspondence” between blueprint and ideal model (cf. this chapter: one-to-one image).
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Three troublesome matters are chained to the use of the four languages.
First, it is a troublesome matter when argumentation researchers do not stick
to the established meaning of a term (F).74 Then several understandings of
a particular term may occur. For instance, in pragma-dialectics the use of
“critical discussion” is troublesome because it is used to refer to the ideal
model as well as to a stencil (cf. this chapter).
Second, it is a troublesome matter when a term from one language is used
in the context of another language in which it has no meaning (G).75 That
is the case, for instance, when a term from ideal language is used to refer
to an element, relationship and context in argumentative reality (εa, ra or ca)
without making use of describing language. In doing that an argumentation
researcher neglects that the meaning of a particular term is bound to the ideal
language. Using the term in actual language means to use it in a language in
which it has no meaning.
Third, it is a troublesome matter when the use of a term is not transparent
(H).76 The scaffold facilitates, for example, to transparently relativize the
conditions of a grid onto a fragment, and to reconstruct and evaluate a
particular εa, ra or ca as a particular εi, ri or ci. Analysts can spell out their
use of certain translation criteria (cf. this chapter). Besides, in their research
projects argumentation researchers can spell out their use of intuition. The
relationships between the four languages, between the ideal model and the
blueprint, between the grid and a discourse etc. are facilitated by my
conviction that an argumentation researcher’s work can be made transparent
by the characterization of a certain research strategy (cf. this chapter).
Making use of the scaffold is one option to arrive at transparency with
respect to the creation and use of the four languages. It is a means to thus
arrive at clarity to the matters, and to thus facilitate to optimize argumentative
reality in argumentation research. In table 2.1 there is an overview of the
troublesome matters A-H.77
74I show instances of this troublesome matter among the potential, and actual issues in the case study (cf.
chapter 4).
75I show an instance of this troublesome matter among the potential issues in the case study (cf. chapter 4).
76I show instances of this troublesome matter among the potential, and actual issues in the case study (cf.
chapter 4).
77All of the tables are specially developed in the context of my present research.
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Table 2.1: Troublesome matters.






A – every term from natural language can become defined as part of an ideal,
or describing language
B – no meaning for particularly relevant terms
C – meaning is unclear
D – r to existing terms in the respective context
E – correspondence between εa, ra and ca and εi, ri and ci, and vice versa
F – sticking to the established meaning of a term
G – term from one language is used in the context of another language in
which it has no meaning
H – use of a term is not transparent
I emphasized the relevance of the methodical gap to the pragma-dialectical
purpose. However, the methodical gap is relevant to – (not only)
pragma-dialectical – research in other components than the practical
component as well. Irrespective of the component, obscurity may spark
off disagreement and thus, independently from the component, troublesome
matters may spark off disagreement in argumentation research (cf. chapter
4). As shown, Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar manage matters
related to the methodical gap. Supposedly, if the authors had clarity to
those matters they would not have to amend each other’s interpretations:
“Different from what Siegel and Biro seem to suppose (2008), critical
rationalistic argumentation theorists do not [...]” (GvL10: 136). However,
in their discourse the authors do not only refer to matters from the
practical component but they do (not) consider troublesome matters in other
pragma-dialectical components as well (cf. this chapter: troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics)). They particularly manage recurrent troublesome
matters, such as B which is instantiated in the relationship between ideal
model and stencil, and thus relates to the philosophical and the theoretical
component. Discussing recurrent matters in pragma-dialectics can be a sign
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that those matters are troublesome matters because they recurrently give rise
to obscurity, like the difference between argumentative reality and theories
about argumentative reality.78
2.2 Troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics)
By employing the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) the gap between cis and cas
can be bridged. However, in studying the pragma-dialectical five components
some matters may recurrently cause obscurity, i. e. prevent clarity. Because
argumentation researchers aim at clarity to the matters the module of the
troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) (a-n) must be scrutinized. I aim
at particularly applying the modules of the four languages and the five
components as well as the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) and my terms (cf.
chapter 1) to spell out how I do (not) comply with pragma-dialectical research
to date.
So, in this section I research the creation and use of the four languages
in the five components of pragma-dialectics. After showing the relevance
of the module of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) to the other
modules, I present troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) that are chained
to the creation of ideal and describing language, before I show troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics) that are chained to the use of the four languages.
However, I also suggest how to make use of some of the troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics) in order to optimize argumentative reality in
argumentation research.
78However, neither does every (recurrent) troublesome matter nor does every (recurrent) troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics – just like that – trigger a disagreement. An argumentation researcher may, for instance,
acknowledge that in order to arrive at clarity to a particular matter he needs more background knowledge.
Then he may decide that even though he does not understand a point of view on this very matter he does
not disagree. Furthermore, of course, there also may be disagreement on matters that are not troublesome
matters.
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The troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) illustrate the relationships
between the modules of the five components and the four languages (cf.
this chapter: the scaffold (pragma-dialectics)). Furthermore, since I
trace back this module to (the relationships between) the troublesome
matters it backs up – by means of examples – the findings chained to
the module of the troublesome matters (cf. this chapter). Besides, in my
purposeful scrutiny of the pragma-dialectical research program I spell
out the module of strategy and the module of the quartet of terms (cf. this
chapter); moreover, I facilitate the modules of an ontological framework
(cf. chapter 3) and of the terms issues and contentions (cf. chapter 3).
It is a troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that researchers do not take
into consideration that a describing language is needed to manage a bridging
element, relationship or context, i. e. εia, ria, cia, εai, rai and cai (a). Chained
to the creation of languages that can be traced back to the troublesome matter
that no meaning is established for particularly relevant terms (B).
There is an ideal language in pragma-dialectics. There is a describing
language in pragma-dialectics, as well. And pragma-dialecticians do
acknowledge that ideal elements, relationships and contexts (εi, ri or ci) are
referred to by means of an ideal language: “[...] defining the conditions for
critical discussion, distinguishing between principles and practices, between
rules and regularities, so that one can see when, how, and why ordinary
argument deviates from the critical ideal” (vEGSH96: 278).79 The ideal
language is used to characterize critical discussion (“principles” and “rules”)
whereas describing language is required to relate εi, ri or ci to matters from
argumentative reality (“practices” and “regularities”). Pragma-dialecticians
oftentimes spell out the methodical gap (“ordinary argument deviates from
the critical ideal”), and that the creation of an ideal language is a matter of
the pragma-dialectical philosopher. However, I have shown in which sense it
is troublesome to not properly manage – or bridge – the methodical gap by
means of a describing language (cf. this chapter: four languages).
79However, based on the same attitude that Toulmin (Tou58) illustrates, pragma-dialecticians have an image
of a “critical ideal” that may be somewhat “closer” to argumentative reality than researchers from “formal
logic” (cf. Gov99a: 83) (cf. this chapter: concept “ideal model”).
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2.2.1 The philosophical component
There are two troublesome matters in pragma-dialectics’ creation of ideal
language. First, a troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics is that no meaning
is established for a term in ideal language (b).80 This troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics can be traced back to the troublesome matter that in the
creation of an ideal language no meaning is established for terms that are
particularly relevant in a research program, branch or field (B).81
However, giving a meaning to a newly created term is relevant to clarity
to the matters in all of the five components. An establishment of a meaning
facilitates that a reader understands a term in a context of use. So, for instance,
in the creation of a term against the background of the distinction between
three languages the reader may get to know to which of the three languages the
term is considered to belong. The reader thus arrives at clarity to the context
of the term. When he knows the context of the term, then – if uncertain –
he makes sense of that term in the context of that particular language. He
is thus supported to arrive at an understanding of the term’s meaning. Even
metaphors used to establish the meaning of a term can be of help for a reader.
The second troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics in the creation of ideal
language, i. e. in the philosophical component,82 is that the established
meaning of a term is unclear (ct).83 This, obviously, is based on an improper
establishment of the meaning. Clarity to the establishment of the meaning of
a term supports the reader to understand what the term is suggested to mean in
a particular instance of use. This troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics can
be traced back to the troublesome matter that no meaning is established for
particularly relevant terms (B), to the troublesome matter that the established
meaning for a term is unclear (C), or to the troublesome matter of the r
between newly created terms and terms that already have been created in the
respective context of terms (D).84
As suggested, the established meaning of a term is unclear, thus
troublesome, when, e. g., different meanings are established for this term.
80Note, however, that also for a term from describing language no meaning may be established.
81I show an instance of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
82Note, however, that this troublesome matter can apply to a term from describing language, too. Then the
pragma-dialectical theorist is concerned.
83In order to demarcate the abbreviation for context (c) from the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics
mentioned here I refer to the latter as ct .
84I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential, and actual issues in the
case study (cf. chapter 4).
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Different meanings for a particular term may occur when either different
meanings are established in the creation of the term, or when different
meanings can be spelled out from the use of the term. Intuitively speaking,
it supports a reader to understand a term’s use if that term has, in a particular
context of use, one meaning rather than more than one meaning.
The established meaning for a term is unclear when the meaning is
established by relating it improperly to other terms. However, if a relationship
is created between one term and another, apparently, a meaning of the former
term can only be established through its relationship to the latter one. Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst aim at establishing the meaning of advancing
an argument: “This is not to say that advancing argumentation cannot be
combined with, or even include, the use of pathos and ethos, or that relevant
arguments cannot be suggested by, or even implied in, apparently irrelevant
arguments” (vEG04: 192). “Advancing an argument” is one of the speech
acts in the ci of critical discussion, thus the term belongs to ideal language.
The authors seek to establish the meaning of the term by relating it (not)
to particular terms (pathos, ethos, irrelevant arguments).85 However, by
writing “[t]his is not to say that it cannot [...]” the authors commit to say
that it can very well be “combined with,” “include” etc. (Note that they
say simultaneously that it “can” not.) With that they do not state that the
speech act of advancing an argument is combined with or does include the
other terms. So, the authors do not state that there is a relationship. By only
suggesting there can be a relationship the establishment of meaning through
the relationship is troublesome.
However, I sense that the terms “combined with,” “include,” “suggested by”
and “implied” do suggest the reader that there are relationships between the
speech act advancing an argument and pathos, ethos and irrelevant arguments.
Now, imagine a reader – e. g. a researcher in one of the five pragma-dialectical
components – does acknowledge (by sensing it intuitively based on terms
such as “combined with”) that there are those relationships and seeks to
understand the relationships in order to understand the meaning of “advancing
an argument.” A troublesome matter occurs as a troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics: The terms used by van Eemeren and Grootendorst to
depict the relationships are unclear. For instance, what does “combined with”
85The terms “pathos,” “ethos,” “irrelevant arguments” can be understood by means of pragma-dialectical
literature, e. g., on the Code of Conduct. Commandment 4 is that “Standpoints may not be defended
by non-argumentation [e. g. pathos or ethos] or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint” (cf.
vEG04: 192).
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mean? Again, obviously a meaning of a term established through relating
the term to other terms can only be understood by a reader if the relationship
(“combined with”) is depicted properly.86
However, grant that the authors employ “combined with” in a sense of
natural language and imagine the reader does make some sense of “advancing
an argument.” He is still not certain whether this is the one intended by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst. In fact, the authors can hardly be held liable to
any intention. What they do say about advancing an argument is “[t]his is not
to say that [...].” So, rather than saying what is to be said about “advancing an
argument” in order to establish a meaning for the term, and to thus arrive at
clarity to the matter, they opt for excluding certain meanings that the reader
may (not) think of.
In sum, with respect to the quote on advancing an argument van Eemeren
and Grootendorst first suggest the reader to understand that the term’s
meaning is established through its relationship to other terms from ideal
language. However, this relationship is neither clearly created in the sense
of the philosophical component, nor is it clearly spelled out by the authors.
Moreover, as the authors employ unclear terms to depict a certain relationship
they suggest readers (by means of their natural language) to rather sense the
essence of – than to understand – those relationships. At last, having thus
achieved any understanding of the meaning of the term a reader has achieved
an understanding that is not the meaning of the term that van Eemeren and
Grootendorst had intended. Two troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) can
be concluded from this discussion of the troublesome matter ct . There is
the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that there is an exclusion of (an
arbitrary amount of possible) meanings of a term instead of an establishment
of one meaning of a term. Moreover, there is the troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics that natural language must be employed to understand a
term from ideal language. Clarity to what a term means is supported when
one meaning for this term is established. (Unclearly) Establishing different
meanings – and then saying that these meanings do not represent what the
term to be defined means – prevents clarity to the matters.
However, in order to conclude the discussion of the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) that refer to the creation of language recast the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics) which shows the r between the creation of the ideal and
86Note that, by using those terms properly in this instance the authors may facilitate the reader’s understanding
of their use of those terms in other instances, too.
66
describing language. The respective tasks of the pragma-dialectical role
models in the philosophical component and the theoretical component are
illustrated in figure 2.3.87
ε , r, c
pragma-dialectics as
a research program
Th, An, Em, Pr















Figure 2.3: Philosopher facilitates pragma-dialectical research.
2.2.2 Using four languages in five components
Next, I present troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) which refer to the use
of the languages. Before I present troublesome matters in the theoretical, the
analytical, the empirical and the practical component of pragma-dialectics, I
show troublesome matters that are chained to the use of language in any of
the five components of pragma-dialectics.
In any of the five components there is the troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics that a particular term is inappropriately used in a particular
87Abbreviations in figure 2.3: Ph = philosopher, comp. = component, Th = theorist, An = analyst, Em =
empiricist, Pr = practitioner, arg. reality = argumentative reality.
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language (d). This may be traced back to the troublesome matter that a term
is used in a language in which no meaning has been established for it (G).88
Apparently, a term has no meaning in a context in which a meaning for
the term has not been established. Using such a term prevents clarity to the
matters. It is neglected that every term is to be used in a language (c) in which
a meaning for it has been established. However, if used in the respective
context a term’s use supports a reader’s understanding.
It is a troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics – though note that I point out
borderline cases with respect to that matter – that in employing a term from
one particular language this term is chained with (a) term(s) from another
language. In such a case an author runs danger to neglect that terms may only
be understood if they are used in a context in which they have an established
meaning. It may prevent the reader’s understanding because he is not certain
whether the author is talking about an ideal, a bridging or an actual element
or relationship (εi, εa, ri, ra, εia, ria, εai or rai). However, it is likely to be
relevant to understand which of those matters the author is talking about in
order to understand the liabilities that the author is expressing by means of
a particular utterance. Note, however, that does not mean that in a single
utterance a researcher should never employ terms from different languages.
For instance, recast that against the background of the desire to bridge the
methodical gap employing terms from ideal language, describing language
and actual language is required in order to chain εs and rs from a ca with εs
and rs from a ci. Yet recast that in chaining terms from different languages it
is desirable to understand that there is only a correspondence between actual
language and ideal language, and between a blueprint and its template, an
ideal model.
In sum, chaining terms from different languages in a single sentence can be
best understood when there is clarity to the “homes” of the chained terms.
Having managed the matters properly in their respective “home contexts”
the chaining of terms from different languages can even inspire enlightening
conclusions. Note also, that oftentimes a reader is asked to employ his
intuition to arrive at clarity to the matters, not just in pragma-dialectics.
The list of terms provided in the appendix can be used as a support for a
reader’s intuition in understanding matters. It shows how terms are employed.
When a reader does not understand any elements, relationships or contexts
88I show an instance of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
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displayed in the text, he can refer to the list. It thus becomes clear whether
the εs and rs are couched in the c of ideal language, describing language, or
natural language. This facilitates his arriving at clarity to a chaining of terms
presented in the text.
2.2.3 The theoretical component
Particularly against the background of the methodical gap it is, thus far, a
troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that in the theoretical component the
term “ideal model” is used in the sense of natural language (e). That can be
traced back to the troublesome matters that a term from one language is used
in the context of another language in which it has no meaning (G), and to the
troublesome relationship between newly created terms and terms that already
have been created in the respective context of terms (D).89
My scrutiny of this troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics is particularly
relevant to the introduction of the module of strategy, and the quartet of terms.
Those two modules, in turn, facilitate to develop the other remaining modules
(cf. chapter 3: ontological framework, issues and contentions, integration
of role models) and to conduct the integrative case study (cf. chapter 4).
Therefore, I devote the following three paragraphs to spell out the sequence
of my case revolving the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics e.
By means of the scaffold I will, at first, refer to the use of the different
contexts of language in the different pragma-dialectical components to show
why the term “ideal model” is troublesome. For sake of clarity to the matters,
I show, it is worthwhile to explicate the meaning of the term “ideal model.” I
aim at explicating the meaning of “ideal model” by referring to the tasks of the
pragma-dialectical theorist to build and characterize the scopes and functions
of “the ideal model of critical discussion” (vEGJJ93: 30) in the context of the
research program.
Furthering my case I particularly use the module of the (relationships
between the) five components and the findings about the methodical gap
to recast the explanatory functions of “strong and weak theories” in
argumentation research. I conclude how the term ideal model should be
understood – particularly in line with the concept of reasonableness in, and
the purpose of pragma-dialectics.
89I show an instance of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
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Then, taking into account the insights about building ideal contexts, I
introduce and develop the module of my definitions of strategy and strategic
action. I make use of the modules of the five components and strategy – and
refer to the pragma-dialectical concept of fallacy – to conclude and develop
the module of the quartet of terms: “ideal model,” “stencil,” “blueprint” and
“grid.” I sum up why building stencils is possible in pragma-dialectics, and
that it is in line with both the use of languages shown in the scaffold and
with the purpose of the research program, e. g. in analytical endeavors.
Concluding, I scaffold the functions of the ideal contexts in the module of
the quartet of terms in a figure.
So, first, pragma-dialecticians write about their understanding of an “ideal
model”: “[...] a model is presented of the various stages an argumentative
discussion must ideally go through [...]” (vEGSH02: xiii) and “there is no
pretense that these stages occur in the specified order in actual discourse”
(vR01: 459). The ideal model, apparently, is a configuration of terms from
ideal language. Against the background of the methodical gap, and the
four languages it is apparent that an ideal model must not be immediately
chained to actual discourse, the respective pragma-dialectical research is
troublesome.90
Next I show how in a theoretical component an argumentation researcher
creates an ideal model. I refer to the example of configuring ideal terms in
building a pragma-dialectical ideal model. A philosopher (pragma-dialectics)
creates the ideal terms that a theorist relates to one another. The ci of critical
discussion is limited in the sense that the philosopher creates the terms for
ideal language, and the theorist relates only those very terms to build an ideal
model.
Exemplary terms are “protagonist” and “antagonist,” the parties in critical
discussion (vEG04: 36-37), and their relationships to the “distribution of
speech acts” in critical discussion.91 So, the speech acts distributed are
assigned to protagonist, or antagonist, or both. By doing so, for instance,
the start of critical discussion is defined. The start of critical discussion is
defined by means of the protagonist applying an assertive which brings about
the expression of a standpoint.92 The list also defines that the end of the
90Cf. this chapter: analytical component, empirical component.
91For explications of “protagonist,” “antagonist” and the “distribution of speech acts” cf. van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (vEG84: 10, 88, 99, 105, 111), and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 67-68).
92Cf. this chapter: standpoint.
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“game”93 is obtained, in fact by means of the speech act “[e]stablishing the
result of the discussion” (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG84: 111);
(vEG04: 67-68)).
The limits of a ci point to its scopes. The list of the distribution of speech
acts depicts those speech acts that are to be exerted by the parties in critical
discussion: No other speech acts than the ones in the list are part of critical
discussion. In that way the theorist configures the matters in building critical
discussion, i. e. he builds a pragma-dialectical “ideal model.”94
Next, against the background of the module of the five components I refer
to Kvernbekk (cf. Kve12: 291-293) who presents a “strong/weak distinction
between theories” which I take into consideration to further elucidate the
meaning of “ideal model” in pragma-dialectics. In her article Argumentation
in Theory and Practice: Gap or Equilibrium? Kvernbekk is concerned
with the distinction between ci and ca, and with the function of (types
of) theories. Note, first, that she purports, that “practice is fundamentally
theory-laden” (Kve12: 292). Against the background of the distinction
between the three languages, however, it is apparent that argumentative reality
is not “fundamentally theory-laden.”
So, I spell out why I understand – against the background of Kvernbekk’s
weak/ strong distinction – the ideal model of critical discussion neither as
a “strong theory,” i. e. “a well-articulated theory dealing with a carefully
delineated aspect of the world.” Critical discussion is characterized as an
ideal context (ci consisting of εi and ri) which cannot be immediately related
to any element, relationship or context (“aspect”) from argumentative reality
(“the world,” i. e. ca). Nor do I consider critical discussion a “weak theory”
whose εi and ri are characterized to “fall short of explicit articulation, be
only partly articulated” (Kve12: 292). The pragma-dialectical literature does
not suggest, at all, that the matters in the research program (should, nor do)
fall short of explicit articulation. About a “weak theory” Kvernbekk also
writes: “Most claims about everyday events and happenings are of this kind”
(Kve12: 292). Obviously, critical discussion is not a theory of such kind. I
understand critical discussion as the pragma-dialectical attempt to create a
well-articulated “logic,” an ideal model (cf. vEG84: 111), a theory that is –
93Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 187).
94Some of the relevant matters to be configured in an ideal model of critical discussion are, for instance,
difference of opinion, protagonist and antagonist, the four stages of critical discussion, the speech acts in
those four stages, the first-order conditions and the higher-order conditions.
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against the background of Kvernbekk’s distinction – even “stronger than a
strong theory.”
Next, against the background of the pragma-dialectical purpose (cf. chapter
1) an ideal model cannot be applied to any actual element, relationship or
context (εa, ra or ca). Metaphorically speaking only the philosopher and the
theorist are concerned with (the scopes of) an ideal model in the sense that the
ideal language is used to build the framework of the ideal model, for instance
the ideal model of critical discussion in pragma-dialectics. Kvernbekk points
out that theorists can be “pursuing theory for its own sake” (Kve12: 291). So,
as soon as the ci of an ideal model is built the theorist may “play around” with
the configuration of εis and ris. For example, he can scrutinize the ris between
terms within the ideal model, and he may thus also modify the ideal model.
In the framework of terms from ideal language that has been philosophically
established “playing around with the ideal model,” or “pursuing theory for its
own sake” is the first function of an ideal model.
However, concerning the methodical gap Kvernbekk states that “the gap is
a problem, and the way to remedy it is to change the theory” (Kve12: 291).
In pragma-dialectics I do not propose to change the theory – the ideal
model of critical discussion – but against the background of (the desire to
bridge) the methodical gap I suggest the way to manage the matter of the
relationship between argumentative reality on the one hand, and theories
about argumentative reality on the other hand, is to change the stance towards
the functions of some of the research results in the theoretical component of
the research program.
So, next, I focus on the functions of ideal contexts in the five components.
Garssen and van Laar depict critical discussion as “universal”: “The norms
for critical discussion are universal in the sense that they constitute the
ideal of critical discussion that is applicable to argumentation in all settings”
(GvL10: 127). Against the background of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics)
I discussed why I disagree with the function of critical discussion being
“applicable in all settings.” As an ideal model it cannot be immediately
chained to any actual phenomena.95
95Whereas in fact the ideal model’s elements and relationships (εis and ris) are not actualized in any actual
context (ca) Garssen and van Laar do not seem to suggest any limit to “applying” critical discussion, as if
the conditions from critical discussion were actualized in disputes – even “in all settings.” Consequently,
in all settings disputes would be proceeding in a pragma-dialectical fashion. Analogously the authors
may agree that the football rules of Deutscher Fußball-Bund (DFB) are actualized as the accepted rules
in all actualizations of football “in all settings.” However, what about a game in which none of the
“Mitgliedsverbände” (Deu13: 2) of DFB is involved? The teams do not play in a “DFB-fashion” there.
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However, the functionality of the ideal model in the theoretical component
must not be sacrificed. In order to present the second function of an ideal
model, and to remedy the problem of the methodical gap, I make use of
Garssen and van Laar’s term “universal.” I suggest that the theorist uses
the structure of the ideal model to arrive at clarity to building the layout
of a stencil.96 A theorist manages a stencil in the sense of a blueprint,97
analysts and empiricists manage a stencil in the sense of a grid.98 “[C]ritical
discussion, in its basic form” (vEGJJ93: 117) is universal in the sense that as a
template it is used by a pragma-dialectical theorist to build different blueprints
(cf. this chapter: building stencil).
In discussing the methodical gap I concluded that a stencil is needed in
pragma-dialectics. Now, besides from critical discussion being “universal” in
the sense of being a template for pragma-dialectical stencils, another reason
that blueprints from the template are possible is the fact that reasonableness
in a pragma-dialectical ci, e. g. critical discussion, is variable.
Next I facilitate to introduce – against the background of the elicitation of
the concept of reasonableness in the ideal model of critical discussion – the
module of my definitions of strategy and strategic action. I recast the task
of the pragma-dialectical theorist to build critical discussion though I foster
the insights by spelling out the relevance of the pragma-dialectical sense of
reasonableness to the function of the ideal model as a “universal” template.
When a pragma-dialectical theorist manages the ideal model, i. e. builds
or plays around with critical discussion, he must take into consideration
the pragma-dialectical sense of “reasonableness.” In accordance with the
pragma-dialectical philosophy “[t]he reasonableness of the procedure is
derived from [...] problem validity [...] in combination with [...] conventional
validity [...]” (vEG04: 132). The two types of validity are problem-solving
validity and conventional validity:
96Van Rees employs the term “problem-solving discussion” to refer to a pragma-dialectical stencil:
“Problem-solving discussions, then can be seen as a form of verbal interaction in which participants
try to resolve in a rational fashion the differences of opinion that rise in the various stages of
the problem-solving process.” The actualization(s) of problem-solving discussion she calls “real-life
problem-solving discussions” and “actual problem-solving discussion” (vR03: 466, 465, 467).
97Aakhus (Aak03: 285) employs this term. He refers to what I call a stencil which is a one-to-one image of
critical discussion (cf. this chapter: one-to-one image).
98Greco Morasso (GM08: 160) employs this term. She as well refers to what I call a stencil. She refers to a
one-to-one image of critical discussion.
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[P]roblem-solving validity depends on the adequacy of the model
as a description of effective practice [...] (vEGJJ93: 23).
In order for the rules to be of any practical significance,
however, there must be potential discussants who are prepared
to play the game by these rules, because they accept them
intersubjectively – so that the rules acquire conventional validity
as well (vEG04: 187).
In order to facilitate to optimize argumentative reality against the background
of the methodical gap, I suggest that an εi or an ri in any pragma-dialectical
ci, i. e. critical discussion or a stencil, is “reasonable” when the two types of
validity (defined philosophically) are satisfied respectively.
So, I next I recast the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics a, i. e.
the use of terms from ideal language to refer to a certain ca without
taking into consideration a describing language that is required to bridge
the methodical gap, with respect to “the two types of validity.” Apparently,
writing about “effective practice” rather than the “ideal procedure,” and about
“potential discussants” rather than “protagonist and antagonist” by means of
the relationship between the term “model” and the two types of validity van
Eemeren and Grootendorst refer to the blueprint rather than to the ideal model.
Besides, note that the quotation on problem-solving validity can be found in
the 1993 book when the authors write about the empirical component. Thus
they consider the matter of problem-solving validity when they spell out that
the grid is to be checked whether it is indeed appropriate “as a description of
effective practice,” i. e. of a ca in argumentative reality.
Likewise, with respect to conventional validity van Eemeren and
Grootendorst say: “Because the rules were developed exactly for the purpose
of resolving disputes, they should in principle be optimally acceptable to those
whose first and foremost aim is to resolve a dispute” (vEG04: 25). Again, the
parties in critical discussion are – by definition of the “logic” – resolving
the difference of opinion, whereas persons in a ca are such “whose first and
foremost aim is to resolve the dispute.” The authors employ the term “two
types of validity” to talk ideal, yet not only in the context of an ideal model
which cannot be immediately chained to actual phenomena.
Still, the concept of the two types of validity facilitates a certain flexibility
to building pragma-dialectical stencils. So, next, I recast the function of
critical discussion as a template to depict how the pragma-dialectical sense of
reasonableness facilitates a flexibility for building pragma-dialectical stencils.
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As shown, in building the ideal model the theorist relates ideal elements
and relationships (εis, ris) to one another. So, the matters of the ideal context
critical discussion (ci) are configured by the theorist (pragma-dialectics).
Taking into consideration the two types of validity he defines that the parties
(in the procedure) of critical discussion do play reasonably: “[i]t is the
task of dialectical argumentation theorists to formulate these rules of critical
discussion in such a way that together they constitute a problem-valid as well
as conventionally valid discussion procedure [...]” (vEG04: 134).
Problem-solving validity and conventional validity elicit reasonableness in
critical discussion in the sense that fulfilling the conditions in the procedure
of their obtaining the resolution of the difference of opinion – so, on
their track to the resolution of the difference of opinion – protagonist and
antagonist overtly play the game of critical discussion by the rules. They
play reasonably. In fact, the parties in the framework of critical discussion
cannot not play reasonably. Their actions elicit the pragma-dialectical sense
of reasonableness.
The theorist does not define how the εi or an ri of critical discussion are
to be managed by the parties, thereby effecting that the two types of validity
are satisfied. He does not define how the parties proceed reasonably, which
is plausible because the parameter of reasonableness of critical discussion is
founded in the two types of validity. Recasting van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(vEG04: 134), he does not define “in which way together the rules constitute
a problem-valid as well as conventionally valid discussion procedure.” So,
even if the theorist (pragma-dialectics) configures the matters, and arrives
at a procedure – i. e. arrives at “such a way” – that, if executed, satisfies
the pragma-dialectical concept of reasonableness: Protagonist and antagonist
may modify the configuration of matters – if, for them, it was not problem
valid or conventionally valid.
However, why should the parties in the ideal model of critical discussion
– which is not supposed to be immediately chained to any εa, ra or ca – ever
modify the configuration of the procedure? Why should the parties in the
ideal model of critical discussion ever scrutinize whether the rules are problem
valid? Why should the parties of the ideal model of critical discussion ever
scrutinize the conventional validity of the rules? Protagonist and antagonist do
not question whether a theorist (pragma-dialectics) has established congruent
forms of action and rules “for them” in “the logic.” Metaphorically speaking,
the parties in the ideal procedure of critical discussion “know” that the
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rules are problem valid and conventionally valid. So the pragma-dialectical
concept of “reasonableness” does apply to critical discussion. It is thus
questionable whether the pragma-dialectical concept of “reasonableness” can
be of use in a procedure displayed in an ideal model – in the sense of a
theory that is “stronger than a strong theory.” However, the pragma-dialectical
philosophical stipulation of reasonableness is desirable in order to fulfill the
purpose of pragma-dialectical research by employing stencils.
Within the framework of terms that are established by a philosopher, and
configured by a theorist, the parties in critical discussion play in accordance
with the fifteen rules of critical discussion – they play “pragma-dialectically
right.” However, not only can the parties modify the configuration of the
procedure because reasonableness in critical discussion is elicited by the two
types of validity. Due to the two types of validity reasonableness can be
satisfied on more than one track, thus variably. Hence, the pragma-dialectical
concept of “reasonableness” facilitates to build different blueprints from the
same “universal” template. Since the two types of validity are defined in
terms of ideal language, they are relevant to building blueprints.
The flexibility with respect to the two types of validity facilitates strategic
considerations. Next, I introduce my definitions of strategy and strategic
action in pragma-dialectics.
The definitions of strategy and strategic action facilitate to spell out the
differences between the five role models (cf. chapter 1). Applied to
the ideal model of critical discussion, and together with the module of
the five components it particularly facilitates to show the possibility
of the quartet of terms, and the management of the quartet of terms
(cf. this chapter). It also facilitates to introduce the module of
issues and contentions (cf. chapter 3), and to purposefully manage
the modules of the troublesome matters and the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics), e. g. in the case study (cf. chapter 4). With respect
to the module of the integration of role models the definitions of strategy
and strategic action facilitate to characterize (cf. chapter 3) and actualize
(cf. chapter 4) the role of the mediator.
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Pragma-dialecticians presented philosophical and theoretical research results
with regards to the terms strategy and strategic action. I scrutinize those
insights against the background of the five components before I introduce
the module of the definitions of strategy and strategic action.99 When I
pinpoint how I use my natural language to spell out the applicability of the
module of the definitions of strategy and strategic action to pragma-dialectical
purposeful research I employ the scaffold (pragma-dialectics).
Argumentative strategies in our sense are methodical designs
of moves for influencing the result of a particular dialectical
stage, or the discussion as a whole, to one’s own advantage,
which manifest themselves in a systematic, coordinated and
simultaneous exploitation of the opportunities afforded by that
stage (vEH02: 141).
[S]trategic maneuvering does not manifest itself just in the
complex speech act of argumentation [...] (vE10: 40).
[D]erailments of strategic maneuvering [...] violate one or more
of the rules for critical discussion [...] (vE10: 198).
Strategy may seem irrelevant to the concerns of normative
theory. Compared with the theoretical picture of ideal discussion
conducted under ideal conditions, the concept of strategy
evokes images of evasion, concealment, and artful dodging.
Such things are and should be excluded from an ideal model
of critical discussion, but strategy also encompasses means
employed to enforce an ideal in the face of nonideal conditions
(vEGJJ93: 173).
Argumentative strategy is the means through which
argumentation is made possible in the flow of communication,
especially when the second and third order conditions for critical
discussion do not hold (Aak03: 269).
So, in pragma-dialectics an argumentative strategy is a methodical design.
Acting in accordance with an argumentative strategy is called strategic
99I also refer to this module by means of “the module of strategy.”
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maneuvering.100 Derailments of strategic maneuvering refer to the rules of
critical discussion. Thus the concept of argumentative strategy is chained to
the ideal model of critical discussion. Still, under ideal conditions of critical
discussion, the authors write, strategic considerations “should be excluded.”
However, in a stencil, which can be employed to optimize argumentative
reality – “to enforce an ideal in the face of nonideal conditions” whose
status I explicated against the background of the methodical gap –, strategic
considerations make sense to be explicated (cf. this chapter: functions of
stencil applied in practical component).
According to the authors an argumentative strategy is aim-oriented. A
party in a limited ci aims at influencing to his own advantage the discussion
procedure with respect to a particular stage or with respect to the conditions
for acting. “As wholes” both cis of critical discussion and stencils consist of
the matters that are contained in the stages, and of matters that are contained
in the conditions for conducting the discussion. So, first, an argumentative
strategy is a systematic exploitation of the options in a stage, a coordinated
exploitation of the options in a stage, and a simultaneous exploitation of the
options in a stage – e. g. of the speech acts of requesting an argument, and
advancing an argument in the argument stage (vEG04: 68). Second, Aakhus
particularly states that an argumentative strategy is an exploitation of the
options related to the conditions, e. g. when they “do not hold.”
Apparently, Aakhus’ definition of “argumentative strategy” is narrower
than the one by van Eemeren and Houtlosser. The definition of Aakhus
(Aak03: 271, 270, 281-282) is philosophically and theoretically troublesome.
First, by writing “especially” the author prevents clarity to the question
whether an argumentative strategy can be actualized, when the second-order
conditions, i. e. “psychological factors,” or/ and the third-order conditions,
i. e. certain “social circumstances,” are fulfilled. Second, it remains open
in which sense an argumentative strategy can also refer to the first-order
conditions, i. e. “the rules of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure”
that regulate “the performance of speech acts” (cf. vEG04: 189, 38). If
from the terminological (philosophical) perspective it is unclear, or even
implausible, how the term “argumentative strategy” can be theoretically –
i. e. by means of ideal language – used: How can, in the other components,
100“In our terminology, strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse refers to the efforts that are made in
the discourse to move about between effectiveness and reasonableness in such a way that the balance – the
equilibrium – between the two is maintained” (vE10: 41).
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ever be an actualization of a strategic action, i. e. a relationship between
ideal language and actual language (cf. methodical gap)? However,
this troublesome matter does not occur with respect to the stipulation by
van Eemeren and Houtlosser. Their explication allows to speak about an
actualization of a strategic action.
Next, I further facilitate my take on the term by depicting the use of the
term “strategy” inside and outside the pragma-dialectical research program.
In pragma-dialectics, a synonym for the term argumentative strategy is
“strategy” (vEGJJ93: 173). In their chapter on sessions of mediation van
Eemeren et al. also employ the term “discourse strategy”: “Through these
discourse strategies real mediators try to live up to the standard of the ideal
mediator” (vEGJJ93: 119).101 In their rules for mediation the WIPO102
employs the term “procedures” and “means” (WIP09: 11).
Referring to the classicist Albert Rijksbaron, van Eemeren (cf. vE10: 41)
spells out the etymological background of the term “strategy.” The Greek
noun “stratêgos” is a configuration of the terms “strat-” meaning army and
the adjective “-êgos” meaning leading. So, stratêgos means commander or
general. The adjective “stratêgikos” means belonging to the prerogatives of
the commander. The privilege of generals include the planning of actions.
Likewise, about “Feldherrenkunst” (Wikb) in football Bisanz and Gerisch
write that “Strategie bedeutet Planung” (BG10: 377). However, I think a
strategy is different from creating a strategy. So, unlike the verb planning
or the noun “Planung” which refer to a procedure of creating a strategy I take
the noun strategy to refer to a plan, or “a methodical design.”
Now, summing up the aforementioned I develop my definition of “strategy.”
With respect to their strategic considerations in pragma-dialectics Aakhus
particularly refers to the conditions, van Eemeren and Houtlosser can
be understood to refer to both the conditions and the speech acts. In
general, “strategy” is a (commander ’s) plan of actions. In the sense
of the philosophical component (pragma-dialectics) I explicate the term
“strategy” and show the similarities and differences with the aforementioned
explications. I relate the term to the ideal model of critical discussion.
Moreover, I particularly present an understanding of the term “strategic
action.”
101Note, that, again, the authors emphasize the methodical gap (“real,” “ideal”).
102“WIPO” abbreviates World Intellectual Property Organization.
79
– Strategy is the configuration of possible forms of action that are in
accordance with particular rules and a particular purpose.103
The configuration in my definition can also be called a plan, or “a methodical
design.” That will bring it close to the meaning of strategy established by
the authors mentioned, both inside and outside pragma-dialectics. However, I
opted for the term “configuration” to leave it up to the reader’s natural (or, if
applicable, ideal) language to apply the meaning of strategy individually.104
Against the background of the troublesome matter e, the insights about
building ideal contexts and the two types of validity I spell out the forms
of action. A “form of action” is a configuration of ideal terms that can be
used to describe actions. An action can occur in a c referred to by means of
actual language, e. g. an action of a person in argumentative reality, or in a
c referred to by means of ideal language, e. g. an action of the protagonist
in critical discussion. The parties in critical discussion do play by, or “in
accordance with,” the pragma-dialectical rules. When the parties in critical
discussion act then any action is in accordance with the – first-, second-,
third- and fourth-order – conditions.105 So, a form of action, i. e. speech
acts, in critical discussion results in a pragma-dialectically reasonable action.
Spelling out the forms of action in critical discussion thus involves spelling
out that the conditions of critical discussion are fulfilled (cf. vEH02). Recast,
that in the procedure of critical discussion the conditions do not not hold (cf.
Aak03).
The parties apply only those speech acts that are possible according to the
theorist’s configuration of forms of action in the ideal model. Therefore, in
a strategy possible forms of actions are configured (“exploitation of options,”
e. g. the speech acts of requesting an argument, and advancing an argument).
103Due to the c of argumentation research an “argumentative strategy” refers to a strategy in a ci in argumentation
research. My concept of strategy is thus broader than a solely pragma-dialectical one.
104The r between strategy as a term from ideal language and “configuration” as a term from natural language
is such that instead of the term configuration other terms from natural language can be used to explicate
the actualization of a strategy. Van Eemeren et al. exemplarily write about an actualization of a strategy:
“participants engage in a combat of selves where argumentative strategy is dominated by a self-expressive
function and by moral constraints on [...]” (vEGJJ93: 158). By writing about a self-expressive function
it becomes apparent, that terms from the natural language (or, in this instance, of an ideal language from
psychology) of different persons can be brought to bear.
105The fourth-order conditions are “normal input and output conditions” which van Eemeren et al.
(vEGJJ93: 35) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 189) leave out, or discount, because their
relevance is not confined to utterances in argumentative reality. However, are not both the second- and
the third-order conditions, as well, relevant to discourse outside argumentative reality?
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So, I think it makes sense to chain the term strategy to the r between speech
acts – “opportunities” – and the different stages (cf. vEH02).
Unlike the considerations of the authors mentioned I particularly mention
the purpose – instead of the goal, or “target,” of influencing a particular stage
or the discussion “as a whole” – in the definition of strategy. Thus I arrive
at a definition of strategy in pragma-dialectics that refers to pragma-dialectics
as a research program rather than at a definition that refers only to the ci of
an ideal model or stencil. A strategic aim is an aim which facilitates to fulfill
the purpose of the strategy (strategic purpose). Different strategic aims, or
strategic goals can be instrumental to arrive at the same strategic purpose. For
example, in the pragma-dialectical research program different role models
arrive at different strategic aims and thus facilitate arriving at the strategic
purpose of pragma-dialectics.
So, a strategy in pragma-dialectics is a strategy with the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research, i. e. to optimize argumentative reality.
Applying a pragma-dialectical strategy means to “play pragma-dialectically”
because only pragma-dialectical forms of actions are included in such a
strategy. Furthermore, applying a pragma-dialectical strategy means to aim
at fulfilling a purpose that refers not only to those elements, relationships
and contexts (εis, ris and cis) configured in critical discussion, such as the
aim to arrive at the resolution of the difference of opinion, but to all of
the elements, relationships and contexts that can be “pragma-dialectical.”
So, a pragma-dialectical strategy can, for instance, refer to the use of
intuition to bridge the methodical gap in accordance with the rules that
a pragma-dialectical analyst must follow (cf. chapter 3: mediator as
pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance).
Next, a strategic action means to configure – or, again, methodically design
or planfully act – εs, rs and cs in accordance with a strategy.106 By means of
a strategic action a strategy is transformed into an action, a strategy is applied
(“systematic, coordinated and simultaneous”).
A strategic rule is a rule that is applied in creating or applying a strategy.
A pragma-dialectical strategic rule thus refers to a rule that is related to (at
least) one of the five components of the research program. The notion of a
strategic rule is particularly relevant when I concern myself with different
106Thus, the r between strategic action as a term from ideal language and “configuring” as a term from
natural language is such that instead of the term “configuring” other terms from natural language, such
as “methodically design,” can be used to explicate the actualization of a strategic action.
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research projects (cf. this chapter), and with my actions as a mediator – a
strategist – in the case study (cf. chapter 4). A “strategist” is a person who
manages elements, relationships and contexts (ε , r and c) in the sense of the
concepts “strategy,” “strategic action,” “strategic rule” or “strategic aim.”
Next, elaborating the module of strategy, I aim at facilitating the purposeful
application of the module, together, e. g., with the module of the five
components. I further elucidate the relationship between strategy and the
pragma-dialectical sense of reasonableness. Then I spell out why there is a
“bundle of strategies” in critical discussion and how that bundle of strategies
relates to the five role models. Taking into account the function of the ideal
model as a template and the pragma-dialectical sense of reasonableness, I sum
up why it is possible to distinguish the ideal model from the stencil. I thus
introduce the module of the quartet of terms, i. e. the means to manage the
different functions of ideal contexts in the layout of the five components.
The two types of validity facilitate strategic considerations with respect to
the ideal model of critical discussion. In critical discussion the goal of the
resolution of the difference of opinion is arrived at in a pragma-dialectically
reasonable fashion. First, the forms of action are the speech acts characterized
in the ideal model. Second, the configuration of those forms of action is
characterized in the definition of the ci, the ideal model of critical discussion.
Third, the accordance to the pragma-dialectical rules is elicited by the
accordance with the two types of validity. In the “problem-valid as well as
conventionally valid discussion procedure” that is “constituted” by the rules
(vEG04: 134), the rules are exerted on a track that is a pragma-dialectically
“reasonable” track to arrive at the goal in critical discussion. So, since the
parameter for reasonableness in critical discussion, i. e. the two types of
validity, gives rise to a variety of configurations of the matters in critical
discussion, reasonably obtaining the goal is a question of strategic actions.
Fourth, apparently the parties in critical discussion aim at a goal, but do not
aim at fulfilling a particular purpose. In fact, a theorist (pragma-dialectics)
configures the ci of critical discussion. This theorist can “let the parties exert”
a particular strategy by means of particular strategic actions.107 Suppose,
a pragma-dialectical practitioner is interested in teaching (cf. this chapter:
107Apparently, it makes sense to distinguish between the configuration of the matters in a ci of critical discussion
(“constituted” (cf. e. g. vE01: 157) by the theorist), and strategies in critical discussion, i. e. actions in a ci
(exerted by the parties).
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reflection and prescription in teaching). Arriving at the strategic aim of the
resolution of the difference of opinion and the strategic actions of the parties
in critical discussion are relevant to teaching, they are relevant to the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research. Making use of the philosophical stipulation of
the term strategy depends on the decisions in the theoretical component and
facilitates fulfilling the purpose of pragma-dialectical research.
Next, metaphorically speaking, in critical discussion there is a bundle of
strategies. Due to the two types of validity various combinations of possible
forms of actions can mean to act pragma-dialectically reasonable. When a
theorist (pragma-dialectics) has configured ideal elements and relationships
(εis and ris) which generate an ideal model, that does not mean that all
the possible configurations, that can be called “reasonable” in the sense
of pragma-dialectics, are exhausted. Any of such configurations generates
an ideal context (ci) which suffices the pragma-dialectical stipulation of
reasonableness and thus facilitates that the parties act in accordance with the
rules, and with the end of having arrived at the strategic aim of the resolution
of the difference of opinion.
Opting for a focus on the application of the pragma-dialectical rules
different strategies from the bundle of strategies in critical discussion can be
revealed. I present strategies to (not) exert a particular rule, and I present
a strategy as to how to exert the rules. In any of the examples the party
acts strategically, i. e. in accordance with the pragma-dialectical rules, and
with the strategic goal which relates to the pragma-dialectical purpose in the
aforementioned sense.
First, in a strategy one of the fifteen rules of critical discussion is not
applied. For instance, even if the antagonist does not apply rule 10, in which
“the optimal use of the right to attack” (vEG04: 151-152) is defined, against
the background of the pragma-dialectical purpose he is still proceeding
reasonably towards the resolution of the difference of opinion when he exerts
rule 6 (cf. below).
Next, not applying a rule can be illustrated by a strategy in critical
discussion to apply a rule though against the background of the
pragma-dialectical purpose to optimize argumentative reality, e. g. in
argumentation research, it is not plausible to exert that rule. For instance,
the protagonist exerts rule 15, which regulates the “rights and obligations
of discussants in relation to the performance of usage declaratives or to
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requesting the performance of usage declaratives” (vEG04: 157),108 though
it is clear that the protagonist must not exert this rule because in critical
discussion there is no obscurity – neither is there any obscurity to the
antagonist nor to the protagonist. In this example, the reason that the
protagonist does exert rule 15 is that he does not doubt the need to (not) exert
a particular rule in critical discussion. The strategy is defined by the theorist;
though the researcher’s strategic actions do not provide an optimization of
argumentative reality in argumentation research. So, the strategies in critical
discussion are different from the strategies of researchers. In fact, ideal
models and stencils are instrumental to the pragma-dialectical purpose.
Next, not applying a rule can be illustrated by a strategy in which only
parts of a rule are exerted. For instance, rule 6 consists of the rules 6a., 6b.
and 6c. The antagonist applies rule 6b. which regulates that he “may always
attack a standpoint by calling into question the propositional content or the
justificatory force or refutatory force of the argumentation” (vEG04: 144).
So, he can apply this rule in a limited way by only calling into question
the propositional content of an argument (“or”). Again, in this example
the reason that the antagonist exerts rule 6b. in this way is that against the
background of the pragma-dialectical purpose a theorist has configured that
this is the optimal use of the right to attack (cf. rule 10). A theorist can let
the antagonist exert this rule in this way, i. e. this theorist defines the strategy.
The antagonist does not doubt the forms of action or whether or not exerting a
particular strategy in critical discussion is “desirable.” The parties can arrive
at a strategic goal which facilitates to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose.
Second, I present an example of how to exert a rule in applying a certain
form of action. A strategy as to how to exert rule 11 which regulates
“the optimal use of the right to defend” in critical discussion is that the
protagonist brings forth argumentation which can be designated “the use
of pathos” (vEG04: 151-152, 192). The form of action “to bring forth
argumentation” means that an argument scheme is used.109 However, which
of the pragma-dialectical argument schemes the protagonist exerts to bring
forth “a use of pathos” can be defined by a strategy. For instance, the argument
scheme of analogy can result in the utterance “This is like [pathos].” The r
108Cf. this chapter: usage declaratives.
109In pragma-dialectics there are the “main” argument schemes of causal argumentation, symptomatic
argumentation and analogy argumentation, as well as various “subtypes” (cf. e. g. van Eemeren et al.,
2002: 96-104; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 94-102).
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between the pragma-dialectical philosopher, theorist and the parties’ strategic
actions in the ideal model are illustrated in figure 2.4.110
two types of validity (Ph)
critical discussion (Th):
forms of action and rules
protagonist acts
strategically
e. g. rule 11
antagonist acts
strategically
e. g. rule 6
Figure 2.4: Strategy in critical discussion.
Since different strategies to arrive at the end in critical discussion can be
defined, a particular strategy may be labeled in a particular way. For example,
the previous one may be labeled “the strategy of pathos in analogies.” Taken
together, all the possible strategies can be shown by means of the metaphor of
a bundle of strategies in critical discussion.
In sum, making use of the modules of the five components and my
definitions of strategy and strategic action the module of the quartet of
terms – “ideal model,” “stencil,” “blueprint” and “grid” – can be concluded.
In fact, I have shown two reasons that building pragma-dialectical stencils
is possible. First, the ideal model of critical discussion is a “universal”
template for blueprints – or, for that matter, for grids which are used to
either analyze argumentative reality, or check ideal contexts. The ideal model
is thus an option to arrive at clarity to both cas, and cis. It is an option
to optimize argumentative reality. Second, the pragma-dialectical concept
of “reasonableness” facilitates that a theorist (pragma-dialectics) can define
different configurations of the framework of critical discussion and different
pragma-dialectical strategies – all of which accord with the two types of
validity.
110Abbreviations in figure 2.4: Ph = philosopher, Th = theorist.
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The quartet of terms illustrates – by taking into consideration the module
of the four languages – the differences between role models (cf. chapter
1). The quartet of terms facilitates to manage the module of the
troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics), in particular the troublesome
matter in pragma-dialectics e (cf. this chapter). Also, by spelling out
the module of the quartet of terms I facilitate to introduce the module
of an ontological framework (cf. chapter 3) – which, in turn, I employ
(by taking into consideration the module of strategy) to introduce the
module of the integration of role models (cf. chapter 3). So, the module
of the quartet of terms facilitates to apply the definitions of strategy and
strategic action in argumentative reality (cf. chapter 4).
Focussing on the quartet of terms I further elucidate the relationship between
the ideal model and the stencil. I further the insights how to build ideal
contexts – a stencil –, against the backgrounds of the terms from ideal
language and the pragma-dialectical sense of reasonableness. Concluding
with an overview of the different functions of ideal contexts in argumentation
research I sum up my scrutiny of the troublesome matter e.
Pragma-dialectical ideal terms should be used to characterize critical
discussion and blueprints, i. e. in building a stencil, too, the terms “acquire”
a meaning in an ideal context (cf. this chapter: troublesome matter B).
Therefore elements and relationships defined in the context of the ideal model
(ci) are different from those in the context of the stencil (ci). However,
configuring a blueprint as a derivative from an ideal model relevant terms
from the template are represented in a blueprint, thus the different elements
and relationships (εis and ris) can correspond.
However, by distinguishing between the elements and relationships of the
two ideal contexts the scopes and functions of the stencil can properly be
spelled out. Unlike the ideal model, the stencil can be used by the analyst,
and empiricist, which is particularly relevant against the background of the
management of bridging elements, relationships and contexts (εia, ria, cia,
and εai, rai and cai) – i. e. the methodical gap.
Next, I relate the ideal model and the stencil to the two types of validity
and the five role models. I exemplarily illustrate that the quartet of terms is
a “remedy” (cf. Kve12) when I relate the three languages to the functions of
ideal contexts.
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Both ideal model and blueprint accord with the pragma-dialectical concept
of “reasonableness.” Both are contexts facilitating strategic considerations
about how to manage the εis and ris in the respective cis.
As stated, it makes no sense that the parties in critical discussion scrutinize
the problem validity and the conventional validity of the rules. However, in
argumentative reality, people may very well have the intention to scrutinize
those actual elements and relationships that an empiricist will show to be
relevant to the problem validity and the conventional validity in the sense
of an ideal procedure. In a discourse people may very well have the intent to
scrutinize the rules they (do not) acknowledge.111 So, against the background
of the purpose of pragma-dialectical research and the methodical gap a
theorist builds the blueprint with the intent to apply it to argumentative
reality. In fact, by means of the stencil the pragma-dialectical concept of
reasonableness must be applicable to argumentative reality for researchers in
the analytical, the empirical and the practical component (cf. this chapter:
functions of stencil).
The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation regards each
argumentation as part of an explicit or implicit discussion
between parties who try to resolve a difference of opinion (that
may be implicit) by testing the acceptability of the standpoints
concerned. To resolve the difference of opinion, the discussion
has to go through several stages (vEG04: 21).
An empiricist questions whether or not, and in which sense the
pragma-dialectical conception of reasonableness elicited by the two types
of validity in the context of a grid suits the sequence of “convincing” and
“testing” in argumentative reality (cf. chapter 4). For instance, in a grid
that is a “one-to-one-image” of critical discussion in the sense that there are
fifteen rules, an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) finds out that this blueprint is
not applicable for, say, an analysis of a discourse from the Law:
[...] legal procedures provide additional rules necessary for a
rational resolution of legal disputes. Such rules supplement,
111In fact, it may be relevant in a ca to assess whether or not, and which rule(s) they do (not) acknowledge in
creating a procedure to – analytically speaking – resolve a difference of opinion. However, note that the
philosophical question what it is that makes an action a pragma-dialectically “reasonable” action precedes
the theoretical procedure characterized in an ideal model or the blueprint. Therefore, in the (theoretical)
opening stage of critical discussion, or a blueprint, the (philosophical) two types of validity cannot be at
stake in the parties’ “[a]greement on premises and discussion rules” (vEG04: 68). In the opening stage the
parties do not consider the philosophically stipulated “pragma-dialectical reasonableness.”
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amend, or restrict more general pragma-dialectical rules for
contexts in which various higher-order conditions are not met.
[...] [O]ne must show how these implementations, additions, or
restrictions can be justified in relation to the legal order as well as
from the perspective of a rational discourse in the relevant legal
context (Fet03: 154).
Feteris particularly suggests the option of a difference between the
higher-order conditions in a stencil and the higher-order conditions in the
ideal model. So, the empiricist states, for example, that the participants
in the discourse acknowledge to not employ a certain rule that would be
reconstructed as “rule 1” from the blueprint. Then, apparently, the grid
is not suitable for analyses of a discourse from this ca. The empiricist
(pragma-dialectics) may suggest a theorist (pragma-dialectics) to amend the
blueprint by neglecting its rule 1. The grid in which only fourteen rules of –
the “general pragma-dialectical rules” from the “universal” critical discussion
– are required for arriving at “reasonableness” may thus be appropriate for
this analyst (pragma-dialectics) of a discourse from the respective ca of the
Law.
Thus, in pragma-dialectics different stencils should be depicted. Persons
in a discourse may scrutinize the reasonableness, e. g., of a rule. Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst refer to the need of a particular grid for analyses
of monologues: “The monologue is then taken to be a specific kind of critical
discussion” (vEG04: 59). So, based on its functionality an analyst should
have the choice to make use of one particular grid instead of another: The
conditions of a certain grid can suitably be relativized onto a certain fragment,
i. e. the grid is relevant to an analysis of this very actual context (cf. chapter
3: integration of mediation with critical discussion, ontological framework).
So, on the one hand a theorist (pragma-dialectics) manages the two types
of validity similarly in building an ideal model, or stencil. On the other hand,
with respect to the five components it becomes obvious why reasonableness
is managed differently in the template, and derivative. Only the theorist is
concerned with the functions – and thus the elicitation of reasonableness –
of the ideal model. The theorist, analyst and empiricist are concerned with
the functions of the blueprint. This is what I understand van Eemeren and
Grootendorst to point at when they write that “we can also show how this ideal
[of reasonableness] can be implemented [...] in the analytical reconstruction”
(vEG04: 116, my italics). An analytical reconstruction, in turn, facilitates to
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fulfill the purpose of pragma-dialectical research to optimize argumentative
reality (cf. chapter 4).
Next I illustrate the possible correspondence between matters from
critical discussion and an blueprint. So, I present an example of a
pragma-dialectical theorist’s relating of terms in building a blueprint. A
theorist (pragma-dialectics) creates an r between the terms “protagonist,”
“antagonist” and the “higher-order conditions.” Now, as shown, “protagonist”
and “antagonist” are terms from ideal language that are configured as “the
parties” in critical discussion. Yet in their chapter “A Code of Conduct for
Reasonable Discussants” van Eemeren and Grootendorst employ the terms
“protagonist” and “antagonist,” “first-order conditions” and “higher-order
conditions” to talk about a stencil rather than about critical discussion:
By clearly and systematically indicating what the rules for
conducting a critical discussion are, the model provides those
who want to fulfill the role of reasonable discussants with a series
of well-defined guidelines, which may, though formulated on a
higher level of abstraction and based on a more clearly articulated
philosophical ideal, to a great extent be identical to the norms
they would like to see observed anyway (vEG04: 189).
Making use of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics), there is no question, that
pragma-dialecticians apply the terms “ideal” and “model” to refer to matters
that are managed by means of ideal language. However, there are (rather more
than less) examples, in which these terms are employed in a sense of natural
language. Against the background of the methodical gap “those who want to
fulfill the role of reasonable discussants,” i. e. those who aim at actualizing
particular roles in argumentative reality, cannot be the parties in critical
discussion. In the quote the term “model,” and respectively “reasonableness,”
refers to the stencil.
By means of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) and the quartet of terms it
becomes clear, that pragma-dialecticians employ the term “ideal” not only
to refer to the ideal model. The ideal context of a blueprint also brings
about an ideal sense of reasonableness as the parties are “[...] conducting
a critical discussion in the ideal sense”; likewise, in their “conducting” the
parties satisfy the “[...] higher order conditions for resolving differences of
opinion” (vEG04: 189).
So, relating the terms “protagonist,” “antagonist” and “higher-order
conditions” brings on a blueprint with two parties, protagonist and antagonist,
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who do fulfill the higher-order conditions. Note, however that the elements
and relationships in a blueprint can be traced back to “a higher level of
abstraction and based on a more clearly articulated philosophical ideal,” i. e.
the ci of the “universal” ideal model of critical discussion.
As another case in point, thus far, in pragma-dialectics, the term “ideal
model,” as well, is employed in the sense of natural language. Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst write: “As an ideal model, it reproduces only those aspects
relevant to the resolution of a dispute; the model provides a set of instruments
for grasping reality and to determine to what extent practice corresponds to
the requirements of the resolution process” (vEG88: 507, 509). Again, how
can critical discussion “reproduce” certain matters for “grasping reality” if its
matters cannot be immediately chained to argumentative reality? I think that
“our ideal model” facilitates to build stencils.
However, concluding the scrutiny of the troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics e I illustrate against the background of the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics) the relationship between an ideal model and a respective















εa, ra, ca as εi, ri, ci? (An)
εi, ri, ci as εa, ra, ca? (Em)
Figure 2.5: Three languages and functions of cis.
It is a troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that the rules of critical
discussion are suggested to function like rules from a stencil ( f ). This can
112Abbreviations in figure 2.5: Th = theorist, An = analyst, Em = empiricist.
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be traced back to the use of any of the four languages because it can be traced
back to the troublesome matter that there is a correspondence between ideal
and actual elements, relationships and contexts (E), to the troublesome matter
that authors do not stick to the established meaning of a term (F), or to the
troublesome matter that use of a term is not transparent (H).
Next, in order to foster the understanding of the module of the quartet of
terms I refer to the pragma-dialectical take on the concept “fallacy” and its
relationship to the pragma-dialectical “code of conduct,” and I spell out the
functions of the stencil. In that endeavor I refer to the term “critical” which
facilitates the module of the integration of role models (cf. chapter 3), so I
further facilitate the application of the module of the ontological framework
in the case study (cf. chapter 4).
Either van Eemeren suggests that a fallacy can arise in critical discussion,
or the following quote is another example of the troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics that a researcher does not take into consideration that a
describing language is needed to manage the bridging elements, relationships
and contexts (εias, rias, cias, and εais, rais and cais):
These rules can be recapitulated in a series of basic principles,
each of which expresses a separate standard or norm for critical
discussion. Any infringement, whichever party commits it, and
at whichever stage in the discussion, is a possible threat to
the resolution of a difference of opinion and must therefore
be regarded as an incorrect move or “fallacy.” The term
fallacy is thus systematically connected with the rules for critical
discussion and defined as a speech act that prejudices or frustrates
efforts to resolve a difference of opinion (vE01: 157-158).
“Fallacy” may be understood as a term configured in the ci of critical
discussion. The author introduces the rules as “principles” for critical
discussion. Fallacy is an “infringement” in one of the stages of critical
discussion. However, the parties in critical discussion apply the forms of
action reasonably, in the sense of the two types of validity. Just as there is no
obscurity in the ideal framework of critical discussion any strategy in the ideal
framework is exerted without any mistake, without any “fallacy.” It makes no
sense to define “fallacy” in critical discussion.113
113It is one of pragma-dialectics’ characterizations of the scopes of critical discussion is the recurrent assessment
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When the theorist who builds a pragma-dialectical blueprint relates the
matter of the parties to the matter of the rules he configures those forms
of action of protagonist and antagonist that are employed to translate the
turns of persons in a discourse into ideal terms. And most certainly, “the
empirical domain will provide useful starting points” (vEG04: 28): The
actualization of argumentation may come out to not correspond to the
meaning of argumentation in the context of a grid. So, a turn of a person
may not be suitable to the rules configured in the grid. Since there can only
be a “correspondence” between ideal model and stencil, it is possible that
theorists configure blueprints by using terms that are not configured in the
ideal model.
So, I conclude the meaning, and the location, of the term “fallacy” in
pragma-dialectics. Any such move that is not suitable to the rules of the
stencil is determined to hinder the resolution of the difference of opinion, and
is thus determined as “fallacy.” In building a stencil – by relating the terms
“the parties” and “the rules” – the theorist (pragma-dialectics) can conclude
the meaning of “fallacy” in the stencil. Because the rules of the stencil, not the
rules of the ideal model, are used to relativize the concept of reasonableness
onto a discourse, the rules of a blueprint must be considered to be different
from the rules of an ideal model. “Fallacy” is a concept that does have a place
in the theoretical component of pragma-dialectics, though this place is not in
the ideal model. In pragma-dialectics, the term “fallacy” is part of the ideal
language, and its meaning is restricted to stencils.114
Now, when “fallacy” is understood as a term from a blueprint, van Eemeren
is still right, that it is “systematically connected with the rules for critical
discussion”: The connection is the correspondence between template and
derivative. Fallacies can thus, e. g. by a pragma-dialectical analyst, be
“regarded as” (cf. describing language) a “possible” threat in a discourse.
If fallacies are part of a blueprint rather than of an ideal model, it is
that critical discussion is ideal rather than actual, e. g. as Amjarso writes: “[...] observing the rules of critical
discussion, is not what is in actual practices (as opposed to the ideal context of critical discussion) required
of arguers [...]” (Amj07: 7). The opposition of ideal model and argumentative reality (“actual practices”)
with respect to rules illustrates that in the procedure of critical discussion mistakes, or fallacies, cannot
occur.
114Likewise, it is desirable that pragma-dialecticians, e. g. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 67), present
the speech act usage declarative as a term in ideal language. Though in critical discussion, a theory that
is “stronger than strong” in the sense of Kvernbekk, I suggest that the parties do not apply this speech
act. Therefore in the configuration of the ideal model applying a usage declarative is a superfluous form
of action. However, in applying a stencil an analyst (pragma-dialectics) may require usage declaratives to
analyze a discourse in regards of clarity to the respective elements, relationships and contexts.
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particularly remarkable that van Eemeren and Grootendorst state that the
“code of conduct” is suggested as “a simplified version [of the rules of critical
discussion], specially adapted to the analysis of fallacies” (vEG88: 509). So,
it is worthwhile to elaborate whether the pragma-dialectical “code of conduct”
(vEG04: chapter 8) can thus be understood as an attempt to suggest rules for
a blueprint.
For practical purposes, we now propose a simple code of conduct
for reasonable discussants who want to resolve their differences
of opinion by means of argumentation that is based on the critical
insights expressed in the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure
(vEG04: 190).
Next, I present the code of conduct. The reason for pragma-dialecticians
to present the code of conduct is that the procedure of critical discussion
is “too technical for immediate use” (vEG04: 190). However, the code of
conduct “is based on critical insights,” the authors talk about the philosophy
of reasonableness. Note, that the philosophy of reasonableness is “expressed”
– or in my terms “elicited” – in the procedure of critical discussion. The
philosophy precedes the theory (cf. this chapter: the scaffold).
Moreover, van Eemeren and Grootendorst point to the correspondence
between the ideal model and a blueprint in the research program (cf. this
chapter: quartet of terms). The “practical purposes,” I sense, refer to
the functions of the grid, e. g. analyses (cf. this chapter: functions of
stencil). So, the procedure of critical discussion is “too technical” to optimize
argumentative reality. In fact, the code of conduct may be intended to
depict the rules for a blueprint in order to manage the bridging elements,
relationships and contexts (εias, rias, cias, and εais, rais, cais).
At last, by means of an analogy I elucidate the practicality of the code of
conduct which van Eemeren and Grootendorst spell out. Then I chain the
conclusion to the module of strategy.
In football according to DFB there is the term “Abseitsstellung” (as part of
an ideal language). This term does not define a violation of any rule, and by
and in itself, this status is not “an infringement” to the procedure of the game:
“Die Abseitsstellung eines Spielers stellt an sich noch kein Vergehen dar.”
It defines a status in the game, and this status is neither an advantage nor a
disadvantage: “Ein Spieler befindet sich in einer Abseitsstellung, wenn er der
gegnerischen Torlinie näher ist als der Ball und der vorletzte Gegenspieler.”
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However, rule 11 of DFB can be violated only when a player acts in an
“Abseitsstellung”: “wenn er nach Ansicht des Schiedsrichters zum Zeitpunkt,
zu dem der Ball von einem Mitspieler berührt oder gespielt wird, aktiv am
Spiel teilnimmt” (Deu13: 71). Where is the player whose being offside is
in question, where is the baseline of the opposing team, where is the ball,
where is the second last player of the opposing team – a referee assesses by
means of the relationship (r) depicted between certain ideal elements (εis) the
configuration in a certain actual context (ca, “Zeitpunkt”).
Likewise, it is not the ci that actualizes fallacies in a discourse, it is a person.
In an analysis the term “fallacy” is used to translate a configuration in the ca of
a discourse into the state of a violation of a particular rule from a blueprint – an
“infringement” to the procedure that is configured in the ci. Just as a violation
of rule 11 of DFB can only be assessed by taking into consideration an action
(“aktiv”) in the particular ca, the violation of a rule from a pragma-dialectical
grid is brought about by means of an action in argumentative reality.
Now, recast that in different blueprints different strategies are
characterized. Both “the protagonist and the antagonist can commit
violations” of the rules (vEG04: 174), and a move in the ideal context is
brought about by applying a rule from the grid. Applying the rules is brought
about by certain forms of action in the application of a strategy. Therefore, a
“fallacy” is a move that is not suitable to a particular strategy that is applied.
The mistake is “in” the behavior which is inappropriate to the strategy.
Next, I spell out the functions of a stencil. Just as the scopes of an ideal
model are restricted, the scopes of stencils are restricted, too (cf. this chapter:
structure and scopes of ideal model). However, in building the stencil the
theorist is oriented towards the application of the stencil for sake of bridging
the methodical gap. That involves, e. g., that particular conditions are defined
in the stencil. A stencil is not applicable to “all settings.” Metaphorically
speaking, three of the five role models are particularly concerned with the
(application of the) stencil: the theorist builds the blueprint, and the theorist,
the analyst and the empiricist use the grid. So, against the background of the
distinction between the five components, I conclude the functions of a stencil
in pragma-dialectics.
First, when the stencil is built the pragma-dialectical theorist may “play
around” with it in the sense of a blueprint (cf. this chapter: playing
around with the ideal model). Second, and third, as a grid the stencil
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has two functions. In pragma-dialectics, a grid has one function in the
analytical component and one function in the empirical component. The more
transparent a theorist makes the scopes of a grid the better the functions of the
grid can be made use of (cf. this chapter: analysis of texts from the Law,
14 rules) because the respective analyst or empiricist can, as well, research
transparently. Because it is particularly relevant to integrate the modules in
the case study (cf. chapter 4) I particularly elaborate the function of the grid
in the pragma-dialectical analytical component. However, I do also refer to
the function of the grid in the empirical component of pragma-dialectics.
The function of a grid in the analytical component (pragma-dialectics) is
to depict discourse based on an analysis. However, against the background of
the methodical gap “ordinary argument” (argumentative reality)115 can only
be analyzed properly when an argumentation researcher applies a grid and
a describing language. Examples of relevant terms from pragma-dialectical
describing language that an analyst employs are first, reconstruct and second,
evaluate.
First, the grid is employed “as a heuristic tool in the process of analytic
reconstruction and as an evaluative tool in the process of critical assessment”
(Hou98: 388).116 As a heuristic tool the grid is used, first, to show that the
conditions from the grid are actualized in the discourse. Then, second, text
from actual language is assigned to – reconstructed as – terms from ideal
language configured in the stencil. For example, the term “standpoint” defined
in the context of the grid, and thus an εa, ra or ca can be reconstructed as a
standpoint.
Second, the result of the reconstruction “can serve as a starting point for a
well-founded evaluation” (vEHSH07: 5). As an evaluative utensil the grid is
used, for example, to spell out mistakes as fallacies. So, all in all, an analyst
can show “when, how, and why” discourse “deviates from a critical ideal,”
hence the bridge between a ca and a ci (vEGSH96: 278). The stencil is applied
like a “strong theory” in Kvernbekk’s sense.
The term “critical” is particularly relevant to research with the grid in the
pragma-dialectical analytical component. So I explicate the terms “critical”
and “critical analyst.” On the one hand, van Eemeren et al. write about
“critical reconstruction” (vEGJJ93: 48), on the other hand van Eemeren
115Cf. van Eemeren et al. (vEGSH96: 278).
116In that sense the rules configured in a grid “are not algorithmic, but heuristic; they are not rules that
automatically lead to a specific series of instructions that always guarantee the desired result” (vEG04: 35).
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and Grootendorst write about the stencil’s function as an evaluative tool:
“The critical function is that of serving as a standard in the evaluation [...]”
(vEG04: 59). So, the meaning of the term “critical” can be chained to the
functions of the stencil in an analysis in pragma-dialectics.117
A person can actualize a particular form of action so that he appears
critical (also cf. chapter 3: mediator and “neutrality”) in the sense of the
“critical-rationalistic philosophy of reasonableness” (vEG04: 21) when he
“react[s] critically to what is offered” (vEG04: 36) in a ca. Suppose the ca
is a pragma-dialectical research project. Depicting the term “critical analyst”
Aakhus sums up that “[...] a critical analyst [...] uses the critical discussion
model [grid] to interpret the argumentative functions of moves in a dialogue”
(Aak03: 267). In my terms a pragma-dialectical critical analyst uses the grid
to analyze a fragment (cf. chapter 3: mediator as analyst (pragma-dialectics)).
For instance, an analyst (pragma-dialectics) makes use of critical questions
as a standard in the analysis of a discourse.118 Consequently, an analyst in
pragma-dialectics is a critical analyst.
The function of a grid in the empirical component (pragma-dialectics)
is to check the correspondence between actual language configured in
argumentative reality and the configuration of an ideal language in a grid.
An empiricist may arrive at the conclusion that the grid is not an appropriate
means to reconstruct and evaluate discourses. He thus spells out why and
how either the particular grid should be amended, or he may even trace back
his conclusion to the configuration of the template, the ideal model. (cf. this
chapter: empirical component)
Next, I show in which way the functions of a stencil in the sense of a grid
facilitate to arrive at the target(s) of the pragma-dialectical practitioner (cf.
this chapter: targets of practical component (pragma-dialectics)). Because
van Eemeren and Garssen present how to spell out certain fallacies they are
can be understood to be talking about the use of a grid: “When the answers to
these questions are known, it is easier to recognize – and to avoid – mistakes”
(vEG09a: 25). The target to “recognize” mistakes suggests the use of the grid
for reflection-minded teaching. The target “to avoid mistakes” suggests the
use of the grid for prescription-minded teaching. So, I particularly spell out
the use of the grid in educational contexts.
In “reflection-minded” (vE90: 43) teaching students are supported to arrive
117Cf. the instantiation of the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics ct in the case study (chapter 4).
118For critical questions cf. Garssen (Gar01: 91).
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at clarity to discourses. Teaching students a grid as an evaluative tool can
support them to behave reflection-minded. A part of this reflection-minded
teaching is, for instance, to teach that depending on different situations –
e. g. with respect to the conditions – in various cas different grids should
be employed. Also by recurrent analyses of texts the intuition of students in
disputes is routed in the sense of the grid.
In “prescription-minded” (vE90: 42) teaching the intuition of students
to actualize matters from the grid is routed (cf. chapter 3: mediator as
practitioner): “The pragma-dialectical model [grid] of a critical discussion
is a theoretically motivated system for resolution-oriented discourse”
(vE09: 76). Different cas can be analyzed as “resolution-oriented discourse.”
Hence discourses with different conditions, and different options for strategic
actions. Students can be taught when to actualize a suitable grid. Thus,
different “theoretically motivated systems” – i. e. stencils – should be built
(cf. this chapter).
There is the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that in the theoretical
component – i. e. in the use of ideal, and the creation and use of
describing language – the translation criteria are improperly depicted (g). This
troublesome matter may be traced back to the troublesome matters that there
is only a correspondence between matters from ideal language and matters
from actual language (E), to the troublesome matter of not sticking to the
established meaning of a term (F) and to the troublesome matter that the use
of a term is not transparent (H).119
An analyst needs clarity to the question by which means he can manage
bridging elements, relationships and contexts (εias, rias and cias) – e. g. in
the sense of a pragma-dialectical reconstruction. A theorist elucidates the
respective translation criteria for reconstructing and evaluating εa, ra and
ca as εi, ri or ci. So, depicting translation criteria properly is particularly
relevant to arrive at clarity to the scopes of the grid. However, against the
background of the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that researchers
do not take into consideration that a describing language is needed to manage
εia, ria, cia it makes sense to scrutinize whether the translation criteria that
pragma-dialecticians suggest for the use of the critical discussion can be used
as translation criteria for research with a stencil.
119I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
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Next, I scrutinize the function of pragma-dialectical translation criteria. I
particularly emphasize the role of intuition in analyses.
Authors in pragma-dialectics suggest that intuition is not needed in an
analysis (pragma-dialectics). I aim at backing up this impression by means
of quoting a pragma-dialectical position about analyses in pragma-dialectics,
and then I chain the quotation to an example. So, a pragma-dialectical analysis
is characterized as “etic”:
[T]he discourse is analyzed from an external perspective. Starting
from objective verbal and nonverbal cues, the analyst aims at
identifying what is going on in the discourse by applying an
explicit decision procedure (vEGJJ93: 51, my italics).
Now, in their article The fallacies of composition and division revisited van
Eemeren and Garssen state in an example that “[...] it can, in principle, be
determined independently whether or not someone or something has that
property.” In their analysis they use the translation criterion of “linguistic
criteria for judging whether or not the validity rule has been violated”
(vEG09a: 24, 28-29). In particular, van Eemeren and Garssen present the
example of the relative property “That bag is heavy” (vEG09a: 29). So,
persons in a dispute scrutinize whether or not a bag is “heavy.” The authors
spell out the (comparative) criterion to assess whether or not a bag is “heavy”:
“a heavy bag is a bag that weighs more than a bag weighs on average”
(vEG09a: 29).
Unlike the pragma-dialecticians who suggest that in an analysis intuition is
not needed I think, that the linguistic indicators cannot be applied objectively,
or in principle or independently of an analyst to determine whether properties
do (not) occur. I suppose van Eemeren and Garssen do not expect an analyst
to find statistical data about the average weight of bags in order to evaluate
the discourse. But what if this analyst has never carried any bag, or only one
bag in his entire life, or only bags with the same weight? The comparative
criterion to “independently” determine that a bag is “heavy” is used to route
the intuition of the pragma-dialectical analyst. In fact, the pragma-dialectical
translation criteria support an analytical-intuitive reconstruction.
The term “analytical reconstruction” – cf. e. g. van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (vEG04: 23) – is misleading. Indeed, the pragma-dialectical
reconstruction is analytical in the sense of “etic” when it comes to the function
of the analytical component because the ci of the grid does facilitate an
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“external perspective” in an analysis. However, the application of “logical
gadgets” such as linguistic indicators is not independent from an analyst’s
intuition. Pragma-dialecticians write that “[i]n practice, the logical analysis is
instrumental for the pragmatic analysis” (vEG92: 60).
In the analytical component (pragma-dialectics) the translation
criteria depicted by a theorist (pragma-dialectics) are employed for an
analytical-intuitive reconstruction of a discourse. By means of an analysis
a pragma-dialectician manages the methodical gap between ideal language
and actual language by employing a grid. However, he can only show
a correspondence between the respective ci and a particular ca from
argumentative reality. In building the stencil, the theorist spells out
particularly relevant matters – such as a particular strategy, or fallacies – that
can be researched by means of the respective grid.120
It is a troublesome matter in the theoretical component, i. e. particularly in
the use of ideal and describing language, that there is no proper distinction
between the ideal model and a stencil (h). This troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics may be traced back to the troublesome matters that there
is no definition for a “relevant” term (cf. “ideal,” “model,” “ideal model”) (B)
or to not acknowledge that the r between ideal language and actual language
(cf. strong and weak theories) – just like the r between ideal model and stencil
(cf. fallacy) – is not more than a “correspondence” (E), or to use a term from
one language in another language (G).121
Against the background of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) each of the five
components in pragma-dialectics is a distinct context. Moreover, due to the
methodical gap the elements and relationships from an ideal model cannot be
immediately related to actual elements and relationships (cf. vEGJJ93: 30).
The module of the quartet of term reveals that the scopes and functions of
the ideal model are limited to those components that do not employ actual
language. And, locating “fallacy” in the ideal model of pragma-dialectics
makes no sense.
Against the background of the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics
a researchers tend to use the terms from the ideal model as if they
can simultaneously fulfill the functions of the terms from the stencil.
120Likewise, van Eemeren and Grootendorst employ the term “magnifying glass” (vEG04: 19).
121I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential, and actual issues in the
case study (cf. chapter 4).
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Pragma-dialectical authors recurrently write about “a critical discussion”
(e. g. vEG04: 134), as if there was another critical discussion in
pragma-dialectics. Similarly pragma-dialecticians write about the parties in
critical discussion: “By a critical discussion we mean a discussion between a
protagonist and an antagonist [...]” (vEG84: 17). In critical discussion there
are the protagonist and the antagonist. Therefore I think that the authors mean
by “a critical discussion” the stencil.
All in all, in respect of the theoretical component (pragma-dialectics) it
has become apparent that the distinction between ideal model and stencil is
particularly relevant to achieve clarity to the matters. A troublesome matter
with respect to the ideal model can pull in obscurity to the stencil because
the latter is a derivative of the former. However, the module of the quartet of
terms remedies this troublesome matter. The pragma-dialectical philosophical
stipulation of “reasonableness” as well as the module of “strategy” facilitate
to spell out an r between the four ideal contexts of ideal model, stencil,
blueprint and grid. Still, the different functions of the ideal contexts in the
five components point to the need to distinguish them. Making use of the
scaffold (pragma-dialectics) I thus recast in figure 2.6 why an ideal model























Figure 2.6: The methodical gap, tasks of role models and functions of cis.
122Abbreviations in figure 2.6: Th = theorist, An = analyst, Em = empiricist.
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2.2.4 The analytical component
In the analytical component of pragma-dialectics a researcher makes use
of the research results from theorists. In order to analyze discourse from
argumentative reality he employs the grid, the describing language of the
research program and the translation criteria presented in the characterization
of the blueprint. After having managed the matters of the grid, and the
describing language, next I scrutinize the status quo of the pragma-dialectical
matter of translation criteria. I conclude consequences for the research
program, e. g. with respect to the concept “standpoint,” and I further facilitate
to introduce the module of the integration of role models (cf. chapter 3) and
to hence conduct the case study (cf. chapter 4).
It is a troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that in a reconstruction –
i. e. particularly in the use of the three languages – the translation criteria are
not employed (i). This can be traced back to the troublesome matters that the
use of a term is not transparent (H), or that there is an unclear establishments
of meaning (C).123
Some of the translation criteria presented in pragma-dialectics are
speech act conditions, dialectical transformations, and linguistic indicators.
Moreover in a reconstruction in pragma-dialectics the respective analyst can
fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose by employing the strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction, the strategy of maximally argumentative analysis,
maximally dialectical analysis and the strategy of maximally argumentative
interpretation. I briefly present all of the aforementioned. I particularly
depict the target of each of them and, in order to arrive at clarity to what I
mean by “transparent reconstruction,” I suggest when and how they should be
employed.
The target of employing speech act conditions, dialectical transformations,
and linguistic indicators is to localize in a discourse a matter from the grid
in order to bridge the methodical gap. Speech act conditions should be
employed when an analyst (pragma-dialectics) aims at establishing that a
particular speech act can be shown to occur in the discourse, in order to
“clarify what sort of speech act is performed when argumentation is put
123I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
101
forward and what conditions may be deemed to have been fulfilled when that
speech act is performed” (vEG84: 19). Analyzing a discourse with respect to
sorts of speech acts means to interpret the utterances against the background
of certain conditions defined in terms of ideal language. Those conditions do
not “show themselves” but are shown by an analyst to be fulfilled for certain
reasons. In order to “clarify” that those speech act conditions apply to the text
an analyst depicts the “textual level” on which “sentences are linked to one
another” (vEG82: 7). So, the conditions of speech acts are elucidated in the
ca of the utterance. Thus an analysis in which an argumentation researcher
employs speech acts conditions results in an interpretation of the discourse in
the respective ca (cf. this chapter: analytical-intuitive component).
In pragma-dialectics there are four dialectical transformations
(vEGJJ93: 61-62). First, in employing the dialectical transformation of
deletion an analyst (pragma-dialectics) establishes that particular elements
and relationships from argumentative reality are not relevant to reconstructing
a particular discourse (e. g. repetitions).124 Second, in employing the
dialectical transformation of addition an analyst (pragma-dialectics)
establishes particular parts that are not presented in the discourse, yet they are
relevant to a reconstruction of the respective utterances in order to facilitate
clarity to the matters (e. g. unexpressed premises). Third, in employing
the dialectical transformation of permutation an analyst (pragma-dialectics)
establishes the course of a discourse to be “corresponding” to the sequence
displayed in the grid (vEGJJ93: 62: “parts are put in their dialectically ideal
place”). Fourth, in employing the dialectical transformation of substitution
an analyst (pragma-dialectics) establishes that in the dispute a particular
utterance fulfills a function of a particular term in the grid (e. g. “standpoint”).
So, the dialectical transformations facilitate a management of the methodical
gap.
The authors do not say whether at all, or when the dialectical
transformations must be employed: “[T]hese transformations do not
necessarily correspond to actual steps that an analyst takes in reconstructing
the arguments expressed in the discourse, they do provide a useful way
of thinking about how critical analysis works with a selective idealization
of a discourse” (vEGJJ93: 61).125 The dialectical transformations are
124However, that is not to say that a repetition in a discourse cannot be somewhat meaningful. In fact, just like
a pause in a discourse it can be shown to be meaningful (cf. this chapter: case study van Rees, 15 seconds).
125Recast that a “selective idealization” suggests that critical discussion which is supposed to be used to grasp
reality in all settings, though it cannot be used to grasp reality at all, cannot be a suitable means to do that.
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employed in the analyst’s actions characterized as e. g. “unpacking,”
“changing,” “normalizing,” or “attributing to.” Employing the dialectical
transformations may be “thus implicit.” For example, in an exemplary
analysis (pragma-dialectics) van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 71) state that
“[s]ubstitution is implied.”126
In employing linguistic indicators an analyst (pragma-dialectics) shows
that a particular word or sentence is part of “an inventory of words
and expressions that could serve as indicators of argumentative moves”
(vEHSH07: 5). If a word or sentence is established as part of this inventory
which lists typical means to actualize certain concepts from ideal language an
analyst (pragma-dialectics) concludes that the respective word or sentence can
be translated into a matter from the grid. For example, linguistic indicators for
standpoints that van Eemeren et al. (vEHSH07: 28-45) show are “I think that,”
“I’m sure that,” “in my view.” However, in order to conclude that an utterance
from a ca fulfills a function in the sense of a ci an analyst (pragma-dialectics)
may (not) need to depict the ca of the utterance.
In one example van Eemeren et al. (vEHSH07: 121) do not take the
context of the discourse into consideration: “He answered the first question
with ‘yes’, without any addition, and that means he made an unrestricted
concession.” Without further elaboration the authors conclude (“that means”)
a “concession” – a concept depicted by means of ideal language. However,
in another example the authors do spell out that the context of the utterance
is relevant to conclude that an actual element, relationship or context (εa, ra
or ca) can be translated into a matter from the grid: “Sometimes a state of
affairs referred to in a preceding assertion may appear to be the subject of a
request for justification” (vEHSH07: 48). The state of affairs in a preceding
assertion refers to the ca of argumentative reality in which this assertion has
been uttered. Again, it becomes apparent that an analyst (pragma-dialectics)
depicts his interpretation of the text.
Against the background of the module of the four meta-theoretical
principles (functionalization) one and the same linguistic indicator (εa, ra
or ca) can fulfill one, or more (or none of the) functions in the sense of
the grid (cf. vEHSH07: 25, 100, 111, 159, 162). By taking into account
natural language it becomes clear that the occurrence of a particular word does
126However, an implicit employment can be troublesome. For example, van Eemeren and Garssen state: “The
relative character of the properties ‘heavy’, ‘light’, ‘big’, etc. is evident from the (implicit) comparative
character of these terms [...]” (vEG09a: 29). Does it facilitate clarity to the matters to suggest that something
is “evident” based on something “implicit?”
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not mean that this word can “automatically” be said to fulfill one particular
function. As shown, plausibly employing linguistic indicators can mean that
an analyst (pragma-dialectics) must research on the context of the utterance,
too. But since it is not spelled out in pragma-dialectics – no criteria are
depicted to decide about that – whether or not, and how to research the context
of a word or sentence with respect to linguistic indicators, the respective
analyst must decide intuitively.127
The target of the maximally dialectical analysis is to show as many of the
speech acts from the grid as possible to be actualized in a discourse. In The
Pragma-Dialectical Approach to Fallacies van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(vEG95: 138) state when and how to employ a maximally dialectical analysis:
“In those exceptional cases where there is really no clue whatsoever as to
whether a speech act [in the sense of an actual phenomenon] is intended to
contribute to the resolution process, it is the most charitable solution to opt for
a ‘maximally dialectical analysis’ and interpret the utterance as a constructive
move in a critical discussion, thus deciding for an analysis ‘for reason’s
sake.’” When an analyst (pragma-dialectics) has qualms as to whether a form
of action from the grid is actualized he shall assume – interpret the fragment
as if – it has indeed been actualized.
The strategic target of the strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction
is to prevent an analyst (pragma-dialectics) from forgetting to spell out
any part from the fragment that may be relevant to a reconstruction in
the sense of the grid (vEG04: 26). The strategy of maximally reasonable
reconstruction should be employed when an analyst (pragma-dialectics) is
not certain whether or not a particular part from a discourse is to be translated
into a matter from the grid. In such a case the respective analyst shall assume
that this part can be translated into a matter from the grid. An analyst
(pragma-dialectics) makes use of (cf. this chapter: analyst’s intuition is
routed) the list of speech acts from the grid to suggest that a particular speech
act from that list does come out in the fragment (vEG04: 115). This may, e. g.,
refer to the reconstruction of a sentence as a standpoint in the confrontation
stage.
The strategic target of the strategy of maximally argumentative
interpretation seems to be the same as the one of the strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction: “minimizing the risk that utterances important
to the resolution of a difference of opinion will be overlooked in the
127Still, in arriving at his conclusions an analyst (pragma-dialectics) is routed.
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analysis” (vEGSH02: 43).128 Examples spelled out by pragma-dialecticians
of such a case are “implicit speech acts” (vEG04: 116) and “borderline
cases” that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) should “view as argumentation” (cf.
vEGSH02: 43). However, a demarcation between the strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction and the strategy of maximally argumentative
interpretation may be that the latter refers only to reconstructing matters
related to the argument stage (vEGJJ93: 48).
The strategic target of the strategy of maximally argumentative analysis
is to show “a maximum of argumentative force” of the utterances in a
discourse. In order to do that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) assumes
that a particular part from the fragment is relevant (rather to a greater
than a lesser degree) to the resolution of the disagreement in the sense
of the grid (vEG04: 117). The authors show – supposedly in the sense
of an example – that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) should employ the
strategy of maximally argumentative analysis when managing the matter of
the argumentation structure in a reconstruction.129 When he is uncertain
an analyst (pragma-dialectics) analyzes each reason distinctly rather than
summing up the reasons as one reason. He thus opts for reconstructing the εas
and ras as instantiations of multiple argumentation rather than coordinative
argumentation (cf. vEGSH02: 75-76).
Next, in order to elucidate the potential of the various translation criteria
and pragma-dialectical strategies for an analyst, I spell out one of the possible
rs between them. Spelling out the relationship between the strategy of
maximally argumentative interpretation and the translation criterion of the
speech act conditions facilitates to arrive at clarity to the matters of the
pragma-dialectical analyst.
On the one hand, the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation,
pragma-dialecticians write, should be employed “in the case of speech
acts [utterances] whose communicative function has not been determined”
(vEG04: 116). That means, for example, that utterances which may be
reconstructed as the speech acts of remarking or explaining may, in general,
also be reconstructed as arguing: “[...] any utterance that, for instance,
128In their textbook for students van Eemeren et al. write about cases to employ the strategy of maximally
argumentative interpretation – though an analyst may as well employ the strategy of maximally reasonably
reconstruction in those cases: “cases where no other meaningful interpretation is possible and where there
is no reason to assume that the utterance is intended as nonsense [...]” (vEGSH02: 44).
129There are three kinds of argumentation structure: multiple, coordinative, and subordinative argumentation
structure (cf. vEGSH02: chapter 5).
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might also be just a remark or an explanation is interpreted as argumentation”
(vEGSH02: 43).
On the other hand, in order to establish the function of an utterance an
analyst (pragma-dialectics) can rely on speech act conditions: For instance,
assertives are shown to “serve to express the standpoint” (vEG04: 116,
62-63). In fact, based on the insights about speech acts conditions
pragma-dialecticians already do suggest a distinction between the speech
acts of arguing, and explaining; the former represents the speech act type
of assertives and the latter represents the speech act type of declaratives (cf.
Houtlosser (Hou98: 402, 404) and van Eemeren et al. (vEHSH07: 109)).
So, when pragma-dialecticians suggest that an analyst (pragma-dialectics)
can depict the communicative function of an utterance against the background
of the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation they neglect to take
into account the apparent relationship to the translation criterion of speech
act conditions. Pragma-dialecticians thus far do not elaborate the relationship
between the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation and speech
act conditions. I think, however, that for sake of optimizing argumentative
reality in pragma-dialectics, for sake of clarity to the matters with respect to
the tasks in research projects in the pragma-dialectical analytical component,
elucidating the connection(s) between the translation criteria and the various
strategies for analysts is desirable.
Pragma-dialecticians suggest that it is not troublesome that the translation
criteria are not employed in an analysis (pragma-dialectics). First, according
to the literature it is not per se desirable to employ a particular translation
criterion as van Eemeren et al. point out with respect to linguistic
indicators: “[...] indicators cannot always be relied on for clues either”
(vEGSH02: 75).130
Second, in analyses (pragma-dialectics) utterances are translated into the
matters from the grid yet none of the aforementioned translation criteria is
employed. For instance, van Rees does not show to use either one of the
translation criteria to conclude the standpoint from the fragment she analyzes
when she states: “B briefly sketches the past situation and then argues for the
view that the organization of additional training belongs to the domain of the
training program committee: a standpoint which A, later in the discussion,
also will advance” (vR01: 460). In order to arrive at clarity to the matters of
the pragma-dialectical analyst it is worthwhile to elaborate that example. The
130Cf. this chapter: linguistic indicators.
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example facilitates to depict the relationships between clarity, acceptability
and acceptance (cf. chapter 3).
The term “standpoint” is introduced by van Eemeren and Grootendorst
in writing about the ci of critical discussion: “A critical discussion can
be described as an exchange of view in which the parties involved in a
difference of opinion systematically try to determine whether the standpoint
or standpoints at issue are defensible in the light of critical doubt or
objections” (vEG04: 42). Note, that “in which” metaphorically supports
understanding critical discussion as a c. In fact, critical discussion is presented
as an “ideal context” (Amj07: 7).
As a term in pragma-dialectics “standpoint” is adherent to the four
meta-theoretical principles.131 The standpoint is the result of the speech act
“[e]xpressing a standpoint” (vEG04: 68). Visser et al. (VBRG11: 206) call
this speech act “standpointing” (functionalization). By means of this speech
act “the difference of opinion is verbalized” (cf. vEG84: 1) which facilitates
clarity to the content matters at hand:
By the term standpoint (or point of view) we mean an
(externalized) attitude on the part of a language user in respect
of an expressed opinion (vEG84: 5).
So, the actualization of the speech act prompts a person to take on
particular commitments (externalization). In the confrontation stage of
critical discussion – and a respective derivative – the standpoint can be
accepted or not accepted by both parties (socialization). If it is not accepted
then it can be accepted after the discussion procedure in which the opening
stage and the argument stage are conducted (dialectification). Clarity to the
standpoint is a target, if the acceptance of the standpoint is aimed at:
– In a pragma-dialectical ci the standpoint facilitates clarity to a party’s
committedness to an expressed opinion.
However, in her example van Rees neither shows why B’s utterance(s)
shall be reconstructed as arguing nor why the respective sentence is to be
understood as a standpoint. Still, she presents those results as the conclusions
from her analysis. Apparently, it may prevent clarity to the respective analysis
if the translation criteria are not shown to be employed (cf. this chapter:
131Cf., for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04) and Houtlosser (Hou98).
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translation criteria should be employed in reconstruction).
There is the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that a reconstruction,
i. e. an analyst’s use of the three languages, is not transparent ( j). This
can be traced back to the troublesome matter that authors do not stick to the
established meaning of a term (F), or to the troublesome matter that the use
of a term is not transparent (H).132
A reconstruction (pragma-dialectics) is “not transparent,” for example,
when the translation criteria are not employed, or when the course of the
reconstruction is not transparent. In a transparent reconstruction the course,
step by step, of analysis is shown. For instance, the course is presented of the
analyst who employs the translation criteria and the strategies for analysts.
For sake of clarity it is desirable that an analyst depicts rather more than less
steps of the course of his analysis. Though doing so may be annoying for
experienced argumentation researchers, from the perspective of students in
argumentation research depicting a pragma-dialectical step by step analysis
facilitates enhancing their argumentative competence by means of teaching
the functions of grid (cf. this chapter: functions of stencil). Therefore, I
suggest, in argumentation research there can be books for different target
groups. In fact, books for different target groups can refer to matters from
different components. In pragma-dialectics, an example of a book for an
experienced argumentation researcher is the 2004 book by van Eemeren
and Grootendorst. The book particularly deals with the pragma-dialectical
philosophy and the ideal model of critical discussion. An example of a
textbook for students is the 2002 Argumentation: analysis, evaluation,
presentation by van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans in which
the authors put emphasis on matters of analysts.
It is a troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that in the use of intuition in
the use of the three languages is not spelled out an analysis (k). This can be
traced back to the troublesome matter that the use of a term is not transparent
(H).133
The grid is employed by an analyst to manage the bridging elements,
relationships and contexts (εias, rias and cias). Translation criteria as well
132I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
133I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
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as the aforementioned pragma-dialectical strategies for analysts – e. g.
the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation – are employed
to bridge the methodical gap between ci and ca. The grid supports to
arrive at clarity to a discourse (cf. this chapter: functions of stencil).
However, pragma-dialectical analytical endeavors are analytical-intuitive in
nature. Therefore, I conclude, the analytical component (pragma-dialectics)
should be called analytical-intuitive component. In order to thus facilitate
plausible research, I then concern myself with the relationship between the
terms “analytical” and “intuitive,” and between “intuition” and “logic” in
pragma-dialectical analyses.
The task of an analyst (pragma-dialectics) is to arrive at an interpretation
of the fragment in the sense of the grid. Nonetheless, if van Rees has not
employed the translation criteria yet arrived at her conclusion “[t]hrough this
analysis” (vR01: 467) she must have arrived at her research results via another
route. I suggest that she could arrive at her conclusions because in the analysis
she employed her intuition.
For instance, she apparently aims at emphasizing that in the dispute there is
a somewhat meaningful pause: “After a fifteen (!) seconds pause, C gives
the following answer” (vR01: 460). In the grid that she employs (which
is a one-to-one image of critical discussion) it is not important whether a
party answers within two seconds or within fifteen seconds. Moreover, I am
inclined to state that van Rees cannot employ any translation criterion (not
even the dialectical transformation of permutation) to plausibly elucidate why
she would write “(!)”. Indeed, in a discourse in argumentative reality a pause
of fifteen seconds can be somewhat meaningful. So, I do think that a reader
can understand why she spells out this pause of fifteen seconds. However,
based on the pragma-dialectical matters that van Rees employs, in order to
arrive at an understanding the reader needs his intuition.
In bridging the methodical gap in the analytical component of
pragma-dialectics the translation criteria should be employed in an
analytical-intuitive reconstruction. The analyst uses the grid, and the
describing language, to test fragments in the sense of the grid. The task
of an analyst (pragma-dialectics) in employing the grid is to “use it in
a sensible way to reshape [matters from] argumentative reality [...] in a
way that reveals the extent to which [those matters in] this specimen of
argumentative reality, on closer inspection, corresponds with the ideal model
[grid]” (vEG04: 23). Note that, first, the authors suggest that the target of an
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analysis in pragma-dialectics is to manage the methodical gap. Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst agree that – if at all (a “closer inspection” is needed) –
the matters from a ci correspond to matters from a ca. Note second, that a
reconstruction is “a way” that reveals this correspondence. By employing
the term “reveal” they suggest that the correspondence can be depicted, by
employing the term “a way” they suggest that the correspondence is shown
through a particular interpretation. Note third, that in order to arrive at this
particular interpretation an analyst (pragma-dialectics) needs and employs
his intuition. He must be “sensible.” So, all in all, in writing about the
analytical component the authors apparently suggest that a reconstruction in
pragma-dialectics is both analytical and intuitive.
Therefore, I suggest labeling the analytical component (pragma-dialectics)
the “analytical-intuitive component (pragma-dialectics)”. In order to
explicate the two terms from natural language, next I depict the relationship
between “logic” and “intuition” in a reconstruction in pragma-dialectics, and
how a pragma-dialectical analyst can make use of this r.
In pragma-dialectics the term “analytical” is more chained to “logic,” and
it is less chained to the argumentative reality.134 Examples of that are:
“For Aristotle, logic was concerned with analytical arguments in which the
truth of the premises is evident,” and “formal validity is a validity criterion
that is only applicable to analytical arguments, which are rare in practice.”
Argumentation researchers with “an analytical approach [...] are interested in
the ‘objective’ external characteristics of language use,” i. e. in such evident
matters that are referred to by means of ideal language (vEG04: 42, 47, 74).
I therefore sense that in pragma-dialectics the term “analytical component”
suggests that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) employs logic and that analytical
research is, speaking in terms of natural language, to a lesser degree chained
to argumentative reality.
A translation criteria and the strategies for analysts route the researcher’s
intuition in an analysis (pragma-dialectics). That can be shown by means
of two examples. First, in order to establish that an utterance fulfills the
134In argumentation research, the term “logic” is often employed as a departure to justify one’s scientific
endeavors: Logic is criticized. However, more often than not the term is employed in a sense of
natural language. Seldom it is explicated, for instance, which kind of logic authors refer to (cf. Govier
(Gov99b; Gov99a)). Pragma-dialecticians van Eemeren and Grootendorst are an exception to that: In their
introduction of the logical minimum they mention “classical propositional and predicate logic” as their
“practical starting point” (vEG92: 70, 64). I use the term “logic” in a sense of natural language – leaving
it open for argumentation researchers to employ different kinds of logic. I think, in argumentation research
showing why, when and how intuition is employed for reconstructing and evaluating discourse is particularly
relevant – just as criticizing the scopes of a certain logic, or its restrictions.
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function of a speech act from the grid an analyst (pragma-dialectics) can
employ the strategy of maximally reasonably reconstruction. He thus arrives
at orientation about his target which is to establish an utterance as a speech act.
In order to achieve his target he makes use of the list of speech acts configured
in a respective grid. Now, being aware of his target and of the track to arrive
at that target his intuition is routed. The “external, objective” list of speech
acts, the translation “criteria” and strategies for analysts function as the part
of logic. He does not try to establish any utterance as any speech act that is
not in the list of speech acts in the grid he uses. In this respect his intuition
is routed to seek only such utterances that he may assign to the speech acts in
the list.
Second, in order to assign utterances from a ca to speech acts from a ci
he can, for instance, employ the translation criterion of linguistic indicators.
He may, for example, try to depict that a sentence fulfills the function of a
standpoint. So, he can refer to the “inventory of words and expressions that
could serve as indicators” for a sentence to be determined as a standpoint
(cf. this chapter: linguistic indicators). Being aware of those vocables from
the inventory which functions as the part of logic he is inclined to seek those
words rather than other words in the fragment. Again, being inclined to by
the part of logic means that his intuition is routed.
Using metaphors to depict the matters from the grid may support routing
the intuition of an analyst (pragma-dialectics). For example, assume that
van Eemeren and Grootendorst talk about a stencil when they present
“Acceptance/non-acceptance as the cream on the milk” (vEG84: 70). Imagine
that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) aims at relativizing onto the fragment that,
and in which sense, in a particular discourse the acceptance of a standpoint
in the concluding stage is expressed. Yet this analyst is not certain whether or
not he can plausibly state that it does come out of an utterance. Not only can
he rely on the strategies for analysts. Recasting the metaphor of “the cream
on the milk” facilitates that he is oriented: In fact, his intuition is routed, so he
can sense whether or not the respective utterance actually “softly closes” the
dispute. If he understands “cream on the milk” in this manner – that the cream
“softly closes” a glass of milk – he may conclude that the utterance fulfills the
function of acceptance of a standpoint. He has sensed that the speaker tries to
“softly close” the dispute like cream softly closes a glass of milk.135 I think
135When a great number of analyses has already been presented in such a way, he might also refer to other
analyses where a dispute was analyzed to be “softly closed” like cream softly closes a glass of milk.
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for a reader this may rather be plausible – and thus facilitate clarity to the
matter – than not spelling out the use of intuition at all.
Next, I aim at showing how an analyst (pragma-dialectics) can make use
of the r between logic and intuition. For instance, in a research strategy
according to which an analyst (pragma-dialectics) employs the strategy of
maximally reasonable reconstruction he assumes that reasonableness occurs
in the dispute (cf. vEG04: 184-185). He may “bluntly” state that he senses
that the participants aim at actualizing the attitude that is characterized by the
higher-order conditions. This may be a plausible employment of the strategy
of maximally reasonable reconstruction. For one reader it may result in his
clarity, yet – apparently – another reader may have problems with a “blunt
assumption” of conditions being actualized. He may state that by referring
to his intuition the aforementioned analyst does not depict plausibly why he
assumes that reasonableness, a relevant part defined in the ci, is said to come
out in the discourse.
An analyst (pragma-dialectics), however, may thus spell out that he has
employed a “natural criterion” as van Eemeren and Grootendorst suggest:
“The most natural criterion [for regarding a text as argumentative] is whether
argumentation is advanced or not” (vEG04: 97). Note that the authors,
again, chain intuition and logic: An analyst (pragma-dialectics) can use his
intuition (“natural”), and simultaneously is said to refer to some sort of logic
(“criterion”). Now, a third reader may need to understand what such a “natural
criterion” is. For this other reader an analyst (pragma-dialectics) may need
to spell out, in order to plausibly assume reasonableness to occur in the
discourse, e. g., that (or in which sense) particular εa, ra or ca do correspond
to the rules configured in the grid, or that (or in which sense) he considers the
stances of the participants to be corresponding to the attitude of the parties.
Next, I exemplarily spell out two cases of how reasonableness can
“plausibly” be relativized onto a discourse. In an analysis (pragma-dialectics)
an argumentation researcher can, first, assume that a matter from the grid is
actualized in the text and, second, depict the reason(s) for that assumption
(yet the reason(s) must not come up to logic but intuition may be spelled out.)
First, as shown by van Rees in her case study an analyst may “bluntly
purport” that a particular sentence fulfills the function of the standpoint in
the sense of the grid. This may be plausible for one reader and thus pay
out as clarity to the matter. Yet another reader may not accept that “blunt
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assumption.” For this other reader this analyst (pragma-dialectics) may need
to spell out the use of a particular translation criterion.
Now, van Rees may state she has employed any translation criterion
implicitly, or that a certain actual element, relationship or context (εa, ra or
ca) that she has analyzed is only implicitly functioning as a an ideal element,
relationship and context (εi, ri or ci). For instance, “giving arguments in
support of an utterance” as such – van Eemeren et al. suggest in their
textbook – is a criterion to translate a disagreement that is implicit in a ca
into the term difference of opinion from the grid (vEGSH02: 5). However, I
suppose that van Eemeren et al. are aware that a reader may wonder when
he can plausibly say that “giving arguments in support of an utterance” has
occurred in a discourse. So, they add: “Of course it is possible that she is
mistaken and there is, in fact, no difference of opinion between her and her
readers” (vEGSH02: 5). So, I think, the authors elucidate their awareness to
“bluntly assume” a difference of opinion to be in the ca of their example. (In
fact, there is “a difference of opinion,” namely in the research result of their
analysis; and that research result, of course, is different from the fragment
analyzed.) However, though they neglect the need for a describing language,
they do suggest to employ a criterion to show that such an assumption
is “not mistaken.” Again, it becomes apparent that a pragma-dialectical
reconstruction results in an interpretation.
The methodical gap between a ci and a ca should be bridged by logic and
intuition. The correspondence between them must be managed if the two
contexts should be bridged in an analysis. In order to achieve clarity to the
analysis, however, different routes can be employed. I particularly suggest
that, in order to arrive at clarity to bridging the methodical gap, metaphorically
speaking, two routes can be employed: the route of logic and the route of
intuition. Van Eemeren et al. refer to intuition: “we opt for such an analytic
approach which includes interpretive insights” (vEGJJ93: 52).
Interpretive insights refer to intuition. Interpretive insights in an “analytic
approach” give rise to a “methodical interpretation” (vEG04: 22). The
reconstruction in pragma-dialectics is methodical because, for instance,
particular matters are presented in the grid that should be relativized onto
the fragment, and particular translation criteria can be employed to provide
a transparent, step by step reconstruction. The term methodical refers
to logic, i. e. the “objective, external characteristics” (cf. this chapter:
term “analytical”). The reconstruction in pragma-dialectics results in an
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interpretation because intuition is (to be) employed. The case study of van
Rees illustrates the use of intuition in a pragma-dialectical analysis.
As a methodical interpretation a reconstruction in pragma-dialectics can
spark off disagreement because in accomplishing it, intuition is employed by
an analyst. Therefore disagreement on a reconstruction may be traced back to
an analyst’s (pragma-dialectics) use of his intuition. However, as a methodical
interpretation a reconstruction in pragma-dialectics may bring on clarity to the
discourse. A reconstruction (pragma-dialectics) can be depicted transparently.
For instance, an analyst (pragma-dialectics) can spell out when – and how –
he has employed particular translation criteria, and when – though maybe
not how – he has employed his intuition. However, an author can suggest to
employ intuition, or logic, in understanding particular steps in his analysis in
order to arrive at clarity to his conclusions. A reader can thus be certain how,
on which route(s), he can arrive at clarity to the respective (step of) analysis
in the “analytical-intuitive component.”136
I showed examples by which pragma-dialecticians suggest that an
analyst (pragma-dialectics) does not, at all, need his intuition in a
reconstruction. I also showed that intuition is employed in a reconstruction
in pragma-dialectics. All in all, the label “analytical-intuitive component”
is more appropriate than the label “analytical component” to depict the
research of an analyst (pragma-dialectics). To conclude the discussion why
the analytical component is (more properly) to be called analytical-intuitive
component I opt for citing van Eemeren:
Thus, if things work out well, a theoretical framework is created
which, in dealing with argumentative discourse, can fulfill a
heuristic analytical as well as a critical function (vE90: 40).
Now, in my terms heuristic is chained to the meaning of “intuitive.”
Recurrently in pragma-dialectics the authors suggest a heuristic as well
as an “analytical” as well as a “critical” function of the stencil (grid)
in the analytical component. So, in the quote van Eemeren may have
forgotten a comma between “heuristic” and “analytical.” Or he may suggest
that in pragma-dialectics the heuristic (intuitive) and the analytical (logic)
matters are somewhat chained. In the latter case he can be understood
136If, however, the respective analysis was part of the analytical component the reader may sense that a particular
step in the analysis is troublesome in the sense that the gadgets of the translation criteria do not offer a route
to clarity to the matters managed in that step.
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to agree that instead of an analytical component in pragma-dialectics an
analytical-intuitive component is a proper term to refer the research of
analysts.
2.2.5 The empirical component
Before I spell out two troublesome matters in pragma-dialectics’ empirical
component, against the background of the module of the quartet of terms
I briefly introduce the tasks of the role model of the pragma-dialectical
empiricist. In the empirical component (pragma-dialectics) a researcher
cannot check critical discussion by taking into consideration actual elements,
relationships and contexts (εas, ras or cas) because critical discussion cannot
be immediately chained to any actual phenomenon:
One of the consequences of the normative character of the model
is that, strictly speaking, it cannot be put to a critical empirical
test. After all, the model can neither be falsified nor be confirmed
by means of empirical data (vEGM12: 330).
The ideal model of critical discussion cannot fulfill an explanatory function
with respect to εa, ra or ca, and likewise it cannot be checked by means
of εa, ra or ca. There is no correspondence between the terms configured
in the ideal model and the terms from actual language (cf. this chapter:
how to create a pragma-dialectical stencil). Against the background of
the distinction between ideal models and stencils it is not needed for
argumentation researchers like van Eemeren et al. to “speak strictly” in this
respect. Managing any deviations in argumentative reality (“verbal behavior”)
from the matters in an ideal model is not a matter in the empirical component:
“[...] it would certainly not do simply to declare all verbal behavior that does
not seem to agree with the model as automatically defective” (vEGM09: 25).
In the empirical component (pragma-dialectics) grids should be checked.
In the empirical component the correspondence between the actual language
employed in a ca and the configuration of terms from ideal language in the ci
of a grid is managed by an empiricist. He elucidates whether, and in which
sense, the matters in a grid instantiate what occurs in a dispute. An empiricist
(pragma-dialectics) aims at, e. g., arriving at a conclusion whether or not a
grid can be employed by an analyst (pragma-dialectics). Consequently, in
Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness: empirical research concerning
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the pragma-dialectical discussion rules van Eemeren et al. (vEGM09)
who actualize the role model of the empiricist (pragma-dialectics) must be
understood to present empirical research on (the violation of) the rules of a
grid rather than on the rules of critical discussion.
A result from checking a grid may be that an empiricist suggests amending
the respective grid. If an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) plausibly does
so, then – desirably – a theorist (pragma-dialectics) amends the respective
grid in order to optimize it as to its functions, e. g. for an analyst
(pragma-dialectics). So, an empiricist can support a theorist to achieve clarity
to the scopes of a stencil. The more appropriate a grid is, for instance,
from the perspective of an analyst (pragma-dialectics), the better the research
results that can be expected. Plausible research results from an analyst
facilitate that practitioners (pragma-dialectics) teach (how) to employ the
grid. The empiricist’s research results thus facilitate to fulfill the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research.
Checking whether a grid is proper to fulfill its functions is a recurrent
task in any research program, branch, and field because the manner in
which persons manage configurations in argumentative reality is not fixed.
Recurrently configurations of discourse differ from one another. A grid
may need to be amended respectively. For instance, say there is a grid for
analyzing texts from the Law (cf. this chapter: stencil with 14 rules). In
1989, this stencil has been shown to be appropriate to analyze texts from the
Law in Germany. Now, 28 years later, recurrently new texts are put forward
in the Law in Germany. However, the configuration of discourses in the Law
in Germany is different than 28 years before. Thus a 1989 grid may not be an
appropriate utensil to present an analysis of judicial discourse in Germany in
2017. Thus, it is a recurrent matter to conclude whether or not a grid is to be
amended in argumentation research.
There is – particularly in respect of the use of the three languages – the
troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics’ empirical component that there is
no proper distinction between the empirical component and argumentative
reality (l). This troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics may be traced
back to the troublesome matters that authors do not stick to the established
meaning of a term (F), or to the troublesome matter that it is neglected that
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the ideal language and the actual language are chained by a correspondence
only (E).137
However, the distinction between the empirical component and
argumentative reality is needed for sake of clarity to the matters because
an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) uses the all of the three languages (actual
language, describing language, ideal language). He checks the ci of the
grid against the background of the elements, relationships and contexts from
argumentative reality by means of describing language.
In the empirical domain, we try to give justified descriptions of
argumentative reality.
The empirical estate is a very large one and to a great extent
uncultivated. [...] Our knowledge of the surrounding wilderness,
the various currents that run through it, and the polder projects
that are going on enables us to choose selectively certain areas
within the empirical domain and to chart the areas we concentrate
on very carefully (vEG04: 27).
On the one hand, by depicting this r between the two terms the authors
say that the empirical component (“domain”) is different from argumentative
reality.138 Though I think that when they write to be aiming at
justified descriptions of argumentative reality I would rather say that the
empiricist aims at a justified description of grids. Introducing the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics) (cf. this chapter: figure 2.2) I showed that the terms
empirical component and argumentative reality are not synonymous. In fact,
actual language from argumentative reality is translated into ideal language
that is employed in the empirical component.
Now, facing a number of projects in empirical research in argumentation
research (cf. e. g. OJ95) I may understand that the empirical component
is said to be “a very large one.” However, the “various currents” can
be clustered by means of the layout of the five components – instead of
being considered “running through the component.” Why is the empirical
component “uncultivated?” I am not certain whether the authors talk about
the “surrounding wilderness” in the empirical component and whether
137I show an instance of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
138The terms “estate” and “domain” are employed synonymously with the term “component” (cf. chapter 1).
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the research projects are “polder projects.” I sense that the “certain
parts” that the authors suggest to concentrate on refer to those parts of
argumentative reality which are managed by means of the stencil: “When
conducting analytical reconstructions, it soon becomes clear what kind
of empirical research is relevant and therefore has priority” (vEG04: 27).
However, apparently, a proper distinction between the empirical component
and argumentative reality supports clarity to the scopes of the empirical
component (pragma-dialectics) in the context of the entire research program.
There is the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that in a research project
the correspondence between the stencil and the discourse is established
improperly (m). This may be traced back to the troublesome matter that
the use of terms, particularly those terms from the three languages, is not
transparent (H).139
Next, at first I depict the relationship between pragma-dialectics’
analytical-intuitive and empirical component. Second, I elucidate that
relationship, particularly by taking into account a pragma-dialectical article
by van Rees (vR01).
Argumentation researchers in pragma-dialectics manage the
correspondence between εi, ri and ci and εa, ra and ca in the
analytical-intuitive and in the empirical component. In fact, empirical
research facilitates to optimize the research in the analytical-intuitive
component:
Good empirical research should enable the analyst to address
questions of whether or not people are arguing as they should
and what factors facilitate or inhibit meeting normative standards
(vEGJJ93: 23).
I take the authors to not suggest that an “analyst” – instead of an empiricist –
works in the empirical component (pragma-dialectics). An empiricist shows
in which sense the matters from the stencil are not appropriate. For instance,
he checks the first-order conditions configured in the stencil (“factors that
facilitate”) or the higher-order conditions (“factors that inhibit”).
Though they do not spell out that the relationship is only indirect I
understand them to say that the research results from the empirical component
139I show an instance of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
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can be used – indirectly via the respective amendments to the stencil by a
theorist – to optimize the research in the analytical-intuitive component. A
pragma-dialectical analyst is supported to arrive at clarity to the normative
matters in the grid (“people are arguing as they should”). And likewise
an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) has the task to depict whether the grid
“behaves” as it “should.” He uses the text to check whether or not the
grid can be used to correspondingly depict the behavior of participants
in argumentative reality. Thus, analyst (pragma-dialectics) and empiricist
(pragma-dialectics) have different departures to manage the correspondence
between ca and ci.
Taking into consideration the three languages facilitates to arrive
at clarity to the distinction between the empirical component, and
the analytical-intuitive component in pragma-dialectics. However, the
actualization of role models may not always bringt about a distinction
between research endeavors that is as clear as the characterization in the
layout of the five components suggests. I aim at elucidating the different
departures of the actualization of the analyst (pragma-dialectics) and the
actualization of the empiricist (pragma-dialectics). I present how they manage
the matter of reasonableness differently in their chaining of terms from a ca
and terms from a ci.
Though in pragma-dialectics there is the troublesome matter that thus far
there is no distinction between the ideal model and stencils, I presented that
the concept of reasonableness – being stipulated by a pragma-dialectical
philosopher – can be applied by a theorist to build pragma-dialectical
stencils. Reasonableness in the grid is expressed by means of the “normative
standards” (vEGJJ93: 23) configured in the blueprint. In chaining a ca with
the ci of a grid, an analyst employs those normative standards. He manages
the methodical gap with a censorious stance towards the discourse. The
matters depicted in the grid are assumed to be actualized in the discourse. An
analyst (pragma-dialectics) suggests that reasonableness in actual language
is corresponding to reasonableness expressed in the grid. However, as
shown, in this respect “bluntly” purporting that reasonableness does occur
correspondingly in actual language is a troublesome means in bridging the
methodical gap.
Also aiming at managing the correspondence between terms from ca
and terms from a ci an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) in “good empirical
research” checks whether (and why) people’s behavior may be deviating
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from the normative standards. An empiricist (pragma-dialectics) manages
this correspondence with a censorious stance towards the grid. He checks
whether the matters from the grid can plausibly be assumed to be actualized in
the discourse. So, an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) establishes censoriously
whether the reasonableness in terms of ideal language is corresponding to the
behavior of persons in argumentative reality.
The task of an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) is to be censorious towards
the reasonableness elicited by a theorist (and thus of an analyst) from the
same research program. This reasonableness inspires the analyst’s research
results and as the components are chained those research results are relevant
to the purpose of the research program. However, “bluntly” purporting that
reasonableness does not occur correspondingly in a discourse is troublesome.
Two examples serve to show how an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) may
behave censoriously towards the grid.
First, to show that the stencil is inappropriate an empiricist may always
censoriously point out that the grid “presumes ideal participants and ideal
conditions [...]” (vEGJJ93: 30). Indeed, the application of the grid is
based on an analyst’s assumption that the participants in discourse do behave
reasonably in the sense of the grid. And it is troublesome when this
assumption is not only arrived at via a logical route. A pragma-dialectical
analyst interprets the configuration of the discourse. For instance, seldom
persons express their mental states in terms of the higher-order conditions
depicted in the grid. It can thus be troublesome for an analyst to provide
reasons for the higher-order conditions to come out in argumentative reality.
Typically, an analyst (pragma-dialectics) can only suggest an interpretation of
the behavior of the participants to spell out in which sense the higher-order
conditions are actualized (cf. this chapter: article by van Rees (vR01)).
Second, though he may acknowledge that the conditions characterized in
the ci are actualized in the ca, in order to show that a stencil is inappropriate
an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) may censoriously recast that in the research
program “we [...] do not assume a priori that all use of language is
argumentative” but sentences “only become an argumentation in relation to a
particular opinion” (vEG82: 2, 5). For instance, authors in pragma-dialectics
“bluntly” purport that there is, e. g. a particular standpoint for which “an
argumentation in relation to the respective opinion” is suggested. In her case
study van Rees assumes that there is the standpoint “that the organization of
additional training belongs to the domain of the training program committee”
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and likewise she (bluntly) assumes “an argumentation in relation to it”:
“B briefly sketches the past situation and then argues for the view [...]”
(vR01: 460). A pragma-dialectical researcher in the empirical component
may say that it is troublesome to show in which sense the utterances in the
discourse “become an argumentation in relation to a particular opinion.”
Any analysis (pragma-dialectics) can be suggested to be a check whether
the grid is appropriate as to the functions that are purported for it.140 That
can be elucidated by means of an example. Imagine, that the behavior of
persons in a dispute deviates from the speech acts that express reasonableness
in a grid. An analyst (pragma-dialectics) concludes that the respective person
has behaved unsuitably. He concludes that the person is mistaken. In terms
of ideal language configured in a blueprint, i. e. by relying on a grid, he
suggests a fallacy to come out: “we should also use the ideal model of a
critical discussion [grid] to identify moves which are potentially or actually
fallacious” (vEHSH07: 17). An empiricist (pragma-dialectics), however,
instead of acknowledging this conclusion, aims at presenting other reasons
why the participant has put forward an utterance that does not correspond to
the speech acts configured in the grid. Stating that a certain behavior was not
mistaken he can spell out that reasonableness in a dispute must not be the same
as reasonableness configured in a grid. Say, the participants still resolved their
disagreement in the sense of arriving at the respective speech act in the grid.
Then an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) concludes that the management of the
expression of reasonableness, of problem validity and conventional validity –
i. e. the strategic actions – depicted in the grid is not established appropriately
to translate utterances from this very (part of) argumentative reality into
terms of ideal language. Thus, in actual argumentation research different
conclusions from the same research result may be presented. Whose one
is more plausible, the analyst’s or the empiricist’s? Intuitively, in respect of
the aforementioned example I suggest to check whether the respective analyst
has relativized reasonableness plausibly onto the fragment and determined a
fallacy plausibly.141
In her article The Diagnostic Power of the Stages of Critical Discussion
in the Analysis and Evaluation of Problem-Solving Discussions van Rees
presents a dispute “which, in the opinion of the participants themselves,
140Note that when a respective research becomes troublesome this may be traced back to the troublesome matter
of the correspondence between actual elements, relationships and contexts and ideal elements, relationships
and contexts, and vice versa (E).
141Moreover, recast that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) presents his pragma-dialectical interpretation of the text.
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developed in an unsatisfactory fashion” (vR01: 457). The unsatisfactory
fashion of the dispute results in the fact that the disagreement is not
resolved (vR01: 460, 466). The author aims at presenting an analysis
(pragma-dialectics) of the text: “[I]t is argued that this development can be
traced back to flaws in the execution of the stages of a critical discussion”
(vR01: 457).142 Apparently, in chaining actual language and ideal language
she aims at being censorious towards the text rather than towards the
grid, hence research in the analytical-intuitive component rather than in the
empirical component of pragma-dialectics. Next, I show that, behaving as an
analyst (pragma-dialectics) van Rees aims at relativizing reasonableness onto
the fragment. Then, I present her conclusions from her – pretended – analysis
before I show in which sense both, first and second, are troublesome.143
First, behaving as an analyst (pragma-dialectics) van Rees must relativize
reasonableness characterized in the ci of the blueprint onto the fragment
plausibly. Van Rees states that she has checked whether the course of the
dispute “enabled” the sequence of resolving the difference of opinion, i. e.
whether the respective conditions have been actualized in the fragment. She
suggests (somewhat implicitly) that the grid can be employed in an analysis of
the fragment when she writes to be “investigating how the successive stages of
critical discussion have been executed in this particular discussion.” In order
to conclude this assumption she refers to the participants’ “verbal behavior
in the discussion.” For example, she concludes that the participants “do not
simply walk out on each other or shout each other down; they try to resolve
their difference of opinion through an exchange of arguments and criticism”
(vR01: 467, 462, 468). Trying to resolve the difference of opinion in this
sense elucidates a correspondence between the behavior of the persons in
the discourse and the forms of action, i. e. speech acts, of the parties in the
grid (cf. first-order conditions). Thus the person are suggested to accept the
first-order conditions characterized in the grid in the sense of the two types of
validity.
Second, from her analysis (pragma-dialectics) she concludes that with
respect to the discourse she cannot speak of a resolution of the difference
142With respect to the discussion about the term “ideal model” in pragma-dialectics it is apparent that van Rees
must be understood to talk about the stages characterized in a stencil. Since she refers to the matters from
critical discussion – without a limitation – I assume that she employs a stencil that is a one-to-one-image of
critical discussion.
143Illustrating the possible interaction(s) between pragma-dialectical analysts and empiricists the article turns
out to be a borderline case depicting the restricted scopes of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics).
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of opinion in a pragma-dialectical fashion because even though the conditions
were actualized “the sources of the unfortunate development of the discussion
could be established” through showing that “[n]one of these stages [cf. grid]
turned out to have been performed fully” (vR01: 467). Thus, obviously,
she appears critical towards the text rather than towards the grid. Her
research hence refers to the bridging of the methodical gap in the sense of
the analytical component rather than in the sense of the empirical component
of pragma-dialectics.
However, I aim at showing in which sense the suggestions by van Rees are
troublesome. I show that her research results can (rather?) be understood
to suggest that “the unfortunate development” can be traced back to flaws
of the grid, i. e. its appropriateness to analyze the text. I show in which
way it is plausible that in chaining the ca and the ci she could – as well –
be censorious towards the grid rather than towards the text. I suggest why
her article may thus be understood as an article in the empirical component
(pragma-dialectics).
First, it is troublesome how van Rees relativizes reasonableness onto the
discourse. Whereas she presents reasons to believe that a pragma-dialectical
conception of reasonableness can be relativized onto the discourse with
respect to the first-order conditions she also spells out that particular
higher-order conditions are not actualized in the dispute: “[...] the participants
hardly have any awareness of the main thread of the dispute: they lack an
overview of what has been adduced pro and contra the different standpoints”
(vR01: 467). As part of the higher-order conditions the second-order
conditions must be actualized to plausibly relativize reasonableness onto
the discourse. The second-order conditions are “psychological factors,”
that determine the “state of mind the discussants are assumed to be in”
(vEG04: 189). Having hardly any awareness of the main thread of the
dispute does not correspond to the state of mind of that is required to
plausibly actualize the matters from a pragma-dialectical stencil which is a
one-to-one-image of critical discussion. Recast, that in order to arrive at “an
overview of what has been adduced pro and contra the different standpoints”
the parties can apply the speech act usage declarative.
Furthermore, van Rees states that in the dispute “it transpires that there is a
conflict of interests, connected with the different institutional positions of the
participants, which hinders the progression of the discussion” (vR01: 468).
As part of the higher-order conditions the third-order conditions must be
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actualized to plausibly relativize onto the fragment reasonableness. The
third-order conditions “relate to the social circumstances in which the
discussion takes place and pertain, for instance, to the power or authority
relationships between the participants” (vEG04: 189). The third-order
conditions should be “empowering” (vEGJJ93: 33) persons to actualize
matters from a grid. However, van Rees apparently says that the different
institutional positions are not empowering the persons in the course of the
dispute in the sense of the grid. Rather, they “hinder” the course of the
dispute to proceed in the sense of the grid. So, deviating from the stances
of the persons it is plausible to say that the pragma-dialectical grid with
its higher-order conditions is not appropriate to translate utterances from
the discourse at hand into ideal terms. That conclusion, apparently, is a
conclusion from a pragma-dialectical empiricist’s perspective.
Van Rees begins her article by showing the different stages of a stencil, each
of which “represents a necessary step” (cf. vR01: 459). Moreover, at the end
of the article she presents the results of her research: “in the confrontation
stage, the difference of opinion is externalized” and “[i]n the confrontation
stage, the various positions of the participants were not clearly explicated,
nor was the underlying difference of opinion brought out and put up for
discussion”; “in the opening stage, the basis for the discussion is established:
the participants decide to resolve the difference of opinion, distribute the
roles and agree on the starting points and rules for the discussion” and
“[i]n the opening stage, the positions of antagonist and of protagonist of the
contra-standpoint were not taken on, nor was there full agreement about the
starting points for the discussion”; “in the argumentation stage, arguments
are brought forward and responded to” and “[i]n the argumentation stage,
contributions often were only loosely connected”; “in the closing stage,
the results of the discussion are established” and “in the closing stage no
assessment was made of the various positions” (cf. vR01: 467). Whereas
an analyst (pragma-dialectics) may conclude that none of the stages has
been actualized (or many fallacies have been actualized), an empiricist may
conclude that apparently the grid is not appropriate to translate what occurs
in the discourse into the matters from the grid.
Second, the conclusion that van Rees draws is troublesome. She restricts
the scopes of her case study: “I did not establish how well this procedure
itself was carried out.” Then she concludes that “[n]one of these stages
turned out to have been performed fully” (vR01: 467). So, in the sense
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of the pragma-dialectical analytical-intuitive component (cf. this chapter:
term “analyze” requires introduction of describing language) she restricts the
scopes of her case study to the task of reconstructing – not evaluating – the
discourse. Then, obviously, the title of her article in which she spells out
the “evaluation of problem-solving discussions,” i. e. how well the procedure
was carried out, is misleading. In her case study she shows whether or not the
stages have been actualized fully. She concludes they have not. However by
showing in her reconstruction that the persons do not actualize the conditions
to have a “problem-solving discussion” in the sense of the grid she factually
cannot conclude that the persons have “carried out this procedure” at all. The
fashion in which the author bridges the methodical gap is troublesome.
A conclusion that an empiricist (pragma-dialectics) can draw from the
research is that van Rees has shown that the grid she uses cannot be employed
in an analysis (pragma-dialectics) of this very fragment. In the discourse
factually the stance of the participants is different from the one presupposed
in the stencil that she can be held committed to be applying. Thus, in order
to employ the grid in an analysis of this very discourse, the elicitation of
reasonableness in the grid should be amended.
Now, van Rees can be understood to be researching in the empirical
component of pragma-dialectics. Pragma-dialecticians write about the
empirical component (pragma-dialectics) that there is “research on the
question of to what extent ordinary language users in everyday contexts really
tend to resolve their differences of opinion by means of the kind of discussion
favored” (vEG04: 31). I sense that this question can be answered by both an
analyst (pragma-dialectics) and an empiricist (pragma-dialectics). However,
the article of van Rees merely is an example to answer the question from
the perspective of the empirical component: In the fragment the participants
“tend to a little extent” to resolve their disagreement through actualizing a
pragma-dialectical stencil. This conclusion may trigger a suggestion to amend
the blueprint.144
All in all, the article by van Rees exemplifies the troublesome matter in
pragma-dialectics, i. e. in accordance with the pragma-dialectical approach,
that the correspondence between ci and ca is established improperly.145 The
144In particular, the higher-order conditions may consequently be amended.
145As shown, in a similarly troublesome way van Eemeren writes about the empirical component in a rhetorical
approach: “The empirical research that is conducted in this tradition consists for the most part of case studies
[...] [which] concentrate[s] on analysing specific public speeches or texts that are meant to be persuasive”
(vE15: 6). Again, analyzing is a strategic action applied by analysts.
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author does not plausibly suggest, for example with respect to reasonableness,
accordances with the grid. She does not conduct “good analytical research” in
the analytical-intuitive component (pragma-dialectics). If it were a research in
the empirical component (pragma-dialectics), however, then the author would
need to present a respective conclusion, such as an amendment of the grid
with respect to particular matters. However, my scrutiny of the module of
the five components has revealed that argumentation researchers can suggest
different conclusions from the same research.
2.2.6 The practical component
Every departure from the intellectual status quo requires the
elimination of one or more differences of opinion. [...] A
dispute, then [...] may be able to make a (more or less modest)
contribution to intellectual progress (vEG84: 1-2).
Thus, argumentation theory may be instrumental in improving
the quality of democracy by furthering a reasonable management
of differences of opinion (vE95: 144).
There are two reasons to conduct argumentation research. First,
argumentation research facilitates intellectual progress. The scaffold
facilitates intellectual progress inside argumentation research. It is good to
manage troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) by tracing them back to the
methodical gap. For instance, on the one hand I showed that the concept “ideal
model” is troublesome, on the other hand the scaffold (pragma-dialectics)
facilitated to scrutinize the remedy brought about by the module of the quartet
of terms. Second, argumentation research facilitates to “improve the quality
of democracy.” In fact, the purpose of pragma-dialectical research to optimize
argumentative reality facilitates to facilitate both intellectual progress and
democracy.
Next, I present the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics’ practical
component. Then, in order to facilitate clarity to the matters as the basis
for an optimization of argumentative reality in the case study (cf. chapter
4) I present an overview of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). At
last, facilitating to introduce the mediator as an integration of role models (cf.
chapter 3) I characterize the pragma-dialectical practical component.
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There is the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics that the scopes of the
practical component are improperly established (n). This can be traced back
to the use of natural language, particularly to the troublesome matter that no
meaning is established for a relevant term (B) or that the meaning established
for a term is unclear (C).146
I suggest that the scopes of the practical component (pragma-dialectics) are
improperly established if its borders are unclearly established. An improper
establishment of the scopes of the practical component (pragma-dialectics)
can prevent clarity to fulfilling the purpose of the research program.
Argumentation researchers in the other components of pragma-dialectics
cannot be certain how to support practitioners (pragma-dialectics) (cf. this
chapter: mutual support of role models).
In order to facilitate that argumentation researchers arrive at clarity to
the scopes of the practical component consider the fact that van Eemeren
and Grootendorst do not depict any borders for the practical component
(pragma-dialectics): “all the institutionalized and non-institutionalized
settings that serve as formal or informal meeting places where the inhabitants
of the realm can have their exchanges – from official deliberations in law
courts and political gathering to unofficial get-togethers and encounters in
offices, pubs, at home, or at the proverbial village pump” (vEG04: 31-32).
It is remarkable that – in comparison to the characterization of the other
components – instead of saying how a person behaves when he actualizes
the role model of the practitioner (pragma-dialectics), the authors say, where
this person behaves. This person (“inhabitant”) can be a person in all
institutionalized and non-institutionalized setting, i. e. anywhere – and
anywhere he can be part of a “meeting” which is formal or informal, i. e.
any meeting. So, can anybody be a practitioner (pragma-dialectics)? Thus
far, the characterization of the component is vague because it is shown by
means of natural language in such a way that no borders of the practical
component (pragma-dialectics) are suggested. However, before concluding
this section with findings about the relevance of the practical component for
argumentation research I sum up the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics).
In table 2.2 there is an overview of the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) a-n, ordered in the way that I discussed them. I
present the overview in this section because it illustrates that I consider
146I show instances of this troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) among the potential issues in the case study
(cf. chapter 4).
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the modules as means to fulfill the purpose of pragma-dialectics – inside
argumentation research. The overview illustrates that the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) can be traced back to the troublesome matters A-H,
and thus to the relationship between the five components and the four
languages.147 148
Table 2.2: Troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics).
descr. l. Ph any comp. Th An Em Pr
a b d e i l n
ct f j m
g k
h
a – describing language is needed to manage εia, ria, cia, and εai, rai
and cai (B)
b – no meaning for a term (B)
ct – meaning of term is unclear (B, C, D)
d – term is inappropriately used in a particular language (G)
e – term “ideal model” is used in the sense of natural language (G, D)
f – rules of critical discussion are suggested to function like rules from
a stencil (E)
g – translation criteria are improperly depicted (E, F, H)
h – no proper distinction between ideal model and stencil (B, E, G)
i – translation criteria are not used in reconstruction (C, H)
j – reconstruction is not transparent (F, H)
k – use of intuition is not spelled out in an analysis (H)
l – no proper distinction between the empirical component and
argumentative reality (E, F)
m – correspondence between stencil and discourse is established
improperly (H)
n – scopes of practical component are improperly established (B, C)
Next, I foster the understanding of the practical component of
pragma-dialectics by referring to the aim and the (intuitive) use of
147Abbreviations in table 2.2: descr. l. = describing language, Ph = philosopher, comp. = component, Th =
theorist, An = analyst, Em = empiricist, Pr = practitioner.
148I apply the modules of the troublesome matters and the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) in the case
study. In fact, the authors in the case study manage matters related to the methodical gap.
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languages. I add to the pragma-dialectical distinction between reflection-
and prescription-minded research by pointing at different target groups of
practical research. At last, facilitating a pragma-dialectical characterization
of the mediator (cf. chapter 3: integration of role models) I refer to the
module of the quartet of terms, and to the module of strategy in order to show
why the pragma-dialectical designer is a practitioner.
A practical component (field, branch, research program) is desirable.
Argumentation researchers often depart from criticizing “logic” in the
sense that it does not provide them with means that are applicable to
argumentative reality in the sense of analyzing cas, and applicable in
argumentative reality in the sense of optimizing it. I aim at illustrating
that they suggest the need to optimize argumentative reality. I also aim at
illustrating that pragma-dialecticians share that desire. In fact, next I show
that pragma-dialectical authors suggest that optimizing argumentative reality
is the purpose of the research program. Against the background of that
suggestion it is then plausible to consider a practical component desirable
in other fields, branches, and research programs, too. In order to show in
which sense the practical component differs from the other components of a
respective research program, branch, or field, next I spell out the aim, the use
of the three languages and the use of intuition in the practical component.
First, the aim in the practical component is different from the aim
in the other four components. The scopes of the practical component
(pragma-dialectics) may be understood through the target of this component.
No other component in pragma-dialectics has the aim “to improve
argumentative practice in a purposeful way” (vEG04: 32). I think that by
“argumentative practice” the authors refer to argumentative reality, thus to
cas. A “purposeful way,” I think, refers to a pragma-dialectical fashion, i. e.
the three languages are employed in the sense of the five components of
pragma-dialectics. “Improving” argumentative reality, I think, refers – e. g.
– to enhancing the argumentative competence of persons in cas. Since those
persons are relevant to argumentative reality, enhancing their argumentative
competence is a means to optimize argumentative reality (cf. figure 2.7).149
Research in the practical component (pragma-dialectics) is chained to
research results from the other four components of the research program in
the sense that a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) uses the research results from
149Abbreviation in figure 2.7: arg. reality = argumentative reality.
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reasons to conduct argumentation research
= facilitate intellectual progress,
facilitate democracy
purpose of pragma-dialectics,
= optimize arg. reality
target of practical component
= optimize arg. reality in a pragma-dialectical fashion









Figure 2.7: The purpose of pragma-dialectical research as part of
argumentation research.
any of the other components. Pragma-dialecticians show that there can be
an r between a research of a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) and a research
of a theorist (pragma-dialectics) when they write about the matter of fallacy:
“the approach taken in practical research depends directly on the theoretical
perspective from which research is conducted” (vEGJJ93: 24). I suggest that a
respective practitioner can make sense of the “direct dependence” intuitively.
Research in the practical component (pragma-dialectics) is called “applied
research” (vEG04: 40), van Eemeren et al. depict the research in this
component as “practical research” (vEGJJ93: 24). Thus, the target groups
of the pragma-dialectical optimization of argumentative reality are persons
that are “inhabitants of the realm,” as well as all (the other) “inhabitants of
argumentation research,” as well as persons who seem to be unchained to
argumentation research but who are somewhat chained to disputes in cas.
Thus the target group of practical research contains all the persons relevant
to argumentative reality.
Second, speaking metaphorically, in order to arrive at his aim a practitioner
has an unlimited access to any of the research results from any of the
components of the respective research program, branch, or field (cf. this
chapter: the scaffold). Facilitating the section about “research strategies” (cf.
this chapter), and the module of the integration of role models I thus suggest
to distinguish practitioners in the pragma-dialectical research program in
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accordance with the components whose research results they are making use
of: practitioners (philosophical, pragma-dialectics), practitioners (theoretical,
pragma-dialectics), practitioners (analytical-intuitive, pragma-dialectics),
practitioners (empirical, pragma-dialectics). Against the background of
the three languages, as well, practitioners (pragma-dialectics) can be
distinguished: practitioners (ideal language, pragma-dialectics), practitioners
(describing language, pragma-dialectics) and practitioners (actual language,
pragma-dialectics). The different options of distinguishing between types of
practitioners inside a single research program, branch or field illustrates the
relevance of the distinction between the five components, for example the
relevance to pragma-dialectics: I refer to the first option of distinguishing
practitioners when I characterize the mediator (cf. chapter 3).
The purpose of a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) can be suggested to
be a target for practitioners in other research programs, branches, and
fields, too. Whereas, e. g., in the theoretical component of a different
research program there are different targets than in the theoretical component
(pragma-dialectics) (because different matters are managed (differently)), the
target to optimize argumentative reality may also be intuitively suggested
for a practical component of another research program. In this other
research program different research results are arrived at compared to
pragma-dialectics. Different practitioners employ different means to optimize
argumentative reality. Still, those means may be chained to pragma-dialectical
reflections and prescriptions. In this sense, the practical components from
the different fields, branches, and research programs further democracy and
intellectual progress (cf. this chapter: mutual support of role models).
It makes sense to spell out the target of the practical component
(pragma-dialectics) in order to achieve clarity to the establishment of its
borders. Making use of the target of practical research facilitates an
integration of the research results of the other components which is needed
due to the distinction between (the use of) the three languages. Recast,
for instance, that clarity can be arrived at via different routes, one of
which is intuition. When they write about “inhabitants of the realm” and
“meeting places” to establish the borders of the component, van Eemeren
and Grootendorst do rely on the reader’s intuition. However, making use
of the term “meeting places” to establish the border(s) of the practical
component is troublesome. In those meeting places different inhabitants –
pragma-dialecticians – may talk any of the three languages. Employing actual
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language, describing language and/ or ideal language can prompt researchers
to be talking at cross purposes (cf. chapter 4: Münchhausen Trilemma).
Characterizing a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) by his intention to “optimize
argumentative reality” means to facilitate the actualization of a role model that
can integrate research results by employing any of the four languages.
Third, in no other component an argumentation researcher is offered the
opportunity to employ “so much intuition” in respect of “How to do research.”
The reason for that is that – compared to the other components – the most
relevant criterion to determine a research to be “successful” in this component
is that it accords with the reasons to conduct argumentation research. For
instance, in the course of his research a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) is not
restricted as to which of the three languages he employs, and how. First and
foremost, it is important that the respective research “makes sense” in respect
of optimizing argumentative reality in a pragma-dialectical fashion. However,
obviously, disagreement can occur on whether, and in which sense, a
particular research does make sense with respect to optimizing argumentative
reality. Transparency in employing a particular research strategy supports
arriving at clarity in such a dispute. A teacher at a university who behaves
as a practitioner (analytical-intuitive, pragma-dialectics) may spell out that
he presents a mix of reflection-minded research and prescription-minded
research. In teaching a matter from a grid, he can spell out when he aims at
furthering reflection and when he aims at prescribing in a pragma-dialectical
fashion.
By means of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) the r between the practical
component (pragma-dialectics) and the other four components of the research
program becomes apparent: The research results in the “cluster of four”
are instrumental to arrive at the target in the practical component. In
this sense, a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) aims at accomplishing the
target of optimizing argumentative reality based on research in the other
components of the research program. If the scopes of the practical component
(pragma-dialectics) are established it is more likely that argumentation
researchers in the other four components of the research program can support
practical research. I suggest an actualization of the practical component
(pragma-dialectics) with respect to the two target groups mentioned.
First, a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) can optimize argumentative reality
(in a pragma-dialectical fashion) for the target group of argumentation
researchers by facilitating clarity to the matters in argumentation research.
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For instance, in order to “do justice to the ecological diversity in the realm”
(vEG04: 9) – and in other research programs, branches, and fields – depicting
and employing the five components as a layout to separate and cluster the
matters can optimize clarity to the matters in argumentation research (cf. this
chapter: separate and cluster matters). Argumentation researchers can use the
layout to arrive at an overview of, thus orientation to, the state of the art. For
example, freshmen in argumentation research can thus arrive at orientation in
argumentation research.
Second, a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) can optimize argumentative
reality (in a pragma-dialectical fashion) for the target group of persons who
are only somewhat chained to discourses in cas by facilitating that they
arrive at clarity to (how to) manage a discourse. There are two routes to
arrive at clarity to (how to) manage a discourse: the “logical” route and the
intuitive route. Both routes can be referred to in reflection-minded and in
prescription-minded research (vE90: 42-43) in the practical component of
pragma-dialectics.
“[F]urthering reflection” on discourse is a target in the practical component
(pragma-dialectics) (vEG04: 35). It is a target with respect to the target
group of persons who are only somewhat chained to discourses in cas.
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst the rules for critical discussion
are appropriate to arrive at an awareness of the actual elements, relationships
and contexts (εas, ras and cas) because they depict “the rules that already
apply in ordinary discourse,” those rules have “more ties with reality than
some people think” (vEG88: 507). So, reflection-minded research may be
arrived at via the logical route by teaching the first-order conditions, as
well as the higher-order conditions of stencils. This can route student’s
distinct reflection on configurations in disputes. Also, examples of mistakes
in disputes can be shown to be violations of the rules in the sense of a
grid in order to arrive at a greater awareness of mistakes in the student’s
everyday life discourse. Note, that again, the student’s reflection is routed
pragma-dialectically.
As to the intuitive route in reflection-minded research a person’s
argumentative competence for dealing properly – in the sense of a
pragma-dialectical grid – with configurations of disputes can be enhanced.
For example, based on the teaching of pragma-dialectical argument schemes
a teacher can present to students a fragment and ask them to produce
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(vEG04: 32) questions that are reconstructed as critical questions.150
Likewise, teaching examples of fallacies can support the intuition of a person
to sense mistakes in disputes in the sense of a stencil.
Pragma-dialecticians spell out why prescription-minded research in the
practical component in the sense of pragma-dialectics is not troublesome,
e. g. in a sense that a practitioner undesirably dictates particular rules
to be employed in argumentative reality. Prescription based on an ideal
model of pragma-dialectics, van Eemeren and Grootendorst suggest, means
to prescribe a behavior based on “a system of norms ordinary language users
have internalized anyway” (vEG88: 508). So, the authors purport that they
have spelled out rules that are employed in a discourse (cf. this chapter:
critical discussion as “universal”).151
Let us think of the ideal discussion procedure as a “code of
conduct” for rational discussants. What sort of people could
adopt such a code? (vEGJJ93: 30-31).
Against the background of the methodical gap and the pragma-dialectical
characterization of the ideal discussion procedure of critical discussion the
answer to that question is: “None!” However, as to the logical route for
prescription students (e. g. in a lecture at a university) can be taught the
code of conduct which is depicted “for immediate use” in argumentative
reality (vEG04: 190). Teaching a certain grid thus means that a respective
practitioner can “empower ordinary discussants to engage in argumentation
that more closely approximates ideal standards” (vEGJJ93: 24). Besides
teaching a certain grid, he can particularly take into account the concept of a
pragma-dialectical strategy.
In pragma-dialectics a designer has the character of a practitioner. Writing
about the practical component (pragma-dialectics) van Eemeren et al. state:
“The second sort of application, associated with pragmatically oriented
approaches such as [...] our own pragma-dialectical theory, centers on
the design of discourse processes” (vEGJJ97: 227). Thus, apparently,
in pragma-dialectics “design” can be located in the practical component.
150For argument schemes cf. my introduction of the ideal model of critical discussion (chapter 1), of strategy in
critical discussion (this chapter) and the case study (chapter 4). For critical questions cf. the term “critical
analyst” (this chapter).
151In the pragma-dialectical paradigm the derivates of critical discussion are thus supposed to accord with what
“ordinary language users have internalized anyway,” too.
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Writing about the functions of the stencil I suggested that matters from the
grid can be actualized. Now I show how to actualize first, the code of conduct,
and second, a strategy from a stencil.
First, pragma-dialecticians write that people can “make a methodical
attempt to bring about a critical discussion” (vEG04: 35). Apparently, they
must be understood to talk about a pragma-dialectical stencil. So, a teacher
– a designer of the ca of a teaching – can suggest, for instance, a role play in
which the participants that have learned the code of conduct try to actualize
the discussion procedure that is characterized in the ci of a stencil. That
is a prescription via the logical route because the rules of a stencil route
the (“methodical”) “approximation” – or actualization – of a grid. Thus, a
practitioner is a person who is aware of the matters in argumentation research
and makes use of this awareness in argumentative reality, e. g. in a ca of
teaching.
However, I also aim at depicting the intuitive route in this example of
prescription-minded research in pragma-dialectics’ practical component for
the target group of persons who are only somewhat chained to discourses in
actual world. In actualizing the rules the person’s intuition is, apparently,
relevant. It is the student’s attempt to bring about the discussion procedure
in the sense of the respective grid, not their certainty to behave in that way
(which suggests clarity via the logical route). In fact, the course of actualizing
particular rules may vary from student to student. Every student employs
their argumentative competence, and their natural language, for actualizing
the code of conduct.
Second, actualizing a strategy means to arrive at a configuration of possible
forms of actions that are in accordance with particular rules and a particular
purpose. A person is guided by the grid in his configuring of actions that
accord with the rules of particular stencil and a particular purpose. He senses
that his actions can be translated into ideal matters by means of the grid which
he refers to. Actualizing a strategy from a pragma-dialectical grid thus means
to configure actions in accordance with the rules from a pragma-dialectical
grid and to thus optimize argumentative reality in a pragma-dialectical sense.
For instance, his strategy may be to behave censoriously towards only
those utterances that are translated into the argument scheme of analogy.
Thus he actualizes particular critical questions in order to arrive at the
pragma-dialectical analyst’s aims. So, he responds to a certain configuration
of a dispute in accordance with the respective strategic rules and with
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the pragma-dialectical purpose. Intuitively speaking, the more often he
actualizes a (particular) strategy from a grid the greater the enhancement of
his argumentative competence for producing utterances in the sense of this
strategy, i. e. of this grid. His intuition (of how) to manage discourse is
shaped pragma-dialectically.152
At last, a practitioner can integrate reflection-minded research with
prescription-minded research. Argumentation researchers in practical
research can suggest arriving at respective targets for the two target groups
simultaneously. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst spell that a practitioner
(pragma-dialectics) shows in which sense the research results from the
other components of the research program can be “carefully translated
into recommendations,” into “proposals for improvement” (vEG04: 33).
Both target groups can be taken into consideration in such proposals.
In that respect practitioners can make use of those proposals in their
optimizing argumentative reality for different target groups simultaneously.
On the one hand, such suggestions can be part of a reflection-minded
research (“carefully”) as well as prescription-minded research (“translate into
recommendations”) of argumentation researchers in pragma-dialectics. On
the other hand, those proposals for improvement – or rather optimization –
may also refer to the target group of persons who are only somewhat chained
to discourses in cas. For instance, in a company people aim at a new way of
managing conflicts, thus there may be a proposal for optimization which then
is a prescription that is based on reflection about the current way of managing
conflict in that company.
2.3 Research strategies of five role models
Clarity to the matters is the aim of argumentation researchers. Therefore I
traced back the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) to the troublesome
matters, which in turn can be traced back to the management of the methodical
gap. By means of introducing the module of, e. g., the quartet of terms
I facilitated to prevent recurrent disagreements – and conflicts – on the
troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics e. In my case study as a mediator
I illustrate that clarity to troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) can be
152Likewise, a football team may enhance their competence to employ the strategy of “offside traps” when this
team recurrently produces offside traps in their training. Their intuition – e. g. for the timing to employ the
strategy – is shaped.
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arrived at in argumentative reality in the context of argumentation research
(cf. chapter 4). However, I aim at facilitating to integrate pragma-dialectical
role models to thus further facilitate the characterization of the mediator (cf.
chapter 3). Since the characterization rests on the module of the definitions of
strategy and strategic action, in this section I elaborate the matter of “research
strategies.”
So, I aim at showing how argumentation researchers can employ the
scaffold to arrive at clarity to the matters. I recast the relevance of the
module of the five components to the concept of approaches to emphasize
that, in general, my concept of role models should be used in argumentation
research. Then I apply the module of the definitions of strategy and
strategic actions to the term research project (a term from natural language)
to conclude (pragma-dialectical) research strategies. I then emphasize that
the five components should be used not only in pragma-dialectics but in
all of the paradigms. I suggest criteria for assigning research projects to
the components in the different fields, branches or research programs. I
conclude this section by making use of the scaffold – particularly referring
to the creation and use of terms – in order to further the understanding of the
relationships between the components from different paradigms.
Argumentation researchers should use the module of the five components
to configure their work. It is relevant to argumentation researchers to have
orientation as to “the state of the art” (vEG04: 41). The “most recent
developments” have resulted in “different approaches” in argumentation
research (vEG04: 33, 41). The five components facilitate to arrive at an
overview of the state of the art, and thus facilitate clarity to the matters.
Different research projects can be related to one another and demarcated
from one another by means of the five components and hence facilitate
an optimization of argumentative reality in the context of argumentation
research.
For instance, van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 25) suggest that some
matters may be of interest for argumentation researchers in particular
components whereas other matters may simultaneously be of interest for
various components. Argumentation researchers should characterize their
work through relating it to the layout of the five components: “The only
prerequisite is that the research concerned is not isolated and purely ad
hoc, but can be construed as being an integral part of a more-encompassing
research program” (vE90: 43). Whereas here the author only talks about the
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five components of a particular research program I aim at showing that the
layout of the five components should be applied to all the fields, branches
and research program that give rise to the state of the art of argumentation
research.
In a research project an argumentation researcher manages matters. The
target of an argumentation researcher conducting a research project is
clarity to the matters. In order to achieve their target of clarity to the
matters argumentation researchers employ in their research projects particular
research strategies.
In accordance with the definition of strategy a research strategy is a
methodical design for a research project, i. e. it is a configuration of
possible forms of action that are in accordance with particular rules and a
particular purpose of a research project. The rules, as well as the purpose,
are established in the respective research program, branch or field in which
the research project is located. When the forms of action, the rules and
the purpose facilitate strategic actions then the forms of action, the rules
and the purpose of a research strategy consequently determine a researcher’s
strategic actions, e. g. with respect to the question of “How to research
particular matters.” For instance, in a pragma-dialectical research project
in the philosophical, theoretical, analytical-intuitive or empirical component
the respective role models bring about, first, certain rules and, second, the
r between a researcher’s management of the matters and the purpose of
pragma-dialectical research to optimize argumentative reality (cf. figure
2.8).153 154
So, a pragma-dialectical strategy accords with the purpose of
pragma-dialectical research. Moreover, a pragma-dialectical strategy
accords with the rules that are brought about by the respective role model(s)
that is (are) actualized. A pragma-dialectical strategy can also accord with
rules that are brought about by actualizing different pragma-dialectical role
models simultaneously (cf. chapter 3: characterization of the mediator).
In a pragma-dialectical blueprint the concept of a “pragma-dialectical”
strategy is possible due to the fact that the ideal model of critical discussion
is a universal template and due to the two types of validity. In fact, in
153Abbreviations in figure 2.8: arg. reality = argumentative reality, Ph = philosopher, comp. = component, Th =
theorist, An = analyst, Em = empiricist.



























Figure 2.8: Examples of pragma-dialectical research strategies.
pragma-dialectical ideal models and blueprints the two types of validity
make a form of action a “pragma-dialectical form of action.” Hence the
sense that a pragma-dialectical analyst assumes persons in a ca to act
pragma-dialectically. A pragma-dialectical empiricist checks, for instance,
whether the pragma-dialectical reasonableness is appropriate to be relativized
onto discourse in a certain ca. The research strategy thus facilitates
the optimization of argumentative reality in the pragma-dialectical fashion
characterized in the five components.
Next, I present a consequence from conducting argumentation research in
accordance with the strategic rules of a research strategy. The structure of
a blueprint that a theorist builds depends, first, on the rules for theoretical
research in the respective research program, branch, or field and second,
on his intuition in building a blueprint for this particular research program,
branch, or field. If in a research program, branch, or field an analyst and an
empiricist conclude purposefully that a grid is suitable for, e. g., analyses of
discourse from the Law then for a respective practitioner the grid can have
– intuitively speaking – “diagnostic power” (cf. vR01). In fact, I emphasize
that the diagnostic power of the grid means not only that it can be used to
anticipate what can go wrong (cf. vR01: 459) but also that it can be used to
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present what is needed in a discourse to actualize the sense of reasonableness
spelled out in the blueprint. So a consequence of conducting research in
accordance with a research strategy is to facilitate the use of the diagnostic
power of a grid.155
Clarity to the matters in research projects is needed, if an overview of
the state of the art is an aim of argumentation researchers. When there is
a certain layout with certain criteria to characterize the research projects in
argumentation research, then this overview can be used to demarcate different
research projects. Thus an overview of the state of the art is arrived at.
Thus, in order to have orientation in argumentation research it is desirable
that an argumentation research acknowledges that every research project has
the target of clarity to the matters and that this is facilitated by means of clarity
to his research strategy.
Employing a particular research strategy facilitates arriving at clarity to
the use of the layout of the five components: “If scholars of argumentation
suc[c]eed in doing this, and if they do so within the context of a well-defined
research program, then it will be clear what progress can be made on the
various levels of research [...]” (vE90: 43-44). Thus van Eemeren agrees
that employing the layout of the five components can bring on clarity to the
matters.
The layout of the five components should be used in all fields, branches, and
research programs of argumentation research. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
write that matters from argumentation research shall be taught “properly”
(vEG04: 33). Argumentation researchers set for themselves particular criteria
for conducting argumentation research properly. For instance, the teacher
must be “familiar with the state of the art” (vEG04: 33). Being familiar
with argumentation research means to have clarity to it. To date, there are “a
variety of approaches” which “differ considerably” (vEG04: 5). Employing
the layout of the five components in all fields, branches, and research
programs facilitates an understanding of those differences. For instance, it
shows that within different fields, branches and research programs there are
different aims in particular components, there are different senses of how
155From the theorist’s perspective in the case of a grid for discourse from the Law the diagnostic power is
confined to optimizing argumentative reality with respect to discourse from the Law. From an analyst’s
perspective I suggest – intuitively – the rule that in an analytical-intuitive reconstruction he should aim
at presenting a transparent reconstruction by showing when intuition is employed. Transparency, I think,
facilitates clarity to the matters.
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to do research, or there are different sense of how the five components fit
in the layout of a “comprehensive” research program, branch, or field of
argumentation research (cf. vEG04: 39).
So, in my introduction of the module of the five components in
different approaches I envision something similar to what van Eemeren
and Grootendorst envision in their introduction of the five components of
the Realm of Argumentation Studies. They write: “Doing so makes it
easier to get an overall picture of the state of the art in the discipline, to
distinguish approaches from each other, and to indicate where there are
genuine opportunities for mutual cooperation” (vEG04: 41). Against the
background of the scaffold which facilitates to manage the methodical gap by
means of the layout of the five components I imagine mutual cooperation, for
instance, between an actualization of the theorist from normative pragmatics
and an actualization of the theorist from pragma-dialectics. Both are departing
from a “dialectical conception of reasonableness” (cf. vEGJJ93: 21) and aim
at similar goals, e. g. creating stencils that are used to bridge the methodical
gap. I imagine mutual cooperation, for instance, between an actualization
of the empiricist of one branch which is specialized in research projects in
the empirical component, and an actualization of an empiricist from a field
in which an empirical component is being developed. Apparently, against
the background of the integration of a proper management of the methodical
gap by means of the distinction between the five components researchers
can strategically act in accordance with the reasons to conduct argumentation
research.
When the layout of the five components is employed in all fields,
branches and research programs not only a proper teaching is facilitated
in argumentation research. Also the particular components of the different
research programs, branches, and fields will be supported: “[I]t may
sometimes be fruitful to make use of certain insights achieved in one program
in carrying out another program” (vEG04: 41). However, when research
results from different research programs, branches or fields are taken into
account in a research project the insights need to be demarcated, or integrated
(cf. chapter 3: issues and contentions). Based on an integration of insights
practitioners of different research programs can state how – in accordance
with a particular strategy – they are using matters inspired by the various role
models that can be distinguished in the fields, branches, research programs of
argumentation research.
141
It thus becomes apparent, that the concepts of strategy and form of action
are relevant to the endeavors of argumentation researchers. Irrespective
of the methodical means that is used – be it the connection between
the four languages and the five components as shown in the scaffold, or
another methodical means – those concepts facilitate, e. g., to enhance the
argumentative competence of people in ca. As I show in the case study,
the scaffold facilitates clarity to the matters since it can be used to prevent
and solve conflicts in argumentative reality, particularly in argumentation
research.
Against the background of the reasons to conduct argumentation research,
next I aim at showing show how to assign the matters that an argumentation
researcher is faced with in his research project to a particular component in
argumentation research. The target of any argumentation researcher is clarity
to those matters that he is faced with. An option to arrive at that target is
to show that the matters he is faced with belong to a particular component
because the layout of the five components is an option to arrive at clarity to
the matters. To date, it is unclear how to assign a matter to a component.
There is no proposal as to how to establish a matter as a matter in a particular
component. Though I think that this obscurity is not troublesome per se – it
even leaves open the way of intellectual progress of managing the matters in
argumentation research – and I thus do not state that there is one particular
“best” way of assigning the matters to components, I aim at suggesting how
to assign certain matters to the various components.
Recast that clarity can be arrived at via different routes. First, an
argumentation researcher can spell out to have employed his intuition for the
assignment of his research project to one (or more) component(s). Second,
he can spell out to have assigned the matters via the logical route based on
certain criteria.
First, in order to assign a matter to a particular component intuition
can be used. Spelling out that the reader is supposed to employ his
intuition to understand the assignment is more likely to support the reader’s
understanding than not spelling out that intuition has been made use of in
the assignment because it facilitates that the reader will not employ the
logical route since he is informed that the logical route is rather unlikely to
be a guide to clarity. Nonetheless, since an intuitive assignment can spark
off a disagreement, an argumentation researcher can aim at explaining his
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intuition why a particular matter is assigned to a certain component. For that
explanation, in turn, he can employ certain essentials of a more “logical”
assignment. So, all in all, I suggest that argumentation researchers make
transparent when they rely on the reader’s intuition in understanding the
assignment of a matter to a particular component.
Second, in order to assign a matter to a particular component logical criteria
can be used. Those criteria should facilitate that the reader is oriented.156
Employing criteria that are spelled out, thus transparent, can support a reader’s
understanding. A researcher can show the application of his research strategy
transparently, i. e. he can show the rules that he applies for a particular
purpose in his assignment of a matter to a very component.
The assignment of a matter to a particular component can be based on the
criterion of terms that are involved in the research. Recast that a term is to be
used only in the language in which a meaning has been established for it (cf.
troublesome matter G). So, against the background of the r between the five
components and the three languages of a particular field, branch, and research
program – where researchers work in accordance with a certain approach, or
paradigm – the creation of a term in (a) particular language(s) brings about (a)
certain component(s) in which this term can plausibly be employed. In other
words, in line with the scaffold the components in argumentation research are
distinguished based on the terms that are created for them. So, in accordance
with the three languages in a particular field, branch, or research program
particular terms are used in certain components – i. e. in accordance with
a certain approach, or paradigm. So, if a particular term does not exist in
a field, branch, or research program, it cannot be part of the matters that
are researched in accordance with the very paradigm. Next, I spell out two
examples.
Firstly, a theorist (pragma-dialectics) talks with a theorist (formal
dialectics). Say, the former talks about the matter “protagonist.” The latter
cannot understand him because the theorist (formal dialectics) is not aware
of the matter “protagonist”.157 There is the drawer of matters for the theorist
(pragma-dialectics), and there is the drawer of matters for the theorist (formal
dialectics).
Suppose the theorist (pragma-dialectics) talks with the analyst
156Facilitating that the reader is oriented means, e. g., that the argumentation researcher makes it simple to stay
on the route that brings on the target of clarity, and to not neglect important side notes in the assignment.
157A formal dialectician knows the term “proponent.”
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(pragma-dialectics) and the former talks about the protagonist and a
certain rule in the ideal model. When the respective analyst employs a
derivative of the template which does not involve the respective rule he will
not understand the theorist. He cannot understand the matter “protagonist”
from the ideal model in the sense of its r to the certain rule. Thus again, there
are different drawers of matters for theorist and analyst.
Secondly, recast that in pragma-dialectics employing the term “reconstruct”
refers to describing language. So, when in a research project a writer
talks about a reconstruction, this term suggests that he is likely to refer
to the theoretical component (defining the term) or the analytical-intuitive
component (employing the term in an analysis).158 All the same, due to
the fact that “reconstruct” is part of pragma-dialectical describing language
it is clear that he does not refer to the philosophical component. Intuitively
speaking, by creating terms in the particular contexts of the three languages
vocabulary is created for different role models.
The assignment of a matter to a particular component may also be based
on the aim of the particular argumentation researcher. Next I present three
examples.
Firstly, an aim of an actualization of the philosopher in a particular research
program, e. g. in pragma-dialectics, is the creation of terms for the ideal
language for that research program. As shown, in this creation of terms for
ideal language intuition is used. Though it may be unconscious, but the use
of intuition suggests that particular matters are (not) presented: In another
research program the ideal language with its “well-conceived philosophical
principles” which “are expressed not only in the selection of the themes
that are in need of theorizing, but also in the way in which the research is
undertaken and how the research findings are used in practice” (vEG04: 13) is
created differently because other themes or ways how the research findings are
(to be) used in practice are intuitively suggested by a respective philosopher.
Secondly, if an argumentation researcher aims at finding out whether a
certain stencil is an appropriate grid to translate parts from a discourse into
ideal terms then this argumentation researcher is about to check the grid. Thus
he is an empiricist. The different aims of the components can be a criterion to
facilitate the assignment of matters to the components.159
158Though, of course, he may also be referring to the empirical component or the practical component. However,
against the background of the pragma-dialectical literature the latter is more unlikely.
159However, due to the fact that a researcher can employ his intuition there can be a difference between the aims
of a role model and the actions of an actualization of this role model. For instance, whether or not a theorist
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Thirdly, grids from different research programs have different
presuppositions for their use (cf. e. g. translation criteria). That means that
particular targets can be arrived at in the analytical-intuitive component of the
respective field, branch, or research program. So, there are different matters
in different actualizations of the role model from the analytical-intuitive
component.
At last, the assignment of a matter to a particular component can be based
on the question of How to do research in the five components of different
fields, branches, or research programs (vEG04: 39). In the following I spell
out two examples of that.
Firstly, with respect to the use of terms to create new terms. In the
philosophical component (pragma-dialectics) definitions can be presented
by chaining words, such as “The term X means this and that.” In the
philosophical component of another field, branch, or research program – i. e.
where argumentation researchers work in accordance with another paradigm
– the definition may be presented by chaining symbols, such as “X = p∩q.”
Secondly, if an empiricist conducts research he employs his methodical
devices of empirical research. That means, whichever matter an empiricist
(pragma-dialectics) faces, in employing his methodical devices he somewhat
“makes” that matter a matter of the empirical component (pragma-dialectics).
Intuitively speaking, the role models bring the methodical devices.
Argumentation research brings the matters. The matters can be researched
on with those different methodical devices. Apparently, the results of doing
research on a particular matter vary depending on the methodical devices that
are employed. In different components there are different methodical devices
that can be employed to achieve clarity to the matters. In employing any of
those methodical devices clarity to the matters can be achieved via different
routes. All in all, again, I suggest argumentation researchers to transparently
depict when they aim at arriving at the reader’s clarity to the matters via which
route.
There may be more options on a logical route to distinguish the components
in argumentation research. My target is to elucidate that every component in
argumentation research is distinct from any other component (be it inside or
(pragma-dialectics) responds to an empiricist’s proposal to amend a blueprint depends on the very theorist
because he may intuitively (not) accord with the proposal of the empiricist (pragma-dialectics). However, in
this regard note that the particular configuration of a blueprint may be understood by showing work in all of
the five components in the research program, and by acknowledging that a respective theorist employs his
intuition in building and amending the blueprint.
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outside the same field, branch, research program, i. e. in accordance, or not
in accordance, with a certain approach). From the distinction between the
components by means of the criteria of a logical route it becomes apparent
that, metaphorically speaking, the distinct five components of a field, branch,
or research program are drawers to separate the matters in accordance with a
certain approach, or paradigm, in argumentation research.
Sticking to the metaphor of the drawers, the components are chained as
drawers of the same cabinet. The distinct five components of a particular
research program, branch, or field are drawers to cluster the matters in
argumentation research. By means of the five components in the Realm
of Argumentation Studies, van Eemeren and Grootendorst state, “research
can relatively easily be clustered into larger wholes, or ensembles, so
that it becomes clear what kind of research program is [...] represented”
(vEG04: 41). As I have shown by means of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics),
clustering is an option to structurally configure the matters in the Realm of
Argumentation Studies. I suggest to extend the use of the module of the
five components: It should be used not only in the Realm of Argumentation
Studies, but in other paradigms in argumentation research, too. Doing so
facilitates to optimize argumentative reality.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are aware that the five components of
the Realm of Argumentation Studies are somewhat related to one another.
However, the authors’ characterization of the relationships between the five
components may prevent clarity. They state that the components are distinct
yet chained. On the one hand, “[...] all the components are relatively
autonomous and have their own standards [...],” on the other hand “[t]here is
a mutual dependence among the five components of the research program”
(vEG04: 39). Since the authors do not refer to a more abstract criterion
– such as the distinction between ideal language and actual language, a
distinction which is particularly relevant to research projects in argumentation
research – the authors do not facilitate clarity to what they mean by “relatively
autonomous” yet “mutual dependent.” The scaffold, however, does facilitate
to arrive at a way of plausibly clustering the matters.
I aim at clarity to the r between the five components in order to show how
the five components are an option to cluster the matters in argumentation
research. First, clarity to the relationships between the five components may
be arrived at by making use of the distinction between the three languages.
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I showed how the three languages and the five components can be related to
each other. From that layout, the scaffold, some rs can be suggested in order
to depict the five components as an option to cluster the matters.
For instance, there is no relationship between different components
involved in the creation of an ideal language because only the philosopher
is responsible for the creation of an ideal language. All those matters that are
connected to creating an ideal language can thus be clustered as a part of the
philosophical component.
However, next I exemplary spell out an r between components with respect
to the creation of a language. It is the theorist’s task to create a describing
language. A theorist decides, though he may very well employ his intuition in
deciding, which are the “themes in need of theorizing” (cf. vEG04: 13) with
respect to a describing language in the respective field, branch, or research
program. In creating a describing language a theorist can use the “material”
from ideal language that has been created by the philosopher. For instance, in
spelling out a pragma-dialectical meaning of the term “analysis” in describing
language a theorist refers to the meaning of the “two types of validity” as the
basis for spelling out the meaning of the relational terms “reconstruct” and
“evaluate.” In can be part of answering the question: “By which means does
a pragma-dialectician evaluate?” In this case, the matters connected to the
creation of the term “analysis” in pragma-dialectical describing language can
be clustered in the theoretical and the philosophical component.
Every research program, branch, and field is characterized by a
configuration of the three languages (cf. this chapter: the scaffold). So,
in general, the five components of a research program, branch or field are
chained by using terms from the same structure of the three languages because
the role models work in accordance with a certain approach, or paradigm.
However, since the three languages are separate, a clustering of terms in those
separate languages suggests a characteristic fashion of research in accordance
with a certain approach.160 So, employing different terms in different fields,
branches, and research programs facilitates that a reader arrives at clarity to
the matters.
A distinction between research programs, branches and fields based on the
creation of different terms, and on the different uses of terms, apparently,
is already at stake in argumentation research. Whereas pragma-dialecticians
in their ideal language employ the term “protagonist” and “antagonist,”
160Every field, branch, research program can have a separate list of terms (cf. appendix).
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formal dialecticians in their ideal language employ the terms “proponent” and
“opponent.” The concepts are similar in the sense that in they designate the
parties in ideal cis. Now, when a reader aims at clarity to a sentence in which
the term “protagonist” is employed – and he is given a list of terms like in
the appendix – then he will refer to pragma-dialectical literature rather than
literature from formal dialectics.
Understanding in which sense the languages relate to each other and in
which way the different languages relate to the five components facilitates to
understand which of the terms are to be used in the different components, and
thus in which way the matters can be clustered in the different components.
For instance, in making use of the describing language both theorist and
analyst can be faced with one and the same matter “protagonist” in the
sense of a certain stencil. Thus these components are related via the use of
describing language. Yet in both components there are different ways of how
to be doing research concerning a matter. Therefore, again, the components
are also characterized as distinct. The scaffold (pragma-dialectics) facilitates
an optimization of argumentative reality in the sense that it facilitates clarity
to the matters.
Arriving at an aim of one component may be required in order to arrive at
an aim in another component. In such a case the components are connected
through their aims. For instance, a blueprint rests on the ideal language that
has been created. Both creating describing language and using describing
language to spell out the scopes of a blueprint – e. g. to spell out the
translation criteria – are matters of the theoretical component. So a theorist
creates and uses the term “translation criteria.” An analyst, as well, uses the
term translation criteria. However, he uses the term to arrive at his aim of a
reconstruction of a text. Thus there is a connection between the aims of the
creation and use of describing language in the theoretical component and the
use of describing language in the analytical-intuitive component. In this case
the respective matters connected to “translation criteria” are clustered in the
theoretical, and the analytical-intuitive component because the role models
need the matters to arrive at the aims of the research projects in their particular
components.161
Depending on the field, branch or research program there are different
161Certainly, the empirical component may as well be taken into consideration, e. g. if the translation criteria
are to be checked by an empiricist. In fact, the options to do this must be presented by a theorist in building
the blueprint.
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standards – in accordance with the different approaches – when it comes to
the question how to do research in the theoretical component with respect
to using an ideal language to build a stencil. In an empirical component
there is also a particular standard of how to be doing research. This may
refer to employing actual language, describing language and ideal language
to check the grid. Suppose, a grid is checked by means of methodical
devices of qualitative empirical research. Such methodical devices can only
be employed if the blueprint is built properly. For instance, a methodical
device from qualitative research to check the translation criteria of a grid can
only be employed when the scopes of the grid with respect to those translation
criteria are spelled out properly. Thus, the standard how to be doing research
in the theoretical component must somewhat suit the respective standard in
the empirical component of that field, branch or research program. So, the
matters can be clustered in accordance with the question of how to be doing
research in different research projects in argumentation research.
Every field, branch, research program in argumentation research is
a distinct structure entailing the five components – which are chained
because the researchers work in accordance with a certain approach, or
paradigm. I suggest to add an index to each of the components in
argumentation research. In that way researchers can show to which
field, branch, or research program the particular component belongs, for
instance: philosophical component (normative pragmatics) and theoretical
component (pragma-dialectics). Writing about his research project an
argumentation researcher thus, for instance, states: “This is a research project
in the analytical-intuitive component (pragma-dialectics).” He thus prevents
conflicts in argumentation research, e. g. with respect to the scopes of his use
of terms.
So, since clustering the matters is a means to arrive at clarity to the
matters I metaphorically consider the five components of different research
programs, branches and fields to be drawers of the same cabinet. The matters
and the management of the matters can be located in the different drawers
of the cabinet. Role models and integrations of role models can thus be
envisioned not just in the pragma-dialectical research program (cf. chapter
3: characterization of the mediator) but in other research programs, branches
and fields, as well.
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2.4 Conclusion of the chapter
In section 2.1 I introduced the terms, e. g. “matter,” “r” and “context,” that
formed the background to developing and applying my methodical means
of “the scaffold.” I consider those terms part of the natural language (cf.
below). In the context of argumentation research I introduced the methodical
gap which illustrates the relationship between matters referred to by means
of (the contexts of) ideal language or actual language. I backed up the
distinction between the contexts of language by spelling out the distinction
in pragma-dialectics between ideal contexts and actual contexts, and by
distinguishing the creation of a language from the use of a language.
Researching the relationship between the five components, the creation and
use of a language and the methodical gap I depicted the need to introduce a
third language: A describing language fulfills a bridging function with respect
to the methodical gap. Hence “the three languages” of ideal, actual and
describing language. However, reflecting on the three languages I pointed at
the matter of the aforementioned “natural language” – hence the module of the
four languages – which is particularly relevant to argumentation researchers.
For example, an argumentation researcher who actualizes the role model
of the analyst analyzes a fragment comprised of matters spelled out by
means of actual language (i. e. words used by a person) by making use of
the configuration of matters in an ideal language (speech acts applied by a
character in an ideal context) which, by means of describing language (e. g.
“reconstruct”), he shows to be actualized. Since some of the terms used
in the analysis by this argumentation researcher are neither from ideal, nor
from actual, nor from describing language the analyst employs his natural
language, too.
So I developed the scaffold from the modules of the five components
and the four languages. I applied the scaffold to pragma-dialectics, hence
the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) (cf. figure 2.2). I chained the methodical
findings to (the management of) the purpose of optimizing argumentative
reality. I particularly made use of the findings about the methodical gap when
I presented the next module, eight troublesome matters (A-H), with respect to
the creation and use of language(s) in the different components.
Section 2.2 is an overview of the five components, i. e. the entire research
program, of pragma-dialectics. I exemplarily scrutinized pragma-dialectics to
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elaborate the relationships between the five components in a certain research
program, branch or field of argumentation research.
I presented the module of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics)
(a-n). I traced back those fourteen matters to the module of the troublesome
matters (A-H). So, again, those findings are based on the management
of the methodical gap and can be chained to the creation and use of
language. In line with the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) I particularly spelled
out that the understanding of the concept of “ideal model” is troublesome
in pragma-dialectics because the term is employed in the sense of natural
language (e).
However, against the background of the desire of argumentation
researchers to bridge the methodical gap I referred to Kvernbekk’s distinction
between strong and weak theories and to the relationships between the
five components when I developed the module of the quartet of terms
(ideal model, stencil, blueprint, grid). I thus elaborated the scopes and
functions of ideal models and of stencils (i. e. blueprints and grids) in
argumentation research. I stated that, and in which sense, the distinction
between ideal models and stencils is needed in order to fulfill the purpose
of pragma-dialectical argumentation research: Spelling out the particular
relevance of those components to the management of the methodical gap I
suggested a distinction between the management of a stencil in the sense
of a “blueprint” in the theoretical component (pragma-dialectics), and the
management of a stencil in the sense of a “grid” by the pragma-dialectical
analyst and empiricist. I showed that the terms “blueprint” and “grid” are
used by other argumentation researchers as well – however, they do not define
the terms against the background of (the management of) the methodical gap
(by means of the five components).
So, with respect to the module of the five components I used the scaffold
to elaborate the relationship between an ideal model and a stencil by referring
to the their different functions for the different role models. Whereas the
template of an ideal model has two functions – both of which are relevant
to the theorist –, the blueprint has one function – relevant to the theorist
– and the grid has two functions – one being relevant to the analyst, and
one being relevant to the empiricist. As to the stencil I moreover presented
against the background of the methodical gap and the matter of translation
criteria the relationship between theorists and analysts: Translation criteria
are depicted by a theorist and employed by an analyst. Chained to the matter
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of argumentative competence I showed in which way the functions of a grid
facilitate to arrive at the aims of reflection-minded and prescription-minded
researchers in the practical component (pragma-dialectics).
Departing from the pragma-dialectical take on reasonableness, i. e. the two
types of validity, I developed the module of my definitions of “strategy” and
“strategic action.” A strategy is a configuration of possible forms of action that
are in accordance with particular rules and a particular purpose. In unfolding
the module I consequently suggested that a strategic action means to configure
matters in accordance with a strategy. Against the background of the module
of the five components I showed examples of strategic actions to illustrate that
in the pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion there is a bundle
of strategies.
By putting to use the scaffold and the different modules I hence showed
how to manage some of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). In fact,
I made use of the finding about the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics
that the term “ideal model” is employed in the sense of natural language to
introduce the concept of strategy, and to foster pragma-dialectical research
with respect to strategic actions.
I introduced the pragma-dialectical term “standpoint.” Concerning myself
with the module of the five components I elaborated the terms “critical” and
“critical analyst” and took into account the module of the four languages to
conclude a change in the pragma-dialectical take on the five components:
Based on the relationship between logic and intuition – both concepts are
referred to by means of natural language – I suggested to label the “analytical
component” of the research program the “analytical-intuitive component.”
I thus researched the relationship between the analytical-intuitive and
the empirical component in pragma-dialectics, particularly – against the
background of the methodical gap – with respect to the management of the
concept of “reasonableness.”
At last, against the background of the module of the five components I
introduced the concept of a “designer” in pragma-dialectics and spelled out
the reasons to conduct argumentation research in relation to first, the purpose
of pragma-dialectics to optimize argumentative reality, and second, the target
of the pragma-dialectical practitioner to optimize argumentative reality in a
pragma-dialectical fashion (e. g. to enhance the argumentative competence of
persons in actual contexts). I illustrated in which sense the research results of
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the pragma-dialectical practitioner relate to the research results from the other
four components of the research program.
In section 2.3 I aimed at facilitating an optimization of argumentative
reality in argumentation research: I concerned myself with the question
of how argumentation researchers in argumentative reality already do –
and in order to prospectively prevent conflict can – employ the scaffold.
I showed that the layout of the five components should be used in all of
the fields, branches, and research programs of argumentation research. I
employed three criteria to suggest how to assign the very matters that an
argumentation researcher is faced with in his research project to a particular
component in argumentation research: the terms, the aim, and the question
how to do research. Respectively inspiring the exemplary distinction between
a philosophical component (normative pragmatics) from a theoretical
component (pragma-dialectics) I showed that my concept of the five role
models applies to “the state of the art” of argumentation research. Making
use of the scaffold I elaborated in which sense every research program,
branch, and field is characterized by the different contexts of languages, i. e.
the module of four languages. I related two modules when I chained the term
strategy and the five components in spelling out the concept of “research
strategies.” One of the findings is particularly relevant to the next chapter: A
pragma-dialectical strategy accords with the purpose of pragma-dialectical
research.
The findings from this chapter facilitate to answer the first – and partly
the second – research question (cf. chapter 5). Concluding, the following
modules can now be structurally determined: The five components are
structurally determined by means of (the management of) the methodical
gap; the four languages are structurally determined by means of the creation
and use of the terms in the five components; the troublesome matters are
structurally determined by means of the creation and use of the terms
from the four languages; the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) are
structurally determined by means of the troublesome matters in respect of
pragma-dialectics; the quartet of terms is structurally determined by means
of the different functions of ideal contexts in the five components; the
four meta-theoretical principles are structurally determined by means of
the pragma-dialectical purposeful integration of pragmatic with dialectical
insights; the definitions of strategy and strategic action in pragma-dialectics
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are structurally determined by means of the four meta-theoretical principles,
particularly purposeful functionalization. In order to facilitate more answers
to the second research question, and to answer the third research question in
the next chapter I particularly focus on the characterization of the mediator.
3 Mediation and pragma-dialectics
In this chapter I use the module of the four meta-theoretical principles to
explicate the (relationships between the) terms clarity, acceptability and
acceptance in pragma-dialectics, I introduce in the research program the
notion of “clarity formula.” Next, philosophically and theoretically I face
the obscurity revolving the concept of ideal model when I facilitate – in line
with the modules of the meta-theoretical principles and the quartet of terms
– the building of a pragma-dialectical stencil that can be used purposefully to
analyze sessions of mediation. Based on pragma-dialectical research results,
e. g. on two meanings of the term, I conclude different theoretical contexts to
elaborate the mediator, and the relationship between clarity and mediation.
Unfortunately Greco Morasso (GM08) does not refer to a particular
set of rules for sessions of mediation to pragma-dialectically spell out
her “mediation framework,” so its very analytical-intuitive applicability is
questionable. Integrating matters from critical discussion with the “WIPO
Mediation Rules” (World Intellectual Property Organization, an agency of
the UN) I arrive at the module of an ontological framework for a stencil of
critical discussion (m) (the “m” points to “mediation”).
In line with current pragma-dialectical endeavors (cf. vE15) not all of the
twenty-seven articles from the WIPO are relevant to analytical-intuitive – and
hence theoretical – goals. I employ the scaffold and the module of strategy
to integrate the fifteen rules of the ideal model with the relevant articles from
mediation. I utilize that endeavor to introduce in ideal language the module
of the terms issue and contention in the pragma-dialectical research program.
Against the background of the speech acts of critical discussion I relate the
module of issues (requesting an argument) and contentions (advancing an
argument) to the aforementioned configuration of rules and articles (module
of ontological framework) and to my research on acceptance. Related to the
module of the five components I spell out the theoretical, analytical-intuitive
and practical benefits from applying the ontological framework. I furthermore
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make use of the module of the five components to particularly emphasize the
scopes and functions, and the benefits of applying critical discussion (m).
I employ the scaffold and the modules of the five components – the
relationships between the five role models –, the ontological framework
of critical discussion (m) – i. e. the modules of strategy, and of issues
and contentions –, and the meta-theoretical principles to characterize the
mediator pragma-dialectically. Fostering the (metaphorically expressed)
pragma-dialectical understanding of the role of mediators I particularly
pinpoint the relationship between his strategic actions, clarity and acceptance,
and his paradoxical role to introduce the module of the integration of role
models: The mediator is a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance;
in the sense of the WIPO he is an integration of the pragma-dialectical
critical analyst with the designer of acceptance. I apply the scaffold to
localize those complex findings in order to facilitate the strategic actions of
analytical-intuitive practitioners who manage the methodical gap. At last, I
further specify the scopes of a stencil critical discussion (m) for theoretical
research.
3.1 Avoiding obscurity: Acceptance, acceptability
and clarity in pragma-dialectics, and in
mediation
Thus far the term “clarity” has been particularly prominent in my research (cf.
e. g. “clarity to the matters,” clarity in sessions of mediation). Also, pointing
at the module of the integration of role models I briefly concerned myself with
the pragma-dialectical matter of “acceptance” (of the standpoint) (cf. chapter
2: analytical component). I aim at explicating (the relationships) between the
terms acceptance, acceptability and clarity.
At first I show the relevance of the terms to argumentation research by
referring to argumentation researchers who are not pragma-dialecticians.
Second, I explicate the terms – one by one – in a pragma-dialectical fashion,
i. e. adherent to the four meta-theoretical principles of the research program.
I recast, for instance, the “acceptance of a standpoint.” Tracing it back to
the need to explicate it pragma-dialectically, however, I particularly focus on
the term clarity. This focus results, for example, in my pragma-dialectical
introduction of the notion of the “clarity formula.” At last, in order to
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particularly facilitate the introduction of the modules of the ontological
framework and the integration of role models (cf. this chapter) I spell out
the relationships between the terms clarity, acceptability and acceptance.
First, Wolski and Jacobs concern themselves with statistical reasoning in
empirical research. They consider this reasoning to be characterized by
“demonstrative proof,” i. e. “strong conclusions involving direct evidence,
certainty, necessity, infallibility and the like.” In particular they write about
the r between the null hypothesis, i. e. the point of view that an element,
relationship or context is absent, and the “proof of the existence of the
phenomenon [ε , r or c] under test” (cf. the point of view that the respective ε ,
r or c is present). They write that acceptance of a proposition is a “voluntary
decision” which is based on rational justification which in turn is “a matter of
persuasion” (WJ99: 877). Formulating a null hypothesis, they say, represents
establishing a presumption which has to be taken into consideration with
respect to the acceptance of a research hypothesis. And since rejecting a
presumption is a question of “plausible” rather than of statistical reasoning
the acceptance of a research hypothesis is a question of plausible reasoning:
“Scientific theory and empirical knowledge is a matter of deciding what to
treat as true or false” (WJ99: 879).
In the context of “issue-relevant thinking” acceptance depends on goals
and preferences, and those are purpose-dependent which means that the
acceptance of propositions is context-dependent (Pin03: 825, 827). Pinto
distinguishes between reasons why a person acts in a particular fashion
and the reasons of a person for acting in a particular fashion: Reasons for
accepting can be distinguished from reasons which configure “the grounds on
which” a person accepts a matter (Pin03: 826). Acceptance as a “cognitive
state rather than a cognitive move” “emerges” from certain matters in a
context (Pin03: 828, 829). According to the author’s suggested distinction
between context-independent grounds for accepting a proposition and the
context-dependent reasons to accept a proposition a person can accept a
proposition that he does not believe.
By accepting a proposition I mean being prepared to use it
as a premiss in my reasoning or inferences (or in cases of
public discussion being prepared to tolerate its use by others)
(Pin03: 827).
Wolski and Jacobs deal with acceptance in the context of scientific discourse.
Acceptance is controversial: In the context mentioned plausible rather
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than statistical reasoning facilitates acceptance. The context-dependency of
acceptance is spelled out by Pinto as well. Researching reasons for accepting
means researching those utterances in a discourse that facilitate that the
speaker points to a certain actualized (“cognitive”) configuration.
To know what a person’s reasons for accepting a proposition
are is to understand why, from the agent’s point of view, it is
reasonable to accept that proposition. [...] [W]e should count as
reasons for accepting p those factors on which the reasonableness
of accepting p depends [...] (Pin03: 828).
Pinto spells out the basis on which acceptance is arrived at: reasonableness.
Likewise, departing from a discussion of Aristotle’s dialectic Alford considers
propositions to be acceptable against the background of a context of “careful
scrutiny.” Dialectical argumentation, he writes, “relies upon acceptable but
unproved premises” (Alf03: 10).
Johnson deals with the adequacy of premises. Just like Lumer who
identifies acceptability with “truth, high probability or verisimilitude” –
i. e. “being true, probably true or truth-like” (Lum10: 45) – he chains
acceptability to truth when he remarks that acceptability is “often put forward
as an alternative to the truth-requirement.” He questions whether there can
be a plausible explication of it “without recourse to the truth-requirement”
(Joh99: 412). In fact, he criticizes, argumentation researchers spell out the
“truth-potential” when it comes “to test the strength of the inference” but
install an acceptability-potential when it comes to “evaluating the premise
itself” (Joh99: 413).
Chained to the insights about acceptance Alford depicts that acceptability
depends on the context of a procedure of testing acceptability. Johnson spells
out the relevance of premises to such a procedure.162 All of the meanings of
acceptability suggested by Lumer illustrate that acceptability is controversial.
In argumentation research thus far the terms “clarity” and “clear” are
employed in a sense of natural language. They refer to a meaning of
“facilitating an understanding,” e. g. “Aristotle was clear on what is required
for a proof” (Alf03: 10) or “I want to make it clear” (Joh99: 411) and “Given
the clarity of Aristotle’s comments” (Alf03: 11). They can also be explicated
as “having arrived at an understanding,” e. g. “it is clear from what they
162In pragma-dialectics the four meta-theoretical principles facilitate to arrive at clarity to the acceptability of
premises.
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write on page 96” (Joh99: 413) or “it is pretty clear that the reasons he is
talking about are claims” (Pin03: 829) or “reveals that a clear idea of this
approach as an approach aiming at knowledge or justified belief is missing
there” (Lum10: 48) and “ideas behind constructivism are clarity and [...]”
(Lum10: 52).
In their articles the authors illustrate that clarity in a discourse is
context-dependent. Clarity is controversial and it is chained to utterances.
Also it is possible to spell out what facilitates an understanding, and how. The
authors do not spell out an r between clarity, acceptability and acceptance.
However, that can be traced back to the fact that clarity is a term which is
employed in a sense of natural language.
Second, the meta-theoretical principles in pragma-dialectics (cf. chapter
1) facilitate that concepts are explicated in a transparent fashion. So,
in accordance with the pragma-dialectical meta-theoretical principle of
dialectification parties in a pragma-dialectical blueprint aim at acceptance of
matters from this blueprint. So, in regards of dialectification Pinto inspires
that acceptance is understood to be context-dependent in the sense that the
ci of acceptance is the respective blueprint. Acceptance is a term from ideal
language, it is related to other terms from ideal language – and by means of
describing language it can be related to terms from actual language, too.
For instance, the acceptance of the standpoint – either in the confrontation
stage or in the concluding stage – defines that the parties have arrived at the
resolution of the difference of opinion. In a blueprint that can be used to
analyze a mediation session a theorist configures those matters that are, on the
one hand, pragma-dialectical research results which are relevant to acceptance
in the ci – such as pragma-dialectical argument schemes – and, on the other
hand, matters that are – against the background, e. g., of analyses – relevant
to be managed in the ca of a mediation session.163 For instance, he assumes
that the application of pragma-dialectical argument schemes is relevant to the
ca of a mediation session in which persons can “indicate willingness to accept
any proposal for settlement” (WIP09: 13).
163Referring to their argument schemes Johnson (Joh99: 413) purports that pragma-dialecticians treat acceptance
in a similar way that “logic” treats “truth.” He states, the requirements for acceptance are similar to the
truth-requirements. However, in pragma-dialectics the acceptance of a standpoint, brought about by means
of the application of an argument scheme, is the acceptance of an (externalized) attitude in respect of an
expressed opinion. It is not the acceptance of an opinion – which Johnson may refer to by “truth” – but the
expressed attitude towards it.
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In accordance with socialization the parties in a pragma-dialectical
blueprint facilitate acceptance by discussing matters from the blueprint.
In accordance with Pinto in pragma-dialectics acceptance is potentially
controversial (Pin03). It makes sense to respond to a sentence like “I accept
this proposition,” by stating, for instance, “Why do you purport to accept
this proposition?” A speaker does not question purporting that the actual
proposition is clear, or that it is acceptable. The speaker questions the actual
standpoint that it is accepted. In fact, in order to facilitate the procedure
of resolving the difference of opinion the mediator may spell out that very
question (cf. vEG04: 68: speech act of challenging to defend a standpoint).
In accordance with externalization the parties in a pragma-dialectical
blueprint arrive at acceptance when the respective commitment is arrived at.
For instance, the acceptance of the standpoint brings about the commitment
of being convinced of the (externalized) attitude in respect of an expressed
opinion:
In the approach centering round the resolution of a difference
of opinion, the effect of convincing manifests itself in the
externalization of the acceptance of a standpoint (vEG04: 30).
Acceptance of a standpoint is an “effect,” it is a configuration that is brought
about through the procedure of convincing. In the ci it is defined that an
“acceptance formula” (vEG84: 57) with respect to the standpoint is required
so that the “acceptance of the standpoint” is brought about, either in the
confrontation stage or in the concluding stage (vEG04: 67). Acceptance thus
is a configuration that defines the end of critical discussion.
Unlike Pinto (cf. Pin03: 827) who writes that accepting is a state, in
accordance with functionalization the configuration – or, for that matter, state
– of acceptance is brought about by means of the speech act to accept, i. e.
accepting. In a ca the speech act to accept is brought about by actualizing an
“acceptance formula”:
“Acceptance,” for instance, can be externalized as giving a
preferred response to an arguable act that commits the respondent
who accepts [...] (vE10: 6).
As shown, authors like Wolski and Jacobs refer to acceptance of propositions
(WJ99). The parties in a pragma-dialectical blueprint, however, manage
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the acceptance of a certain speech act’s propositional content and/ or
communicative force (cf. vEHSH07: 193-194). So, for instance, with respect
to the speech act standpointing (cf. chapter 2: analytical component) of the
protagonist, the antagonist can respond “I purport the acceptance of – i. e.
I accept – the propositional content of the (externalized) attitude and/ or the
communicative force of this externalizing.” Thus an analyst can locate an
acceptance formula by which a party commits himself either to a particular
propositional content or to a particular communicative force, or both.164
Note first, for instance in the ca of a mediation session, acceptance of
elements and relationships can be arrived at on both routes of logic, and
intuition. Note second, that in order to arrive at the acceptance of elements
and relationships it must be accepted that the respective εs or rs can be
accepted.165
In accordance with dialectification parties in a pragma-dialectical blueprint
aim at the acceptability of matters from this blueprint. Whereas Pinto
writes about “conative factors in the generation of belief and acceptance”
(Pin03: 825) pragma-dialecticians research “[...] which factors and processes
are important in argumentative discourse to convince someone who is in
doubt of the acceptability of a standpoint” (vEG04: 39). Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst thus spell out that acceptability is one of the “concepts
that occupy a crucial place in argumentation theory” (vEG04: 18). In fact,
acceptability is occupying a place in the pragma-dialectical definition of
argumentation:
Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at
convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint
[...] (vEG04: 1).
The pragma-dialectical term acceptability is a term from ideal language. It
164Note that the configuration of acceptance, as such, is not to a party’s (dis)advantage. Neither does the
configuration show how to arrive at that status. For instance, the reasonably obtained end of critical
discussion is not (dis)advantageous for one of the parties. However, against the background of executing a
strategy, acceptance can facilitate fulfilling a particular purpose. Hence an analysis of a certain configuration
of acceptance against the background of a procedure of executing a strategy can foster the insight in which
sense this configuration of acceptance is (dis)advantageous. Likewise, in a game of football the final whistle
(cf. Deu13: 63: “Festlegung der Spielzeit”), as such, is not to a team’s (dis)advantage. However, an analysis
against the background of a procedure of executing a strategy can result in the insight that a final whistle
is (dis)advantageous. Pragma-dialecticians aim at characterizing those (possible) forms of action and rules
that are relevant to arriving at “acceptance or non-acceptance of the standpoint” (cf. vEG04: 68).
165So, responding to the obscurity spelled out by Johnson (cf. Joh99: 413) a pragma-dialectical concept of
acceptability requires to be explicated.
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can thus be theoretically related to other terms from ideal language such as
“standpoint.” In a blueprint that can be used to analyze a mediation session
a pragma-dialectical theorist configures those matters that are, on the one
hand, pragma-dialectical research results which are relevant to acceptability
in the ci – against the background of Alford’s suggestions about dialectical
argumentation “it must be determined whether the constitutive argumentative
statements are acceptable” (vEGSH02: 91) – and, on the other hand, matters
that are – against the background, e. g., of conducting pragma-dialectical
analyses – relevant to be managed in the ca of a mediation session.
For instance, against the background of pragma-dialectical ideal elements
and relationships (εis and ris) van Eemeren et al. show in a case study in
which sense a “mediator’s formulation shifts the potential force [...] to that of
objections that suggest criteria for an acceptable proposal” (vEGJJ93: 123).
Apparently, an acceptable proposal which accords with certain “objections”
in the sense of a pragma-dialectical ci is relevant to both a pragma-dialectical
analyst, and to the persons in the ca of the mediation session. In fact, a
mediator facilitates a configuration of εa and ra in the sense of facilitating
acceptability of the proposal. So, in mediation the acceptability of matters in
the sense of the pragma-dialectical ci can be arrived at.
In accordance with socialization the parties in the ci of a pragma-dialectical
blueprint facilitate acceptability by discussing matters from the blueprint.
Acceptability is potentially controversial. It makes sense to respond to a
sentence like “I accept that this proposition can be accepted,” by stating, for
instance, “Why do you purport that this proposition can be accepted?” The
speaker does not question purporting that the proposition is clear, or that it is
accepted. The speaker questions that it is acceptable.
In accordance with externalization the parties in a pragma-dialectical
blueprint arrive at acceptability when the respective commitment is arrived at.
For instance, the acceptability of the standpoint brings about the commitment
of being convinced that it is possible to be convinced of the (externalized)
attitude in respect of an expressed opinion.166 When a party commits himself
to acceptability of a certain element or relationship he commits himself to the
166Unlike Johnson who states that “the fact that most or all accept a premise does not mean that it is acceptable”
(Joh99: 413) I consider a pragma-dialectical explication of acceptability that means that, when anyone
accepts a premise that does mean that this premise is acceptable (also cf. Lum10: 64). Inspired by
Lumer, against the background of reasons being context-dependent, I identify the term from ideal language
acceptability with the term from natural language truth. In this sense, any context-dependent matter (e. g. a
premise or an inference) that brings about an “acceptability-potential” brings about a “truth-potential.”
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acceptability of that ε or r in the particular configuration at hand. Similar to
acceptance the acceptability of a standpoint is an effect. It is a configuration
that is brought about through the procedure of becoming convinced that it
is possible to be convinced of the standpoint. The mediator facilitates this
procedure and he can particularly spell out its result.
In accordance with functionalization the configuration of acceptability can
be brought about by means of an assertive:
In performing a speech act of this kind, a person commits himself
more strongly or less strongly to the acceptability of a particular
proposition (vEG04: 63).
Thus it is characteristic of an “acceptance formula” that refers to the
acceptability of a certain matter that it can be reconstructed as an assertive
whose propositional content involves the respective matter. However, that in
argumentative reality the commitment can be “more or less strong” demands
the reader to employ a sense of natural language. Moreover, I see no reason
that only an assertive can be actualized to signal such a commitment.
However, the means – be it an assertive or not – by which the parties in a
pragma-dialectical blueprint manage the acceptability of a certain speech act
refers to the propositional content and/ or the communicative force of that
speech act. Note, first, that – for instance in the ca of a mediation session
– acceptability of elements and relationships can be arrived at via both
routes of logic, and intuition.167 Note, second, that in order to arrive at the
acceptability of elements and relationships, is must be clear which ε or r is
at stake.
Clarity to an element, relationship or context (ε , r, c) – and a lack thereof
– can be arrived at on both routes of logic, and intuition. Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (vEG04: cf. e. g. 24) write about clarity to the matters
in argumentation research. Analyzing a case from a ca they write: “[T]he
mover’s first question, ‘Does that piano have to go any further?’ involves a
relevance problem [...] the apparent irrelevancy results from a lack of clarity”
(vEG04: 86). Concluding that a “lack of clarity” facilitates this “relevance
167The configuration of acceptability is not to a party’s (dis)advantage. Neither does the configuration show how
to arrive at that status. However, against the background of executing a strategy acceptability can facilitate
fulfilling a particular purpose. Hence an analysis of a certain configuration of acceptability against the
background of a procedure of executing a strategy can result in the insight in which sense this configuration
of acceptability is (dis)advantageous.
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problem,” the author must have considered the very matters that result in the
lack of clarity on the intuitive or logical route.
Thus far, in pragma-dialectics the term “clarity to the matters” is employed
in a sense of natural language. So, a reader is suggested to employ his intuition
to make sense of the term. However, in a procedure of arriving at clarity to
the intended interpretation of a speaker’s utterance a listener may need to
prevent an (intuitively apparent) “irrelevancy.” In fact, his use of intuition
may have prevented him to focus on relevant matters. The listener who is
faced with a “lack of clarity” can aim at reassuring to be “on the right track”
towards the intended interpretation. Therefore it is worthwhile to spell out in
pragma-dialectics that, and how clarity can be arrived at via the logical route.
So, next, I aim at explicating the configuration of clarity as it is arrived at
via the logical route. Depicting the background of past pragma-dialectical
research on clarity I particularly refer to the relationship between, first,
the recognition conditions and, second, the Communication Principle in
pragma-dialectics. Third, I relate the findings to the module of the quartet
of terms, and integrate them in an elaborate pragma-dialectical explication of
clarity that runs parallel to my explication of acceptability and acceptance, i. e.
against the background of the module of the four meta-theoretical principles.
First, pragma-dialecticians present their concept of recognition conditions.
They position the respective discussion of matters on the “communicative
level” in argumentation research and depart from a discussion of Searle’s
conception of speech act conditions. They suggest that “the recognizability
of illocutions for the listener must be incorporated into the happiness
conditions.” In particular, van Eemeren and Grootendorst show that arriving
at the intended illocutionary force of a speech act depends not exclusively on
a correct performance, i. e. meeting the correctness conditions, but also on a
recognizable performance (vEG84: 44, 41).
In order to make their point they give the example of a promise. A listener,
can understand – or recognize – an utterance as a promise, be the sincerity
condition met or not. A listener can hold a speaker committed to having
promised something even if the Searlean sincerity condition has not been
fulfilled. They show that depending on the context an utterance can be
recognized as a promise even if not all of the correctness conditions have been
fulfilled. The recognition conditions – called “recognizability conditions” by
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG88) – consist of the propositional content
condition and the essential condition:
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If S performs his argumentation in a recognizable manner, this
automatically means that the propositional content condition and
the essential condition for pro- or contra-argumentation have
been fulfilled (vEG84: 43).
So, the “happiness” of Searle’s conditions for a promise does not facilitate
a listener’s recognition of an utterance as a promise: “an illocutionary act
that meets Searle’s correctness conditions cannot automatically be regarded
as ‘happy’” (vEG84: 42). Taking into consideration the listener’s perspective
thus pays out as the insight that certain conditions, which facilitate clarity to
the matters, refer to the part of the listener.168
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst suggest that a listener who is aware of the
purpose of the discourse can establish such illocutionary acts that are spatially
and temporarily relevant (cf. vEG84: 42). They depict the propositional
content condition and the essential condition of “the speech act complex of
argumentation.” The former reads “The constellation of statements S1, S2
(,..., Sn) consists of assertives in which propositions are expressed.” The
essential condition reads “Advancing the constellation of statements S1, S2
(,..., Sn) counts as an attempt by S to justify O to L’s satisfaction, i. e. to
convince L of the (un)acceptability of O” (vEG84: 43).169 So, focusing
on pragma-dialectical core concepts van Eemeren and Grootendorst present
recognition conditions of argumentation which can be employed to show that
“the listener has indeed understood” (vEG84: 43).
Second, four “kinds of rules for communication” are distinguished by
van Eemeren and Grootendorst. Syntactic rules “for the production and
interpretation of sentences and larger stretches of discourse” are the basis
to distinguish semantic rules (meaning of the words in “these” sentences),
communicative rules (rules for recognizable and correct performance of the
speech acts actualized in “these” sentences) and interactional rules (conduct
of sequences of speech acts in “these” sentences). Though their definition
of the rules already bring about an apparent r (cf. “these”), the authors opt
for labeling the former two “grammatical rules.” The latter two, which van
Eemeren and Grootendorst focus on in their article Rules for Argumentation
in Dialogues, are “pragmatic rules” (cf. vEG88: 500). The Communication
168Against the background of the meta-theoretical principle of socialization clarity is researched in the sense of
the result of a “bilateral process” (vEG84: 41).
169“S” abbreviates speaker, “O” abbreviates opinion, “L” abbreviates listener.
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Principle (cf. vEG04) or Principle of Communication (cf. vEG92) refers to
the pragmatic rules.
The Communication Principle is inspired by “Searlean communicative
insight and Gricean interactional insight” (vEG04: 76-77). In fact, van
Eemeren and Grootendorst aim at reformulating “Gricean maxims in a
Searlean way” (cf. vEG88: 501). On the one hand, “maxims for the conduct
of discourse such as those explicitized by Grice (1975)” are relevant to
research in which sense a listener has indeed understood.170 Moreover,
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG92: 50) state that the five rules of the
Principle of Communication arrive at “a similar epistemological status as
Grice’s Co-operative Principle,” i. e. the rules can be traced back to “the
principle of effective means” according to which a presumption holds that a
speaker’s actions are justified by his beliefs and end. Against the background
of the diagnostic power of a stencil, I think these “maxims,” and rules also
facilitate to illustrate in which sense a listener can indeed be understanding.
On the other hand, the formulation of the rules can be traced back to Searle’s
work.171 Inspiring the research on the performance of speech acts Searle
inspires the pragma-dialectical fashion of research.172
(1) Perform no incomprehensible speech acts,
(2) Perform no insincere speech acts,
(3) Perform no unnecessary speech acts,
(4) Perform no pointless speech acts,
(5) Perform no new speech acts that are not an appropriate
sequel or reaction to preceding speech acts (vEG88: 501).
The first rule of the Communication Principle is suggested to be “an
implementation of the principle of clarity” (vEG04: 76-77). It “corresponds
to the recognizability conditions of speech acts” (vEG88: 501).173 Thus it is
particularly relevant to the explication of clarity in pragma-dialectics.
170“Without a knowledge of these conventions of usage it is impossible for the listener, even in the case of a
promise issued explicitly, to comprehend what the speaker’s utterance implies” (vEG84: 62).
171“The rules for communication correspond to a large extent to Grice’s maxims. The main difference, which
is also the main advantage, ist that the maxims are now formulated as rules for the performance of speech
acts” (vEG88: 502).
172Again, in order to arrive at clarity to the rules recast the background of the four meta-theoretical principles.
By referring to speech acts it becomes apparent, for instance, that a pragma-dialectical fashion means to
stick to the meta-theoretical principle of functionalization.
173“The first rule corresponds roughly to Searle’s propositional content condition and the essential condition”
(vEG88: 502-503).
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Next, I spell out the r between the recognition conditions and the (first
rule of the) Principle of Communication. Taken together they give rise to
the explication of the basis of clarity to the matters. If the recognition
conditions are fulfilled, i. e. the essential condition and the propositional
content condition are fulfilled, and a listener employs the rules of the Principle
of Communication, particularly the first rule, then “the listener succeeds in
establishing the illocutionary force of a speech act” (vEG84: 42).174
In order to be clear the speaker (or writer) must formulate the
speech act that he wishes to perform in such a way that the listener
(or reader) is able to recognize its communicative force and to
establish what propositions are expressed in it (vEG88: 501-502).
Formulating a speech act clearly (“in such a way”) is a task of a
speaker. Clearly formulating in the sense of the recognition conditions
means to facilitate comprehensibility (“not incomprehensible”). However,
comprehensibility can only be actualized in a discourse when the recognition
conditions are indeed fulfilled and the listener indeed makes use of certain
“conventions of usage” (vEG84: 62). In a discourse clarity to a matter
can thus be facilitated by both the speaker and the listener – by means of
actions that accord with “actualizing a certain argumentative competence”
with respect to the recognition conditions and those conventions (“being able
to recognize”). However, in a discourse clarity to a matter can only be
arrived at by configuring the relationship between the actions of the speaker
and listener. Note, however that irrespective of the fulfillment of all of the
correctness conditions on the part of a speaker, if the listener has understood
– or recognized – the intended communicative force of a speech act then he
can hold the speaker liable for having uttered a speech act with a certain
illocutionary force.175
Now, since the parties in critical discussion cannot not act in accordance
with the recognition conditions and the rules of the Principle of
Communication it makes no sense to define clarity in the context of the
ideal model. Therefore, I understand van Eemeren and Grootendorst to talk
about the parties in a pragma-dialectical stencil when they write that “the
174So, when the authors scrutinize the pragmatic rules they stick to the meta-theoretical principle of
dialectification by spelling out the context-dependency, both spatial and temporal, of illocutionary acts.
175In line with the meta-theoretical principle of externalization pragma-dialectical research means taking into
consideration commitments.
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protagonist of a standpoint and the antagonist attempt to achieve clarity [...]”
(vEG04: 58) (cf. chapter 2: locating “fallacy”). Hence I explicate a meaning
of the term “clarity” that can be employed by theorists (pragma-dialectics) in
building stencils.
Third, departing from the context of a stencil in accordance with
dialectification parties in a pragma-dialectical blueprint aim at clarity to the
matters from this blueprint. In a blueprint that can be used to analyze a
mediation session a theorist configures such matters that are, on the one hand,
pragma-dialectical research results which are relevant to clarity in the ci – e. g.
with respect to the Communication Principle – and, on the other hand, matters
that are – against the background, e. g., of conducting analyses – relevant to
be managed in the ca of a mediation session.
So, it is relevant to both an analyst who employs concepts in the sense
of a pragma-dialectical ci and to persons in the ca of the mediation session
whether, or in which sense a listener has arrived at clarity to the matter at
hand. In fact, the mediator facilitates a configuration of εa and ra in the sense
of facilitating clarity to the matters. A mediator, for instance, spells out which
communicative means have facilitated to arrive at clarity to the matters (cf.
this chapter: usage declaratives, clarity formula), or in which way a person
arrived at clarity to the matters via an intuitive route. Clarity to the matters in
the sense of a pragma-dialectical ci can be arrived at in mediation.176
In accordance with socialization the parties in a pragma-dialectical
blueprint facilitate clarity by discussing matters from the blueprint. In
a ca a listener is oriented towards understanding the speaker’s intended
interpretation. As suggested in van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s example
of a promise in fulfilling his intent to understand the speaker’s intended
interpretation a listener may even make use of information that the speaker
did not at all intend to be relevant to understanding his utterance. Eventually,
an utterance like “I get it,” shows that the listener (“I”) has made sense of
something which he had not made sense of before.
Clarity is not potentially controversial. It makes no sense to respond to
a sentence like “I get that this proposition can be accepted,” by stating, for
instance, “Why do you get that this proposition can be accepted?” Still, a
176In argumentative reality clarity to the matters is desirable because it facilitates that people are oriented in
a ca. Yet other things may be “desirable” based on other reasons, or may facilitate orientation and be
“undesirable.” It is not per se enough to say that clarity is “desirable” only because it facilitates to have
orientation and other things may require more than just being “facilitating to be orientated” in order to label
them “desirable.”
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mediator can maintain that a person has spelled out the commitment to clarity
to the respective matter.
Thus, in accordance with externalization the parties in a pragma-dialectical
blueprint arrive at clarity when the respective commitment is arrived at. For
instance, the clarity to the standpoint brings about the commitment of having
recognized the (externalized) attitude in respect of an expressed opinion.
When a party commits himself to clarity to a certain element or relationship
he commits himself to the clarity to that ε or r in the particular configuration
at hand. For instance, clarity to a standpoint is an effect. “Recognizedness,” or
having made sense, of an actual standpoint is a configuration that is brought
about through the procedure of understanding the respective standpoint.
The mediator facilitates this procedure and he can particularly spell out the
“committedness to the recognizedness” (cf. vEG84: 5).
In accordance with functionalization the parties in a pragma-dialectical
blueprint manage the clarity to a certain speech act’s propositional content
and/ or communicative force. So, with respect to the speech act standpointing
of the protagonist the antagonist can respond “I understand the propositional
content of the (externalized) attitude and/ or the communicative force of this
externalizing.” An analyst can then locate a clarity formula by which a party
commits himself either to a particular propositional content or to a particular
communicative force, or both. Note that even if clarity to a particular matter
has been arrived at there can still be disagreement as to that matter (cf. chapter
2: reasons to conduct argumentation research, figure 2.7).177
Communicative means facilitate to arrive at the target of clarity to the
matters. I suggest that in a ca the configuration of clarity is brought about
by means of an actualization of a “clarity formula”.
– A clarity formula is a communicative means that brings about the
commitment of having recognized the acceptability of a matter.
Pragma-dialecticians present usage declaratives as such communicative
means to arrive at clarity to a matter. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst dedicate
a whole section to “The role of usage declaratives” (vEG84: 109-112).
177The configuration of clarity is not to a party’s (dis)advantage. Neither does the configuration show how to
arrive at that status. However, against the background of the procedure of executing a strategy clarity can
facilitate fulfilling a particular purpose. Hence an analysis of a certain configuration of clarity against the
background of a procedure of executing a strategy can result in the insight in which sense this configuration
of clarity is (dis)advantageous. In this dissertation I aim at characterizing configurations of forms of action
that are relevant to arriving at clarity to the matters in the sense of the pragma-dialectical research program
(cf. chapter 3: issues and contentions).
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Adhering to the four meta-theoretical principles, next I briefly
characterize “the only declaratives with any positive contribution” within a
pragma-dialectical blueprint (cf. vEGJJ93: 30).
Against the background of socialization the need to spell out usage
declaratives becomes apparent. In the ca of a discourse there can be a
“misunderstanding” between persons (vEG04: 166). Usage declaratives are
“helpful in avoiding misunderstandings” (vEGJJ93: 30), “to ensure mutual
comprehension of the interlocutor’s speech acts” (vEG84: 109). They
facilitate clarity to what is (not) controversial. Not providing a usage
declarative when it is requested is suggested to be a violation of the Principle
of Communication (vEG92: 197).
Against the background of dialectification in order to sort out a “lack
of clarity” a speech act is needed that has a particular r to the one that
triggered the misunderstanding (vEG04: 166). Since any speech act can pull
in obscurity, a usage declarative can refer to speech acts from any of the four
stages in the ci of the blueprint. They can refer to matters from any of the
stages and are thus not assigned to one of the stages (cf. e. g. vEG04: 66).
Against the background of functionalization usage declaratives facilitate
the illocutionary effect that the listener arrives at clarity to the intended
interpretation of a speech act (with respect to the propositional content and/ or
the communicative force). Belonging to the speech act class of declaratives
a usage declarative can be actualized, e. g., when a person in a discourse
defines or explicates a matter in order to spell out the intended interpretation
(vEG84: 109). For instance, a person can put forth an utterance that can be
reconstructed as an “argumentation based on a definition” (vEHSH07: 160).
Then the definition is a means “to facilitate or increase the listener’s or
reader’s comprehension” of the respective argumentation (vEGJJ93: 30). A
usage declarative facilitates a configuration of speech acts that involves a
clarity formula.
Though usage declaratives are not assigned to a particular stage in a
blueprint, against the background of externalization is becomes apparent
how they “nevertheless contribute to the resolution” (vEG84: 109). A usage
declarative is employed “to make clear how a particular speech act is to be
interpreted” (vEG04: 66). As suggested, managing clarity to a speech act
means managing the intended interpretation of that speech act. Managing
the intended interpretation is a means to manage the commitments that are
brought about by the respective speech act.
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Though in configuring critical discussion it makes no sense to take
into consideration usage declaratives, I think, it is still desirable that
pragma-dialecticians have introduced the matter. Intuitively speaking in
creating the stencil a theorist (pragma-dialectics) is reminded by the template
of critical discussion that usage declaratives may be required when a
researcher aims at, for instance, analyzing a certain discourse with respect to
the matter of a strategy.178
Concluding this section I spell out the rs between clarity to, acceptability of
and acceptance of a matter. Clarity to a matter is the basis for acceptability of
that matter. Acceptability of a matter is the basis for acceptance of that matter.
In cases in which verbal externalization is necessary for the sake
of clarity, the listener – acting in turn as speaker – will utter one
of the available “acceptance formulas”, in which case he will say
something like “I accept ...” or “O.K.” (vEG84: 57).
Verbal externalization of acceptance (or non-acceptance) by
the listener means that the mutual obligations between the
interlocutors are firmly and clearly established (vEG84: 57).
The actualization of an acceptance formula to a matter commits a speaker
to having clarity to this matter (“for the sake of clarity,” “firmly and
clearly established”). When clarity to a matter is actualized that does not
simultaneously mean that acceptability of that matter is actualized. When
acceptability of a matter is actualized that does not simultaneously mean that
acceptance of that matter is actualized.
However, due to the meta-theoretical principle of externalization a
pragma-dialectical analyst can plausibly state that when acceptance of
a matter is actualized then simultaneously acceptability of that matter
is actualized. Likewise, when acceptability of a matter is actualized
simultaneously clarity to that matter is actualized. So, because clarity to a
matter is actualized in the acceptance of a matter, clarity to a matter is a target
if acceptance of that matter is the goal.
Aiming at acceptance of certain matters a mediator manages clarity to those
matters. In fact, mediators facilitate acceptance by facilitating a discussion
178Recast that there can be a strategy to not apply a certain rule, e. g. rule 15 which regulates the “rights
and obligations of discussants in relation to the performance of usage declaratives or to requesting the
performance of usage declaratives” (cf. chapter 2: bundle of strategies in critical discussion).
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about actualizations of matters from the stencil. Greco Morasso illustrates
that acceptance – or “a lack thereof” – can be characteristic of a session
of mediation: “His silence, however, will turn out to be a sign of lack of
acceptance of the mediator’s management of the process” (GM08: 214).
The mediator applies his argumentative competence to manage the
procedure. This argumentative competence rests on the research results from
pragma-dialectics. A mediator facilitates arriving at a clarity formula with
respect to the acceptability of an actualization of one or more standpoint(s).
The mediator manages the acceptance of certain speech act’s propositional
content and communicative force. Mediators configure matters that are
relevant to clarity and acceptability in regards of the actualization of certain
speech act’s propositional content and communicative force. For instance,
they facilitate clarity to the matters of the recognition conditions.
The mediator’s management of the procedure is thus a pragma-dialectical
matter. Clarity to, as well as acceptability and acceptance of the mediator’s
management of the procedure can be arrived at (cf. table 3.1). The fact that
Greco Morasso writes about a lack of acceptance suggests that acceptance of
the respective matters can be arrived at in mediation.
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Table 3.1: Definitions of clarity, acceptability and acceptance.
















































With respect to dialectification each of the terms acceptance, acceptability
and clarity can be defined as a configuration in the ci of a blueprint.
3.2 A pragma-dialectical critical discussion (m)
In this section I face philosophically and theoretically the obscurity revolving
the concept of ideal model when I facilitate – in line with the modules
of the meta-theoretical principles and the quartet of terms – the building
of a pragma-dialectical stencil that can be used purposefully to analyze
sessions of mediation. I spell out some of the matters relevant to building
a pragma-dialectical stencil for the ca of a mediation session, i. e. a session of
mediation according to the WIPO. The stencil is labeled “critical discussion
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(m)” (“m” points to mediation). I show in which sense critical discussion (m)
is a stencil for the actual resolution of the difference of opinion in a mediation
session.
It makes no sense to suggest the character of the mediator in critical
discussion. In the framework of the ideal model a character who facilitates
that the parties obtain their goal to resolve the difference of opinion is not
required. For instance, with respect to clarity to the matters applying the
forms of action, i. e. the speech acts, does not give rise to fallacies, nor can
anything be unclear. In critical discussion clarity is guaranteed because the
parties act in the sense of the logical route. Speaking in natural language
there is no use for the character of a mediator in critical discussion, e. g. to
apply a usage declarative to facilitate that the parties arrive at clarity a matter.
In critical discussion there is no “lack of clarity” (vEG04: 166). As the aim of
an argumentation researcher is clarity to the matters why would he suggest a
character like the one of the mediator for critical discussion when there is no
use for it?
3.2.1 Conflict: Two theoretical contexts
Based on pragma-dialectical research results, e. g. on two meanings of the
term conflict, I aim at concluding different theoretical contexts to elaborate
the mediator, and the relationship between clarity and mediation. Next,
I show that, from the perspective of argumentation research – particularly
pragma-dialectical research results –, managing the term “conflict” is a
desirable departure in the integration of the contexts of critical discussion
with mediation which must be based on a theoretical “investigation of the role
played in this practice by argumentative processes” (GM08: 4). I explicate
the term within the context of mediation in the sense of the WIPO. Then I
elucidate on the consequences of the insights for creating critical discussion
(m).
In particular, as a conflict resolution practice, mediation is
progressively assuming the role of an institutionalized alternative
to court adjudication (GM08: 18).
Greco Morasso (GM08: 22-64) presents different cs, in which people aim
at solving conflicts. She writes about contexts of “ADR,” i. e. “Alternative
Dispute Resolution.” Mediation belongs to these contexts of ADR. In a
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mediation session cultural diversity becomes apparent. That makes the
context an interesting context for argumentation researchers who concern
themselves with cas of conflict management. In a mediation session people
manage actual differences of opinion with respect to a position, an aim or
desires of a person (cf. GM08: 139). In order to elucidate the need for a stencil
of critical discussion (m) and to arrive at clarity to the matters of such a stencil
I present a distinction between two meanings of the term conflict: C1, and C2.
I apply this distinction which originates in Greco Morasso (GM08: 122-153)
to explicate the term mediation.
First, conflict as “C1” (GM08: 131-134) is a “hostility between parties,” a
“reciprocal endeavor of eliminating one’s adversary.” The hostility “may be
more or less exacerbate.” C1, the conflict, may at any time facilitate a physical
escalation (cf. GM08: 133). Consequently, Greco Morasso labels this first
meaning of the term conflict “interpersonal hostility (C1)” (GM08: 248).
However, next I aim at chaining this meaning to further insights from
argumentation research. In fact, within the context of mediation in the sense
of the WIPO different contexts can be distinguished that are relevant to
managing the conflict.
Mediation is a ci in the sense of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) (cf. appendix). This ci is actualized as the ca of a
mediation session:
Mediation: an informal procedure in which a neutral
intermediary, the mediator, assists the parties in reaching a
settlement of the dispute (WIP09: 2).
Mediation (conflict) is thus the procedure (ci) in which C1 is managed.
Mediation (conflict) consists of those ε und r, which the WIPO depicts in
the twenty-seven articles of the “WIPO MEDIATION RULES” (WIP09: 7).
Those twenty-seven articles refer to the “Commencement of the Mediation,”
“Conduct of the Mediation,” “Termination of the Mediation” as well as to the
“Administration Fee” and “Deposits” etc. (cf. WIP09: 8, 10, 13, 14, 15).
In the ci of mediation (conflict) there are three characters: the parties
and the neutral intermediary, or the mediator in the sense of the WIPO
(WIP09: 10, 2). The target of a mediation (conflict) is the solution to
the conflict. In the procedure of the mediation (conflict) the parties and
the mediator make use of “any manner that the mediator believes to be
appropriate” (WIP09: 11) for arriving at the solution to C1. For example,
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according to the WIPO in a “Conduct of the Mediation” a mediator may talk
“separately with a party” based on “the clear understanding that information
given at such meetings and in such communications shall not be disclosed”
(WIP09: 10). It becomes apparent that clarity is a target in the course of
a mediation session. The target of the mediation (conflict) is arrived at
when there is the settlement of the conflict C1 (WIP09: 2, “settlement of
the dispute”). This settlement can be “full or partial” (WIP09: 14). The
configuration of the settlement of the conflict is actualized “by the signing
of a settlement agreement by the parties” (WIP09: 13). So, C1 is managed in
the context of mediation (conflict).
Second, Greco Morasso characterizes conflict in the sense of “C2” as a
“propositional incompatibility” (GM08: 134-138). She calls a proposition
a “state of affair” which includes “points of view,” “arguments,” “roles” and
“goals.” The propositional incompatibility is based on two mutually exclusive
propositions (cf. GM08: 137-138). However, since applying the speech act
of standpointing means to put forth an attitude in respect of an expressed
opinion, and from the speaker’s perspective in pragma-dialectics that involves
anticipating doubt rather than a mutually exclusive proposition, it is precise
to say that C2 is actualized by means of actualizing a standpoint.179 All
the same, Greco Morasso elucidates the r between the matters in a ca of
a session of mediation and matters that are relevant to pragma-dialectical
research employing ideal and describing language.
There are two ends possible in critical discussion. If the parties in the ci
of critical discussion have arrived at the concluding stage, then the end of
the “careful scrutiny” (Alf03: 10) is arrived at by means of the speech act
“[e]stablishing the result of the discussion” (vEG04: 68). Critical discussion
ends either with the resolution of the difference of opinion or – if the
resolution of the difference of opinion is not arrived at – with the acceptance
of both parties that the resolution of the difference of opinion is not possible
179In that sense, the suggestion by Greco Morasso (GM08: 149) that difference of opinion is “of the kind C2”
still holds. In fact, in the sense presented C2 adheres to the four meta-theoretical principles. Against the
background of functionalization and externalization the speaker’s speech act standpointing brings about the
commitment to be convinced that – against the background of socialization and dialectification – there can
be doubt with regards to the respective attitude in respect of an expressed opinion.
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on the very merits (vEGJJ93: 26: “either a resolution or a mutual recognition
that no agreement is (currently) attainable”).180 181
In a ca it is the actual parties, i. e. the actualization of protagonist and
antagonist, who arrive at clarity to the matters: “A speaker [...] advances a
standpoint and acts as protagonist, and a listener [...] expresses doubt with
regard to the standpoint and acts as antagonist.” Against the background of
the methodical gap the authors must be understood to talk about a stencil
when they state that: “In a critical discussion that proceeds in accordance
with pragma-dialectical rules, the protagonist and the antagonist try to find
out whether the protagonist’s standpoint is capable of withstanding the
antagonist’s criticism” (vEG04: 133). I suggest that the protagonist and
antagonist aim at one of the ends mentioned.
The goal in critical discussion is the resolution of the difference of opinion
(cf. e. g. vEG04: 54). One possible configuration of the actual difference
of opinion being resolved is an utterance that can be reconstructed as the
speech act acceptance of a standpoint. An acceptance formula with respect
to the standpoint depicts the end of critical discussion.182 The end of critical
discussion, as such, is a “neutral outcome” (vEGJJ93: 118).
Acceptance of the standpoint as the resolution of the difference of opinion
is facilitated by arriving at the acceptance of particular matters (cf. vEG04: 68:
list of speech acts). Employing the diagnostic power of a stencil it is apparent,
that clarity to those matters, for instance clarity to a certain “point of view”
and to “arguments” (cf. Greco Morasso’s C2) is required. One of the
questions is which “sort of”183 standpoint is doubted.184 All in all, clarity
180“To pragma-dialectically resolve” means: “Only if both parties can agree on the outcome can the dispute
really be regarded as having been resolved,” “[a] dispute is resolved only if the doubt about the standpoint
expressed by one party is retracted because the argument offered to support it is convincing or if the other
party withdraws the standpoint by virtue of realizing that it cannot stand up to the criticism leveled against
it” (vEGJJ93: 27, 34).
181“Settling a dispute means that the difference of opinion is simply set aside [...], temporarily or forever. This
can be done in ways ranging from more to less civilized (calling in a referee, ombudsman, judge, or arbiter;
compromising; tossing a coin; or fighting it out)” (vEGJJ93: 34-35).
182The difference of opinion is also resolved when the standpoint is retracted. The difference of opinion is not
– or as the author write “not really” – resolved when the configuration of the “settlement” is accepted: “A
dispute is settled when, by mutual consent, the difference of opinion has in one way or another been ended
– for example, by taking a vote or by the intervention of an outside party who acts as a judge or arbitrator.
Of course, reaching a settlement does not mean that the difference of opinion has really been resolved”
(vEG04: 58).
183Cf. Garssen (Gar01: 91).
184According to Freeley and Steinberg (FS08: 55-58) three sorts of standpoint can be distinguished: the
proposition of fact, the proposition of value, the policy proposition (cf. this chapter: ontological framework,
correspondence between “proposition” and “standpoint”).
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in arriving at a resolution of the difference of opinion facilitates to arrive at
the resolution of the difference of opinion.
There are two ends that can come out in mediation (conflict). First, there
is the solution to the conflict, i. e. the settlement of the conflict. As shown,
when there is the solution to the conflict the aim of the mediation (conflict) is
arrived at. The second end is when there is not the solution to the conflict. A
configuration is arrived at, which is not characterized by the settlement of the
conflict. Then the aim of mediation is not arrived at.
Next, I spell out the r between the two meanings of “conflict” (C1 and C2),
and the goals characterizing critical discussion and mediation (conflict), i. e.
the c of mediation in the sense of the WIPO.
[I]t is important to remark that the intervention in a conflict of
the type C1 cannot abstract from the consideration of its origin,
namely C2 (GM08: 147).
Taking into consideration the distinction between C1 and C2 it becomes
apparent that not all of the ideal elements and relationships (εis and ris) of
the ci of mediation in the sense of the WIPO are interesting for argumentation
researchers. For sake of, e. g., pragma-dialectical research a stencil is needed.
Not all of the actions referring to the management of C1 also refer to the
management of C2. In fact, employing a respective stencil and the describing
language facilitates to show from the perspective of argumentation research
(cf. chapter 2: diagnostic power of the grid) when in a ca a conflict of the
type C2 “degenerate[s] into a real interpersonal conflict C1” (cf. GM08: 139).
Possible reasons that Greco Morasso considers for a degeneration of a C2
into a C1 are that a person does not feel appreciated with respect to his
positions, aims or desires.185 So, an actual difference of opinion (C2) can
be reconstructed as the basis of a conflict (C1), and it thus becomes clear why
the resolution of an actual difference of opinion is an aim in a ca in which a
conflict is managed.
Consequently, I distinguish two cis: an actual conflict C1 is managed in
the actualization of the ci of a mediation (conflict); an actual difference of
185Apparently, e. g., psychological research on the ca can thus be employed to explain such a degeneration.
Psychologists may say that a degeneration occurs when in the ca in which a C2 is managed a certain
configuration of needs of the respective persons is managed in a particular way. So, for instance, depending
on the conception of human needs taken into account certain reasons can be spelled out (cf. e. g. the
conception of needs by Grawe (Kuh06)). Hence C1 can be facilitated by matters that are chained to the
pragma-dialectical higher-order conditions.
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opinion C2 is managed in the actualization of the ci of a mediation (difference
of opinion). The resolution of the difference of opinion (C2) precedes the
solution to the conflict (C1) in the sense that the former is a means to arrive at
the latter.186
The distinction between mediation (conflict) and mediation (difference of
opinion) facilitates clarity to the term “mediation” in the sense of the WIPO:
Upon the termination of the mediation [conflict], the mediator
shall promptly send to the Center a notice [...] whether or not the
mediation resulted in a settlement of the dispute [conflict] and if
so, whether the settlement [conflict or difference of opinion] was
full or partial (WIP09: 14).
Seemingly anaphoric the WIPO writes about the settlement. However, the
resolution of the difference of opinion (C2) in the ci of mediation (difference
of opinion) is not the same as the solution to the conflict (C1) in the ci of
mediation (conflict), and so is not the settlement of the difference of opinion
and the settlement of the conflict.
C1 can be solved (only) partly because the respective difference of opinion
has not – or (only) partly – been resolved. In fact, the difference of opinion can
be partly resolved when, for instance, particular matters, such as the issues,
have not been managed properly. In such a case the mediator can propose
further endeavors to arrive at the resolution of the difference of opinion (cf.
WIP09: 13, 11), an action by which he facilitates the solution to the conflict.
So, understanding that there is not an anaphoric r between “a settlement” and
“the settlement” against the background of the distinction between C1 and C2
facilitates clarity to the matters from the twenty-seven articles of the WIPO.
Likewise, van Eemeren et al. write that “the mediator does not argue for
or resolve the case but serves only to facilitate a discussion by which the
disputants may search for their own settlement” (vEGJJ93: 118). Again,
the term “settlement” can be understood to refer to both a settlement of the
conflict in mediation (conflict), i. e. C1, and a settlement of the difference
of opinion in mediation (difference of opinion), i. e. C2. In the former case
it becomes apparent that mediation (difference of opinion) is a means to the
solution to the conflict. A mediator “facilitates a discussion,” for example,
186Though she does not refer to the rules from the WIPO where the “settlement of the dispute” coincides with
the solution to the conflict Greco Morasso similarly distinguishes between a “Phase of C1” and a “Phase of
pure C2” (cf. GM08: 147, 152).
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with respect to article 23 about “Deposits” according to which he facilitates
an appointment “to deposit an equal amount as an advance of the costs”
(cf. WIP09: 15). In the latter case a mediator is depicted to “facilitate a
discussion” in the sense of “the search” – i. e. the “careful scrutiny” (cf.
Alf03: 10) – which means that he facilitates that the actual parties apply
speech acts in accordance with mediation (difference of opinion).
3.2.2 Facilitating an integration: Four theoretical contexts
Next, I employ the theoretical distinctions presented to facilitate a creation
of a stencil in order to facilitate to fulfill the purpose of pragma-dialectical
research. First, against the background of the module of the quartet of terms I
recast the relevance of C1 and C2 to pragma-dialectics. Second, I distinguish
four theoretical contexts to facilitate the introduction of the module of the
ontological framework. I conclude this section by relating mediation and
clarity.
First, suppose a pragma-dialectical theorist has arrived at clarity to the
matters in the ci of critical discussion, and clarity to the matters in the ci
of mediation. For instance, he has clarity to the distinction between C1 and
C2 and has thus arrived at the insight that critical discussion (m) – which is
a stencil for the actual procedure of resolving the difference of opinion (C2)
in a mediation session – is needed against the background of the purpose of
pragma-dialectics. In fact, critical discussion (m) facilitates a proper conflict
(C1) management.
Thus far, there is not a term in pragma-dialectics with a similar meaning
to C1. Pragma-dialectical research focuses on the term argumentation
rather than the term conflict, pragma-dialecticians refer to several cs, some
of which involve an interpersonal hostility. An interpersonal hostility,
C1, can be one ground for the need to actualize pragma-dialectical
matters. So, whereas C2 can be characterized pragma-dialectically as
a configuration in a ca actualized by means of actualizing a standpoint,
note that not every discourse between persons who actualize the parties
from a pragma-dialectical blueprint can be considered to be a management
of a conflict in the sense of C1 (cf. vE10: 129-162). Therefore, in
accordance with dialectification “interpersonal hostility” is not a matter when
a theorist characterizes critical discussion. However, particularly against the
background of socialization, functionalization and externalization the term
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can be relevant to a pragma-dialectical theorist who characterizes a certain
stencil. Since I do not aim at creating a stencil I suggest the working
hypothesis that C1 – which I take to be the meaning of the term “conflict”
– is a ca’s configuration in argumentative reality (arrived at by certain forms
of action) which in natural language can be labeled interpersonal, reciprocal
hostility between (at least) two persons.187 Initiating a mediation session is a
means to manage an actualization of C1. In a mediation session managing to
arrive at a resolution of C2 is a means to arrive at a solution to C1.
The distinction between C1 and C2 gives rise to the distinction between
mediation (conflict) and mediation (difference of opinion). Against
the background of pragma-dialectical research in – for example – the
analytical-intuitive component the distinction between mediation (conflict)
and mediation (difference of opinion) results in the need to integrate certain
matters of mediation (conflict) – in fact those that are configured in mediation
(difference of opinion) – with the matters from the ideal model of critical
discussion. The theorist aims at building a stencil of critical discussion (m)
which can be used to analyze the matters from the discourse in a mediation
session.
Second, the distinction between mediation (conflict) and mediation
(difference of opinion) facilitates clarity to the integration of matters from
mediation (conflict) on the one hand, with critical discussion on the other
hand, and how the integration generates the ontological framework for a
stencil critical discussion (m). So, next I anticipate the r between critical
discussion (m) and the use of describing language, and the r between critical
discussion (m) and critical discussion.
In creating critical discussion (m) the theorist configures matters from ideal
language in accordance with εa and ra from the ca of a mediation session: He
derives critical discussion (m) from critical discussion in accordance with
a ca.188 He facilitates that analysts (pragma-dialectics) employ describing
language in their research of such εa und ra, which are part of the actualization
of the ci of mediation (difference of opinion), and which thus facilitate to
arrive at the actualization of the aim of mediation (conflict), i. e. the personal
187Defining the term C1 in the sense of pragma-dialectical ideal language – and only for the ci of mediation
– brings about the need to take into consideration other terms. Note, that those terms may not yet be
defined in pragma-dialectical ideal language either, such as “interest”: “probably the most important value
of mediation resides in the parties’ possibility of considering their deep interests in the design of a solution
to their conflict” (GM08: 302). I focus on the terms acceptance and clarity.
188Recast that the theorist also characterizes the application of the stencil as a grid. Thus he can depict how to
employ describing language in using a particular stencil.
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signing of a respective agreement. Hence based on the assumption that
particular εas and ras of the ca of a mediation session can be reconstructed
as εis and ris of the ci of mediation (conflict), the distinction between
mediation (conflict) and mediation (difference of opinion) facilitates to create
a pragma-dialectical stencil critical discussion (m).
Against the background of the distinction between mediation (conflict)
and mediation (difference of opinion) it becomes apparent where the ideal
elements and relationships (εis and ris) of critical discussion (m) (ci) come
from. In fact, critical discussion (m) is defined by such matters of mediation
(conflict) that correspond to matters from critical discussion. Hence the
insight that a stencil is needed with three characters: protagonist, antagonist
and mediator.
– Mediation (conflict): ci in accordance with rules by the WIPO
(cf. appendix);189 actualized as mediation session; terms are not
pragma-dialectical terms, e. g. “issue”
– Mediation (difference of opinion): εis and ris from ci of mediation
(conflict) which are managed in creation of critical discussion (m);
actualized as mediation session; terms are not pragma-dialectical terms,
e. g. “issue”
– Critical discussion: ci of pragma-dialectical ideal model (cf. e. g.
vEG04); cannot be actualized; terms are pragma-dialectical terms
– Critical discussion (m): ci from the integration of εis and ris from
mediation (difference of opinion) +190 certain191 εis and ris from
critical discussion; can be actualized as mediation session; new terms
must be established as pragma-dialectical terms, e. g. “issue”
In mediation (difference of opinion) the terms are not pragma-dialectical, e. g.
the term “issue.” In critical discussion (m) the terms are pragma-dialectical,
i. e. when the term “issue” is employed to characterize critical discussion
(m) it must have been integrated before in pragma-dialectical research.
Therefore, mediation (difference of opinion) and critical discussion (m) are
different cis. Against the background of critical discussion (m) the difference
between mediation (conflict) and mediation (difference of opinion) can thus
be characterized as follows: All the matters from an actualization of mediation
189In this dissertation the term “mediation” refers to this context.
190This “+” illustrates the creative efforts of a theorist (pragma-dialectics).
191Cf. this chapter: ontological framework.
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(difference of opinion) can be reconstructed as mediation (conflict) but not
all of the matters from an actualization of mediation (conflict), e. g. those
referring to article 23 about deposits, can be reconstructed as mediation
(difference of opinion). Those matters from mediation (conflict), i. e. which
are spelled out in the twenty-seven articles, that are relevant to the resolution
of C2 in the sense of pragma-dialectics, i. e. relevant to mediation (difference
of opinion), are configured in critical discussion (m). Critical discussion
(m) is a stencil whose scopes refer to the actual procedure of resolving the
difference of opinion (C2) in a mediation session, i. e. a session of mediation
that accords with the articles of the WIPO. Hence the sense in which critical
discussion (m) is an integration of terms from the three languages from
pragma-dialectics with terms which – thus far – have not been employed
in pragma-dialectical research (cf. this chapter: structural determination of
issues and contentions).
[M]ediation never fails, as it causes the parties to define the facts
and issues of the dispute, thus in any event preparing the ground
for subsequent arbitration or court proceedings (WIP).
Suppose an actual difference of opinion (C2) in a mediation session will not
be, or has not been, resolved. Clarity to those matters which are managed
in the respective procedure of the mediation session is still desirable. A
conflict (C1), i. e. an interpersonal, reciprocal hostility between (at least)
two persons, cannot only be managed in mediation sessions, but also in
other cas, e. g. courts of arbitration. Having established certain matters in
a mediation session facilitates to arrive at acceptance of the actualization of
particular material starting points in another ca. In the case study I refer to
the actualization of issues. Having managed actualized issues in a mediation
session facilitates the actualization of the acceptance of an argument in
another ca. Clarity to the facts and issues in the procedure of a mediation
session, the management of C2, “prepares a ground” for a solution to the
respective conflict (C1) in another ca. So, if in mediation the target to resolve
the difference of opinion (C2) is not arrived at – i. e. either the difference of
opinion is “set aside” (vEGJJ93: 34-35) or the standpoint is not accepted –
then the conflict (C1) can still be solved.
Next, I spell out the relationship between clarity and mediation. As shown,
because clarity to a matter is actualized in the acceptance of a matter, clarity
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to a matter in mediation should be considered a target if acceptance of that
matter is the goal. The target in the actualization of mediation (difference of
opinion) is the resolution of the difference of opinion actualized.
Obscurity in the conflict management in a mediation session is
troublesome.192 For example, van Eemeren et al. spell out “problems of
clarity” which a mediator manages by means of his “efforts at clarification”
(vEGJJ93: 122, 139). In a mediation session there can be a problem of
clarity with respect to the actual standpoint that is (to be) managed. In their
analysis van Eemeren et al. write that “the mediator is ostensibly eliciting and
clarifying the wife’s (Tammy) point of view” (vEGJJ93: 129). The persons
involved in a session of mediation are supposed to have clarity to this very
point of view. It is a task of a mediator to prevent obscurity to the actual
standpoint. Jacobs elucidates particular fragments of discourse in which a
mediator “simply clarifies” (Jac02: 1417, 1420, 1422).
Obscurity in a mediation session is troublesome because it prevents an end
to the respective conflict. Intuitively speaking, other things may be more
or less or just as troublesome for a resolution of a conflict as obscurity
in a mediation session. And since both an actual difference of opinion
as well as a conflict can be (re)solved by other means than conducting a
mediation session, a matter in a mediation session can be “troublesome” yet
not “troublesome enough” to prevent an end to the respective management
of the actual difference of opinion, and conflict. Against the background
of acceptance, acceptability and clarity it is “case-dependent” which things
may be more or less or just as troublesome as obscurity with respect to
(arriving at) the resolution of the actual difference of opinion, or an end of
the respective conflict. It depends, e. g., on the very persons (do they behave
“more” or “less” pragma-dialectically reasonable) or on the very mediator
(his argumentative competence, or his intuition). Also recast that a hostility
may be in the configuration of the very ca may be “more or less exacerbate.”
Besides, of course, the resolution of an actualized difference of opinion can be
prevented by other things than obscurity as well. These things may not even
be troublesome per se. In the procedure of the discourse the participants may,
for instance, arrive at the intent to suspend the actual difference of opinion
rather than resolve it.
192However, apparently, there can be other things than obscurity that are troublesome in a mediation session,
e. g. if the stances of the actual parties do not correspond to the higher-order conditions spelled out in the
blueprint.
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In a mediation session obscurity is facilitated when the values that
depict a mediation session are not actualized, or when prompting clarity
is intentionally neglected. A value relevant to mediation is neutrality (cf.
this chapter: strategic goal of the mediator). Other values are impartiality,
transparency – which I introduced as an option to arrive at clarity –, and
lucidness. For example, in a mediation session a “timetable” can be employed
to make lucid the procedure of the conflict management in (a) mediation
session(s) (WIP09: 10).
For example, the mediator does not actualize the value of impartiality when
– e. g. in the case of pragmatic argumentation – he intentionally spells
out only desirable consequences from the suggestions of one party and only
undesirable consequences from the suggestions of the other party. Then the
mediator, apparently, does not facilitate arriving at an acceptable conclusion
in the sense of the WIPO. Such a mediator actually confuses the parties on
their track.
However, clarity can be arrived at when a value that characterizes the
conflict management in a mediation session is actualized. For instance,
the value of “open communication” is actualized when the persons in the
discourse spell out their liabilities. Clarity is actualized by means of an
utterance like “I get it,” which may be a response to the question of a mediator
“Do you get it?” Thus, when a liability is spelled out the value of open
communication is actualized.193 Since liabilities that are spelled out are
means to arrive at clarity to relevant matters in the procedure of mediation the
value of open communication is a means to arrive at clarity to relevant matters
in the procedure of mediation. Open communication facilitates a “win-win
solution” (GM08: 32).
Not handling obscurity in a mediation session is undesirable as it prevents
an end of the hostility between the persons. If not handling obscurity in the
mediation session prevents the resolution of the actual difference of opinion,
and this resolution is a means to the actual solution to the conflict, then
obscurity in the mediation session prevents an end of the hostility between the
persons. Of course, an end of the hostility between the persons is desirable. It
193However, something may as well be labeled “open communication” based on other reasons than the spelling
out of liabilities. For example, to put forward how a person feels about a single element, a relationship or
a context can be suggested to illustrate an open communication. Also not every spelling out of liabilities
means that there is an open communication. A person can, for instance, spell out (for whatever reason) only
a part of his entire liabilities. Moreover, the spelling out of liabilities can be understood as the actualization
of another value, as well, e. g. “decision by consensus” (Jac02: 1405). And, of course, clarity to a matter
can be arrived at by other means than actualizing the value of open communication.
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is the very reason why those (at least) three persons are present in a mediation
session.194
However, I do not suggest that handling obscurity is “the best” means to
avoid preventing an end of the hostility (C1) between the persons. Other
means are simultaneously needed in order to achieve the resolution of the
actual difference of opinion, such as actualizing particular speech acts from
the respective grid. Also the stances of the actual parties should be such
that, for instance, they may be held liable for one actual point of view at the
start of the mediation session and may actually be held liable for a different
one at the end of the mediation session. At last, from a pragma-dialectical
perspective managing obscurity in a mediation session is also desirable
because it facilitates an enhancement of the argumentative competence of
the respective persons in regards of managing obscurity in their ordinary
lives, e. g. in actually resolving differences of opinion in the future. Thus
managing obscurity facilitates to fulfill the purpose of pragma-dialectics. It is
a noteworthy intention to pragma-dialectically research the r between clarity
and mediation.
So, obscurity (to a matter) is managed in order to arrive at clarity (to that
matter). Jacobs writes that it is a mediator’s “official” behavior to facilitate
that the actual parties arrive at clarity: “mediators [...] officially act to clarify
and inform”; “Officially, he has simply clarified what the document says”
(Jac02: 1423, 1420). On the one hand, clarity can be arrived at to what
a document says. On the other hand, a mediator can facilitate arriving at
clarity to “what the disputants are arguing,” “to positions,” or to “arguments”
(vEGJJ93: 120, 126).
However, in order to arrive at clarity to the matters in the conflict
management in a mediation session more matters are relevant to
pragma-dialecticians. Here I briefly elucidate two of them. First, the stances
of the actual parties should be such that the second-order conditions can
plausibly be reconstructed. For instance, as suggested they may change their
actual point of view in the procedure of the mediation session. Likewise, they
should “be prepared” to accept an end of doubting against the background
of the matters discussed and accepted (cf. Pin03: 827). Also, the stances
should be such that the third-order conditions from the stencil can plausibly be
194Apparently, here I assume a configuration in which a mediator is not putting to use the option granted
by article 11 according to which he is “free to meet and to communicate separately with a party [...]”
(WIP09: 10).
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reconstructed. For example, in order to achieve clarity to the matters the actual
parties should converse “in good faith” to “cooperate with the mediator”
(WIP09: 10) as well as, respectively, with the other party. In good faith can
mean, e. g., to actualize a form of action by which one’s entire liabilities are
spelled out.
Second, clarity to particular matters can be based on clarity to other matters.
For instance, in order to facilitate that the parties arrive at clarity to the
matters in the procedure the mediator can only employ his argumentative
competence if there is clarity to the standpoint at hand. Van Rees depicts
in her example “the fact that the various positions which the participants take
have not been clarified” which “almost undoubtedly is one of the causes for
the defective execution of the subsequent stages” (vR01: 462). Thus, clarity
to the standpoint is the basis that the mediator can, e. g., ask the relevant
critical questions as a response to speech acts by which argument schemes
are applied.
So, clarity (to the matters) is arrived at during the mediation because the
mediator employs his argumentative competence for facilitating to arrive at
clarity in the procedure. I briefly present two examples. First, Jacobs shows
that a mediator can “make statements that re-state what a disputant advocates”
and that “[s]uch statements can function to clarify what the disputant are
arguing and to structure the direction and the relational tone of the discussion”
(Jac02: 1414). So, the mediator has the argumentative competence to
facilitate that the parties arrive at clarity to the procedure characterized in the
ci itself (with respect to “arguing” and “the direction”). Also, a mediator has
the argumentative competence to facilitate that the higher-order conditions are
actualized (“relational tone”).
By [...] pressing for clarification, the mediator’s questions [...]
make sense as efforts on the part of the mediator to press the
wife into clearly and consistently expressing a position [...]
(vEGJJ93: 136).
[...] the question allows the wife to favorably clarify the scopes
of her arguments [...] (Jac02: 1413).
The mediator is nevertheless also able, by obtaining clarification,
to obtain commitments to premises and to elicit acts that follow
from those commitments (vEGJJ93: 129).
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Second, by facilitating to arrive at clarity (“pressing for clarification”) the
mediator facilitates transparency to the liabilities of the wife. Those liabilities
may provoke a particular point of view (“position”). Likewise, in the example
of Jacobs a mediator employs a question to route an actual party to spell
out his liability to (a) particular argument(s). The mediator thus has the
argumentative competence to manage by means of questions the values that
characterize mediation, and the commitments relevant to matters such as
premises or arguments. Moreover, he can strategically act in regards of the
respective commitment to such matters to route the behavior of the parties:
In accordance with the relevant rules he can purposefully “elicit certain acts”
that can be traced back to (“follow from”) the commitments spelled out.195
However, a mediator’s argumentative competence refers not only to
facilitate arriving at clarity. In more general, a mediator has the argumentative
competence for facilitating to actualize critical discussion (m) – or at
least certain matters from its ontological framework. This argumentative
competence thus means that the mediator can localize “the plausible
argumentative relevance of a move” (Aak03: 283). The argumentative
relevance of a move is determined with respect to a blueprint. In applying a
grid an analyst (pragma-dialectics) localizes utterances as speech acts which
are (not) argumentatively relevant.
All in all, clarity (to the matters) should be an aim in the sequence of
mediation. Obscurity in the sequence of mediation may prevent to arrive
at the aim of mediation to resolve the difference of opinion. Not arriving
at the resolution of the difference of opinion prevents to arrive at the aim of
mediation (conflict), the solution to the conflict.
In critical discussion (m) the characters apply the speech acts from the
respective list of speech acts. For example, the mediator applies usage
declaratives to facilitate arriving at clarity to the standpoint vocalized by
the protagonist in the confrontation stage. Clarity to the standpoint in the
confrontation stage is required because that particular standpoint is to be
discussed in order to solve the difference of opinion, thus to arrive at the
aim of the procedure of mediation.
Clarity to a particular matter in mediation is brought about by means of
a clarity formula. With a clarity formula a character commits himself to
having recognized a certain matter. Clarity to particular matters is required
195For instance, certain critical questions are used for testing – against the background of the very commitments
– the acceptability of an application of an argument scheme (Gar01: 91).
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for arriving at the acceptance of those matters. So, for example, clarity to the
standpoint in the confrontation stage facilitates acceptance of the standpoint
in the concluding stage.
The blueprint of critical discussion (m) is created, e. g., to be employed
as a grid to analyze a discourse. In arriving at an actualization of a
particular argumentative strategy in a mediation session mistakes may occur.
Respectively, a pragma-dialectician can analyze the fragment in regards
of fallacies. For instance, with respect to clarity the actual parties can
be mistaken. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst “all kinds of
ambiguity fallacies” based on a “lack of clarity” exemplify the configuration
in which a violation of rule 15 from a pragma-dialectical stencil is actualized
(vEG04: 166). Those configurations are determined to hinder the resolution
of the actual difference of opinion. The persons, however, may not be aware of
having actualized a fallacy, i. e. of having prevented the respective resolution.
Now, a mediator can facilitate that the persons arrive at clarity to the very
matter. In an example in which the persons consider that “woman, generally
speaking, have a different logic from men” van Eemeren and Grootendorst
show that the actual parties understand “generally speaking” differently which
the authors trace back to a fallacy with respect to rule 15 “having to do with
the communicative force of the speech act” (vEG04: 167, 166). The authors
depict that it is troublesome that these different understandings of the actual
standpoint occur in the discourse. A mediator, I think, can facilitate that
persons arrive at clarity to matters in the procedure of their discourse.196
A mediator may actualize a usage declarative. He thus facilitates that the
persons arrive at clarity to the phrase “generally speaking.” Consequently,
against the background of the diagnostic power of stencils, clarity to this
particular matter in the discourse facilitates the resolution of the actual
difference of opinion, i. e. actualizing acceptance of the particular point of
view which involves the phrase “generally speaking.”
3.2.3 The ontological framework for critical discussion (m)
In the ca of “Third-Party Dispute Mediation,” pragma-dialecticians suggest,
matters occur that can correspond to a pragma-dialectical grid: They label
their chapter “6 Mediation as Critical Discussion.” They suggest a discourse
196Note, though, that the example, supposedly, is not a case of an interpersonal hostility. Still, the respective
fallacy can be reconstructed and evaluated to be actualized in other cas, which are chained to such a hostility,
as well.
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from the ca of conflict management “to approximate an ideal model of a
critical discussion” (vEGJJ93: 118, 117-141, 139, my italics). Note, though,
that they do not refer to a particular set of rules according to which the ca of
the discourse is configured as critical discussion (in the sense of a grid).197
Neither does Greco Morasso refer to a particular set of rules for sessions
of mediation to pragma-dialectically spell out her “mediation framework”
which she uses like a certain stencil (“[t]his model”) that “is assumed, in
the present dissertation, as a basis for the analysis of argumentative strategies
in mediation” (GM08: 160). Against the background of the quartet of terms
and the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) its very analytical-intuitive applicability
is questionable, and for sake of clarity to the matters it is desirable to show in
which sense the stencil of the mediation framework corresponds to (cf. critical
discussion “as”) the ca analyzed, i. e. in which analyses the grid can indeed
(not) be employed, and which ca is to be taken into account to do empirical
research on the stencil.
Not the ideal model of critical discussion, but a stencil of critical discussion
(m) is to be used to analyze a mediation session (cf. WIPO). However,
the stencil can only be applied (by employing describing language) if
certain matters from mediation indeed accord with matters from critical
discussion.198 Only then critical discussion (m) is suitable to refer to matters
from the ca of a mediation session.199 Though I do not create an entire stencil
– which would amount to spelling out all of the relationships between the εi
and ri that are configured – I do illustrate how to facilitate the creation of such
a stencil.
So, next, I spell out relationships between matters from mediation and
critical discussion. In line with current pragma-dialectical endeavors I show
that not all of the twenty-seven articles from the WIPO are relevant to
analytical-intuitive – and hence theoretical – goals in pragma-dialectics.200
I particularly employ the module of strategy to integrate the fifteen rules of
the ideal model with the relevant articles from mediation. For instance, I spell
out in which sense matters from the two ideal contexts “accord” in order to
197Cf. chapter 2: pragma-dialectical “ideal model” and quartet of terms.
198Cf. troublesome matter D (chapter 2) and issues and contentions (this chapter).
199Cf. troublesome matter E (chapter 2) in the case study (chapter 4).
200“A second striking development in argumentation theory is the greatly increased attention being paid to the
context in which argumentation takes places. By taking explicitly account of contextual differentiation
in dealing with the production, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse this development goes
beyond mere empiricalization” (cf. vE15: 10). Also cf. troublesome matter B (chapter 2) and scopes of
critical discussion (chapter 3).
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introduce – in terms of ideal language – the module of the terms issue and
contention in the pragma-dialectical research program. Integrating matters
from the two cis I arrive at the module of an ontological framework for a
stencil of critical discussion (m).201 I sum up the matters from the ontological
framework. Reviewing the development of the ontological framework I
spell out the (limited) scopes of a stencil of critical discussion (m), before
I conclude the section with an overview of the main insights about critical
discussion (m).
The ontological framework is characterized against the background of
the modules of the troublesome matters and the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics): I take into consideration the troublesome matters
B, D, and E to thus prevent the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics)
a, b, ct , e, f , h, l and n (cf. chapter 2). In order to integrate matters from
two theoretical contexts, which can both be researched by means of the
module of the definitions of strategy and strategic action (cf. chapter
2), I particularly use the module of the four meta-theoretical principles
(cf. chapter 1). Hence a pragma-dialectical ontological framework
whose matters – e. g. the module of issues and contentions (cf. this
chapter) – I actualize in the case study by means of certain strategic
actions. This pragma-dialectical ontological framework facilitates the
module of the integration of pragma-dialectical role models (which,
in turn, exemplifies the relationship between the modules of the four
languages and the five components (cf. chapter 2: the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics)); it also facilitates the actualization of the respective
character of the mediator in the case study (cf. chapter 4). With respect
to the case study the module of the ontological framework facilitates
to purposefully manage the modules of the troublesome matters (cf.
chapter 4) and the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) (cf. chapter
4). At last, the ontological framework facilitates the creation of a stencil
of critical discussion (m) in the future of the pragma-dialectical research
program (cf. chapter 1).
201Against the background of the distinction between strong and weak theories, e. g. a logic and a blueprint (cf.
chapter 2: quartet of terms), and my aim to facilitate a blueprint, I follow Greco Morasso when I employ the
term “ontological framework for critical discussion (m)” in the sense that I refer to the factors determining
it. Greco Morasso, however, refers to an ontological framework of the “mediation process” in the sense of
“the factors logically determining it” (GM08: 110, my italics).
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In mediation there are particular characters which accord with the characters
in critical discussion. The WIPO depicts mediation as:
[A]n informal procedure in which a neutral intermediary, the
mediator, assists the parties [...] (WIP09: 2).
In mediation there are three characters: two “parties” and one “neutral
intermediary, the mediator.”202 Greco Morasso writes: “parties move in their
new role of participants in a critical discussion” and “[t]he mediator’s special
role does not keep him from being a participant in the critical discussion”
(GM08: 240, 245). The author refers to describing language (“move in their
role of [...]”) and illustrates that the characters in mediation accord with the
characters in critical discussion. In fact, the persons that are involved in the
actualization of the procedure of mediation (conflict) can also be involved in
the actualization of the procedure of mediation (difference of opinion). I spell
out the “special” role of the mediator showing in which sense he may (not) be
“a participant,” particularly in the sense of a ci of critical discussion (m) (cf.
this chapter: pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance).
Particular prerequisites are fulfilled at the start of the procedure of
mediation. Those prerequisites accord with the conditions that are fulfilled
in critical discussion. First, I refer to the higher-order conditions, second I
refer to the acceptance of the first-order conditions.
First, in the procedure of the mediation (conflict) there can be the procedure
of mediation (difference of opinion). The resolution of the difference of
opinion (in the sense of critical discussion) in the ci of the mediation
(difference of opinion) is a means to arrive at the goal of mediation (conflict).
So, it makes sense to assume that the stances of the parties that aim at the
solution to the conflict in the context of mediation accords with the attitude of
the parties in critical discussion (vEG04: 189: “state of mind the discussants
are assumed to be in”). Thus they fulfill the second-order conditions in critical
discussion.203
202Against the background of the methodical gap it can be relevant that in article 8(a) the WIPO states that the
character of a party “may be represented or assisted in their meetings with the mediator” (WIP09: 10). Also
the character of the mediator can be actualized by various persons. Therefore I distinguish a character in a
ci from a person in a ca.
203Likewise, with respect to the attitude of protagonist and antagonist Greco Morasso writes that the actual
parties in a ca of a session of mediation “accept to assume the role of parties willing to find a solution to
their conflict by means of mediation” (GM08: 114).
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[T]he mediator shall, in consultation with the parties, establish a
timetable for the submission by each party to the mediator and to
the other party [...] (WIP09: 10).
Both the mediator and the parties are equally provided the timetable.
No particular “authority relationships” are at stake between the parties
(vEG04: 189). Likewise, Greco Morasso writes: “the parties’ professional
roles, as they enter mediation, become less determinant than their equal status
of human beings and potential co-arguers” (GM08: 193).
On the one hand “the conflict has already escalated so much that it is not
possible for the parties to handle it without external help” (GM08: 36). On the
other hand, though, it is plausible to assume that the parties follow the rules
of the WIPO: “Each party shall cooperate in good faith with the mediator to
advance the mediation as expeditiously as possible” (WIP09: 10).
Against the background of externalization the very act of entering a
mediation session points to two states of mind in the respective social
circumstances. Firstly, it is a sign that the respective persons in the ca
have clarity to the fact that they are somewhat involved in a hostility (cf.
GM08: 133). For instance, in article 1 of the characterization of mediation
(conflict) the WIPO states that the conflict between the parties is already clear
or it is becoming clear (cf. WIP09: 8). Secondly, the mediator is considered
“an authoritative person whom both parties trust enough to allow hi[m]/her
to intervene in the conflict” (GM08: 27). So, the equal provision of the
timetable as well as acting in good faith against the background of clarity
to the c (hostility, role of mediator) illustrate that the parties in mediation act
in “social circumstances” according with the third-order conditions of critical
discussion (vEG04: 189).
Second, against the background of the two types of validity the parties
in critical discussion accept the configuration of the first-order conditions.
However, recast that protagonist and antagonist can alter those rules (cf.
chapter 2: reasonableness in critical discussion).
“Mediation Agreement” means an agreement by the parties [...]
in the form of a [...] contract.
[F]or mediation under the WIPO Mediation Rules, these Rules
shall be deemed to form part of that Mediation Agreement [...]
(WIP09: 8).
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The rules of mediation are established in the Mediation Agreement.204 In
different sessions of mediation “under the WIPO Mediation Rules” there
can be different actualizations of “these Rules.”205 However, all characters
involved in the mediation accept the (contractually) fixed rules. The
characters accept the rules fixed which accords with the parties in critical
discussion who accept the first-order conditions.
Particular configurations define the end, and the goal of the procedure of
mediation. In particular, the goal of mediation (difference of opinion) accords
with the goal of critical discussion.
In the literature in pragma-dialectics both ends of critical discussion, the
resolution of the difference of opinion and the settlement of managing the
difference of opinion, are suggested as the aim of mediation in the sense
of a ci. On the one hand, Greco Morasso suggests that the aim is the
resolution of the difference of opinion: “In negotiation and mediation, parties
are [...] directly involved in an argumentative discussion oriented towards the
resolution of their problem” and “the mediator’s role precisely respects the
fundamental aim of any argumentative discussion, which can be defined [...]
as reasonably resolving a difference of opinion [...]” (GM08: 86, 105). On
the other hand, van Eemeren et al. suggest that the aim of the mediation (with
a respective “track toward” it) is a settlement: “[T]he mediator’s formulation
in 036 and 038 effectively clarifies what the wife’s objections are all about
and puts the discussion back on track toward finding a mutually acceptable
settlement” (vEGJJ93: 120). Both a resolution of the difference of opinion
or setting the discussion aside must be acceptable to the parties in mediation.
The acceptability of the end of critical discussion is chained to rule 14 from
the ideal model which regulates the management of a conclusive defense,
and attack of the standpoint.206 Both a conclusive defense and attack of
the standpoint are related to the issues of the discussion. Thus there is an
204The mediator, as well, acts by these rules: “the mediator shall, in accordance with these Rules [...]”
(WIP09: 10).
205I do not depict all of the possible mediation agreements. Still, in order to facilitate creating a stencil in
accordance with the rules that govern mediation (difference of opinion) note that “[u]nless the parties have
agreed otherwise, these Rules [...] shall apply” (WIP09: 8). Hence – as shown in developing the module
of the ontological framework – the rules in critical discussion (m) should be configured in accordance with,
first the (configuration of) rules of critical discussion and second, the (configuration of) rules of mediation.
206In the case of the antagonist’s conclusive attack of the standpoint the protagonist is obliged to retract the
standpoint. In the case of the protagonist’s conclusive defense of the standpoint the antagonist is obliged to
retract the doubt. In the case of settling neither the protagonist is obliged to retract the standpoint nor is the
antagonist obliged to retract the doubt (vEG04: 154).
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accordance between article 12(a) from the WIPO and pragma-dialectics’ rule
14 from the ideal model:
[I]nterests and contentions in relation to the dispute and the
present status of the dispute, [...] other information and materials
as the party considers necessary for the purposes of the mediation
[...] in particular, to enable the issues in dispute to be identified
(WIP09: 11).
The “purposes of the mediation” are means to arrive at the aim of mediation
(conflict). One of these “purposes” is to facilitate the identification of
issues.207 Identifying issues is thus an option to arrive at the aim of a
mediation session. The WIPO writes that the result from managing the issues
is established in the “settlement agreement”:
[S]ettlement agreement by the parties covering any or all of the
issues in dispute between the parties (WIP09: 13).
Furthermore, the WIPO states that the mediator facilitates that the characters
“settle” or “resolve” the respective issues (WIP09: 11). Since the settlement
agreement is a way to manage the issues it refers to the question whether or
not the parties have arrived at the resolution of the difference of opinion in
the sense of the acceptance of the standpoint. By means of their providing
a signature to a settlement agreement persons externalize their acceptance of
this settlement agreement (cf. WIP09: 13). In that way an argumentation
researcher can – with respect to ria – reconstruct the commitment of that
person, that – against the background of the respective management of the
issues – the actual difference of opinion has (not) been resolved.
From the discussion of the possible ends of mediation (difference of
opinion) and of critical discussion, two ends in critical discussion (m) can
be suggested. Based on the explication of the term conflict I establish one
of them as the aim of critical discussion (m). The first end of mediation
(difference of opinion) is the resolution of the difference of opinion (C2), e. g.
the acceptance of the standpoint. The second end of mediation (difference of
opinion) is the settlement of the difference of opinion (C2), or setting aside
the management of the difference of opinion (C2). Now, recast that arriving
207Greco Morasso depicts the management of issues as “critical testing of arguments in support of given
positions” (GM08: 157).
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at the aim of mediation (difference of opinion) is a means to arrive at the aim
of mediation (conflict).
Since in a respective ca “a difference of opinion already degenerated into a
proper conflict,” I think, arriving at the aim of the resolution of this particular
actualized difference of opinion (C2), on which the conflict (C1) is based, is
“already an important step towards the resolution of the conflict” (GM08: 161,
141).208 Intuitively speaking, a resolution of the actual difference of opinion
is more desirable as a means to arrive at the solution to a conflict, than
the non-acceptance of the respective point of view or the settlement of the
discussion are desirable as means to arrive at the solution to a conflict. When
persons have resolved (an) actual difference(s) of opinion by means of a
procedure that accords with the procedure spelled out in a stencil – which
represents reasonableness – it is, intuitively speaking, more likely that an
interpersonal hostility can be settled than when (an) actual difference(s) of
opinion is (are) just settled, or when the actual standpoint is not accepted.
The goal in mediation (difference of opinion) accords with the goal in critical
discussion.209 Therefore I suggest that the aim of critical discussion (m) is
the resolution of the difference of opinion.
[V]iews expressed or suggestions made by a party with respect to
a possible settlement [...] (WIP09: 13).
The WIPO writes about the possible settlement. A possible settlement is one
that can be accepted, i. e. which is acceptable. A “view expressed” or a
“suggestion made” thus refers to an end of mediation that can be accepted.
The acceptance of the standpoint is such a possible end. This end is based
on the acceptability of the standpoint. In turn, this acceptability is based on
clarity to the matters that have been managed in the procedure of mediation
(difference of opinion).210 Since arriving at the resolution of the difference
of opinion is a means to arrive at the solution to the conflict clarity to the
matters in mediation (difference of opinion) is an option to arrive at the aim
208However, Jacobs states that in order to arrive at a solution to a conflict it can even be desirable to leave some
of the issues unresolved (cf. Jac02: 1418).
209Greco Morasso depicts the accordance of the goals as a “compatibility”: “As a matter of fact the meaning
of reasonable confrontation and critical testing of arguments in support of given positions is very much
compatible with the aim of the mediation practice” (GM08: 157).
210So, if this end is located in the respective concluding stage, then it is based on clarity to the matters in the
confrontation stage, the opening stage, and the argument stage. Note that the pragma-dialectical rule 14 of
critical discussion refers to the conclusive attack and defense of the standpoint against the background of
the other stages which means that the respective party has acted “in the manner prescribed in rule 9 [...] in
the argumentation stage (and has also observed the other discussion rules)” (vEG04: 154).
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of mediation (conflict). The mediator facilitates clarity to the matters, and thus
facilitates the resolution of the difference of opinion in mediation (difference
of opinion), and thus facilitates the solution to the conflict in mediation. So,
in the procedure of mediation clarity to the matters is an aim and clarity to
the matters in mediation (difference of opinion) accords with clarity to the
matters in a pragma-dialectical derivative of critical discussion.211
[A] statement summarizing the background of the dispute [...] to
enable the issues in dispute to be identified (WIP09: 10-11).
In mediation a difference of opinion is managed which accords with the
difference of opinion in critical discussion.212 The summarizing statement
refers to the content matters that are to be managed in mediation (WIP09: 14:
“subject matter of the dispute”). Moreover, the statement refers to the issues.
By means of this summarizing statement the propositional content as well
as the communicative force of an utterance as a standpoint are spelled out.
So, the actual standpoint is made recognizable. Based on the fulfillment of
the higher-order conditions an accordance can be suggested between article
12(a) from the WIPO and the pragma-dialectical rule 1 which regulates that
irrespective of its propositional content the protagonist has the right to express
the standpoint, and irrespective of its propositional content the antagonist has
the right to express the doubt.
Moreover, critical discussion’s rule 10 (“optimal use of the right to attack”
(vEG04: 151-152)) can be referred to by a party in mediation who – in
accordance with article 12(a) – puts forth their statements in respect of
summarizing the background of the difference of opinion. If a person, for
instance, spells out certain past actions of the other person – because he
“considers them necessary” to identify certain “issues” (cf. WIP09: 11) – he
can thus make optimal use of his right to attack. Likewise, a person can
actualize the use of his “optimal use of the right to defend” (vEG04: 152:
rule 11) when employing article 12(a) in a mediation session. However, the
difference of opinion in mediation accords with the difference of opinion in
critical discussion.213
211Therefore, the matters regulated by the pragma-dialectical rule 15 can be taken into consideration in building
critical discussion (m).
212Recast that the difference of opinion is “of the kind C2” (GM08: 149).
213Likewise, Greco Morasso writes: “what the mediator is doing is to search for the difference of opinion that
has led the parties to disagree and that is at the origin of the conflict (C2)” (GM08: 208). A strategic action
of the mediator is to summarize the difference of opinion (“sum up”) (cf. GM08: 251). In accordance with
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In the procedure of mediation particular forms of action employed by the
characters accord with the speech acts applied by the characters in critical
discussion. With respect to article 8(b) and 11 of the mediation (conflict)
“communications” during the “meetings of the parties with the mediator”
occur – just as pragma-dialecticians envisage it (vEGSH02: xi) – in written or
spoken form (WIP09: 10). The characters manage
information and materials as the party considers necessary for the
purposes of the mediation [...] to enable the issues in dispute to
be identified (WIP09: 11).
Speaker and listener communicate.214 Information and materials can refer to
the issues. Since issues can be located in mediation (difference of opinion)
written and spoken communication can be located in the ci of mediation
(difference of opinion).
In fact, in the procedure of mediation (difference of opinion) the parties and
the mediator apply forms of action that accord with speech acts configured
by the pragma-dialectical theorist who creates the stencil. For example, the
accordance to rule 6a. from critical discussion can be relevant to a meeting
of a mediator with only one of the actual parties (cf. article 11). Rule 6a.
regulates the management of a “sub-difference of opinion” (vEG04: 144)
about which a mediator and the respective actual party may talk.
With respect to the four meta-theoretical principles, any speech act in the ci
of mediation (difference of opinion) comes up to a particular function in the
stencil: The three characters are “engaged in a process of weighing arguments
in favor of one or the other solution and discussing them together, and trying
to understand each other’s reasons with the help of the mediator, in a[n] [...]
reasonable fashion [...]” (GM08: 12). So, against the background of ria the
mediator is of “help” in actualizing the procedure characterized in critical
discussion (m):
[T]he mediator’s intervention is crucial for the correct
development of the critical discussion [...] (GM08: 105).
certain rules a mediator can actualize one, or more, of a number of possible forms of action in order to fulfill
a certain purpose.
214The “communication references” telephone and email illustrate that there are speaker and listener (cf.
WIP09: 9). That, apparently, facilitates to take into account in pragma-dialectical research on the
twenty-seven articles by the WIPO the meta-theoretical principle of socialization.
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Next, against the background of dialectification I present the accordance of
matters from mediation to the matters in the four stages (“development”) of
critical discussion. I introduce the terms “issues” as well as “contentions.”
As shown, in at least one communication in mediation a view is expressed
or a suggestion is made with respect to an acceptable end of the procedure (cf.
WIP09: 13). Actualizing such a form of action accords with actualizing the
speech act “[e]xpressing a standpoint” in the confrontation stage (vEG04: 68).
Rule 1 from critical discussion accordingly regulates the “cooperation on the
externalization of the difference of opinion” (cf. vEG04: 136).215 In respect
of the standpoint, i. e. the externalized attitude in respect of an expressed
opinion, the WIPO even points to an acceptance formula: “the fact that a party
had or had not indicated willingness to accept any proposal for settlement
made” (WIP09: 13). The respective actualization can be reconstructed as
the speech acts “[a]cceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint, upholding
non-acceptance of a standpoint” (vEG04: 68). In mediation there is a phase
that accords with the confrontation stage in critical discussion.216
As shown, note that with respect to critical discussion’s rule 1, in article
12(a) the WIPO (WIP09: 10) points to the relevance of clarity to the matters
at the start of the mediation (“party’s interests and contentions,” “present
status of the dispute,” “issues in dispute to be identified”). In article 17
the WIPO deals with the agreement on those matters that form the basis
of the procedure: “any admissions made by a party in the course of the
mediation” (WIP09: 13). So, in both articles there are references to such
communicative actions whose actualizations can be reconstructed as the
speech acts “[a]greement on premises and discussion rules” and “[d]ecision
to start a discussion” (vEG04: 68). Consequently, in a respective stencil rules
2 and 3 can be taken into consideration. Rule 2 regulates that the standpoint
expressed can be challenged, i. e. the speech act “[c]hallenging to defend a
standpoint” can be applied (vEG04: 68). Rule 3 regulates that the standpoint
expressed must thus be defended, i. e. the speech act “[a]cceptance of the
challenge to defend a standpoint” can be applied (vEG04: 68).
“Any admissions” refer to both material and procedural starting points.
Rule 3 also spells out the basis for managing starting points in the
pragma-dialectical ideal model (vEG04: 139: “any shared premises and
215Greco Morasso spells out “the moment in which a difference of opinion emerges and is clarified between the
parties [...]” (GM08: 242). Cf. also van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 136).
216Likewise, Greco Morasso writes that “the mediator appears to firmly guide the construction of a sound
confrontation stage, which parties are not able to create themselves” (GM08: 206).
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discussion rules”).217 Hence an accordance between the parties’ “providing”
of matters in the sense of article 12(b) and in the sense of rule 3 from critical
discussion. With respect to the WIPO procedural starting points can be at
stake, e. g., in creating the timetable (cf. WIP09: 10: article 12(a)). In fact,
the whole procedure of mediation rests on “the manner agreed by the parties”
(WIP09: 10).
However, material starting points are part of the information and materials
that refer to the respective issues (WIP09: 10). Argumentation researchers
Freeley and Steinberg define the term “issues” as “questions with answers that
directly prove or disprove the proposition” (FS08: 72). Freeley and Steinberg
are not pragma-dialecticians. Nonetheless, their concept of “proposition”
is similar to the pragma-dialectical concept of “standpoint.” Freeley and
Steinberg write that “[d]ebate is a means of settling differences, so there
must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a
debate” and “[c]ontroversy is an essential prerequisite of debate” (FS08: 43).
After having thus shown the r between the terms “difference of opinion”
and “controversy” they refer to the r between those concepts and the term
“proposition”: “In argumentation and debate a proposition is a statement of
judgment that identifies the central issue in controversy” (FS08: 45). So, the r
between Freeley and Steinberg’s terms difference of opinion and proposition
is similar to the r in pragma-dialectics between the terms difference of opinion
and standpoint.218 However, note that in mediation there is a phase that
accords with the opening stage in critical discussion.219
Next, against the background of the speech acts in the argument stage of
the ideal model of critical discussion I introduce the module of the terms
issues and contentions. (Note, though, that taking into account the module
of the four meta-theoretical principles, e. g. dialectification (cf. chapter 1:
217Pragma-dialecticians also write about “common premises,” “commitment to premises,” “establish the mutual
premises” und “grounds for rejection” (vEGJJ93: 126, 129, 135, 128).
218Likewise, van Eemeren distinguishes that standpoints “can be descriptive as well as evaluative or prescriptive”
(vE10: 1-2). Cf. this chapter: sorts of propositions and critical discussion.
219Greco Morasso writes, for instance, about the summary of the background of the difference of opinion: “the
narration of the story of the conflict [...] could certainly be interpreted as part of the opening stage of a
critical discussion” (GM08: 207). Certainly, she does not refer to the “background of the dispute” in the
sense of the WIPO (WIP09: 10-11). From her perspective narrating the story is to be understood as a means
to facilitate that “through the mediator’s guidance, parties are brought to find their material starting points
(premises concerning the interpretation of their conflict and their previous relationship) [...] [as well as]
procedural starting points (the external conditions such as agenda of the meetings, communication rules,
turn taking conventions, and so on)” (GM08: 242). So, in a mediation session the elements, relationships
and contexts forming the background of the dispute are summarized in order to actualize (the matters from)
the confrontation stage and the opening stage.
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four stages of critical discussion), it becomes apparent for pragma-dialectical
theorists that issues and contentions are relevant to the all of the four stages
of critical discussion (m).) Having introduced this module I relate it to my
findings on acceptance, and to the module of the five components when I spell
out the theoretical, analytical-intuitive and practical benefits from applying
both issues and contentions.
The terms of issues and contentions exemplify – together with
the module of the quartet of terms (cf. chapter 2) – how to
pragma-dialectically arrive at an integration of two theoretical contexts.
It is thus particularly relevant to the module of the ontological
framework (cf. this chapter). However, being related to the matter of
speech acts the module also represents a pragma-dialectical application
of the module of strategy (cf. chapter 2). At last, managing the
terms issues and contentions I facilitate the case study by introducing
concepts which are particularly relevant to the module of the integration
of role models (cf. this chapter): As a practitioner (analytical-intuitive,
pragma-dialectics) I employ this module in actualizing the character of
the mediator in the mediation session (cf. chapter 4).
The term “issue” is not a term from the pragma-dialectical ideal language.
Taking into consideration its relevance to the ci of mediation against the
background of facilitating a stencil of critical discussion (m), its r to
pragma-dialectics needs to be explicated. An issue, Freeley and Steinberg
write, is chained to the difference of opinion in the sense that it is “inherent”
in the standpoint: Issues “suggest checklists or categories of arguments to
be addressed by the participants in a debate or argumentative situation”
(FS08: 72).220 As an issue thus consists of certain matters configured in a
checklist entailing questions, an issue is actualized in the form of a question.
For example, discussing about a policy proposition,221 brings about the
questions whether a suggested plan is workable and whether its consequences
will, indeed, solve a certain problem (cf. FS08: 76).
220To “enable the issues to be identified” (cf. WIP09: 11) consequently means facilitating to arrive at clarity to
the standpoint because by means of the concept of issues the matters that are “inherent” in the standpoint
are spelled out.
221In his audio lecture 7 Zarefsky gives an example of a policy proposition: “The federal government should
provide financial support for stem cell research” (Zar05: 05:15 minutes).
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From the perspective of argumentation research managing the issues is
an option to arrive at clarity to such matters in mediation that are relevant
to the resolution of the difference of opinion (C2), i. e. relevant to the
conflict management (C1). The WIPO states, likewise, that the settlement
of the issues is an aim in mediation. One means to arrive at that aim is
to manage a “party’s contentions” (cf. WIP09: 11). Employing the same
term Freeley and Steinberg write that a question which actualizes an issue
is answered by referring to certain “contentions.” Again, from the perspective
of argumentation research the term can be explicated:
Contentions are statements offered in support of an issue [...]
evidence is organized into cogent arguments to support each
issue. Usually several contentions are offered in support of an
issue (FS08: 73).
After having explicated the similarities between the use of the concepts
“issues” and “contentions” in mediation to the use by Freeley and Steinberg
now I chain the insights to pragma-dialectics – in order to thus facilitate a
creation of critical discussion (m) against the background of the relationship
between terms that have already been created in the research program, and
newly introduced terms (cf. chapter 2: troublesome matter D). Recast that
the manner of managing issues in pragma-dialectics, e. g. in a stencil of
critical discussion (m), is to be traced back to the meta-theoretical principle
of dialectification. Therefore, e. g., the rules and the goal of the procedure of
critical discussion are to be taken into account.
There is an accordance between article 12(a) dealing with issues in the ci
of mediation and rule 5 from the ci of critical discussion. Rule 5 regulates
the agreement on successfully managing an attack on and defense of the
standpoint (vEG04: 143). When successfully attacking and defending a
standpoint means to manage certain issues then asking a question from the
checklist can be reconstructed as the speech act “requesting an argument”:
When a person puts forth a matter from the respective checklist he asks for
certain arguments to be addressed.222 Thus, based on the application of a
strategy to optimally use the right to attack (rule 10) a party one can spell out
particular questions in accordance with the issues.
Now, against the background of the goal that I have suggested to
222Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 68).
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characterize a procedure of critical discussion (m)223 the actualization of the
speech act requesting an argument (rule 6b.) sparks off the actualization of the
speech act “advancing an argument” (cf. vEG04: 68). The respective person
can thus act strategically by optimally using the right to defend (rule 11).
It becomes apparent that the settlement of an issue in mediation is based
on communication in accordance with critical discussion’s rules 7 and 8, i. e.
the successful attack and defense of propositional content and communicative
force of argumentation (vEG04: 147-151). In fact, applying the speech act
of advancing an argument means to manage the contentions. Managing
the contentions accords with applying the rules 7 and 8. Finally, when the
contentions that pertain to the argument are answered “satisfactorily”224
the state of “being convinced” [of the argument] can be
externalized as the expression of acceptance of a positive
commitment to a speech act [advancing an argument] by a person
who was initially opposed to that speech act (vEG04: 55).
All in all, against the background of dialectification in a mediation session,
clarity to the issues inherent in the actual standpoint facilitates to arrive at the
acceptability of the management of the contentions. That, in turn facilitates
the acceptance (or non-acceptance) of both the propositional content and
the communicative force of the speech act advancing an argument. Hence,
in accordance with the sense characterized in the ideal model of critical
discussion (cf. rule 13b.)225 the management of the contentions gives
rise to the speech act “[a]cceptance or non-acceptance of an argument” (cf.
vEG04: 68). Issues and contentions are concepts that are relevant to a
pragma-dialectical analyst.
In the ci of mediation “[t]he asking of questions [issues] thus functions
not merely to perform such tasks as probing, clarifying, and organizing but
also to perform important argumentative tasks” (vEGJJ93: 128). To conclude
the discussion of the concept of issues, next I sum up the insights in an
overview that exemplifies how – in an ontological framework of a stencil of
critical discussion (m) – matters from mediation and argumentation research
can be shown to “accord” to each other. The enumeration points to a
223Recast that the end of critical discussion (m) can be arrived at without the speech acts in the argument stage.
224Cf. Garssen (Gar01: 91).
225“The protagonist and the antagonist must in turn make a move of (complex) speech acts with a particular role
in the discussion” (vEG04: 154).
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possible procedure of the actualization of matters when they are characterized
respectively in critical discussion (m) (cf. table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Accordance of matters from different ci.




1. statement (article12(a)) proposition
expressing
standpoint (rule 1)


















Since pragma-dialectical research that focuses on “acceptance,”
metaphorically speaking, digs deeper (1.-4.) than Freeley and Steinberg
do (1.-3.) and than the WIPO does (1.-3.) in the consideration of matters,
research in a pragma-dialectical fashion can facilitate clarity to the matters
of the latter two. In article 12(b) the WIPO depicts that the mediator can, at
any time in the procedure, ask for additional information: “mediator may at
any time during the mediation suggest that a party provide such additional
information or materials as the mediator deems useful” (WIP09: 11).226
Thus, a mediator uses his intuition to characterize such times respectively. He
may actually refer to the management of certain contentions. For example, he
can request or apply a usage declarative at any time he considers it desirable
226Cf. article 12(a), in which “such” information and materials are characterized (pragma-dialectical starting
points).
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to arrive at clarity to the issues – which is a means to settle the issues.
Hence, in mediation there is a phase that accords with the argument stage of
critical discussion.227
By writing about the “Termination of the Mediation” the WIPO –
apparently – refers to the end of the mediation (WIP09: 14). The actualization
of mediation (difference of opinion) is a means to arrive at the goal of the
actualization of the mediation (conflict). An end of the actualized mediation
(difference of opinion) is arrived at when the speech act “[e]stablishing the
result of the discussion” has been actualized (vEG04: 68).228 In suggesting
the aim – i. e. one of the ends – of critical discussion (m) I spelled out the r
between rule 14 from critical discussion’s concluding stage and article 12(a)
from the WIPO (“Conduct of the Mediation”: background of dispute and
difference of opinion).
However, rule 14 about the management of a conclusive defense, and
attack of the standpoint in critical discussion is also relevant to acting in
accordance with the articles 18, 19 and 17. Next, I show that researching
those three articles from the perspective of argumentation research inspires
the conclusion that the written declaration is an option for a party to act
strategically. By means of “a written declaration of a party at any time
after attending the first meeting” (WIP09: 13: article 18) the speech act
“[a]cceptance or non-acceptance of the standpoint” can be applied by a party
(vEG04: 68). Nonetheless, it is article 19 that regulates that, in fact, it is the
mediator who officially establishes the end of the mediation:
Upon the termination of the mediation, the mediator shall
promptly send to the Center a notice in writing that the mediation
is terminated and shall indicate [...] whether or not the mediation
resulted in a settlement of the dispute and, if so, whether the
settlement was full or partial (WIP09: 14).
Since it is dealing with, among others, the matters from the mediation
(difference of opinion) recast that the written note by the mediator is based
on “the fact that a party had or had not indicated willingness to accept any
227Likewise, Greco Morasso spells out: “proper argumentation stages can be envisaged, in which parties bring
forward arguments, negotiate about the solutions and exchange the role of protagonist and antagonist”
(GM08: 242).
228Greco Morasso depicts that “in mediation they [the parties] are expected to come to an arrangement”
(GM08: 211) and van Eemeren et al. characterize this “arrangement” as an “acceptable arrangement”
(vEGJJ93: 125-126).
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proposal for settlement made” (WIP09: 13: article 17). So, by means of
a written note a mediator actually refers to a communication which can be
reconstructed as the speech act acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint.
Now, in his written declaration – which can be reconstructed as the speech
act acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint – a party can apply a
usage declarative, such as a specification or a definition. In that way he
can reasonably characterize that she considers the settlement to be partial
rather than full. For example, Freeley and Steinberg distinguish between the
“potential issues” and the “issues of the debate.” The former term refers to the
entirety of issues relevant to a certain standpoint (the entire checklist). The
latter term refers to “the issues that are actually introduced into the debate and
on which the opposing advocates clash” (FS08: 73). Consequently, a partial
settlement of the conflict may be traced back to the fact that only some of the
potential issues have been managed, or to the fact that the actual issues have
only partly been managed properly.229
Now, a written declaration precedes – and since the mediator refers to
the matters from the procedure it even facilitates – the officially established
termination of the mediation. The potential issues illustrate the “opportunities
that can be exploited” by an actual party who hands in the written
declaration.230 Because rule 15 facilitates the use of a usage declarative it is
(strategically) relevant to the actions of parties in accordance with the articles
17, 18 and 19 in the mediation. Altogether, in the procedure of the mediation
there is a phase that accords with the concluding stage of critical discussion.
At last, in various articles the WIPO spells out matters that refer to
liabilities in mediation:
exclusion of liability, express authorization, confidentiality, a
written declaration, unless otherwise agreed, other materials
supplied, notes taken by a person (WIP09: 16, 10, 11, 13, 12,
12, 12-13).
So, in mediation a character takes on certain commitments by means of
his actions (cf. e. g. “agree,” “supply”). Likewise, for instance, applying
rule 4 in critical discussion brings about the commitment to “maintain until
229Recast that the management of the contentions in mediation accords with the rules 7 and 8, i. e. the successful
attack and defense of the propositional content and the communicative force of argumentation.
230Hence also an accordance between the communication in mediation and the speech act “[u]pholding or
retracting a standpoint” (vEG04: 68).
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the end of the discussion” the respective role of protagonist and antagonist
(vEG04: 142). The commitments in mediation accord with the commitments
that characters in critical discussion take on by means of the respective speech
acts (cf. also vEGJJ93: 127). In the following I present an overview of the
matters relevant to critical discussion (m) – the ontological framework:
– Characters, cf. two parties, one mediator
– Conditions, cf. pragma-dialectical “reasonableness”
– Aim, cf. resolution of difference of opinion
– Standpoint, cf. clarity to difference of opinion
– Forms of action, cf. speech acts, e. g. requesting usage declarative
– Procedure of four stages, cf. confrontation stage, opening stage,
argument stage, concluding stage
– Issues, cf. checklists of questions
– Contentions, cf. answers to questions from issue
– Commitments, cf. speech acts.
Against the background of the ontological framework for critical discussion
(m) – e. g. the matters of the standpoint, or the issues and contentions – note
that even if the difference of opinion is not resolved having arrived at clarity
to the matters in the procedure of mediation is desirable because it creates,
metaphorically speaking, a groundwork for solving the conflict. Particular
results that have been arrived at in the procedure of mediation (difference
of opinion) can be used in mediation (conflict) to arrive at the solution to
the conflict. For example, the commitments from “defining facts” result in
the “Agreement on premises” in the actual opening stage, and managing the
actual issues results in the acceptance or non-acceptance of an argument in
the actual argument stage. That facilitates to arrive at a settlement of the
conflict through, e. g., “court proceedings” (cf. WIP). Having spelled out
their commitments pays out: The actual parties’ arrived at clarity to the
relevance of particular matters which, in turn, may be discussed in Court.
Next, I make use of the module of the five components to particularly
emphasize the scopes and functions, and the benefits of applying critical
discussion (m). The explanatory scopes of a stencil of critical discussion (m)
are limited:
Indeed, the reality of human interaction allowed by
communication is far more complex than any disciplinary
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approach may account for. Doing an argumentative analysis of
a text, thus, means reconstructing those aspects of it which are
relevant to the argumentative purpose of resolving a difference
of opinion, and neglecting other aspects. Of course, this does
not mean that the other aspects pertaining to the complexity of
human communication are not relevant [...] (GM08: 179).
An analysis of the discourse from a mediation session by means of the grid
is limited to those ideal elements and relationships (“those aspects,” εis and
ris) that are characterized in the blueprint, e. g. the difference of opinion.
Other elements and relationships are not taken into consideration, they are
“neglected” – they may be neglected already in the ontological framework of
the stencil. Over and above that, note that building critical discussion (m) can
mean that the respective theorist (pragma-dialectics) employs his intuition.
Therefore other researchers may miss certain matters for which they would
suggest a respective accordance, or disagree with presenting other matters as
a part of critical discussion (m), or they may suggest a need to further spell
out the relationships between certain matters.
In this section thus far I have concerned myself with the “complexity of
human interaction” in the context of mediation (conflict). So the scopes
of a respective ci of critical discussion (m) are limited to research sessions
of mediation that correspond to the twenty-seven articles by the WIPO.
However, in this very context, I spelled out an ontological framework of those
elements, relationships and contexts that are relevant to the resolution of the
difference of opinion – in the sense of a stencil of critical discussion (m).
Note, however, as shown in developing the ontological framework there
is just an accordance between certain matters from mediation and critical
discussion. Likewise there is just a correspondence between certain matters
from a mediation session and critical discussion (m). So, next, I aim at
spelling out some limits with respect to the explanatory scopes of a stencil of
critical discussion (m). At first, with respect to an ontological framework, for
some of the – supposedly relevant – matters from mediation it is troublesome
to suggest any accordance to the matters from critical discussion, i. e. no
integration of terms is required (cf. chapter 2: troublesome matter B). Second,
there are differences that can be anticipated between certain matters from a
stencil of critical discussion (m) and matters from a mediation session. I
briefly sum up the main insights gained about critical discussion (m) before,
third, I take into account the respective limits of the explanatory scopes
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of such a stencil to spell out the functions that it can, indeed, fulfill in
pragma-dialectics.
First, from the definition of “mediation” according to the WIPO it becomes
apparent that some matters from the WIPO Mediation Rules do not accord
with matters from critical discussion. For instance, the WIPO states in
article 14: “No recording of any kind shall be made of any meetings of the
parties with the mediator” (WIP09: 14). In critical discussion there is no
matter whatsoever that can be chained to the action of recording discursive
material. In facilitating, or building a stencil of critical discussion (m) a
theorist (pragma-dialectics) may thus be faced with the troublesome matter
B, i. e. no meaning is established for particularly relevant terms, when
he manages matters from mediation for which there is no correspondence
whatsoever to the matters from critical discussion.
Second, an analyst (pragma-dialectics) may be faced with certain
differences between matters from critical discussion (m) and matters from
a mediation session. Recast that researching the discourse from a mediation
session means researching the discourse from an “informal procedure” (cf.
WIP09: 2). It is troublesome to spell out whether or not the higher-order
conditions are actually fulfilled. Next, I present two examples to illustrate
that.
Firstly, persons need to have a certain argumentative competence to
actually accept – in a written or spoken form – that, against the background of
conclusive argumentation, they retract doubts with respect to the standpoint.
Even if – from the perspective of describing language – the management of an
actual standpoint gives rise to an r that brings about the pragma-dialectically
“required” (pragma-dialectically reasonable) action to retract a doubt a person
can simply not have the argumentative competence to recognize that, and/
or act correspondingly. Thus it is troublesome to, just like that, assume the
second-order conditions to be actualized.
Secondly, in a mediation session every person is supposed to “treat
one another with civility” (Jac02: 1406) and “in good faith” (WIP09: 10).
Note, that “civility” is not a term from pragma-dialectical ideal language.
So, without explicating it before building the stencil (cf. an ontological
framework) it cannot be a matter from critical discussion (m). Against the
background of natural language making transparent certain matters is a means
to act politely. So, the definition of civility may include spelling out one’s
commitments because that facilitates to arrive at the aim to “understand the
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perspective of the other” (Jac02: 1406). Now, suppose the term civility
has been properly defined pragma-dialectically and from the perspective of
critical discussion (m) actions in accordance with “civility” require to make
transparent all of the commitments that one has taken on. Employing a certain
argumentative strategy, however, may prevent a person to make transparent
any commitment.231 Thus it is troublesome to, just like that, assume the
third-order conditions to be actualized.
In brief, the stances of the persons actualizing the parties may “not always
be optimally adequate” in the sense of critical discussion (m) (vEG04: 73),
and in an analysis of the discourse from a mediation session it is troublesome
to spell out that certain commitments have been actualized. Therefore, in
general, against the background that there is not more than a correspondence
between matters from critical discussion (m) and from a mediation session
it becomes obvious that the intuition of an analyst (pragma-dialectics) is
relevant to both a reconstruction and an evaluation.232 Concluding the
discussion of the limitations of the scopes, in the following I sum up the main
insights that I have depicted about critical discussion (m) thus far.
– Critical discussion (m) is needed against the background of the purpose
of pragma-dialectics, i. e. to optimize argumentative reality.
– Critical discussion (m) is facilitated by an integration of terms from the
three languages from pragma-dialectics with terms which – thus far –
have not been employed in pragma-dialectical research.
– Critical discussion (m) is a stencil for the actual procedure of resolving
a difference of opinion (C2) in a session of mediation which accords
with the articles of the WIPO in the sense that critical discussion (m) is
defined by such matters of mediation (conflict) that accord with matters
from critical discussion.
Third, a stencil of critical discussion (m) fulfills, like any other stencil in
pragma-dialectics, three functions. Because from my research it turns out
to be the most relevant of the functions I particularly focus on spelling out
the function for the analyst (pragma-dialectics). However, note that firstly,
231Since the entirety of the commitments of a person in a ca in argumentative reality may be difficult to be
characterized the relevance of first, the meta-theoretical principle of externalization and of second, a concept
of strategic actions in the sense of the “exploitation of the opportunities” becomes apparent (cf. chapter 2:
definition of strategy).
232In order to arrive at clarity to the perspective of another person a mediator can facilitate, for instance, the
spelling out of the commitments of the person(s) in a mediation session (cf. this chapter: strategic actions
of the mediator).
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a theorist (pragma-dialectics) can employ the stencil to “play around” with
its εis and ris in the sense of a blueprint and secondly, in the sense of a
grid critical discussion (m) can also be applied to arrive at the goals of an
empiricist (pragma-dialectics). Thirdly, in the analytical-intuitive component
(pragma-dialectics) critical discussion (m) has a function to create an r
between εis, ris and cis with εas, ras and cas. A pragma-dialectical analyst
uses the stencil in the sense of a grid to analyze fragments from argumentative
reality. Particular matters from the ci of critical discussion (m) are shown
to be actualized in the respective mediation session. By employing the
pragma-dialectical describing language the particular matters from the ca are
thus reconstructed as matters from the ci. A reconstruction, consequently,
“can serve as a starting point for a well-founded evaluation” (vEHSH07: 5).
Because it is the background against which a pragma-dialectical analyst
evaluates particular matters, the ci of the grid can be used as a means to
show, for instance, that fallacies have been committed. In a mediation session
a “lack of clarity” can occur due to “all kinds of ambiguity fallacies.” For
instance, pragma-dialecticians write, there are ambiguity fallacies “having to
do with the communicative force of the speech act” (vEG04: 166). In the next
section I spell out why the mediator can facilitate clarity, e. g., to the matter
of the communicative force of speech acts.
3.3 The mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical
designer of acceptance
In this section, by taking into consideration matters from the WIPO and from
the literature in argumentation research I introduce the actions and goals of
mediators. I employ the scaffold and the modules of the five components –
the relationships between the five role models –, the ontological framework
of critical discussion (m) – i. e. the modules of strategy, and of issues
and contentions –, and the meta-theoretical principles to characterize the
mediator pragma-dialectically. In that way I particularly illustrate how to
spell out the theoretical r between the paradoxical role of the mediator
and the term argumentative strategy. In line with the pragma-dialectical
practical component the target of my research is to enhance the argumentative
competence of mediators in order to optimize argumentative reality in
sessions of mediation.
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3.3.1 The ontological framework and the paradoxical role of
the mediator
The mediator shall be neutral, impartial and independent.
[T]he mediator, assists the parties in reaching a settlement of the
dispute (WIP09: 9, 2).
Against the background of the four meta-theoretical principles I aim at
rephrasing the two goals of the mediator in a respective ci of critical
discussion (m). Then I introduce strategic actions of the mediator.
The mediator aims at appearing neutral. “To be neutral” thus means to
(not) take on certain commitments (externalization), to (not) apply certain
speech acts (functionalization), and to act in the ci of critical discussion (m)
(socialization and dialectification). The mediator also aims at facilitating the
acceptance of certain matters from critical discussion (m). Facilitating the
acceptance of certain matters from critical discussion (m) means to (not) take
on certain commitments (externalization), to (not) apply certain speech acts
(functionalization), and to act in the ci of critical discussion (m) (socialization
and dialectification).
I want to introduce the “paradoxical role” that I have just pointed at. In
fact, argumentation researchers sum up the coupling (cf. Jac02: 1423) of the
two goals I have related to the module of the four meta-theoretical principles
as the paradoxical role of mediators:
Specifically, mediators must maintain an appearance of neutrality
while managing the course and outcome of a dispute
(Jac02: 1405).
[H]e contributes to argumentation without arguing, as defined by
his paradoxical role [...] (GM08: 195).
Acting in line with those two goals the mediator “inevitably faces paradoxical
expectations” (Jac02: 1407), van Eemeren et al. state that the paradoxical
role brings on “paradoxical requirements” and “paradoxical demands”
(vEGJJ93: 119, 138). Next, I scrutinize the paradoxical role against the
background of the aforementioned concepts: the distinction between C1 and
C2, the two types of validity, clarity and the Principle of Communication, the
terms acceptability and acceptance, strategy, standpoint, issue and contention.
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Recast that a mediator facilitates the management of the matters related to
both the management of C1 and the management of C2: Exemplary tasks of
the mediator are to “regulate, clarify, question, and inform” (Jac02: 1407).
However, against the background of the ontological framework for critical
discussion (m) the paradoxical demands solely refer to the management of
C2 because the management of C2 is a means to the management of C1.
Therefore, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, the mediator’s paradoxical
role can first and foremost be elaborated with respect to the (argumentatively
relevant conflict) management of C2.
Indeed, the very practice of mediation is founded on the
belief that even in cases in which dialogue is blocked, the
intervention of a third person, armed with purely communicative
and argumentative means, can serve to the purpose of reasonably
solving a conflict (GM08: 159).
The mediator arrives at appearing neutral by acting in accordance with
the pragma-dialectical conception of reasonableness (“reasonably solving a
conflict”), i. e. the two types of validity configured in critical discussion
(m), the stencil for the actual procedure of resolving a difference of opinion
(C2) in a mediation session. Facilitating, or “serving,” the acceptance of
certain matters from the stencil is arrived at by acting in accordance with the
distinction between the terms clarity, acceptability and acceptance because
arriving at clarity and acceptability is the basis of arriving at acceptance. So,
for example, the Communication Principle whose first rule refers to clarity is
– as a “purely communicative and argumentative means” – apparently relevant
to facilitating the acceptance of matters from critical discussion (m), e. g. the
commitments of the parties.
For example, against the background of the Communication Principle
questions are purely communicative means to arrive at a clarity formula
with respect to an argumentatively relevant commitment. Jacobs presents
an example: “the question allows the wife to favorably clarify the scope of
her arguments, i. e., to make clear that her arguments reject the particular
visitation proposal and not any proposal in principle” (Jac02: 1413). So,
the wife can be held committed to actualize the second-order condition to
be prepared to accept “any proposal in principle.” Next, the mediator utters
that he has understood that the wife has spelled out this commitment: “In 122,
the mediator immediately follows her turn with ‘Okay’ – a move that locks
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in what she has done.” Apparently, the mediator can apply a speech act that
fulfills the function of a clarity formula with respect to the matters relevant to
critical discussion (m).
Since the two goals of the mediator are means to the same
(pragma-dialectical) purpose – to optimize argumentative reality – and
in order to arrive at those aims the mediator configures the same possible
forms of actions that are in accordance with the same set of rules – the speech
acts from critical discussion (m)– the two goals can be summed up as one
strategic goal. The strategic goal of the mediator is to neutrally facilitate the
acceptance of certain matters from critical discussion (m).233
Next, I present strategic actions of mediators with respect to all of the stages
of a respective stencil of critical discussion (m). Since I focus on the actions
here, and aim at illustrating that the mediator comes up to his paradoxical role
in line with the definition of strategy, it is rather irrelevant which exemplary
standpoint I use. So, I opt for an example by argumentation researcher
Zarefsky: “We should provide financial support to the project” (Zar05).
In order to arrive at his strategic goal a mediator can facilitate the
actualization of the difference of opinion (vEGJJ93: 141: “disputants clearly
express standpoints”). However, rather than “asking the parties what their
problem is” (GM08: 247) he spells out certain commitments which the person
have taken on through their written and spoken communication. By means
of questions that accord with the rules of a stencil of critical discussion (m)
and fulfill the function of one of the possible forms of action, e. g. the
speech act non-acceptance of a standpoint in the confrontation stage, he can
facilitate clarity to the commitment of an actual protagonist: “Is it really a
good idea to agree that we should provide financial support for that project?”
So, when the difference of opinion is still vaguely formulated – the persons in
a respective mediation session are still on their “search for the identification
of C2” (GM08: 247) – the mediator can disagree by means of a question by
which he clearly phrases the standpoint that he senses to “hang in the air” (cf.
Jac02: 1412) and direct this standpoint towards the respective protagonist:
“questions function to give shape and substance to a potential argumentative
case” (vEGJJ93: 136). Neutrally fostering clarity to the standpoint in the
233“[T]he mediator has no resources for shaping of the argument other than discourse, and the mediator must
operate within the same discursive possibilities as the disputants themselves” (vEGJJ93: 174).
214
confrontation stage of the procedure of resolving the difference of opinion
the mediator fulfills the purpose to optimize argumentative reality.
Likewise, a mediator “brings parties to recognize the premises” via the
logical and the intuitive route. The mediator can spell out the agreement
on certain starting points. So he configures the respective forms of action
– i. e. the speech act agreement on premises and discussion rules – and
thus “prepare[s] the way for argumentation” (cf. GM08: 261, 260).234 In
accordance with the respective rules he facilitates the acceptance of matters
from the opening stage of critical discussion (m): “The budget currently
available for the project is 22.101.985 Euro. The whole project costs
29.071.960 Euro.” Facilitating clarity to those matters means to optimize
argumentative reality against the background of critical discussion (m). The
mediator facilitates to arrive at acceptance of matters relevant to the procedure
of resolving the difference of opinion.
As “questioning substitutes for argumentation” (vEGJJ93: 129) in
accordance with the rules applicable to the argument stage of critical
discussion (m) a mediator can ask: “Is it true that they do not have other
potential investors to financially support the project?” Again, in order to
arrive at his goal to appear neutral the mediator “avoids overtly argumentative
speech acts” (cf. vEGJJ93: 129) and uses a question as a substitute. By
employing his intuition to equally spell out issues and contentions “the
mediator ‘forces’ one of the parties not only to imagine their relationship
in the future, but to imagine it through the other parties’ eyes and by
assuming her perspective” (GM08: 257).235 Consequently, he appears neutral
by applying the speech acts of requesting an argument, and advancing an
argument. He thus facilitates clarity to the acceptance or non-acceptance of
an argument. Again, he neutrally facilitates the procedure of the mediation
session in correspondence to the procedure of critical discussion (m), and
thus fulfills the pragma-dialectical purpose.
Greco Morasso depicts an example in which “the mediator makes use of a
very effective metaphor” (GM08: 261). Recasting the metaphor of “the cream
on the milk” (cf. chapter 2) suppose that a mediator calls the financial sum
of another 11.071.959 Euro from investors that can be included into a certain
financial plan “the cream on the milk.” Say, the mediator intuitively uses
234Cf. also van Eemeren et al. (vEGJJ93: 27) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04: 60, 105).
235Recast that a mediator “may at any time during the mediation suggest that a party provide such additional
information or materials as the mediator deems useful” (WIP09: 11). A mediator decides intuitively what
to (not) “deem useful.” He can request additional information to arrive at his strategic goal.
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this metaphor, for instance to “slip[s] out of an awkward position through
the artful use [...]” of the metaphor (Jac02: 1422). Using this metaphor in
accordance with the pragma-dialectical rules in the concluding stage routes
the intuition of a party in understanding the utterance. The listener can sense
whether or not the respective utterance actually “softly closes” the dispute.
So, in the example the metaphor facilitates clarity to a relevant form of action.
The speech act non-acceptance of a standpoint can be reconstructed because
the standpoint “We should provide financial support to the project” is spelled
out to be rejected. The mediator arrived at his strategic goal. He neutrally
facilitated the acceptance of a matter in from critical discussion (m) and
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Figure 3.1: Strategists in critical discussion (m).
By means of his strategic actions that refer to the four stages of critical
discussion, on the one hand the mediator appears neutral with respect to the
content. On the other hand, though, he facilitates the application, hence
clarity to and acceptance of the forms of action in the procedure. His
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communications – in a written or spoken form (WIP09: 11: “in any manner”)
– refer to the possible forms of action, the speech acts, from critical discussion
(m): “Formulations and questions can be used to do work that [...] might
be done by openly asserting standpoints, [...] making arguments, and so
on” (vEGJJ93: 120). So, the matters relevant to critical discussion (m),
such as the standpoint, issues and contentions (“making arguments”) and the
commitments are relevant to the strategic actions of the mediator. However,
interpreting a formulation of a mediator Jacobs spells out that “[t]he danger
for the mediator is that his contribution to the argument may be taken as more
than simply an authoritative paraphrase [...]” (Jac02: 1420-1421). Jacobs
agrees with the conclusion from the exemplary strategic actions that the
mediator’s intuition is particularly relevant to him to arrive at his strategic
aim. He needs to sense the “danger.”236
3.3.2 Integrating role models
Next, in order to facilitate the module of the integration of role models (cf.
this chapter) I expand the scrutiny of the paradoxical role of the mediator.
In reflecting on his argumentative competence I particularly pinpoint the
relationship between the mediator’s strategic actions – i. e. including his
strategic goal –, clarity and acceptance, and his paradoxical role in order
to develop the module of the integration of role models. I make particular
use of the modules of the five components and the four languages to foster
the (metaphorically expressed) pragma-dialectical understanding of the role
of mediators.
236Likewise, Jacobs points to clarity via the intuitive rather than the logical route when he writes about the
timing of actualizing a strategic action: “the mediator’s summary comes off as a timely and fitting response”
(Jac02: 1418).
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The integration of role models illustrates the complex relationships that
are characterized in the module of the five components (cf. chapter
1). Together with the modules of the four languages (cf. chapter 2:
the scaffold) and the definitions of strategy and strategic action (cf.
chapter 2) chained to the ontological framework (cf. chapter 2) – which
exemplifies the quartet of terms (cf. chapter 2), and includes the issues
and contentions (cf. this chapter) – the module of the integration of role
models facilitates my actualization of the mediator’s management of his
paradoxical role in the case study (cf. chapter 4).
Thus far, the “paradoxical role” of mediators received some attention
in pragma-dialectical research (cf. chapter 1), though it has not been
characterized methodically. Making use of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics),
i. e. a configuration of the three languages and the five components, to
spell out the paradoxical role facilitates that mediators fulfill the purpose of
pragma-dialectical research. Understanding their role from the perspective of
argumentation research facilitates to spell out the r between their role and their
application of argumentative strategies. That facilitates that they optimize
argumentative reality in the respective cas. Therefore I aim at characterizing
the paradoxical role of the mediator against the background of the five role
models – in order to enhance the argumentative competence of mediators.
I utilize the findings by taking into account the modules of the ontological
framework and the quartet of terms in order to further specify the scopes of a
stencil of critical discussion (m).
The mediator as a designer of acceptance
The mediator has the character of a pragma-dialectical practitioner.
A mediator “improves argumentative practice in a purposeful way”
(vEG04: 32). A practitioner (pragma-dialectics) aims at optimizing
argumentative reality against the background of both a certain ca and
the findings in the research program. In order to arrive at that goal a
practitioner (pragma-dialectics) spells out suggestions that are based on the
research results from the components of pragma-dialectics. For example,
a pragma-dialectical practitioner (analytical-intuitive) uses the diagnostic
power of the stencil to facilitate clarity to the management of discourse. So,
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I show first that as a practitioner the mediator connects the discourse with
matters from critical discussion (m) and second, that he facilitates to actualize
reasonableness in the sense of critical discussion (m).
First, a mediator aims at facilitating an actualization of critical discussion
(m). As a practitioner a mediator optimizes argumentative reality by
connecting the discourse with matters from critical discussion (m):
Formulations and questions appear to be well suited to doing the
job of compensating for problems in the way that disputants argue
for and against positions [...] (vEGJJ93: 193).
By means of formulations and questions that refer to a bridging element,
relationship or context (εia, ria or cia) in the sense of practical research the
mediator connects the discourse with matters from the stencil. He employs
describing language to manage the methodical gap between the ideal context
of critical discussion (m) (ci) and the discourse from the respective actual
context (ca) from a mediation session. He refers, for example to the concept
of issues which is defined in terms of ideal language: The WIPO (WIP09: 11)
writes that a mediator can propose means for resolving the issues, i. e. means
to manage the issues goal-oriented.237
Second, the mediator optimizes argumentative reality pragma-dialectically
by facilitating the actualization of reasonableness in the sense of the respective
stencil. He thus facilitates the actualization of a sense of reasonableness
that is accepted by the parties in critical discussion (m). Aakhus writes
that “[t]hese comments [of the mediator] represent a significant shift in the
mediator’s approach to managing the interaction and a rationale for the shift”
(Aak03: 278). Because it is a stencil integrated to manage the matters in the
procedure of resolving the difference of opinion (C2) the mediator should
make use of critical discussion (m). The rationale for the (purposeful) shift
can thus refer to the sense of reasonableness elicited by actions in accordance
with the blueprint. A mediator can explain to the actual parties such a shift by
referring to the respective relationship between certain εas, ras and cas from
the discourse and certain εis, ris and and cis from the stencil. In that sense
the mediator facilitates the actualization of reasonableness in the sense of the
237In order to facilitate an actualization of critical discussion (m) as a practitioner a mediator also strategically
aims at preventing a connection between the discourse and other matters than those from the stencil (cf.
this chapter: mediator as practitioner). For instance, if he considers certain utterances unsuitable to the very
management of the issues he can strategically prevent a connection between the discourse and those means.
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stencil and thus optimizes argumentative reality “in a purposeful way” against
the background of the research program.238
The mediator aims at appearing neutral while he facilitates to actualize
critical discussion (m).239 As a practitioner the mediator appears neutral by
connecting his suggestions to the pragma-dialectical research results. Recast
that “the conflict has already escalated so much that it is not possible for the
parties to handle it without external help” (GM08: 36). As a practitioner the
mediator aims at not connecting the discourse to other matters than those
from pragma-dialectics. In this sense he is this external help for the parties.
When the mediator arrives at his goal to facilitate an actualization of critical
discussion (m) it becomes “possible” for the parties to manage the difference
of opinion in the sense of the stencil.
The mediator’s suggestions are based on his argumentative competence
that refers to producing, analyzing and evaluating discourse against the
background of a stencil. This argumentative competence, in turn, rests on the
research results from pragma-dialectics. As a pragma-dialectical practitioner
the mediator can make use of all of the elements, relationships and contexts
(εis, ris and cis; εias, rias, cias as well as εais, rais, cais; εas, ras and cas).
The mediator shall promote the settlement of the issues in dispute
between the parties in any manner that the mediator believes to
be appropriate [...] (WIP09: 11).
The mediator in critical discussion (m) is a pragma-dialectical practitioner
“in a sense of the WIPO.” In order to appear neutral towards content matters
the mediator can prioritize explicitly that his suggestions refer to accepted
research results from pragma-dialectics: A mediator can thus actualize the
value of neutrality by spelling out that the propositional content of the speech
acts actualized by the parties is secondary to him, and that as a practitioner
he renounces from connecting his suggestions to other matters than those
from results arrived at by pragma-dialecticians’ plausible reasoning.240 He
can emphasize that it is his aim to facilitate managing the matters relevant to
the procedure of “overcoming practical problems” (vEGJJ93: 118), and that
employing the diagnostic power of critical discussion (m) is an “appropriate”
means to arrive at that goal.
238Note that, again, he manages the methodical gap.
239Therefore, apparently the mediator does not appear impartial towards the pragma-dialectical research results.
His neutrality refers to the propositional content of the speech acts applied.
240Cf. this chapter: acceptance (cf. WJ99: 879).
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The mediator intuitively uses the stencil and its diagnostic power to
facilitate clarity to the discourse that has been produced and clarity to the
discourse that – against the background of the stencil – desirably is going to
be produced. Aakhus spells out that “the rationality of a discussion can be
measured by the degree to which participants’ communication is isomorphic
with the expectations of the model” (Aak03: 267). A mediator can make
use of the stencil to spell out that and in which sense certain matters, e. g.
fallacies, have been actualized. He can employ the diagnostic power of the
critical discussion (m) to facilitate that and how certain matters are desirable
to be produced in the procedure. In both cases – discourse has been produced
and is going to be produced – the mediator applies describing language to
spell out in which sense the discourse is (not) – or will (not) be – “isomorph”
with the accepted sense of reasonableness. Again, in order to appear neutral
the mediator refers to reasonableness in the sense of the stencil, i. e. he
refers to matters characterized in critical discussion (m) rather than to the
propositional content of the parties’ speech acts. Thus his suggestions are
means that “lead to the desired results or to speeding up the achievement of
the targets that a particular form of oral or written discourse is expected to
serve” (vEG04: 33), i. e. in a mediation session a difference of opinion is
actually resolved.
The mediator has the character of a pragma-dialectical designer. In his article
Neither Naïve nor Critical Reconstruction: Dispute Mediators, Impasse
and the Design of Argumentation Aakhus pragma-dialectically depicts the
r between mediation and design. “Design,” Aakhus writes, “[...] is a
reflective enterprise that involves a designer, an object to be designed, and an
environment in which the object is to be used” (Aak03: 284). The mediator,
he suggests, is a designer: “The dispute mediator may be taken as a designer,
the context of the dispute as the environment, and dialogue and disagreement
as objects of design” (Aak03: 285).
In the following I comply with such a distinction. Indeed, the mediator
is a designer. However, the object to be designed is – more precisely than
“dialogue and disagreement” – the r between a particular form of action and
an action. Critical discussion (m) is the ci, the environment in which the object
is used. Recast that critical discussion (m) can be actualized as a mediation
session. As a designer a mediator thus configures the r between the forms of
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action characterized in critical discussion (m) and the actions in the respective
mediation session.
Now, examples of strategic actions of the mediator are: “assist,”
“determine” and “establish,” “propose” and “suggest,” facilitate “to settle”
and “to resolve,” “promote” an end of the mediation and “send a notice
that the mediation is terminated” (cf. WIP09: 2-14).241 A mediator applies
those strategic actions as a pragma-dialectical practitioner who connects the
discourse to matters from critical discussion (m). Thus the mediator in critical
discussion (m) is a pragma-dialectical designer “in a sense of the WIPO.”242
His silence, however, will turn out to be a sign of lack
of acceptance of the mediator’s management of the process
(GM08: 214).
The mediator has the character of a pragma-dialectical designer of
acceptance. Recast the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) which shows the
relationships between the three languages and the five components in
pragma-dialectics. Greco Morasso writes about a “lack of acceptance.”
That illustrates that as a practitioner (pragma-dialectics) a mediator, who
respectively makes use of certain elements, relationships and contexts,
facilitates a “non-lack of acceptance” (or, for that matter, prevents a lack
of acceptance) with respect to – though not only – the management of the
procedure.
The mediator facilitates the acceptance of certain matters, i. e. the mediator
manages to arrive at the groundwork for the acceptance of those matters.
Against the background of the scaffold such a matter can be characterized
as εi, ri and ci, εia, ria, cia as well as εai, rai, cai and εa, ra and ca. Hence the
mediator manages the methodical gap. Clarity to and acceptability of those
matters belong to the aforementioned groundwork that the mediator manages
to arrive at. The mediator’s strategic actions which “promote” (cf. WIP09: 11)
to arrive at clarity to and acceptability of a matter are means to arrive at
acceptance of the respective element, relationship or context (ε , r or c) (cf.
table 3.3).
241In the pragma-dialectical literature similar terms are employed to characterize the actions of a mediator, e. g.
“the mediator tries to reestablish the premise that [...]” (vEGJJ93: 137).
242In the sense of the practical component (pragma-dialectics) he prevents the connection between the discourse
and other matters than those from the stencil.
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Table 3.3: Strategic goals of the mediator in managing clarity, acceptability
and acceptance.















































































With respect to dialectification the mediator neutrally facilitates the
configurations of acceptance, acceptability and clarity in accordance with the
ci of critical discussion (m).
Note that the very moment when a mediator facilitates the acceptance of a
certain εi, ri, ci, εia, ria, cia, εai, rai and cai this matter can, though must not, be
actualized. For instance, a mediator can ask a question with the consequence
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that the actual protagonist actualizes the acceptance of the challenge to defend
a standpoint in the actual opening stage.
In article 13 the WIPO suggests that a mediator is not supposed to establish
whether or not a standpoint is to be accepted: “The mediator shall [...] have
no authority to impose a settlement on the parties” (WIP09: 11). Greco
Morasso agrees: A mediator is “somebody who helps the development
of the discussion without assuming the task of making a final decision”
(GM08: 9). In order to facilitate the acceptance of the result of the actual
mediation (difference of opinion) a mediator can list the matters that have
been spelled out to be clear and acceptable to the parties: A “summary of
the substance” is thus the result of a strategic action of this mediator “to
support settling or resolving,” e. g., issues (Jac02: 1418). For example, the
mediator can present such a summary in the notice in accordance with article
19 (WIP09: 14). In the notice he can refer to “the signing of a settlement
agreement by the parties,” i. e. the means to establish that the conflict is settled
(WIP09: 13).243 Summarizing the management of the issues facilitates that
a person understands both the reasons for accepting a certain result of the
mediation session and the reasons why it is accepted.244
All in all, as a pragma-dialectical designer of acceptance the mediator
facilitates that the parties arrive at clarity to matters, such as the end of the
mediation (difference of opinion) which, in turn, is a means to arrive at the
goal of the mediation (conflict). Thus the mediator in critical discussion (m)
is a pragma-dialectical designer of acceptance “in a sense of the WIPO.”
Against the background of the five components Aakhus inspires further
pragma-dialectical research on the role of the mediator as a designer of
acceptance by suggesting
reconstruction as “design” that encompasses the moves
third-parties make to shape argumentative dialogue into a means
to solve conflicts (Aak03: 266).
Aakhus poses the question in which sense a “move” in a reconstruction can
be “shaped into a means” that is relevant to a mediator as a designer of the
“argumentative dialogue.” In my terms, he aims at elaborating the relevance
243Cf. this chapter: “written declaration.”
244Against the background of externalization the mediator particularly focuses on clarity to the reasons for
accepting the respective matter. However, he also aims at clarity to the reasons why a matter is accepted.
For instance, he refers to the externalization of certain conditions of critical discussion (m) (cf. this chapter:
acceptance, Pinto (Pin03)).
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of the strategic action of reconstructing – which is a strategic action of a
pragma-dialectical analyst – to a mediator as a pragma-dialectical designer
of acceptance. So, in essence he asks whether a mediator as a designer of
the means of the r between a session of mediation and a stencil applies the
strategic action of reconstructing in order to arrive at the aim of a session of
mediation, i. e. the solution to the conflict. So, when Aakhus aims at showing
in which sense the strategic actions of a pragma-dialectical analyst can be
relevant to a mediator as a pragma-dialectical practitioner, he points to the role
of the mediator as a pragma-dialectical practitioner (analytical-intuitive).245
The mediator as a critical analyst
The mediator has the character of a pragma-dialectical critical analyst. An
analyst (pragma-dialectics) aims at managing the correspondence between
a stencil and a discourse (εia, ria, cia). In order to arrive at that goal he
acts strategically. He accepts to be guided by the matters of the stencil in
the analysis, e. g. in the reconstruction of an utterance as a contention.
Moreover, the analyst (pragma-dialectics) applies the stencil intuitively as
a tool to evaluate whether or not and in which sense the procedure in the
respective ca that the fragment is taken from is an actualization of the
procedure characterized in the ci of the stencil. The pragma-dialectical analyst
takes into account the rules of the grid when he manages the methodical gap
to fulfill the purpose of the research program.
The mediator aims at appearing neutral while he facilitates an actualization
of critical discussion (m). As a pragma-dialectical analyst the mediator
manages the correspondence between the discourse and the stencil by
connecting the discourse with matters from critical discussion (m) and by
preventing a connection between the discourse and other matters than those
from the stencil: “The reconstruction must reflect the characteristic properties
of argumentative reality as well as those of the ideal model that constitutes the
framework of analysis” (vEG04: 23).
As a pragma-dialectical analyst a mediator, firstly, reconstructs and,
secondly, evaluates – i. e. he analyzes – the actual speech acts as if
they were applied by parties in critical discussion (m): “making a decision
on the resolution of their conflict, necessarily involves critical reflection
and evaluation [...] The communicative process in mediation [...] largely
245Note the sense of describing language in Aakhus’ formulation “shape into.”
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constitutes an argumentative discussion” (GM08: 104).246 A mediator
actualizes the strategic actions of a critical analyst (pragma-dialectics).
Firstly, by means of his reconstruction in the sense of the
analytical-intuitive component the mediator connects the discourse with
the stencil in order to create an r between matters referred to by means of
ideal language and matters referred to by means of actual language. He
elaborates whether and in which sense the actual parties act in correspondence
to the stencil. He tests whether and in which sense they actualize critical
discussion (m). In the respective ca – Aakhus writes about a “reconstruction
in practical circumstances” (Aak03: 284) – a mediator as an analyst
(pragma-dialectics) thus appears neutral with respect to the propositional
content of the actualization of certain speech acts while he simultaneously
facilitates that the actual parties arrive at an instantiation of critical discussion
(m).
As a pragma-dialectical analyst a mediator aims at particular goals by
managing the relationship spelled out by means of certain εias, rias, cias:
“Argument reconstruction, then, involves identifying and isolating all those
and only those elements that are relevant to the theoretical perspective and
for the theoretical purpose of the analyst” (vR01: 165-166). Reconstructing
in pragma-dialectics means that the discourse is connected to particular goals
(“theoretical purpose”) against the background of a configuration of matters in
the ci of a grid (“theoretical perspective”). So, the result of the reconstruction
of a discourse is limited in the sense of the goals and perspective characterized
by the respective theorist. For example, in a blueprint for a mediation
session a theorist (pragma-dialectics) can configure the matters of issues
and contentions. Thus those matters are relevant to a mediator as a
pragma-dialectical analyst. Furthermore, in his reconstruction the mediator
applies the translation criteria and the strategies of a pragma-dialectical
analyst, i. e. the strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction, the strategy
of maximally argumentative analysis, the maximally dialectical analysis and
the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation (cf. chapter 4).
Secondly, as an analyst (pragma-dialectics) the mediator evaluates the
discourse by intuitively making use of certain matters from the stencil. The
246Likewise van Eemeren et al. characterize an analyst (pragma-dialectics): “It is a normative presumption in
the sense that we [mediators] expect of interlocutors that they will act in reasonable, cooperative ways, and
we hold them accountable for meeting such expectations” (vEGJJ93: 45).
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mediator can apply an argumentative strategy in the sense of the blueprint.247
Next, I present two examples of a mediator’s evaluations.
First, the mediator aims at an evaluation of the management of the issues.
He can thus refer to the respective contentions. Issues and contentions are
matters from critical discussion (m) since they are chained to the speech
acts listed to characterize the ci.248 So, when one of the characters in an
actualization of critical discussion (m) does not accept the management of
an actual issue in a mediation session he can actualize the speech act of
non-acceptance of an argument purposefully.
Now, at any moment (cf. WIP09: 11) a mediator can ask a question from
the checklist in order to arrive at his goal to appear neutral since, recast, by
asking questions mediators can test whether argumentatively relevant speech
acts have been actualized: “In many respects, such questioning in context can
substitute for the kind of advocacy that would be heard in direct rejections,
open disagreement, and explicit argumentation” (Jac02: 1414). So, on the
one hand, spelling out issues is an option to appear “critical” in the sense of
the procedure of critical discussion (m). On the other hand, as a “substitute”
for explicitly actualizing the speech act requesting an argument it is an option
to avoid an immediate repulse. By actualizing issues a mediator can suggest
that a person provides additional information required for resolving an actual
difference of opinion. In this sense a mediator configures matters from critical
discussion (m) to arrive at his goal to evaluate the management of the issues
and contentions and thus to first, facilitate the acceptance of particular matters
from critical discussion (m) and second, to appear neutral. So, the mediator
as a critical analyst (pragma-dialectics) applies an argumentative strategy.
He configures possible forms of action in accordance with the rules from
critical discussion (m) and in accordance with the pragma-dialectical purpose
to optimize argumentative reality.
Second, in regards of ambiguity fallacies with respect to the communicative
force of speech acts the argumentative competence of the mediator involves
the skill to evaluate a discourse with respect to the communicative force of
speech acts. That, in turn, may result in his conclusion that such an ambiguity
fallacy has been committed. The ambiguity fallacy may be evaluated to be a
reason for a party’s obscurity to a certain matter.
247So, the evaluation, too, is based on the grid and the targets of the respective analysis. Thus the results of an
evaluation are limited, similarly to the results of the reconstruction.
248As shown, actualizing an issue means to actualize the speech act of requesting an argument; contentions refer
to the speech act of advancing an argument (cf. this chapter: issues and contentions).
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The mediator complies with article 17 in which the WIPO deals with
confidentiality: “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the mediator and the
parties shall not introduce (i) any views expressed or suggestions made by a
party with respect to a possible settlement of the dispute; (ii) any admissions
made by a party in the course of the mediation” (WIP09: 13). In order to
accord with this article with respect to the bridging elements, relationships
and contexts (εias, rias, cias) the mediator aims at clarity to the reconstruction
of matters as “views expressed,” “suggestions made” or “admissions made.”
In order to arrive at clarity to those matters he aims at spelling out fallacious
actions. Taking into consideration the strategic actions of a mediator as an
analyst (pragma-dialectics) according to the WIPO he can thus “determine”
these matters in the evaluation against the background of their argumentative
relevance – their contribution – to the resolution of the difference of opinion.
The mediator in critical discussion (m) is a pragma-dialectical analyst “in a
sense of the WIPO.”
The mediator as a critical designer of acceptance
– Since his strategic actions accord with the strategic actions of the
analyst and the practitioner in pragma-dialectics the mediator can be
characterized as an integration of those two role models.
The mediator has the character of a pragma-dialectical critical designer
of acceptance. In the sense of the WIPO he is an integration of the
pragma-dialectical critical analyst with the designer of acceptance. As a
critical analyst (pragma-dialectics) he intuitively applies the stencil to analyze
the discourse. Moreover, he can apply an argumentative strategy. As a
practitioner (pragma-dialectics) – a designer of acceptance – the mediator
facilitates acceptance of certain matters from the stencil. The mediator
appears neutral and facilitates arriving at acceptance, e. g. by facilitating
clarity to and acceptability of certain matters from the stencil. Both
analytically and practically a mediator neutrally facilitates that matters from
ideal language are accepted in the discourse. Therefore, the integration of the
two role models – the character of the pragma-dialectical critical designer of
acceptance – points to a mediator’s management of his paradoxical role.
Greco Morasso writes: “The mediator, in other words, can be said
to work as a heuristic advisor [...]” (GM08: 264). As shown, the
stencil in pragma-dialectics has a “heuristic” function with respect to
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the analytical-intuitive component. An advisor who operates against
the background of a certain configuration of matters that are based on
plausible research can most certainly optimize argumentative reality. So,
in pragma-dialectics a practitioner can be instantiated by a person who is
“advising,” i. e. an advisor. As an advisor a mediator communicatively
– he actualizes speech acts from critical discussion (m) – facilitates the
management of the actual elements, relationships and contexts (εas, ras and
cas) in a mediation session.
Aakhus writes: “In shaping the dialogue, their reconstruction involves
more than clarification of the plausible argumentative relevance of a move
[...]” (Aak03: 283). The author spells out that mediators act strategically like
an analyst (“reconstruction”) and yet this strategic action of reconstructing
“involves more.” Since arriving at clarity to a matter (“clarification”) is a
means to facilitate the acceptance of that matter, I think, this more refers to
the goal of the mediator to facilitate acceptance – in fact, as a designer of
acceptance.
Aakhus repeatedly points to the role of the mediator as a pragma-dialectical
practitioner (analytical-intuitive). He writes that by means of the analyst’s
strategic action of reconstructing the mediator facilitates the visibility of
certain information: mediators “make valid information available to settle
differences” (Aak03: 280). Making argumentatively relevant information
visible in a mediation session means configuring the r between the forms
of action characterized in critical discussion (m) and the actions in the ca.
Aakhus thus points to the goal of the mediator’s reconstruction to facilitate
acceptance (“to settle differences”). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide
a suitable metaphor when they deal with pragma-dialectical analyses:
[A]n analytical reconstruction of argumentative language use
is impossible without sound knowledge of the relevant aspects
of argumentative reality. Just as the possibility of running a
state well depends on a justified harmonization between the
regulations and the behavior of civil society, so is the possibility
of providing an adequate analytical reconstruction dependent on a
justified connection between the theory and argumentative reality
(vEG04: 40).
As shown, “language use” is characteristic of mediation. The mediator
employs his intuition, his “sound knowledge of argumentative reality,” in
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order to reconstruct the discourse as an analyst (pragma-dialectics). He
aims at a “justified connection” between the theoretical component and
argumentative reality by means of describing language (εia, ria and cia).
However, taking into account van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s metaphor it
is not an aim of the pragma-dialectical analyst to arrive at any harmonization
between the discourse and the stencil. So, as a pragma-dialectical critical
analyst the mediator does not at all influence the content of the discussion.
Yet as a pragma-dialectical practitioner the mediator does aim at a “justified
harmonization” between the discourse, or for that matter the “behavior of
civil society,” and the matters spelled out in the ci of critical discussion
(m), i. e. the “regulations” spelled out in the integration of mediation with
critical discussion. Taking on the role of the mediator means to take on the
responsibility to “critically run the procedure of mediation” with the goal to
plausibly (“well”) resolve the difference of opinion.
Now, in order to scaffold the findings I particularly recast the previous
metaphors. The mediator is – as an integration of the pragma-dialectical
analyst with the pragma-dialectical practitioner – a heuristic advisor whose
reconstruction of the discourse involves a more than creating a bridge between
matters referred to by means of ideal language and matters referred to by
means of actual language. Making use of his intuition, his reconstruction
involves a harmonization of the actions of the actual parties with the forms
of action configured in the stencil. As a strategist a mediator thus neutrally
facilitates the acceptance of matters from the procedure of critical discussion
(m). By means of the scaffold those complex findings can be localized in
order to facilitate strategic actions of analytical-intuitive practitioners who
manage the methodical gap (cf. figure 3.2).249
Acting like a pragma-dialectical analyst and practitioner the mediator applies
any of the three languages. Against the background of the five components
the character of the mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of
acceptance thus illustrates in which sense the methodical gap can be bridged
in argumentation research.
The mediator acts strategically as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of
acceptance in order to arrive at his goals to appear neutral and to facilitate
the acceptance of certain matters from critical discussion (m). In order to
instantaneously reconstruct and evaluate the discourse by means of the stencil


























Figure 3.2: Foci of the pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance:
example of the mediator.
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he configures the matters of from critical discussion (m) intuitively, e. g. the
issues. In order to instantaneously spell out his suggestions by means of the
stencil he configures the matters from critical discussion (m), e. g. the issues,
intuitively at a particular moment of the discussion and thus makes use of the
diagnostic power of the stencil. So, he acts in accordance with the rules of
critical discussion (m) to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose.
Mediators can thus instantaneously reconstruct and evaluate the discourse
in the procedure of a mediation session. Aakhus suggests: “When one person
holds another person accountable for saying, intending, or meaning such
and such, what was said has been reconstructed as having argumentative
content [...]” (Aak03: 267) and likewise van Eemeren et al. write: “The
critical analysis of argumentative dialogue may be concerned with aspects of
argumentation other than the structure and substance of a completed ‘case’
made for or against some standpoint” (vEGJJ93: 56). With respect to the
argumentative content at a certain moment of the discussion a mediator as a
critical analyst (pragma-dialectics) can critically analyze what has been said
– before there is a “complete case.”
[A]n analytic account of a sequence is given in which certain
reconstructed commitments of a protagonist are used to explain
the sense and force of an antagonist’s response, the account
implies that the antagonist has performed or could perform a
similar sort of reconstruction (vEGJJ93: 92).
Just as van Eemeren et al. spell out that the parties can instantaneously
reconstruct the discourse the mediator as the third character can
instantaneously analyze the discourse. The “analytic account” is thus given
by the mediator. Here I briefly mention two of the matters relevant to critical
discussion (m) that the mediator can refer to in his analytic account. First,
as van Eemeren et al. suggest the mediator can elaborate the commitments.
Second, he can analyze the discourse with respect to the standpoint, or the
issues: “identifying the main issue, or even a set of relevant issues, is already
an important step towards the resolution of the conflict itself; indeed, this is
one of the mediator’s tasks in the process of mediation” (GM08: 141).
Based on their analyses mediators can instantaneously spell out suggestions
with respect to the discourse in the procedure of a mediation session. Greco
Morasso points to the mediator’s strategic actions that facilitate that he fulfills
his “leading role”: “the mediator’s decisive leading role in selecting issues,
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controlling their commitment store, and so on, as well as the ‘educational
work’ he makes for bringing them to argumentation” (GM08: 272).250
Instantaneously – note the present progressive tense employed – does the
mediator make use of matters (cf. the rules and the possible forms of action)
from critical discussion (m) when he is “selecting” issues or “controlling” the
commitment store, i. e. the entirety of commitments relevant to an analysis.251
The strategic actions chained to configuring the commitments can be
considered to be examples of the very “proposals made by the mediator”
(WIP09: 13). For instance, suppose that a mediator concludes from his instant
analysis that an ambiguity fallacy with respect to the communicative force of
a speech act has been committed. A usage declarative can facilitate to arrive
at clarity to the fact that a fallacy has been committed. Thus, managing an
ambiguity fallacy purposefully can mean that the mediator applies a usage
declarative.252
As an analytical-intuitive practitioner (pragma-dialectics) the mediator can
instantaneously use the diagnostic power of the stencil. In an example
Aakhus depicts the consequences of a mediator’s interference in a ca: “The
mediator’s intervention (line 144, 146, and 152) create[s] a line of discussion
by redirecting the topic toward [...]” (Aak03: 274). Instantaneously (cf. “line
144, 146, and 152”), e. g. in the sense of “redirecting,” the mediator can
reflection- and prescription-minded spell out issues. Particularly against the
background of the Communication Principle “questions elicit answers” (cf.
vEGJJ93: 126) and thus the mediator can facilitate, metaphorically speaking,
the flow of communication: He can “keep the discussion moving through
questions” (Jac02: 1412). By means of managing the issues in his efforts of
reconstructing he can make use of the matter of issues to direct the discourse
towards matters from the ontological framework for critical discussion (m).
250Van Eemeren et al. write about the mediator’s “role as an impartial and substantively neutral discussion
leader” (vEGJJ93: 129).
251Pragma-dialecticians also employ the term “disagreement space” to refer to the entirety of commitments
relevant to an analysis: “The entire complex of reconstructible commitments can be considered as a
‘disagreement space,’ a structured set of opportunities for argument” (vEGJJ93: 95).
252In an example Jacobs depicts that a mediator employs “a clarification check (‘that’s the uh clause that you’re
referring to’, ‘that’s what you’re referring to I’m sure’) that gets confirmed” (Jac02: 1421). By means of the
clarification check the respective mediator provokes the person to spell out his commitment to “that clause”
and “that reference.” Against the background of the list of speech acts in a stencil of critical discussion
(m) such a clarification check provokes a party to apply a communicative means that brings about the
commitment of having recognized the acceptability of a matter, i. e. it provokes a party to apply a clarity
formula in regards of the respective matter. So, in a stencil of critical discussion (m) the speech act will
fulfill the same function as a usage declarative.
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(Both the terms “actualizing” and “directing towards” point to describing
language.)
The result of that directing by means of a reconstruction is spelled out
by Aakhus: It is a “reconstruction of a better case from the dialogue than
might have been presented at face value” (Aak03: 283). I think, in fact, that
a mediator can optimize argumentative reality by means of a reconstruction.
His reconstruction is limited to certain matters from the stencil. He spells
out only those matters. Spelling out those matters is his contribution to the
construction of the discourse. So, his reconstruction is instrumental to the
construction of the discourse. He neutrally facilitates that the persons arrive
at a correspondence between εa, ra and ca to εi, ri and ci.
In the following, by means of “the mediator” I refer to the character
of a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. In fact, in (further
facilitating as well as) introducing and conducting my case study I show why
mediators should actualize this character in order to arrive at their strategic
aim: In their purposeful, intuitive “practical engineering of discussion”
(vEGJJ93: 138) in accordance with the rules of the grid they manage the
methodical gap between the discourse and critical discussion (m) by making
use of the functions of the grid.
First, they refer to the discourse that has been put forward. Instantaneously
they make use of the grid to reconstruct and evaluate the discourse to establish
the argumentative relevance of a particular utterance in the mediation session.
They make use of their argumentative competence to facilitate “the work that
ordinary language users do in order to unwrap the arguments in a discourse”
(vR01: 165). Second, making use of the diagnostic power of a grid they
instantaneously refer to the discourse that is – against the background of this
grid – desirable to be produced in order to arrive at acceptance of particular
matters in the procedure of the mediation session.
So, in a mediator’s analysis of a fragment from a mediation session by
means of a grid critical discussion (m) it can be expected that the role of
the mediator becomes transparent. While on the one hand, the mediator
spells out to interpret neutrally, on the other hand, the paradoxical role and
the methodical gap call for a methodical interpretation. So, managing the
methodical gap is thus illustrated by the mediator’s (strategic) management
of his paradoxical role.
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Specifying the scopes of critical discussion (m)
Based on the previous findings the scopes of a stencil of critical discussion
(m) can further be characterized – against the background of the module
of the five components particularly for the theoretical component of
pragma-dialectics.253 Critical discussion (m) is a “strong theory” in
Kvernbekk’s sense. Taking into consideration the need for describing
language means that the mediator takes into account εias, rias and cias to
facilitate clarity to those matters relevant to critical discussion (m), and thus to
facilitate the resolution of the difference of opinion in mediation (difference
of opinion), and thus to facilitate the solution to the conflict in mediation.
Critical discussion (m) is a blueprint that is neither fragmented nor
incomplete, rather it is a “well-articulated account of some delineated aspect
of the world” (cf. Kve12: 292, 293). In the sense of a strong theory the stencil
can “be used as [an] instrument[s] to modify the world, often expressed as
theory for practice,” it can be employed “to guide, prescribe, illuminate,
ground, justify” (Kve12: 295). The target of employing the grid is to optimize
argumentative reality in a pragma-dialectical fashion.
Against the background of his strategic actions a mediator can thus make
use of the functions of critical discussion (m) as a strong theory. He thus
arrives at the actualization of the integration of role models. For instance,
the strong theory can be used to facilitate (“guide”) that the characters settle
or resolve the issues. Critical discussion (m) can be used as the background
against which a mediator requests or applies the possible form of action of
a usage declarative (“illuminate”) at any time he considers it desirable in
order to arrive at clarity to the issues in order to settle them; at any time
he considers it desirable in order to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose.
Critical discussion (m) can be used in the management of a sub-difference
of opinion about which a mediator may talk with only one of the actual
parties (“ground”). Again, he will act in accordance with the rules of critical
discussion (m), and with the purpose of pragma-dialectics. Or, for example,
critical discussion (m) can be used to facilitate that the parties arrive at clarity
to the end of the mediation (difference of opinion) which, in turn, is a means
to arrive at the goal of the mediation (conflict) (“justify”). Again, taking into
account (the ontological framework of) a grid of critical discussion (m) the
253Cf. chapter 2: troublesome matter h.
235
pragma-dialectical purpose can be fulfilled by means of various reflection-
and prescription-minded strategic actions.
In the case study I show as a mediator how to configure the matters in
the context of a “potential argumentative case” (cf. vEGJJ93: 136) chained
to troublesome matters and troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) – a
discourse in argumentation research between Siegel and Biro, and Garssen
and van Laar. I show by example in which sense a mediator neutrally
facilitates the management of matters from the ontological framework for
critical discussion (m), such as the standpoint, the issues and the contentions.
3.4 Conclusion of the chapter
In section 3.1 I spelled out the terms acceptance, acceptability and clarity.
I scrutinized the findings of other argumentation researchers, both from
inside and outside the pragma-dialectical research program. Making use of
the scaffold I chained the modules of the four languages and the quartet
of terms: I took into account pragma-dialectical research results from the
past to show that thus far the terms “clarity” and “clear” are employed in
the sense of natural language, and that research on the pragma-dialectical
recognition conditions, the Communication Principle as well as on the
relationship between the recognition conditions and the Communication
Principle expands the insights into the need to distinguish ideal models from
stencils. I integrated those insights with a pragma-dialectical explication of
clarity parallel to the explication of acceptance and acceptability, i. e. against
the background of the module of the four meta-theoretical principles. With
respect to socialization, for instance, it is apparent that unlike acceptance and
acceptability of a matter, clarity to a matter is not potentially controversial.
Parallel to the concept of “acceptance formula” suggested by van Eemeren
and Grootendorst I introduced the term “clarity formula.” A clarity formula
is a communicative means that brings about the commitment of having
recognized the acceptability of a matter. By defining it against the background
of the module of the four meta-theoretical principles I characterized the
pragma-dialectical concept of usage declaratives as such communicative
means. I moreover showed in which sense usage declaratives are relevant
to understanding (the need for) the distinction between ideal models and
stencils: Ideal models function as templates for building stencils, and the
matter of the speech act usage declaratives in the pragma-dialectical ideal
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model illustrates the theorist’s need to build stencils that can be used to
arrive at the goals of researchers in the analytical-intuitive component. Hence
the connection between the modules of the quartet of terms and the five
components. I concluded the section by spelling out the relationship between
clarity to, acceptability of and acceptance of a matter: Clarity to a matter is
the basis for acceptability of that matter, and acceptability of a matter is the
basis for acceptance of that matter.
In section 3.2 I developed the module of the ontological framework. I
elaborated the matters that are relevant to building a pragma-dialectical stencil
“critical discussion (m)” for the ca of a mediation session, i. e. matters
that are relevant to conflict management. Departing from the distinction of
Greco Morasso I introduced the term conflict by distinguishing conflict in the
sense of C1 from conflict in the sense of C2. Since not all of the matters
which characterize mediation in the sense of the WIPO are interesting for
argumentation researchers, not all of the actions referring to the management
of C1 also refer to the management of C2. Hence the distinction between two
ideal contexts in this pragma-dialectical dissertation: An actual conflict is
managed in the actualization of the ideal context of the mediation (conflict),
and a difference of points of views – particularly relevant to argumentation
researchers – is managed in the actualization of the ideal context of the
mediation (difference of opinion). Against the background of a discussion
on the relationship between C1 and the possible ends as well as the goal of
critical discussion I spelled out the relationship between mediation (conflict)
and mediation (difference of opinion) by suggesting that the resolution of the
difference of opinion precedes the solution to the conflict in the sense that the
former is a means to arrive at the latter. Unlike Greco Morasso who introduces
the distinction between C1 and C2 but does not apply it to a very set of rules
for sessions of mediation I then showed in which sense my understanding of
the distinction between C1 and C2 facilitates clarity to the term “mediation” in
the sense of the WIPO. Taking into account the methodical gap I thus spelled
out the relationships between mediation (conflict), mediation (difference of
opinion), critical discussion and critical discussion (m).
Critical discussion (m) is a stencil for the actual procedure of resolving a
difference of opinion (C2) in a session of mediation which accords with the
articles of the WIPO in the sense that critical discussion (m) is defined by
such matters of mediation (conflict) that accord with matters from critical
discussion. So, next I facilitated the building of critical discussion (m)
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by showing the accordance of certain matters of mediation (conflict) with
matters from critical discussion: the module of the ontological framework.
For instance, against the background of the distinction between mediation
(conflict) and mediation (difference of opinion), and the two types of validity
I referred to the conditions that characterize critical discussion (m). I depicted
the accordance of the fifteen pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion
with the twenty-seven articles from the WIPO when I concerned myself with
other matters relevant to critical discussion (m): I referred to the goal, to
the relationship between the difference of opinion and the standpoint, to the
commitments, to the forms of action (i. e. the speech acts) and the procedure
of four stages.
For instance, based on the definition of “standpoint” and the module of
the troublesome matters I scrutinized the argument stage to introduce the
module of the terms “issues” and “contentions” which, thus far, have not
been defined in pragma-dialectical research (cf. troublesome matter D).
After having explicated the similarities between the use of the concepts in
mediation to the use of those concepts by argumentation researchers Freeley
and Steinberg I fostered pragma-dialectics by concluding: To manage certain
issues, i. e. to ask a certain question from a relevant checklist of questions,
can be reconstructed as the pragma-dialectical speech act of requesting an
argument. I spelled out the relationship between issues and the module of
strategy to conclude that, against the background of dialectification – i. e.
the module of the four meta-theoretical principles –, in a mediation session
clarity to the issues inherent in the actual standpoint facilitates to arrive at the
acceptability of the management of the contentions.
Spelling out the module of the quartet of terms I depicted the explanatory
scopes of a stencil of critical discussion (m). I showed why there is only
an “accordance,” or not even an accordance, between certain matters from
mediation and critical discussion. I then presented the functions of the stencil
which are similar to the functions of any other stencil in pragma-dialectics.
In section 3.3 I employed the module of the four meta-theoretical principles
to spell out the strategic goal of the mediator which is to neutrally facilitate
the acceptance of certain matters from critical discussion (m). Hence
the paradoxical role of the mediator in critical discussion (m) which I
elaborated against the background of relevant terms established before: the
distinction between C1 and C2, the two types of validity, clarity and the
Principle of Communication, the terms acceptability and acceptance, strategy,
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standpoint, issue and contention. I chained the paradoxical role to four
modules particularly. Against the background of my definition of strategy,
the ontological framework – and the terms of issues and contentions – as
well as the four meta-theoretical principles I depicted strategic actions of the
mediator with respect to all of the stages of a respective pragma-dialectical
stencil of critical discussion (m). On the one hand the mediator appears
neutral with respect to the content, on the other hand, though, he facilitates
the procedure. For example, with respect to the Communication Principle
questions are communicative means to arrive at a clarity formula with respect
to a commitment that is relevant to the acceptance of the management of an
issue.
Next, I further scrutinized the paradoxical role and the strategic goal of
the mediator by employing the modules of the five components (the role
models) and the module of the four languages. At first, I characterized the
mediator as a pragma-dialectical practitioner who optimizes argumentative
reality pragma-dialectically by facilitating the actualization of reasonableness
in the sense of a grid of critical discussion (m). However, inspired by – though
by making use of my module of strategy unlike – Aakhus’ distinction between
a designer, an object to be designed and an environment in which the object
is used, I took into account the strategic actions of the mediator – e. g. “to
establish” and “to propose” (cf. WIPO, 2009) – and the relationship between
the strategic goal and the concepts of clarity, acceptability and acceptance in
order to more elaborately conclude that the mediator is a pragma-dialectical
designer, in particular a designer of acceptance. Second, I characterized the
mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical analyst. Again, I used the module
of strategic actions, though I particularly related it to the module of the
issues: By reconstructing and evaluating the speech acts relevant to a stencil of
critical discussion (m) the mediator, for instance, evaluates the management
of the issues. Integrating the previous findings I presented the module of
the integration of role models when I exemplarily characterized the mediator
as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. Since his strategic
actions accord with the strategic actions of the analyst and the practitioner in
pragma-dialectics the mediator can be characterized as an integration of those
two role models.
Based on scrutinizing the character of the pragma-dialectical critical
designer of acceptance, i. e. the module of the integration of role models, I
extended the findings from the pragma-dialectical literature on the mediator’s
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paradoxical role by means of the module of the five components (the five role
models). For example, my findings facilitate a deeper understanding of the
research results from both Greco Morasso and Aakhus according to which the
mediator is a “heuristic advisor” (GM08: 264) whose reconstruction “involves
more than clarification of the plausible argumentative relevance of a move”
(Aak03: 283). Against the background of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics),
the module of the definitions of strategy and strategic action, and the
twenty-seven articles by the WIPO spelled out in which sense the mediator
is a “heuristic advisor” and in which sense his reconstruction “involves
more.” I pinpointed why the mediator is a pragma-dialectical practitioner
(analytical-intuitive) in the sense of a pragma-dialectical critical designer of
acceptance. Spelling out the “more” I presented his strategic actions as well
as the relevance of intuition to his strategic actions as an analytical-intuitive
practitioner (pragma-dialectics). Using the module of the ontological
framework I concerned myself with his role in critical discussion (m) and thus
particularly reflected on the mediator’s argumentative competence. I thereby
facilitated to enhance the argumentative competence – i. e. I facilitated the
optimization of the argumentative performance – of mediators in mediation
sessions.
In sum, in this chapter I developed and put to use as backgrounds various
modules when I particularly depicted the theoretical relationship between the
paradoxical role of the mediator and the term argumentative strategy. In fact,
taking into consideration (the relationships between) the modules shows that
the mediator illustrates in which sense the methodical gap can be bridged in
argumentation research. Managing the methodical gap is illustrated by the
mediator’s managing of his paradoxical role, i. e. his strategic actions.
Concluding, those modules can be structurally determined: The ontological
framework is structurally determined by means of the quartet of terms;
the issues and contentions are structurally determined by means of
the pragma-dialectical definitions of strategy and strategic action in the
ontological framework; the integration of role models in pragma-dialectics
is structurally determined by means of the definitions of strategy and strategic
actions in the five components. The findings from this chapter thus facilitate
to particularly answer the second and third research question (cf. chapter
5). In order to answer the fourth research question, I aim at actualizing the
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integration of role models by applying the various modules from the previous
chapters in a case study.
4 Case study
In this chapter I use the modules developed in the previous chapters when I
present a pragma-dialectical – analytical-intuitive and practical – case study
which is reflexive with respect to the context of argumentation research. I sum
up the conflict between two groups of argumentation researchers. Garssen
and van Laar (2010) represent a pragma-dialectical paradigm, Siegel and
Biro (2008, 2010) represent an epistemic paradigm. Then, in line with the
pragma-dialectical purpose I reflexively use the module of the (complexly
related) five components, and the module of the integration of role models
when I facilitate a solution to the conflict by actualizing the developed
character of the mediator. I make use of the module of the concepts of
strategy and strategic action when I actualize the respective management of
the paradoxical role in a pragma-dialectical fashion.
I employ the module of the meta-theoretical principles to show why the
discourse can be analyzed pragma-dialectically by means of the matters
relevant to critical discussion (m), e. g. the module of issues and
contentions.254 I make transparent the use of both the scaffold and my
intuition when I analytically put to use two modules to reveal instances
of troublesome matters and troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics), i. e.
I reveal obscurity that can be traced back to the methodical gap. In my
practical conflict management I particularly use the modules of the four
meta-theoretical principles, the integration of role models and strategic
actions purposefully to eventually find new pragma-dialectical strategic
actions that, as well, can be chained to other modules since they are
characteristic of a mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of
acceptance. I conclude two possible solutions to the conflict.
254Recast that critical discussion (m) is an integration of critical discussion with the mediation rules from the
World Intellectual Property Organization – the “m” points to the context of mediation.
241
242
4.1 A paradigm discourse in argumentation research
In this section, I sum up the conflict between two groups of argumentation
researchers, and relate it to the concept of clarity (cf. chapter 3). Garssen
and van Laar (2010) represent a pragma-dialectical paradigm, Siegel and
Biro (2008, 2010) represent an epistemic paradigm. In their 2008 article
Rationality, Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the
Pragma-dialectical View Siegel and Biro address two standpoints.
First, they purport that the pragma-dialectical take on normativity is
troublesome: “[...] van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s account of argumentative
normativity is defective in that the ‘dialectical’ account of reasonableness they
offer fails to capture that normativity” (SB08: 193).
Second, Siegel and Biro elaborate that a very sense of justificationism in
pragma-dialectics is desirable: “[...] van Eemeren and Grootendorst cannot
do without ‘justificationism’ in the sense of positive support. They need
it [...]” (SB08: 199). In their article A Pragma-Dialectical Response to
Objectivist Epistemic Challenges Garssen and van Laar actually commit
themselves to have understood that those two standpoints are at stake:
“Biro and Siegel have raised two objections against the pragmadialectical
approach to argumentation. According to the first, the pragmadialectical
theory is not genuinely normative. According to the second, the rejection of
justificationism by pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted [...]” (GvL10: 122).
Siegel and Biro state that the two types of validity do not suit the goals
of the researcher in the analytical-intuitive component (cf. SB08: 192). In
argumentation research, they write, it is troublesome to make use of (matters
from) critical rationalism because argumentation researchers themselves need
justificationism to provide plausible reasonings for their own actual points of
view. Siegel and Biro refer to the Münchhausen Trilemma (MT) to show
that argumentation researchers’ doubts with respect to justificationism can
be managed by actually accepting the option of positive support: “We are
arguing only that MT can be avoided, since a belief can be justified without
involving an infinite regress, a vicious circle, or an arbitrary stopping point”
(SB08: 200).
Garssen and van Laar respond to Siegel and Biro’s article. With respect
to critical rationalism in argumentation research they state that it is not an
analyst who is supposed to decide what is “appropriate” for the persons in a
particular discourse. Furthermore they say that Siegel and Biro’s “epistemic
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approach” is troublesome in respect of matters in a philosophical component
and a theoretical component in argumentation research (cf. GvL10: 127,
133). In the pragma-dialectical research program, they suggest, “fallibility”
is taken into account (GvL10: 124, 132). The authors disagree that a very
sense of justificationism in pragma-dialectics is desirable. They say, e. g.,
that the terms in the research program are established “in a non-justificatory
manner” suiting “[t]he problem-validity of the discussion rules” (GvL10: 140,
129). Problem-solving validity, they say, depends on “the degree to
which they [the rules] promote criticism”; and that in order to properly
manage the Münchhausen Trilemma Siegel and Biro need “a dialectical,
non-justificationist consideration” (GvL10: 129, 139).
Finally, in their article The pragma-dialectician’s dilemma: Reply to
Garssen and van Laar Siegel and Biro employ a metaphor when they
emphasize that there is an “in-house dispute within the P-D camp”255 which
revolves the take on normativity in the research program. Responding to
Garssen and van Laar the authors, again, write that pragma-dialecticians need
justificationism in the sense of positive support and that the Münchhausen
Trilemma can be managed properly in argumentation research. Moreover,
they wonder what bearing pragma-dialectical research results have on the very
dispute they are having with Garssen and van Laar: “Does this mean that ours
is not a critical discussion?” (SB10: 477).
In their discourse the authors aim at clarity to the matters. Apparently,
they respond to each other’s contributions. For example, Garssen and van
Laar spell out that “Biro and Siegel distinguish between a weak and a strong
form of justificationism (2008, p. 197) [...]” (GvL10: 134), and Siegel and
Biro write: “We appreciate Garssen and van Laar’s (2010) defense to our
criticism. It is clear and very helpful in clarifying the issues at the heart of
the disagreement [...]” (SB10: 459). Also, the authors quote each other to
accomplish clarity to the matters: “We cite Garssen and van Laar’s defense
against the charge that P-D theory requires ‘a whiff of justificationism’ at
such length because it is particularly clear and helpful in bringing out what is
at issue” (SB10: 470).
Moreover, the authors actually, on the one hand request and, on the other
hand apply usage declaratives. On the one hand, both Siegel and Biro
(SB08: 195) and Garssen and van Laar (GvL10: 129) ask for “clarification,”
on the other hand Siegel and Biro provide “clarification” when they respond to
255“P-D” abbreviates pragma-dialectics.
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Garssen and van Laar: “In fact, the parallel argument is explicitly spelled out
in the paper that Garssen and van Laar are discussing: [...]” (SB10: 468).256
At last, I think, the authors aim at actualizing the value of transparency.
For instance, Siegel and Biro write: “We have interpreted van Eemeren and
Grootendorst’s embrace of critical rationalism as [...]” (SB08: 201).
So, in this chapter I continue to use the modules developed in the
previous chapters to present a pragma-dialectical – analytical-intuitive and
practical – case study which is reflexive with respect to the context of
argumentation research. Similar to Siegel and Biro’s question what bearing
the pragma-dialectical findings have on their discourse with Garssen and
van Laar I aim at elaborating what bearing my findings, for instance, about
the troublesome matters, the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics), the
ontological framework for critical discussion (m) and the character of the
mediator have on the discourse between the four argumentation researchers.
In fact, Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar have a discourse related to
the troublesome matters B, C, F, G and H and to the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) b, ct , d, e, g, h, i, j, k, l, m and n. Thus they
manage matters related to the methodical gap. So, against the background
of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) – more than the reasons why – I aim at
elucidating the authors’ reasons for (not) accepting certain matters in their
discourse.
4.2 Strategic actions to optimize argumentative
reality in argumentation research
In the discourse in a mediation session clarity to a matter can be arrived at by
configuring the relationship between the actions of the speaker and listener
against the background of the ontological framework of a stencil of critical
discussion (m): The strategic actions of a mediator thus refer to configuring
actions that instantiate particular forms of action defined in a respective stencil
of critical discussion (m). Acting in line with his paradoxical role the mediator
should employ his argumentative competence to configure possible forms of
action in accordance with the rules from such a grid to arrive at his strategic
goal which facilitates (in a pragma-dialectical fashion) to fulfill the purpose
of pragma-dialectical research to optimize argumentative reality.
256Siegel and Biro then spell out the respective matters, I think, in order to arrive at clarity to those matters.
245
Through these discourse strategies real mediators try to live up
to the standard of the ideal mediator and put philosophy into
practice (vEGJJ93: 119).
In this – analytical-intuitive and practical – case study as a mediator I aim
at actualizing (“try to live up to”) the character of the pragma-dialectical
(“put philosophy into practice”) critical designer of acceptance (“the ideal
mediator”) by means of applying certain argumentative strategies (“through
discourse strategies”).257 Thus the more of my actions overlap with the
strategic actions of the mediator as the very integration of role models,
the more my actions “serve as functional substitutes for more simple
straightforward moves of direction, correction, disagreement, argument, and
the like” (Jac02: 1403). As shown exemplarily, questions are such “techniques
[which] provide mediators with a kind of ‘functional substitute’ for open
argumentation and advocacy” (vEGJJ93: 139).258
Using the module of the five components in adding to the
pragma-dialectical metaphors to characterize the mediator, the
pragma-dialectical theorist configures the background against which
the mediator can act as a catalyst in the sense of pragma-dialectical applied
research. Creating the stencil the theorist (pragma-dialectics) is guided
by the goal that the stencil is applied with particular aims and means of a
practitioner (analytical-intuitive) to manage the methodical gap. However,
the actual management of particular matters from critical discussion (m) – in
accordance with the rules and the pragma-dialectical purpose – brings about
a mediator’s application of one of the strategies from the bundle of strategies
that can be characterized against the background of a ci of critical discussion
(m). In this regard the concepts from my ontological framework for critical
discussion (m) standpoint, issues and contentions are particularly relevant,
so I employ them in the case study. Note, however, that the argumentative
competence of mediators should comprise the management of standpoints,
issues and contentions.259
257A person in a ca “actualizes a character” when he arrives at an actualization of the goals of this character by
means of his arriving at an actualization of the forms of actions of this character. Therefore, other persons
than mediators in sessions of mediation according to the WIPO (WIP09) can actualize the character of the
pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance, too. Besides note that, in general, a person can actualize
a character by intent or by accident.
258Cf. chapter 2: definition of “strategy.”
259Of course, in this regard, other concepts from argumentation research can be valuable, too. Moreover,
managing the matters of standpoints, issues and contentions is apparently not limited to creating, or applying
a stencil of critical discussion (m) (cf. chapter 5).
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4.2.1 Facilitating the case study
In line with the pragma-dialectical purpose both reflection- and
prescription-minded I reflexively use the module of the (complexly
related) five components, and the module of the integration of role models
when I facilitate a solution to the conflict as a mediator in the discourse
between Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar. I make use of the
module of the terms strategy and strategic when I actualize the respective
management of the paradoxical role in a pragma-dialectical fashion.
In order to analyze the discourse I hence apply – partly intuitively, though I
respectively spell out all of them in brackets – the translation criteria and
the strategies of a pragma-dialectical analyst. However, in line with the
actualization of the character of the analyst (pragma-dialectics) I apply the
four dialectical transformations implicitly.260
Next, I employ the module of the four meta-theoretical principles to show
why the discourse can be analyzed pragma-dialectically by means of the
matters relevant to critical discussion (m), e. g. the module of issues and
contentions; I thus take into particular consideration the relationship of a
correspondence between actual and ideal elements, relationships and contexts
(εas, ras and cas, εis, ris and cis, and vice versa).261 Against the background
of the ontological framework I refer to the higher- and first-order conditions,
clarity to the matters and the aim of the procedure, the characters as well as
to the procedure of the four stages including certain forms of action such
as standpointing as well as the module of issues and contentions, to the
commitments and to the conflict.
Certain assumptions facilitate to relativize onto the fragment the respective
conditions characterized in the ontological framework for critical discussion
(m). Siegel and Biro start their article by depicting “[a] major virtue of the
Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation” (SB08: 191). Garssen and van
Laar write: “we shall give a reply” (GvL10: 123). Against the background
of externalization, socialization and dialectification talking about a virtue,
and particularly responding to each other both groups of authors can be held
committed to actualize the second-order conditions, i. e. certain psychological
factors, or states of the mind. (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Moreover, I showed that the authors do act critically towards each
260Cf. chapter 2: translation criteria and intuition, troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics k.
261Cf. chapter 2: troublesome matter E.
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other, and that they accept that. Taking into particular consideration
the meta-theoretical principles of functionalization, socialization and
externalization thus means that they can be held committed to actualize the
third-order conditions, certain social circumstances. Based on those insights
and chained to dialectification I assume that the authors also grant the actions
of a mediator to be appropriate actions in the procedure of the discourse.
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
The correspondence between utterances in the discourse and certain
pragma-dialectical forms of actions, i. e. speech acts characterized in the
ontological framework for critical discussion (m), illustrates the actualization
of the first-order conditions. Recast that the first-order conditions refer to the
performance of the speech acts. All in all, based on both problem-solving and
conventional validity the pragma-dialectical concept of reasonableness is thus
actualized. (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Against the background of the meta-theoretical principle of dialectification
clarity to the standpoint facilitates that as a mediator I make use of the issues
that are characterized in a stencil of critical discussion (m). In line with
the ontological framework for critical discussion (m) the disagreement in the
discourse between Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar is translated
into the difference of opinion. Siegel and Biro write: “However, the account
of key notions offered [...] seems to us problematic in several respects”
(SB08: 191). Note, first with respect to socialization, that by writing that
particular matters are “problematic,” even in several respects, they suggest
that there is a disagreement in the discourse. Note second with respect to
externalization, that the very matters which Siegel and Biro refer to can be
assigned to the pragma-dialectical research program, e. g. “key notions.”
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
So, the targets spelled out in the discourse are translated into certain goals
in line with the ontological framework for critical discussion (m). As shown,
one of the goals of the authors is clarity to the matters. Garssen and van Laar,
for instance, state that they aim at “show[ing] that the objections by Siegel
and Biro against the dialectical project are based on incorrect assumptions.”
That concerns both dialectification and externalization. Moreover, in respect
of all of the four meta-theoretical principles note that the authors not only
apply usage declaratives but also particularly spell out their will to resolve
the difference of opinion rather than ignore it: “it is surely not our intention
to do away with epistemic approaches to argumentation” and “[n]either do
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Biro and Siegel, who make it clear [...]” (GvL10: 123, my italics). Against
the background of the ontological framework for critical discussion (m) as a
mediator I thus recognize that it is desirable for the parties that I neutrally
facilitate the management of the respective issues and contentions in order
to facilitate the acceptance of those matters from a respective grid of critical
discussion (m). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, maximally
dialectical analysis)
The two groups of authors are translated into the parties, in line with the
ontological framework for critical discussion (m). Siegel and Biro “take
it as obvious that we are arguing with Garssen and van Laar” and talking
about a very matter from their discourse they state that “they think it is
adequate, we do not” (SB10: 477). Apparently, the parties are Siegel and
Biro (“we”) on the one hand and Garssen and van Laar (“they”) on the other
hand. Since they have expressed standpoints the former two take on the role
of the protagonist, the latter one take on the role of the antagonist. Hence
the relevance of dialectification and socialization. (Strategy of maximally
argumentative analysis)
Against the background of functionalization utterances in the discourse are
translated into the speech acts in a procedure of a respective ci of critical
discussion (m). Note in addition with respect to dialectification, that the
authors concede to be putting forward utterances that can be reconstructed
as “arguing.” For instance, apparently the respective actualization of a
standpoint in accordance with the pragma-dialectical rule 1 refers to the
actualization of the confrontation stage. With respect to the actualization of
the opening stage both parties can be considered to make use of the same
“information and materials” (WIP09: 11), e. g. the 2004 book A systematic
theory of argumentation: the pragma-dialectical approach by van Eemeren
and Grootendorst.262 Thus the parties can be held committed to agree on
particular material starting points. Besides, recast that both parties accept
the aim of clarity to the matters and suppose that those matters refer to the
procedure of the discussion. If (in a spoken or a written form) I, actualizing
the role of the mediator, and the parties “determine” the acceptance of such
matters then the parties can as well be held committed to agree with particular
procedural starting points.
Actualizations of, e. g., issues refer to the actualization of the argument
stage. Recast against the background of externalization that a certain sort
262Cf. the lists of references in the three articles.
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of standpoint inheres certain issues. As a mediator I facilitate clarity to the
standpoints and facilitate – one by one – “to move the discussion [i. e. to guide
the parties] to consider this issue [...]” (GM08: 256). The diagnostic power
of the stencil thus facilitates that the number of actual issues – in accordance
with the pragma-dialectical rule 10 which regulates calling into question the
propositional content or the communicative force of an argumentation – in
the discourse equals the number of potential issues in the discourse – “each
claim [...] be examined until all objections [i. e. issues and contentions]
are met” (Aak03: 275), and that against the background of socialization the
contentions will be actualized in accordance with the pragma-dialectical rules
7, 8, 11 – i. e. the particular management of the propositional content and
communicative force that has been called into question. Note, however, that
clarity to the starting points is the basis for the management of the respective
issues and contentions. It is thus the basis for the speech act acceptance
or non-acceptance of an argument which will be actualized in accordance
with rule 13b. regulating the appropriateness of a speech act in a certain
sequence within the procedure. At last, note that Siegel and Biro spell out an
actualization of the speech act acceptance of a standpoint in the concluding
stage: “Garssen and van Laar have conceded our main criticism” (SB10: 478).
The actualization of the speech act requesting a usage declarative and of
the performance of a usage declarative mean actions in accordance with
the pragma-dialectical rule 15. (Maximally dialectical analysis, strategy of
maximally reasonable reconstruction)
In line with the ontological framework for a respective stencil particular
liabilities in the discourse are translated into the commitments in critical
discussion (m). Siegel and Biro state that “[v]an Eemeren and Grootendorst
are committed to [...]” (SB08: 194). Garssen and van Laar understand
that Siegel and Biro have suggested “a hidden commitment to (the weak
form of) justificationism” (GvL10: 134). Garssen and van Laar depict that
this commitment is not acceptable for them. Besides, with respect to the
commitments note that the authors quote each other. So the parties refer to
the commitments brought about by certain speech acts. The parties make
use of certain commitments. Apparently, this is particularly relevant against
the background of externalization. (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis)
The conflict (C1) – the “reciprocal endeavor of eliminating one’s
adversary” – between the parties refers to the authors’ different takes on
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matters from the philosophical component. In particular, they consider
matters revolving the terms “criticism” and “justificationism.” Against the
background of socialization the authors are thus involved in an “interpersonal
hostility” in the sense that they, particularly, act as actualizations of the role
model of the (epistemic and pragma-dialectical) philosopher. (Strategy of
maximally argumentative analysis)
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) spells out clarity to
“the nature of the dispute” (WIP09: 9). The “pragma-dialectical nature” of
the standpoint “The pragma-dialectical take on normativity is troublesome,”
comes out by means of a reconstruction. In fact, against the background
of functionalization the speech act expressing a standpoint is actualized.
I evaluate this standpoint as a proposition of value (cf. FS08: 56), or
an evaluative standpoint. Freeley and Steinberg characterize this sort of
standpoint: “a proposition of value essentially makes a statement that
something is good or bad” (FS08: 56). In his audio lecture 7 Zarefsky gives
the example “The city government is unsatisfactory” (Zar05: 05:15 minutes).
The second standpoint that I reconstruct is “A very sense of justificationism
in pragma-dialectics is desirable.” Again, against the background of the
meta-theoretical principle of functionalization note that the speech act
expressing a standpoint is actualized. I evaluate this standpoint as a
“quasi-policy proposition” (FS08: 56), or a quasi-policy standpoint. This
sort of standpoint, Freeley and Steinberg write, “express[es] a value judgment
about a policy,” an example is “Compulsory national service for all qualified
U.S. citizens is desirable” (FS08: 56). Thus the authors consider this sort
of standpoint to be a type of an evaluative standpoint rather than a type
of a policy proposition.263 (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis,
strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
Against the background of dialectification it is relevant to me as a mediator
that there are no separate checklists of questions for managing the proposition
263However, at first they employ the criterion of a plan to distinguish a proposition of value from a policy
proposition: “One of the most prominent differences between a proposition of value and a proposition of
policy is that the policy proposition requires the affirmative to propose a plan to implement the policy.
The proposition of value does not provide for a plan.” Second, in the next paragraph – unless there were
a definition of implicit and explicit plans – the criterion of a plan does not hold anymore to classify
the quasi-policy standpoint as an evaluative standpoint: “Although a plan is not explicit in quasi-policy
propositions, it is implicit, and the debaters may need to debate the policy implications of the proposition.”
I understand the quasi-policy standpoint to be a type of an evaluative standpoint which refers to a policy –
and a policy is expressed in a policy proposition. In this sense the quasi-policy standpoint illustrates that
“[a] value may be a precursor of a policy” (FS08: 56).
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of value or the quasi-policy standpoint. In both cases the issues to be managed
in the sense of the speech act advancing an argument are the issues for a
proposition of value.264 Thus these are the issues relevant to the discourse
(cf. FS08: 74-75):
1. Definitions: What are the definitions of the relevant terms?
2. Criteria: What are the criteria for the values? What are the devices for
measurement of the values (for the interpretation of definitions)?
3. Correspondence: Do the facts correspond to the definitions (examples)?
4. Application: What are the applications of the values (connection
between 2. and 3.)?
4.2.2 Strategic actions as a mediator
Having introduced the case study by showing, e. g., in which sense the
module of the four meta-theoretical principles facilitates clarity to the
correspondence between matters from the discourse to matters from the
ontological framework for a respective grid, next against the background of
Siegel and Biro’s and Garssen and van Laar’s respective management of the
actualization of the issues listed, i. e. their management of the actual issues, I
aim at elaborating the management of the two standpoints. I make transparent
the use of both the scaffold and my intuition when I analytically put to use two
modules to reveal instances of, first, the troublesome matters and second, the
troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). That means, I reveal obscurity that
can be traced back to the methodical gap.
I start by showing the author’s management of the actual issues. Then,
in my practical conflict management, I particularly use the modules of
the four meta-theoretical principles, the integration of role models and
strategic actions to facilitate my take on the end of the discourse and on
the two possible solutions to the conflict. In that way I aim at optimizing
argumentative reality in the context of argumentation research.
The first standpoint by Siegel and Biro is that the pragma-dialectical take
on normativity is troublesome (SB08). (Strategy of maximally reasonable
264Note, using in the case study the modules as I have discussed them I refrain here from elaborating the r
between the issues listed. The list of issues facilitates my analytical-intuitive, and practical research.
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reconstruction, maximally dialectical analysis, cf. this chapter: summary of
discourse)
With respect to the issue of definitions Siegel and Biro request Garssen
and van Laar to elaborate the relevant concepts at stake which are first,
“pragma-dialectical” – or “pragma-dialectics” – and second, “normativity.”
First, clarity to the understanding of the approach “pragma-dialectics”
becomes apparent in their management of the second standpoint. In fact, the
authors can be held committed to talk about pragma-dialectics in the sense
of a research program. (Strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction,
maximally dialectical analysis)
Second, Siegel and Biro state that “[...] van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s
account of argumentative normativity is defective” because it “fails to capture
that normativity” (SB08: 193). “That” normativity is a “kind” of normativity
that Siegel and Biro assume to be actualized in cas. Garssen and van Laar
aim at clarity to “the right kind of normativity”265 by responding that the
terms in pragma-dialectics are “defined in a non-justificatory manner,” “[t]he
dismissal of justificationism can further be argued for by pointing at the
fallibility of our convictions and theories” (GvL10: 140, 132). They state
that “[i]f one adopts the viewpoint of a critical rationalist ‘one pursues the
development of a reasonableness model that takes the fallibility of human
reason explicitly into account [...]’” (GvL10: 124). (Strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction, maximally dialectical analysis, linguistic indicator
in ca (“critical rationalist”))
As a mediator I reconstruct that by means of the term “account”
Siegel and Biro (SB08: 193) particularly talk about the philosophical
and theoretical component (pragma-dialectics). By means of “capture”
they (SB08: 193) refer to the management of the methodical gap in the
analytical-intuitive component of pragma-dialectics. Facilitating acceptance
in a pragma-dialectical fashion I reconstruct that the contention of Garssen
and van Laar refers to the pragma-dialectical philosophical component, i. e.
the basis of properly managing the methodical gap (GvL10: 140, 132). Thus,
against the background of the module of the four meta-theoretical principles
I particularly spell out that in this discourse an agreement (cf. vEG04: 68)
on the term normativity means an agreement on the term justificationism.
(Linguistic indicators in ca (“account,” “capture”))
As a mediator who makes use of the scaffold and the meta-theoretical
265Cf. Siegel and Biro (SB10: 460).
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principles of functionalization and externalization I recognize that Garssen
and van Laar actualize a contention when they spell out a relevant difference
between pragma-dialectics and an epistemic approach (GvL10: 124).
Whereas the latter is chained to justificationism, the former particularly refers
to fallibility, i. e. the departure from critical rationalism. Thus I employ
the scaffold to facilitate clarity to the paradigms in argumentation research.
(Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation, linguistic indicators in
ca (“justificationism,” “fallibility”))
The second issue is raised by Siegel and Biro in requesting Garssen and van
Laar to manage the criterion used as the background against which the value
“troublesome” is measured. In fact, that criterion is clarity to the matters.
A matter is troublesome when there is obscurity to the matter. So, the
pragma-dialectical take on normativity is troublesome when there is obscurity
to it.
Siegel and Biro refer to the very goal of argumentation researchers:
“We grant that so understanding their position allows van Eemeren and
Grootendorst to avoid the criticism adduced thus far” (SB08: 201). However,
Garssen and van Laar spell out that the obscurity chained to pragma-dialectics
is based on Siegel and Biro’s “misconception that resolution is not a normative
notion” (GvL10: 140). Hence Garssen and van Laar refer to “the criticism
thus far.” This criticism refers to the history of the conflict between their
epistemic approach and pragma-dialectics: “Having argued for these points in
the papers cited in the previous footnote, we will not pursue the matter here”
(SB08: 193). Siegel and Biro display the reach of the conflict: “Essentially the
same point is made by Newton-Smith (1981, pp. 44-76), O’Hear (1980, pp.
36-67, see esp. p. 46), and others too numerous to mention” (SB08: 198).
However, Siegel and Biro respond to the antagonist’s management of the
misconception: “It is clear and very helpful in clarifying the issues at the
heart of the disagreement between pragma-dialectitians and advocates of the
epistemic view” (SB10: 459). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis,
linguistic indicators in ca (“papers,” “thus far,” “clear,” “clarifying”))
I reconstruct that by “understanding” Siegel and Biro suggest to manage
the goal to arrive at clarity to the matters (SB08: 201). I show that Siegel
and Biro refer to the practical component because they chain the matters in
the discourse to intellectual progress in argumentation research (SB08: 201,
198). In this respect I instantaneously reconstruct that Siegel and Biro have
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actualized a clarity formula (SB10: 459). Though on the one hand I can
show – against the background of socialization – that the authors spell out
obscurity to certain matters, on the other hand I can refer to the scaffold,
which reveals the r between the three languages and the five components,
and can thus emphasize that having arrived at clarity to a matter in one
component facilitates clarity to the matters in other components. (Strategy of
maximally argumentative analysis, maximally dialectical analysis, linguistic
indicator in ca (“understanding”))
With respect to the issue of correspondence Siegel and Biro request Garssen
and van Laar to deal with two examples. Against the background of clarity
to the matters as a criterion to show that the pragma-dialectical take on
normativity is troublesome Garssen and van Laar hence manage matters in
respect of the Münchhausen Trilemma, and in respect of an example about
a person’s voting decision in a political election. (Strategy of maximally
argumentative analysis, maximally dialectical analysis)
Garssen and van Laar say that argumentation researchers should aim
at solving the Münchhausen Trilemma: “Apparently, a really ‘normative’
argumentation theory should provide provisions that stop discussants from
agreeing on principles that can be called absurd” (GvL10: 127). Siegel
and Biro emphasize that they have arrived at clarity to the Münchhausen
Trilemma by, e. g., accepting that in a discourse there can be “a stopping
point” which is accepted even if it has not actually been discussed before
by the respective persons (SB10: 465). They particularly refer to scientific
discourses: “scientific (and other) theories cannot be proved in the logician’s
sense of the term or established with certainty and thus cannot be justified in
this sense” (SB08: 196). (Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
However, after Garssen and van Laar’s response with respect to such
matters of the Münchhausen Trilemma that had been raised by Siegel and Biro
the latter authors write that “what they say here does not touch the P-D theorist
[...] as he wishes to defend his theory as superior to the other, incompatible,
theories (such as, for example, an epistemic one)” and “[w]e see nothing in
Garssen and van Laar’s discussion that answers the question in a theoretically
helpful or satisfying way” (SB10: 470, 477). After having depicted that Siegel
and Biro “conclude that the pragma-dialectical rationality or reasonableness is
not the kind of reasonableness we are after [...]” pragma-dialecticians Garssen
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and van Laar talk about the “the so-called opening stage [...]” (GvL10: 126).
(Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
As a mediator I show that Siegel and Biro are dissatisfied with respect to
theoretical matters (SB10: 470, 477), and in actualizing a contention Garssen
and van Laar refer to the theoretical component as well as to the philosophical
component (GvL10: 126). The authors are thus talking in terms of ideal
language. Also, in the book which Siegel and Biro refer to, van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (vEG04), the Münchhausen Trilemma is not suggested as
a matter connected to any actual element, relationship or context (εa, ra or
ca) but as a matter referred to by means of ideal language.266 (Strategy
of maximally argumentative interpretation, linguistic indicators in ca (“P-D
theorist,” “theory,” “theoretically,” “reasonableness,” “opening stage”))
I can thus spell out against the background of the three languages that
somewhat consequently the pragma-dialecticians talk about the theoretical
component (pragma-dialectics), they talk in terms of ideal language
(GvL10: 126). In managing the contention they refer to the ideal model –
or if they are understood to refer to a stencil they talk about it in the sense of
a blueprint: They refer to the first function of the ideal model (or blueprint),
i. e. the theorist plays around with the matters. However, I make use of
functionalization: Though Siegel and Biro actualize the speech act acceptance
of an argument since they accept the goal to solve the Münchhausen Trilemma
(SB10: 465), and though they point to intellectual progress in argumentation
research (SB08: 196), as a pragma-dialectical mediator I recognize that
because they conclude clarity to the Münchhausen Trilemma with reference
to cas they cannot, like Garssen and van Laar, talk about an ideal model. Even
though they were talking about a stencil they must be referring to the stencil
in the sense of the grid. So, since Siegel and Biro can be understood to talk
about matters referred to by any of the three languages in this case I aim at
clarity to the use of the three languages. (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis, maximally dialectical analysis)
I can spell out the troublesome matter B, i. e. no meaning established
for relevant terms (“ideal model,” “stencil,” “blueprint,” “grid”). The actual
characters of a grid of critical discussion (m) may, particularly, trace back the
fact that the authors talk at cross purposes to the suggestion that the blueprint
266Cf. the chapter “A dialectical notion of reasonableness” in which the authors refer to Münchhausen Trilemma
with respect to the “starting-point” of their “theory of argumentation,” with respect to the “status of a
premise,” with respect to “the protagonist and the antagonist” and the “standpoint” (vEG04: 131-134).
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is a derivative of the ideal model (h). The ideal model, the blueprint and the
grid are relevant to different role models. Since the pragma-dialectical ideal
model has no immediate connection whatsoever to any εa, ra or ca it, in fact,
must not be a means to arrive at clarity to the Münchhausen Trilemma in the
sense suggested by Siegel and Biro.
So, taking into account socialization I point to the fact that the authors talk
at cross purposes. I can actualize a usage declarative to facilitate clarity to
what Siegel and Biro mean by “theoretically helpful.” In order to arrive at
clarity to the matters against the background of the five components and the
three languages, and their r depicted in the scaffold, the authors can compare
this meaning to a respective understanding of Garssen and van Laar. In that
sense they manage the troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) h (“kind” of
reasonableness in either template or derivative) which can be traced back to
the troublesome matter B. I can facilitate clarity to the phrase “theoretically
helpful” by neutrally referring to Kvernbekk and to the module of the quartet
of terms, i. e. the distinction between ideal model, stencil, blueprint and
grid.267
I can sum up that in managing the issues of the first standpoint Siegel
and Biro refer to philosophical and theoretical matters, to analyses and to
intellectual progress. I thus aim at elucidating whether Siegel and Biro
(SB10: 465) – talking about a grid – particularly refer to the matters of a
theorist, or of an analyst, or of a practitioner (or even of an empiricist). In
general, I can spell out that both Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar
particularly state that with respect to the future of managing the Münchhausen
Trilemma argumentation researchers may refer to previous literature in order
to prevent “absurd principles” (GvL10: 127).268 (Strategy of maximally
argumentative analysis)
The second example, too, is introduced by Siegel and Biro:
For example, if you and I are white racists and are engaged
in a critical discussion about the wisdom of voting for a black
candidate – I plan to vote for him because, despite his skin color,
he reminds me of my father, say – your reminding me of my
general attitude concerning the ability of blacks, in moves that
comport perfectly well with the pragma-dialectical rules, might
well resolve our difference of opinion in accordance with rules
267Cf. chapter 2: strong and weak theories.
268Also cf. Siegel and Biro (SB10: 464).
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we both accept, but my new belief that I should not vote for this
candidate is still not justified by my racist prejudices, despite our
agreement on the matter and the appropriateness of the procedure
by which I arrived at it (SB08: 194). (Linguistic indicator in ca
(“example”), maximally argumentative interpretation)
Garssen and van Laar elaborate the example in pragma-dialectical terms
(GvL10: 129). They spell out the matter of procedural starting points. In
particular, they refer to argument schemes:269 “For parties who choose to
resolve practical issues only by deontic measures, the pragmatic scheme could
possibly lack problem validity. [...] So, the scheme is problem valid [...]
because the scheme helps the participants to critically assess proposals for
action [...].” They expand their response to the matter of material starting
points: “[a]bsurd as the case may be, argumentation theorists should not, a
priori, rule out the possibility that this point of departure is correct. (Possibly,
handsomeness turns out to be indicative of political strength.)” Turning from
the cs referred to by means of ideal language to cs referred to by means of
actual language they say: “we leave it up to individual disputants to create
what they conceive of as an appropriate common ground” (GvL10: 127).
(Maximally dialectical analysis)
I recognize that all of the authors refer to the use of ideal language,
describing language and actual language.270 However, I particularly
notice that Siegel and Biro talk about the concepts “attitude,” “belief”
and “prejudices” (SB08: 194) when they conclude that based on the
characterizations of pragma-dialectical procedures applying such procedures
is troublesome. Now, unlike the latter two terms the concept “attitude” is
used in pragma-dialectics as well – similarly to the use of Siegel and Biro.271
Therefore, instead of enhancing the likelihood of the need to apply a usage
declarative, as a mediator I opt for employing the term “attitude” when I
spell out that Siegel and Biro point to a matter that is pragma-dialectically
managed by means of the concept of the second-order conditions, i. e.
“psychological factors,” which determine the “state of mind the discussants
are assumed to be in” (vEG04: 189). I ask, though, by making use of
269An argument scheme in pragma-dialectics is “the pragmatic principle of support that is used when in the
argumentation a reason is advanced for accepting a standpoint” (vEG09b: xvi).
270For example, Garssen and van Laar show how to employ the pragma-dialectical matter of an argument scheme
to bridge the methodical gap (GvL10: 129).
271Recast the definition of the term standpoint as “an (externalized) attitude on the part of a language user in
respect of an expressed opinion” (vEG84: 5).
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functionalization and externalization why in actualizing a contention Garssen
and van Laar do not refer to the second-order conditions but to the starting
points (GvL10: 129), whose actualization does not depend on any attitude.
I thus facilitate clarity to the fact that Garssen and van Laar emphasize
that an analyst (pragma-dialectics) should not decide what a person in
argumentative reality considers to be acceptable (GvL10: 127). I “redirect”
the discussion:272 Is the discourse at this point about the characterization
of the application of pragma-dialectical procedures, or is it about one of the
conditions for applying pragma-dialectical procedures? (Linguistic indicator
in ca (“attitude”))
With respect to the issue of application – based on the previous management
of clarity to the two examples – Siegel and Biro request Garssen and van
Laar to manage certain other matters that they spell out. The need to
further elaborate the matters adduced thus far becomes apparent. (Strategy
of maximally argumentative analysis)
Siegel and Biro state: “We do appreciate, of course, that P-D does
not assess arguments in terms of their epistemic worth” (SB10: 460).
Later, they commit themselves to clarity to the Münchhausen Trilemma “in
straightforwardly epistemic terms” (SB10: 466). Siegel and Biro say that
Garssen and van Laar have “redefined crucial normative terms” (SB10: 474).
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Siegel and Biro suggest that the pragma-dialectical take on reasonableness
is troublesome: “[I]t is clear that disputes resolved in accordance with the
pragma-dialectical rules can result in new beliefs that are not reasonable in
the straightforward sense that the reasons offered in their support establish
their truth or enhance their justificatory status” (SB08: 194). A matter can
be “‘PD-rational’ – but patently irrational from the epistemic point of view,”
Siegel and Biro write (SB10: 458). (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis)
Garssen and van Laar write that, for them, making use of an epistemic
approach means to “not pay sufficient attention to the addressee” in a
discourse (GvL10: 133). They compare the “dialectical stance” with the
“justificationist stance” (GvL10: 139). They compare a pragma-dialectical
and an epistemic approach. (Strategy of maximally argumentative
interpretation, linguistic indicator in ca (“stance”))
272Cf. Aakhus (Aak03: 274).
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As a mediator I recognize that Siegel and Biro spell out relevant differences
between pragma-dialectics and an epistemic approach (SB10: 460, 466).273
In particular, they refer to the philosopher and theorist (“epistemic worth,”
“epistemic terms,” “redefine”) as well as to the analyst, i. e. the management
of the methodical gap in a pragma-dialectical fashion to “assess arguments.”
Referring to the use of ideal language I note that the term “epistemic worth,”
as the authors suggest themselves, is not a term in pragma-dialectics. I
thus sense that the troublesome matter G can be at stake (cf. “epistemic
worth,” “epistemic terms,” “redefine”). I can spell out that properly managing
this troublesome matter pragma-dialecticians prevent the troublesome matters
d, e and h. (Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation, linguistic
indicators in ca (“epistemic worth,” “epistemic terms,” “redefine”))
Taking into account the meta-theoretical principles of socialization, I
recognize when Garssen and van Laar juxtapose the different stances
(GvL10: 139) they also refer to differences between an epistemic approach
and pragma-dialectics. The pragma-dialecticians refer to the entire research
program, i. e. the use of any of the three languages. However, by referring
to the perspective of the addressee Garssen and van Laar (GvL10: 133)
exemplarily spell out a difference relevant to both philosophical and
theoretical considerations in a pragma-dialectical or epistemic approach.
Again, particularly taking into consideration functionalization it becomes
apparent that they actualize a contention. (Strategy of maximally
argumentative interpretation, strategy of maximally argumentative analysis,
strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction)
However, making use of externalization and functionalization as well as
the module of the five components I apply a usage declarative: I facilitate
that the authors recognize that taking into account the different “stances”
(i. e. paradigms) means taking into account the differences between all the
matters from a pragma-dialectical and epistemic approach. Thus all of the
three languages are concerned. So, it is troublesome that the authors are
talking about matters from the context of pragma-dialectics and make use
of those “straightforwardly epistemic terms” (SB10: 466). I can spell out
the very fact that the authors suggest that research in accordance with an
epistemic approach brings about the use of terms from this epistemic approach
273Also cf. Siegel and Biro (SB10: 462, 468, 471, 474). Since they refer to the contention by Garssen and
van Laar (cf. issue of definition), against the background of functionalization it becomes apparent that they
actualize the speech act acceptance of an argument. (Strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction)
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rather than those of pragma-dialectics (SB10: 474). So, Siegel and Biro’s
acceptance of an argument with respect to Garssen and van Laar’s contentions
with respect to the philosophical differences (justificationism, fallibility) and
the goal to solve the Münchhausen Trilemma can be traced back to the use of
“straightforwardly epistemic terms.” (Strategy of maximally argumentative
interpretation, linguistic indicator in ca (“straightforwardly epistemic terms”),
maximally reasonable reconstruction)
For example, I use dialectification: I show that by the “dialectical stance”
and the “justificationist stance” Siegel and Biro refer to the management of the
methodical gap (SB08: 194), and somewhat consequently, Garssen and van
Laar spell out the contention that an attempt to introduce justificationism (as
the right kind of normativity) in pragma-dialectics brings about other matters
which need to be managed than only the management of the methodical gap
(GvL10: 133). From that sequence, I can conclude the question whether
Siegel and Biro (SB10: 458), indeed, accept the distinction between the three
languages chained to a field, branch, or research program and whether they
thus can be held committed to having accepted an argumentation by Garssen
and van Laar. (Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
All in all, I can show that clarity to a matter facilitates to plausibly suggest
that a very matter is troublesome. If a matter is troublesome, indeed, further
elaborations may thus be needed. Exemplarily recasting the misconception
I spell out that clarity to the meaning of the term “normative notions” may
be particularly relevant to further considerations (GvL10: 140).274 Likewise,
since the authors have been talking at cross purposes in terms of the module
of the five components I can suggest that with respect to the Münchhausen
Trilemma, as well, further elaborations are needed. Against the background
of the scaffold I can, in general, recommend argumentation researchers
to recognize that terms are established within a very research program, or
branch or field. (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, strategy of
maximally reasonable reconstruction)
The second standpoint by Siegel and Biro is that a very sense of
justificationism in pragma-dialectics is desirable (SB08). (Strategy of
maximally reasonable reconstruction, maximally dialectical analysis, cf. this
chapter: summary of discourse)
With respect to the issue of definitions Siegel and Biro request Garssen and
274Respectively actualizing a usage declarative facilitates acceptance of the matter.
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van Laar to elaborate the relevant concepts at stake which are “a very sense of
justificationism” and, again, “pragma-dialectics” – or “pragma-dialectical.”
Siegel and Biro state: “[...] van Eemeren and Grootendorst cannot do
without ‘justificationism’ in the sense of positive support. They need it
[...]” (SB08: 199). They spell out that van Eemeren and Grootendorst
need justificationism and that pragma-dialectics already “contains ‘a whiff
of justificationism’” (SB10: 459). So, in their second article Siegel and Biro
write about Garssen and van Laar’s management of the second standpoint:
“positive support has found its way back into their account” (SB10: 477).
Siegel and Biro use a metaphor when they claim that there is an “in-house
dispute” in pragma-dialectics (SB10: 462). (Strategy of maximally reasonable
reconstruction, maximally dialectical analysis, linguistic indicators in ca
(“justificationism,” “positive support,” “need”))
As a mediator I facilitate clarity to the management of the issue
of definitions particularly by making use of the module of the four
meta-theoretical principles. First, against the background of functionalization
Siegel and Biro actualize a contention when they spell out that the very sense
of justificationism refers to positive support (e. g. SB08: 199). Garssen and
van Laar introduce the term “a whiff of justificationism.”275 In referring to
“a whiff of justificationism” Siegel and Biro thus actualize the speech act
non-acceptance of an argument (SB10). (Maximally dialectical analysis)
Second, against the background of externalization I can suggest that
because they are pragma-dialecticians Garssen and van Laar can be held
committed to consider pragma-dialectics as a research program. In addition I
make transparent the use of my intuition when I spell out that the metaphor of
pragma-dialectics as “a house” elucidates that Siegel and Biro (SB10: 462),
too, consider pragma-dialectics to be a research program (cf. first standpoint:
issue of definitions). However, I can illustrate, for instance, that in the house
of pragma-dialectics there are living the five role models. Those role models
apply the three languages. (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
The second issue is raised by Siegel and Biro in requesting Garssen and van
Laar to manage the criterion used as the background against which the value
“desirable” is measured. Again, that criterion is clarity to the matters. A
matter is desirable when there is no obscurity to the matter. So, a very sense
275“Here we shall also try to show that there is not even a whiff of justificationism in pragma-dialectics”
(GvL10: 131).
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of justificationism in pragma-dialectics is desirable when hence obscurity is
prevented.
Siegel and Biro suggest that van Eemeren and Grootendorst need
justificationism because in pragma-dialectics clarity to the matters is
prevented. Suggesting an alternative they recast the Münchhausen Trilemma:
“MT can be avoided, since a belief can be justified without involving an
infinite regress, a vicious circle, or an arbitrary stopping point” and “[a]s we
have seen, justificationism, if understood evidentially, resolves the difficulty”
(SB08: 200, 201). (Maximally dialectical analysis)
However, Garssen and van Laar say that there is not a problem in
pragma-dialectics. They respond: “As far as the second kind of objection
is concerned, the authors [Siegel and Biro] do not seem to acknowledge
that [...]” (GvL10: 140). Garssen and van Laar write that “every argument
can be understood as part of a mutual, critical examination” (GvL10: 138).
“Reasonableness” is elicited in the procedure of a very ideal model or stencil.
Garssen and van Laar spell out four means to check whether the acceptability
of a point of view of an actual protagonist can be plausibly concluded in
pragma-dialectics: “there is a larger inventory of moves that can have a
useful role in a critical examination of the acceptability of a standpoint”
(GvL10: 136). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, linguistic
indicator in ca (“do not seem to acknowledge”))
The elaboration by Siegel and Biro on matters that a “theory of arguments
and argumentation must provide” (SB10: 474) fits in with stating that “[...]
it is right to reject a conception of justification that requires certainty or
proof, but wrong to reject the possibility of justification or positive support
altogether” (SB08: 202). From the perspective of their epistemic approach
the authors ask: “If all this is right, van Eemeren and Grootendorst cannot
do without ‘justificationism’ in the sense of positive support. They need it –
but can they have it?” (SB08: 199). (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis)
I recognize that, when Garssen and van Laar spell out a lack of
acceptance of matters they refer to clarity to matters (GvL10: 140). Siegel
and Biro suggest that justificationism is a means to arrive at clarity
to the Münchhausen Trilemma (SB08: 200, 201). By making use of
functionalization and dialectification I analyze that the contention of Garssen
and van Laar (GvL10: 138, 136) illustrates two of the reasons against
pragma-dialectically establishing the term justificationism in the sense of
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positive support in the ideal language. One of them, I can reformulate,
is that in terms of the analytical-intuitive component (pragma-dialectics)
employing a sense of justificationism prompts pragma-dialecticians to neglect
the meta-theoretical principle of dialectification (GvL10: 138). (Strategy
of maximally argumentative interpretation, maximally dialectical analysis,
linguistic indicator in ca (“resolves the difficultly”))
I can spell out the relevance of the philosophical question raised by Siegel
and Biro whether justificationism in pragma-dialectics is possible: Without
a very sense of justificationism arriving at the pragma-dialectical purpose
is prevented (SB08: 199). Siegel and Biro can be understood to raise
the question whether pragma-dialectical teaching is prevented because of
not making use of justificationism (SB08: 199), and by weighing what is
philosophically right and wrong they – e. g. in respect of the r between the
philosophical and theoretical component – can also be understood to refer
to intellectual progress in argumentation research (SB08: 202). However,
chaining that side note about intellectual progress to the fact that Siegel
and Biro refer to pragma-dialectics as a research program I can ask them
whether they accept that the module of the five components is a means
for argumentation researchers to arrive at clarity to the matters. (Strategy
of maximally argumentative analysis, strategy of maximally argumentative
interpretation)
Suitably timing the strategic action I can proceed against the background
of dialectification by presenting two examples.276 A first example that I show
is that the management of matters connected to a “theory” – in the sense
of an ideal model or a stencil – is facilitated by means of the use of ideal
language in the respective philosophical component (SB10: 474). I note that
the authors may need to manage the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics
h (“a theory must provide”) and trace it back to the troublesome matter B. The
term “theory” is troublesome in pragma-dialectics – employing the module
of the meta-theoretical principles I can thus apply a usage declarative –,
especially in respect of the ideal language which is used to manage concepts
like “the possibility and conception of justification.” (Strategy of maximally
argumentative analysis, linguistic indicator in ca (“theory”))
A second example which I can spell out is that in actualizing their
contention Garssen and van Laar point to the relevance of a useful inventory
in a critical examination (GvL10: 136). Again it is plausible to request
276Note, that I appear neutral (cf. socialization) when I equally refer to one example from each party.
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a usage declarative. In fact, because the metaphor of the inventory in “a
critical examination” is spelled out by means of natural language against the
background of the five components I can illustrate that it points to matters
from any of the pragma-dialectical components. All of the components can
be chained to a critical examination in a pragma-dialectical fashion: Any
such pragma-dialectical inventory is based on the work of a philosopher
of the research program. A pragma-dialectical inventory in a critical
examination can be exemplified by the configuration of argument schemes
in a blueprint – then the inventory is managed by a theorist –, or by
the strategies that an analyst applies to manage the methodical gap in a
reconstruction. An inventory in a critical examination can also be exemplified
by a configuration of methodical devices accessible for a pragma-dialectical
empiricist who manages the methodical gap. Such an inventory can,
as well, be exemplified by pragma-dialectical articles that are employed
in pragma-dialectical teachings by practitioners. (Maximally dialectical
analysis, linguistic indicator in ca (“a critical examination”))
So, facilitating an answer to the question whether justificationism in
pragma-dialectics is possible argumentation researchers can take into account
the scaffold which illustrates the relationships between the modules of the
five components and the four languages. In that sense, I sum up in my
“educational work” as a mediator (GM08: 272), introducing a sense of
justificationism in the pragma-dialectical research program means to consider
matters from all of the components.
With respect to the issue of correspondence Siegel and Biro request Garssen
and van Laar to particularly deal with two terms. Against the background of
clarity to the matters as a criterion to show that a very sense of justificationism
in pragma-dialectics is desirable Garssen and van Laar hence manage matters
in respect of the terms “criticism” and “critical.”
On the one hand, in talking about critical rationalism Siegel and Biro deal
with the pragma-dialectical sense of reasonableness: “[...] critical rationalists
simply cannot do without positive justification” (SB08: 198). Garssen and
van Laar react: “Secondly, they claim that the pragma-dialectical approach
does not and cannot live up to its aspirations derived from the critical
rationalist philosophy” (GvL10: 123). On the other hand, Siegel and Biro ask:
“How exactly do ‘criticism’ and ‘critical’ work in the assessment of actual
disputes?” (SB10: 475). By quoting Popper and other critical rationalists
265
Siegel and Biro particularly trace back their question to the matter of critical
rationalism (SB08: 195-197). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis,
linguistic indicator in ca (“criticism,” “critical”))
Metaphorically, Siegel and Biro spell out obscurity in the
pragma-dialectical research program due to an “in-house dispute within
the P-D-camp” (SB10: 462). They say, van Eemeren and Grootendorst
establish and employ “reasonableness” with respect to the two types of
validity. In fact, van Eemeren and Grootendorst write: “As we have indicated,
argumentation in a dialectical approach is regarded as part of a procedure
for resolving a difference of opinion on the acceptability of one or more
standpoints by means of a critical discussion. [...] The reasonableness of
the procedure is derived from the possibility it creates to resolve differences
of opinion (its problem validity) in combination with its acceptability to
the discussants (its conventional validity). [...] In a critical discussion that
proceeds in accordance with pragma-dialectical rules, the protagonist and the
antagonist try to find out whether the protagonist’s standpoint is capable of
withstanding the antagonist’s criticism” (vEG04: 132, 133). For Garssen and
van Laar, Siegel and Biro state, reasonableness is “a matter of the promotion
of criticism” (SB10: 462). In fact, Garssen and van Laar write: “The model
for critical discussion that van Eemeren and Grootendorst developed can be
understood as their proposal for an arrangement that promotes criticism”
(GvL10: 130). For the authors of the epistemic approach the different takes
on the meaning of the term reasonableness illustrates a pragma-dialectical
in-house dispute. (Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
Siegel and Biro state that criticism cannot be understood independently
from positive support: “the quality of criticism depends upon positive
support” (cf. SB10: 463). Furthermore, they write that the two types of
validity are troublesome: “Our main complaint, in a nutshell, comes to
this: Problem validity + conventional validity do not yield the right kind of
normativity” (SB10: 460). They spell out:
[...] a move in a critical discussion is acceptable if it comports
with the rules governing critical discussions: those rules are
reasonable if they are both “problem-valid,” i. e., tend to
produce a resolution of the difference of opinion in question,
and “conventional-valid,” i. e., are embedded in a procedure
that is acceptable to the discussants. What of the resolution
itself? If the parties resolve their difference of opinion by making
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acceptable argumentative moves, in accordance with reasonable
(i. e., problem- and conventional-valid) rules, and, in doing so,
come to agree, is the new belief on the part of one of them
reasonable? (SB08: 194). (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis, strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
On the one hand, I reconstruct that Siegel and Biro (SB08: 198) refer to the
philosophical component (“critical rationalism”). Against the background
of clarity to a matter as the basis for acceptance of a matter I reconstruct
that, apparently, Garssen and van Laar have understood that reference, i. e.
clarity to the matter has been actualized (GvL10: 123). With respect to
the r between the philosophical and the theoretical component according to
Siegel and Biro it makes no sense – it is reasonableness of the wrong “kind”
(SB10: 460) – to establish “reasonableness” in the sense of a procedure
in which reasonableness is elicited, because in cas reasonableness depends
on the resolution itself rather than on the procedure yielding the resolution
(SB08: 194). In order to arrive at clarity to the question whether they
are talking about the use of ideal language, or about the r between ideal
language and describing language I ask whether Siegel and Biro refer to (the
procedure characterized in) an ideal model and its function as a template,
or to (the procedure characterized in) the stencil and its function as a grid.
(Linguistic indicator in ca (“critical rationalism”), maximally dialectical
analysis, strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
On the other hand, Siegel and Biro refer to the terms “criticism” and
“critical” with respect to the analytical-intuitive component (SB10: 475).
I sense that the troublesome matter H is relevant. Thus, making use of
externalization, I ask whether Siegel and Biro suggest that the use of the term
“criticism” is not transparent in pragma-dialectics (SB10: 475).277 (Strategy
of maximally argumentative analysis)
In respect of the quasi-policy standpoint I recognize that Siegel and Biro
respond to Garssen and van Laar’s contention with respect to the r between
justificationism and fallibility (cf. first standpoint: issue of definitions)
when they actualize the speech act non-acceptance of an argument. Against
the background of my character as a designer of acceptance I thus aim
at facilitating clarity to the r between the terms “criticism” and “positive
277I recognize that the troublesome matter H may give rise to the troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) k, i. e.
that in an analysis the employment of intuition is not spelled out. (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis)
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support” (cf. SB10: 463): Taking for granted that “criticism” is a term
that is particularly relevant to the pragma-dialectical philosopher I ask
whether Siegel and Biro understand the term “criticism” in such a way278
that they conclude that a certain sense of justificationism, i. e. positive
support, in pragma-dialectics is a good means to accomplish the right kind of
normativity in the research program. (Maximally dialectical analysis, strategy
of maximally argumentative analysis)
I recognize that the in-house dispute spelled out by Siegel and Biro
refers to the pragma-dialectical philosophical and the theoretical component
(SB10: 462). consequently, I use the four meta-theoretical principles
again: Responding to Garssen and van Laar’s contention chained to the
pragma-dialectical meaning of “reasonableness” Siegel and Biro actualize
the speech act non-acceptance of an argument (SB10: 463). However, in
particular, in terms of the pragma-dialectical ideal language Siegel and Biro
spell out the troublesome matter F, i. e. not sticking to the established meaning
of a term (“reasonableness”). Apparently, managing the in-house dispute
is thus relevant: The troublesome matter F can give rise to troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics) in the theoretical component (g), the analytical
component ( j) and in the empirical component (l). (Maximally dialectical
analysis, strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation, strategy of
maximally argumentative analysis)
So I facilitate clarity to the in-house dispute. I can spell out that,
in fact, both van Eemeren and Grootendorst (vEG04) and Garssen and
van Laar (GvL10) talk about reasonableness in critical discussion. With
respect to the “assessment of actual disputes” in the analytical-intuitive
component (pragma-dialectics), however, I refer to the distinction between
ideal model and stencil. I can ask whether in actualizing a contention by
means of “promoting” criticism Garssen and van Laar (GvL10: 130) point
to the r between template and derivative: The configuration that elicits
reasonableness in an ideal model can be understood as the – “universal” (cf.
chapter 2: quartet of terms) – “proposal” that “promotes” reasonableness
in the “arrangement” of a blueprint. So, I employ the module of the five
components to neutrally facilitate clarity to the matters of the in-house
dispute. I aim at facilitating a reconciliation of the matters, and thus facilitate
278I recognize that the troublesome matter ct (the established meaning of a term is unclear) may be at stake
and can be traced back to the troublesome matter C. Hence I may suggest requesting a usage declarative.
(Maximally reasonable reconstruction)
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a solution to the in-house dispute. However, I can particularly spell out
that Siegel and Biro have pointed to the need of the scaffold, a certain
configuration of the four languages and the five components. (Linguistic
indicator in ca (“promoting”), strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
With respect to the issue of application – based on the previous management
of clarity to the two terms – Siegel and Biro request Garssen and van Laar
to manage certain other matters that they spell out. In fact, the option
to reconcile certain matters from an epistemic approach with matters from
pragma-dialectics becomes apparent.
Siegel and Biro spell out the role of justificationism in argumentation
research: “[...] van Eemeren and Grootendorst cannot comfortably join in
rejecting the possibility of supporting evidence, insofar as they offer and rely
upon reasons and evidence in support of their own claims” (SB08: 197).
Siegel and Biro ask: “[...] should not more be involved than that the
speech acts made in the discussion obey to the P-D rules and honor those
commitments?” (SB10: 471). Eventually, they write that “the P-D- theory
does not evaluate arguments in terms of the right properties” and thus
“is inapplicable to many ‘real world’ (political, economic, religious, etc.)
disputes, and to virtually all substantive scholarly disputes” (SB10: 460, 477).
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
In particular, Siegel and Biro say: “This is manifestly not the way that
‘reasonableness,’ and normativity more generally, are understood in either
philosophical or every-day discourse” (SB08: 194); “This seems to us a
mistaken way of conceiving of argumentative quality” (SB08: 192); “[...]
science would be a wholly unimportant activity. It would be practically
unimportant [...]” (SB08: 197). (Strategy of maximally argumentative
analysis)
However, in managing the quasi-policy standpoint Siegel and Biro talk
about “[...] proposals for standards to which arguers ought to strive to
conform” (SB10: 460). They write: “argumentation theory must address
both argumentation, understood as an exchange of speech acts in discussion,
and arguments, understood [...] in particular epistemic relationships to
another” and refer to pragma-dialectics when they are “conceding that critical
discussions that honor the P-D standards can result in the resolution of
disputes” (SB10: 467, 460). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Garssen and van Laar say that, first, (pragma-dialectical) reasonableness
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is elicited in a procedure and second, aiming at clarity to Siegel and
Biro’s “misconception” they suggest that the procedural understanding of
reasonableness in pragma-dialectics is appropriate to translate the very sense
of reasonableness that occurs in a ca in argumentative reality into ideal terms:
“[t]he desired result of any critical discussion is either that the standpoint has
been successfully defended [based on] [...] a particular set of starting points,
or that the standpoint has been successfully criticized from that particular
stance” (GvL10: 138). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Siegel and Biro state that “Garssen and van Laar’s discussion of our
proposed counterexamples to P-D theory is helpful in further clarifying the
dispute” (SB10: 473). They write that “a theory is entitled to use concepts
whose analysis is the business of the theory of knowledge or the theory of
truth” (SB10: 472). Consequently, they accept the “redefinition of the key
terms of argument analysis and evaluation” (SB10: 459). Siegel and Biro
find it acceptable when pragma-dialecticians “utilize” certain “key normative
terms of epistemology” (cf. SB10: 471). However, due to the question “Who
is to decide that a certain statement is a ‘known truth’ or a ‘justified belief,’
in case the matter is contentious?” according to Garssen and van Laar
“the notions ‘known truth’ and ‘justified belief’ need further clarification”
(GvL10: 129). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
As a mediator I employ the meta-theoretical principle of dialectification.
I sum up the matters put forth, and particularly chain them to the issues
discussed before, or to those matters that need to be discussed (cf. diagnostic
power of stencil). Siegel and Biro spell out obscurity with respect to the
concept of reasonableness, and the obscurity refers to the philosophical
component, the analytical-intuitive component and the practical component
of pragma-dialectics (SB08: 194, 192, 197). (Strategy of maximally
argumentative interpretation, linguistic indicators in ca (“philosophical,”
“conceiving of,” “practically”))
Chained to the theoretical component and to the analytical-intuitive
component Garssen and van Laar (GvL10: 138) refer to the stencil rather
than to the ideal model (“any critical discussion,” “a particular set of starting
points”).279 Against the background of socialization I, in this respect,
elucidate that Siegel and Biro point to the fact that the scopes of ideal
models and stencils are restricted because only a limited number of matters
is “involved” (SB10: 471). I emphasize that, apparently – and against the
279These starting points are “the basis of whatever is deemed acceptable by parties” (GvL10: 127).
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background of the layout of argumentation research plausibly –, matters
relevant to pragma-dialectics can be relevant to an epistemic approach, too.
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, linguistic indicator in ca
(“involved”))
For example, all the authors in the discourse consider a practical component
(field, branch, research program) desirable. Siegel and Biro can be understood
to refer to the practical component (pragma-dialectics) (SB10: 460). I can
refer to two examples from the discourse. Firstly, Siegel and Biro particularly
refer to matters that are managed by analysts (“evaluate”) or practitioners
(e. g. “scholarly disputes”). I can thus spell out, that the “inapplicability”
suggested by the authors in this case can refer to the troublesome matters
in those two components (i, j, k, n)280 and thus to the use of any of the
three languages, e. g. fragments from cas of “real world scholarly disputes”
(SB10: 460, 477). So, secondly, because further clarifying suggests that they
talk about intellectual progress as a mediator I make use of externalization
when I ask whether Siegel and Biro (SB10: 473) commit themselves to the
target of facilitating intellectual progress in argumentation research – e. g. in
the sense facilitated by pragma-dialectical practitioners (analytical-intuitive)
who manage the methodical gap Siegel and Biro (cf. SB10: 460, 477).
(Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation, linguistic indicators in
ca (“evaluate,” “real world scholarly”))
However, as a mediator I also spell out the danger of obscurity. In
particular, I show the troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) that the scopes
of the practical component of the research program are improperly established
(n). Referring to the troublesome matter that no meaning for a particularly
relevant term is presented (B), I aim at neutrally facilitating clarity to the
matters by spelling out that the scopes of a practical component (field, branch,
research) can, for instance, be understood by taking into consideration the
target of this component. Therefore I ask Siegel and Biro why the term
“justificationism in the sense of positive support” is – against the background
of the three languages –, indeed, relevant in the drawer of the practical
component in the cabinet of the pragma-dialectical research program,
and in which sense those proposals can be chained to the targets of the
practical component (pragma-dialectics), and to thus further democracy and
intellectual progress. (Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation)
280Thus two troublesome matters with respect to the creation of language (B, C) and two troublesome matters
with respect to the use of language may be at stake (F, H). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
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Suppose that intellectual progress is, indeed, in the interest of all of the
four authors. Intellectual progress can refer to the future of argumentation
research. Spelling out the role of – or, for that matter, responding to my
question about the relevance of – justificationism in the sense of positive
support in pragma-dialectical research, Siegel and Biro may refer to clarity
to the matters (i. e. elements, relationships and contexts in argumentation
research) and they may aim at suggesting that the scopes of justificationism
are somewhat universal (SB08: 197). However, I recognize that Siegel and
Biro – putting it in pragma-dialectical terms – accept that an actual difference
of opinion “can result” to be resolved in a pragma-dialectical fashion
(SB10: 460). Facilitating clarity to this matter against the background of the
practical component I can reassure whether Siegel and Biro, indeed, conceive
of the resolution of disputes in the sense of the use of a pragma-dialectical
stencil to optimize argumentative reality (cas), i. e. whether they conceive
of a pragma-dialectical grid (and its diagnostic power) as an option to be
a “proposal for a certain standard” – and whether thus they can be held
committed to the actualization of the speech act acceptance of an argument
(SB10: 460). (Maximally dialectical analysis, strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction, linguistic indicators in ca (“of their own claims,”
“proposals,” “standards”))
Finally, summing up that the parties disagree on certain matters and
agree on others as a mediator I sense that the authors point to the option
to reconcile pragma-dialectical insights with insights from an epistemic
approach. I mention, for example, that Siegel and Biro distinguish the
philosophical component from the theoretical component (SB10: 472). Since
they (SB10: 459) accept certain tasks of a philosopher in a respectively
reconciled, e. g., research program I illustrate that the two components are
chained as well: An ideal language created by the philosopher is used by the
theorist who creates a “theory,” i. e. an ideal model or a stencil. (Strategy of
maximally argumentative analysis)
Apparently, particularly in terms of a philosophical component I can recast
that certain concepts are particularly troublesome. I mention that actualizing a
contention Garssen and van Laar point to the r between “reasonableness” and
analytical-intuitive as well as practical research (GvL10: 129). By facilitating
clarity to the r between “reasonableness” and the five components I facilitate
the management of the troublesome matter C, the unclear establishment of a
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term. I thus spell out that the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) i and n
may be at stake. (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Against the background of externalization in managing the quasi-policy
standpoint I reconstruct that Siegel and Biro, in general, find certain matters
from the philosophical component (pragma-dialectics) acceptable – such as
the “utilization of certain terms of epistemology” (cf. SB10: 471). Still, in
this case I spell out the troublesome matter H with respect to ideal language.
Argumentation researchers who aim at clarity to the matters should create
and use terms transparently instead of bluntly calling them “key normative
terms” of a certain research program, branch or field. In that way, for
instance, pragma-dialecticians can prevent the troublesome matters g, i, j,
k and m (theoretical component, analytical-intuitive component, empirical
component). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Against the background of the five components as a mediator I recast that
in argumentation research grids are desirable when they can be employed, for
instance, to “evaluate arguments in terms of the right properties.” I can thus
propose that presenting analyses in future argumentation research may be an
option to check whether or not a grid in accordance with pragma-dialectics,
or a grid in accordance with an epistemic approach, should be employed. Or,
since certain matters are relevant to both paradigms I can raise the question
whether there is an option to create a stencil from reconciling the paradigms.
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, linguistic indicator in ca
(“evaluate arguments”))
So, against the background of externalization I can ask whether the fact that
Siegel and Biro (SB08: 197-198) quote other authors means that they commit
themselves to stating that making use of justificationism suits other research
programs, branches and fields in argumentation research. Likewise, however,
I may mention that Garssen and van Laar (GvL10: e. g. 124-125) are quoting
other authors, too. Against the background of the quasi-policy standpoint
Siegel and Biro may be suggesting that justificationism in the sense of positive
support is particularly relevant to future argumentation research whereas the
pragma-dialecticians aim at showing that the fit of pragma-dialectics with
other research programs, branches and fields in argumentation research can
as well be arrived at by other means than introducing a certain sense of
justificationism. As a mediator I can thus ask whether a third option, an
integration of an epistemic approach with pragma-dialectics, is an acceptable
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solution. (Maximally argumentative interpretation, strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction, strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
4.2.3 Solutions to the conflict
At last, as a mediator I facilitate an end of the discourse. I spell out that the
authors suggest two options to arrive at an end. I then facilitate clarity to the
actual resolution of the actual points of view, and I facilitate solutions to the
conflict that has been managed.
First, Siegel and Biro state that “disputes of interest (including the present
one) do not satisfy the theory’s constraints and yet are the sort of dispute to
which the theory is intended to apply” (SB10: 478). They ask: “can the P-D
theory be rightly regarded as a theory of argument (in the ordinary sense) at
all?” (SB10: 477). (Strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction)
They (SB10: 478) say that the management of matters in the
pragma-dialectical theoretical component – based on the “constraining”
philosophical component (pragma-dialectics) – is troublesome because
the pragma-dialectical procedures (ideal models or stencils) do not
“apply” to cas.281 Spelling out the relationship between the theoretical
component (pragma-dialectics) and the analytical-intuitive component
(pragma-dialectics) Siegel and Biro thus conclude that analyses in accordance
with pragma-dialectics are troublesome (SB10: 477). Against the background
of the scaffold I spell out that if the work of a theorist, e. g. with
respect to building stencils, is troublesome then the work of empiricists, and
practitioners, is concerned, too. Since they thus consider research connected
to any of the three languages and to any of the five components to be
troublesome Siegel and Biro can be understood to suggest argumentation
researchers to neglect pragma-dialectical research at all. Note, that by saying
“at all” the conflict between the parties becomes apparent. (Strategy of
maximally argumentative analysis, linguistic indicator in ca (“apply”))
The other option to arrive at an end in the dispute results from Siegel and
Biro saying that “[...] perhaps epistemic theories and P-D theories are simply
talking about two different things [...]” and thus they ask “are Garssen and
van Laar’s criticism of our epistemic theory offered as epistemically forceful
criticisms, or only as PD-criticisms? If the former, are the key terms not
281As a mediator I sense that the authors may need to manage the troublesome matter (pragma-dialectics) e
(traced back to the troublesome matter D) and refer to Kvernbekk (Kve12). (Maximally argumentative
analysis)
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fully redefined after all? If the latter, why should anyone who does not
embrace their redefinitions care about them?” (SB10: 462, 478). Siegel
and Biro say that “it is unclear why he [a pragma-dialectical researcher]
should want to retain and utilize the key normative terms of epistemology in
his epistemically unambitious theory” (SB10: 471). (Strategy of maximally
reasonable reconstruction)
Siegel and Biro state that Garssen and van Laar “concede our criticism
of the pragma-dialectical approach” (cf. SB10: 457, 459, 460, 468, 474).
Garssen and van Laar put forward that “the escape route that Biro and Siegel
construct is only enabled by introducing a dialectical, non-justificationist
consideration” (GvL10: 139). (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis)
Consequently, as a mediator who makes use of the module of the four
meta-theoretical principles I can recognize, metaphorically speaking, an
impasse. A solution to the conflict seems rather unlikely. Both Siegel and Biro
(cf. SB10: 457, 459, 460, 468, 474) and Garssen and van Laar (GvL10: 139)
actualize the speech act to establish a result of the discussion. Both suggest
their conclusions to be acceptable. (Maximally dialectical analysis, linguistic
indicator in ca (“concede”))
However, I elucidate as a mediator that on the one hand all the authors
see the commonality that both pragma-dialecticians and researchers from an
epistemic approach are working in an approach – and thus use any of the
three languages.282 Siegel and Biro, however, also refer to the differences
between (the “levels” of)283 pragma-dialectics and their epistemic approach
(SB10: 462, 478). “Different things” can be, for instance, different matters
managed. A relevant difference that Siegel and Biro particularly spell out
is that pragma-dialecticians use different terms (SB10: 478). (Strategy of
maximally argumentative analysis, linguistic indicators in ca (“different,”
“unambitious”))
So, recasting insights from the actualization of matters from the ontological
framework for critical discussion (m) argumentation researchers can accept
the differences between pragma-dialectics and an epistemic approach.
Elucidating that a term has a meaning only in the context in which
it has been established I can thus ask Siegel and Biro in which sense
any term can be a “key normative term of epistemology” (SB10: 471).
Recasting a formulation from the discourse I can pinpoint that terms in
282Cf. Siegel and Biro (2008, 2010) and Garssen and van Laar (2010).
283Cf. van Eemeren (vE90: 44).
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pragma-dialectics must not be “epistemically forceful” (SB10: 478).284
(Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, linguistic indicators in ca (“of
epistemology,” “epistemically forceful”))
Terms are defined in accordance with a certain “approach” and respectively
they are used in the context of an ideal, describing or actual language of that
field, branch or research program. So, apparently, against the background
of socialization I facilitate clarity to the differences between an epistemic
approach and pragma-dialectics by referring to the module of the five
components, and to the scaffold. In that way I neutrally facilitate clarity to the
matters in the discourse. (Strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction)
With respect to the actual resolutions of the respective differences of
opinion in the discourse as a mediator I, for example, facilitate clarity to the
end of the discourse by summing up the matters that have been discussed
with respect to the issues. I refer, for instance, to those matters which are
chained to the module of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) which,
in turn, can be traced back to the module of the troublesome matters which, in
turn, can be traced back to the methodical gap. From the two ends suggested
– neglecting pragma-dialectical research at all, or accepting the differences
between a pragma-dialectical and an epistemic approach – as a mediator I
can – in line with the four meta-theoretical principles – spell out two possible
resolutions with respect to each of the standpoints discussed.
First, against the background of the option to neglect pragma-dialectical
research at all the evaluative standpoint that the pragma-dialectical take on
normativity is troublesome is not acceptable because more of the potential
issues need to be managed. Against the background of the option to
accept differences between a pragma-dialectical and an epistemic approach
the evaluative standpoint that the pragma-dialectical take on normativity is
troublesome is acceptable, particularly with an outlook to further elaborate the
actual issues managed – in order to spell out more of the differences between
the two paradigms, e. g. against the background of the scaffold. (Strategy
of maximally argumentative analysis, strategy of maximally reasonable
reconstruction)
Second, against the background of the option to neglect pragma-dialectical
research at all the quasi-policy standpoint that a very sense of justificationism
284Thus, I point to the troublesome matter G that a term is used in a language, i. e. a context of terms, in which
no meaning has been established for it. Depending on “what hangs in the air” (cf. Jac02: 1412) I can refrain
from mentioning that Siegel and Biro, as well, employ terms that are established in pragma-dialectics, e. g.
standpoint (SB08: 199).
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in pragma-dialectics is desirable is – just like that – not acceptable.
However, in a reconciled – for instance – research program, in particular
the pragma-dialectical terms “criticism” and “critical” deserve great attention
in order to find a joint solution to the conflict. Against the background of
the option to accept differences between pragma-dialectics and an epistemic
approach the quasi-policy standpoint that a very sense of justificationism in
pragma-dialectics is desirable is acceptable. Results from such a resolution
can be that pragma-dialecticians particularly elaborate their take on the
terms “criticism” and “critical,” or that against the background of the
insights into “justificationism” a reconciliation of the two approaches can
be envisioned for future argumentation research. As a mediator I thus
facilitate clarity to – and intellectual progress with respect to – those matters
in argumentation research. (Strategy of maximally argumentative analysis,
strategy of maximally reasonable reconstruction)
Depending on the very result of the discourse, i. e. the resolution of
the difference(s) opinion managed by means of the ontological framework
for critical discussion (m), two solutions to the conflict between the
argumentation researchers can be imagined. First, the conflict is solved with
the agreement that further elaboration is needed on certain actual issues from
this discourse in order to spell out the differences between pragma-dialectics
and an epistemic approach, particularly with respect to philosophical
considerations about the concepts “critical” and “justificationism” which are
referred to by means of ideal language. Second, the conflict is solved with the
agreement that argumentation researchers may/ or will attempt to reconcile
the two approaches. The argumentation researchers can agree, for instance,
that they aim at paying sufficient attention to the addressee as well as to the
term “resolution” as a normative notion and – respectively – its r to a certain
sense of reasonableness which they then can employ in their research projects
against the background of the configuration of the scaffold, a configuration
of the three languages and the five components. (Strategy of maximally
argumentative analysis)
4.3 Conclusion of the chapter
The findings from this chapter facilitate to particularly answer the fourth
research question (cf. chapter 5). In section 4.1 I recasted the discourse
between Siegel and Biro (2008, 2010) and Garssen and van Laar (2010).
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The back and forth between the authors is an example of a discourse in
argumentative reality in the context of argumentation research. In fact, the
authors in the discourse illustrate both reflection- and prescription-minded
research. For example, based on reflection about pragma-dialectics Siegel
and Biro “suggest an alternative [...] approach” (SB08: 191-192). Based on
Garssen and van Laar’s 2010 response Siegel and Biro write: “In this reply
we hope to show that the view they [Garssen and van Laar] espouse faces a
dilemma. It must either concede our basic criticism, and in effect, sign on to
an epistemic account or be seen as changing the subject and having nothing
to say [...]” (SB10: 459).
Both Siegel and Biro, and Garssen and van Laar aim at scrutinizing the
respective matters. Siegel and Biro write, for instance: “We appreciate
Garssen and van Laar’s (2010) response to our criticism” (SB10: 459).
Garssen and van Laar write that “Biro and Siegel’s criticism of the
pragma-dialectics approach boils down to two objections” (GvL10: 123).
Moreover, the authors state that they are “arguing” with each other: “We
take it as obvious that we are arguing with Garssen and van Laar about [...]”
(SB10: 477). The authors thus have a discussion which is located in the
argumentative reality of the academic context of argumentation research, and
my case study (in argumentation research) is thus reflexive.
In a pragma-dialectical fashion I presented the standpoints actualized and I
summarized the matters at stake, such as the two types of validity, against the
background of the module of the five components. I showed why I consider
the authors to be aiming at clarity to the matters. For example, they actually
request usage declaratives. Also I showed that they apply a clarity formula.
In section 4.2 I made use of the modules of the four meta-theoretical
principles and the ontological framework – as well and the issues and
contentions – to show that the very matters relevant to critical discussion (m)
are actualized in the discourse. I referred to the conditions, to the forms
of actions (i. e. the speech acts), the difference of opinion, the goal, the
parties, the commitments and to the conflict as well as to the four stages
with a particular focus on the pragma-dialectical rules, e. g. on the (sorts
of) standpoints (cf. rule 1), and on the relevant issues and contentions (cf.
rules 7, 8, 11). Then I put to use the module of the integration of role
models: as a mediator in the discourse I actualized, both reflection- and
prescription-minded, the character of the mediator.
Against the background of all of the three troublesome matters in
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pragma-dialectics’ analytical-intuitive component that in a reconstruction
the translation criteria are not employed (i), that a reconstruction is not
transparent ( j) and that the employment of intuition in an analysis is not
spelled out (k) I made transparent the use of both the translation criteria and
the intuition in presenting my analysis. I distinguished my reconstruction (by
referring to certain quotes) from my evaluation. I evaluated the discourse
against the background of the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) and the modules
scrutinized in the previous chapters.285
So taking into consideration – against the background of the scaffold
(pragma-dialectics) – the modules of the ontological framework, the definition
of strategic action and the integration of role models as a mediator I actualized
in the context of an actualization of matters that are relevant to critical
discussion (m) certain strategic actions to thus actualize the character of
a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. When I, for instance,
analyzed the author’s management of the actual issues, or when I presented
my take on the end of the discourse and on the solution to the conflict, my
actions were in accordance with first, pragma-dialectical rules and second,
the pragma-dialectical purpose.286 In the case study I made transparent
to be neutrally connecting the discourse to pragma-dialectical research,
and thus facilitated acceptance of the – pragma-dialectically relevant –
matters against the background of the relationships between three modules
particularly: the four languages, the five components, and the troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics). This background can be traced back to the
methodical gap, or (for that matter) the management of the methodical gap
by means of the scaffold.
In this chapter I, thus far, presented an analysis in which the management
of the first standpoint is elaborated separately from the management of
the second standpoint. Concluding the case study in this section I aim
at illustrating the potential for further research on the conflict, so I briefly
dissolve this separation.
Taking into account the first and the second standpoint recast the fact
that Siegel and Biro (SB10: 474) refer to the philosophical component when
they write about “crucial normative terms” (cf. first standpoint, issue of
application). As a mediator I recognize that the troublesome matters B
285However, as to the pragma-dialectical fashion of my analysis, apparently, I did not refer to any “nonverbal
cues” (vEGJJ93: 51).
286So, I prevent that my “discourse strategies remain largely tacit” (vEGJJ93: 119).
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and C are at stake: No meanings for the relevant terms “justificationism”
and “positive justification” (cf. second standpoint, issue of correspondence)
are established in pragma-dialectics (B) which in the conflict can give
rise to the management of the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics b;
an unclear establishment of the pragma-dialectical meaning of the terms
“critical” and “criticism” (C) (cf. second standpoint, issue of correspondence)
gives rise to the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics ct . Making use of
the two modules of the troublesome matters and the troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics), and in correspondence to the paradoxical role of the
mediator, I can thus be “dancing around the role of advocate” (vEGJJ93: 139):
Employing the modules I recognize and spell out as a mediator that those
troublesome matters can refer, e. g., to the practical component as well.
(Strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation, linguistic indicator in
ca (“crucial normative terms”))
In the case study, I facilitated clarity to the matters by making use of the
various modules. For instance, in managing the issue of correspondence
with respect to the second standpoint Siegel and Biro state that the quality
of criticism depends upon positive support. As a mediator I recognize the
troublesome matter H (the use of a term is not transparent), and that Garssen
and van Laar’s contention refers to fallibility. Siegel and Biro who referred to
positive support spell out that relying on fallibility is troublesome, and they
thus actualize the speech act of non-acceptance of an argument. Therefore
as a mediator who integrates the pragma-dialectical role model of the critical
analyst with the pragma-dialectical role model of the practitioner I aim at
clarity to the r between “criticism” and “positive support.”
Finally, in an overview I sum up the troublesome matters and troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics) that are relevant to the conflict management of
the issues from the first and the second standpoint. The relationships between
the instances from the two modules are similarly depicted as in table 2.2 (cf.
chapter 2):287
– Correspondence (first standpoint): h (B)
– Application (first standpoint): B (b?), C (ct); G? (d?, e?, h?)
– Criteria (second standpoint): h (B)
287The troublesome matters (A-H) that are shown in brackets are those that the respective troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) (a-n) are traced back to; the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) which are shown
in brackets are concerned based on the management of the respective troublesome matter (actual issues).
The question marks point to such troublesome matters and troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) which
can become relevant to the solution to the conflict (potential issues).
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– Correspondence (second standpoint): H (k?); ct? (C); F (g?, j?, l?)
– Application (second standpoint): i?, j?, k?, n? (B?, C?, F?, H?); n? (B);
C (i?, n?); H (g?, i?, j?, k?, m?).
Spelling out the relevance of the modules as a mediator I emphasize
that with respect to the first standpoint “The pragma-dialectical take on
normativity is troublesome,” four examples of the troublesome matters and
six examples of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) are at stake
in the author’s management of the relevant issues; with respect to the
second standpoint “A very sense of justificationism in pragma-dialectics is
desirable,” seven examples of the troublesome matters and eighteen examples
of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) are at stake in the author’s
management of the relevant issues in the case study.
So, all in all, I showed in the case study that and how to employ, as
a mediator, both routes of logic and intuition in order to spell out the
troublesome matters and the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) that
are at stake, as well as the relationships between them. For instance,
I employed my intuition to sense how the social relation between the
authors is endangered by conflict based on the very troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) that are (not) spelled out. In order to optimize
argumentative reality I consequently applied certain strategic actions as means
to arrive at clarity to the matters.
5 Conclusion
In this final chapter I sum up my research, and point at both implications of
the findings and potentials for further research. These are the answers to the
research questions against the background of (the relationships between) the
modules:
1. How can modules be applied to optimize the management of the
methodical gap in argumentation research, particularly in order to
arrive at the pragma-dialectical purpose to optimize argumentative
reality? Argumentation researchers optimize their understanding, and
management of the methodical gap by making use of the modules in
line with the scaffold. The modules and the scaffold facilitate, first,
to understand and apply four contexts of language and second, to
consequently understand and prevent certain troublesome matters and
troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). Argumentation researchers
apply the five components and the definition of strategy by actualizing
the strategic actions of the five different (or integrations of) role
models. For example, integrations of role models – such as the
pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance – are actualized in
line with the scaffold (pragma-dialectics).
2. How do the ideal model of critical discussion and the module of
the definitions of strategy and strategic action facilitate to fulfill
the pragma-dialectical purpose? The module of the quartet of
terms (including the ideal model, and the stencil) facilitates to
understand the need for ontological frameworks, i. e. integrations of
non-pragma-dialectical ideal contexts with the ideal model of critical
discussion. To manage issues and contentions exemplifies strategic
actions in the ideal context of critical discussion (m) – the “m” points
to a stencil for mediation. Since the (integrations of) pragma-dialectical
role models apply similar strategic actions as persons in argumentative
reality the concept of the (integrations of) pragma-dialectical role
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models facilitates to optimize the argumentative performance of those
persons.
3. How can a mediator’s paradoxical role be characterized by means
of the pragma-dialectical research program (i. e. the modules of
the five components and the four meta-theoretical principles)? A
pragma-dialectical strategy is structurally determined by the four
meta-theoretical principles. A mediator actually integrates two of the
five role models when he applies certain pragma-dialectical strategic
actions, i. e. he configures, or methodically designs elements,
relationships and contexts in accordance with a pragma-dialectical
strategy. For example, his management of issues and contentions is in
line with the ontological framework of a stencil for mediation sessions
(critical discussion (m)). As a result the mediator’s management of his
paradoxical role is pinpointed in his management of the methodical gap
in a pragma-dialectical fashion – i. e. against the background of the five
pragma-dialectical role models –, particularly in line with the character
of the pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance.
4. How can the module of the five components in pragma-dialectics be
applied purposefully and reflexively to unwrap, and solve, paradigmatic
conflicts in argumentation research, particularly the conflict between
Siegel and Biro (2008, 2010) and Garssen and van Laar (2010)? The
scaffold (pragma-dialectics) facilitates to understand the troublesome
matters, and troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) at the core of the
conflict. The ontological framework for mediation sessions facilitates
to apply certain strategic actions as a mediator who actualizes – in line
with the four meta-theoretical principles – an integration of role models,
particularly the pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance
(i. e. unwrap and solve). Since the scaffold (pragma-dialectics) also
facilitates other modules, e. g. issues and contentions, such other
modules can be applied, too.
5.1 Summary and implications of the findings
Few teachers of argumentation are interested in training
propagandists for or against a given proposition. Rather, they
are interested in using the proposition as an educational tool by
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which they can teach the theory and practice of argumentation
(FS08: 210).
The reasons to conduct argumentation research are to facilitate intellectual
progress and democracy. Optimizing the argumentative competence through
my case study, in which I acted like a pragma-dialectical critical designer
of acceptance in the discourse between argumentation researchers, illustrates
the potential to optimize argumentative reality pragma-dialectically. There
is a potential to pragma-dialectically optimize argumentative reality in
other actual contexts than an academic discourse, as well. Freeley and
Steinberg put emphasis on education, pragma-dialecticians particularly aim at
“furthering a reasonable management of differences of opinion” (vE95: 144).
My target as a pragma-dialectical practitioner (analytical-intuitive) was to
optimize argumentative reality in a pragma-dialectical fashion, e. g. to
enhance the argumentative competence of persons in actual contexts in a
pragma-dialectical fashion.
Introducing the case study I showed that the back and forth between Siegel
and Biro (2008, 2010) and Garssen and van Laar (2010) is an example of a
discourse in argumentative reality in the context of argumentation research.
Hence the title of the dissertation “How to bridge the gap between theory and
practice in argumentation research: Acting like the pragma-dialectical critical
designer of acceptance.” However, in order to illustrate my integration of the
modules in the case study in this section I recast the various backgrounds
that I made use of, and exemplify how they were analytically and practically
integrated in the case study.
The four meta-theoretical principles (externalization, functionalization,
socialization, dialectification) facilitate purposeful strategic actions in line
with the integration of pragmatic with dialectical insights. Accordingly, the
module of the definitions of strategy and strategic action in pragma-dialectics
is structurally determined by means of the four meta-theoretical principles,
particularly purposeful functionalization. The integration of pragmatic
with dialectical insights is accomplished by means of the five role models
(philosopher, theorist, analyst, empiricist, practitioner): Applying a strategic
action means to configure matters in accordance with a strategy, and a
“strategy” is a configuration of possible forms of action that are in accordance
with particular rules and a particular purpose. I thus introduced the concept
of a “pragma-dialectical research strategy.”
The module of the integration of role models in pragma-dialectics is
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structurally determined by means of the definitions of strategy and strategic
actions of the five role models. I found out that the strategic actions of
the mediator accord with the strategic actions of the critical analyst and the
practitioner (in a sense of a designer of acceptance) in pragma-dialectics.
He (intuitively) reconstructs and evaluates the discourse and, e. g., facilitate
the actualization of pragma-dialectical reasonableness. So, I characterized
the mediator as an integration of those two role models: He is a
pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. In past case studies in
respect of the paradoxical role of mediators (to appear neutral and facilitate
acceptance) pragma-dialecticians already pointed at the relationship of role
models. Asking which one role model is the wrong question, when mediators
are “heuristic advisors” (cf. GM08: 264) whose “reconstruction involves more
than clarification of the plausible argumentative relevance of a move [...]”
(Aak03: 283).
However, the character of the mediator has not been researched against
the background of the five role models, and role models have not been
integrated. I spelled out the “more,” and why they are “heuristic” “advisors.”
By showing why – in line with the four meta-theoretical principles – the
mediator is an integration of role models I facilitated that mediators arrive
at clarity to their paradoxical role. I facilitated to enhance their argumentative
competence, especially when they aim at the strategic purpose to optimize
argumentative reality. Consequently, the third research question is answered:
How can a mediator’s paradoxical role be characterized by means of the
pragma-dialectical research program (i. e. the modules of the five components
and the four meta-theoretical principles)?
So, researching the paradoxical role of the mediator means to ask: How can
he, first, appear neutral, and second, facilitate acceptance, and of what? In
order to appear neutral in the case study I actualized certain strategic actions
that referred to matters which are independent from the very discourse. I
particularly made use of the module of an ontological framework for a stencil
of critical discussion (m). Critical discussion (m) is defined by such matters
of mediation that accord with matters from critical discussion. Two of those
matters that thus need to be accepted are the terms “issues” and “contentions.”
I integrated issues and contentions with pragma-dialectical strategic actions
in the ideal model. Developing an ontological framework for critical
discussion (m) I built upon the application of my definition of strategy
to critical discussion. Hence the module of the issues and contentions is
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structurally determined by means of the definitions of strategy and strategic
action in the ontological framework for critical discussion (m). However, with
an eye on practical research, unlike Greco Morasso I referred to the very set
of twenty-seven articles of the WIPO Mediation Rules288 in order to integrate
matters from critical discussion with mediation. Consequently, the second
research question is answered: How do the ideal model of critical discussion
and the module of the definitions of strategy and strategic action facilitate to
fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose?
The module of the ontological framework is structurally determined by
means of the quartet of terms. In my scrutiny of pragma-dialectical research
I found out that the term “ideal model” – which is one of the most prominent
concepts since the 1980’s – is employed in the sense of natural language.
Ideal models, however, are supposed to be configured in ideal terms and
managed by philosophers and theorists. Their functions for reflection-minded
and prescription-minded practical research are thus limited. I showed, that
a new perspective was needed on the pragma-dialectical concept of “ideal
model.” The module of the quartet of terms is structurally determined by
means of the different functions of ideal contexts for the five role models.
In fact, a “stencil” is managed in the sense of a “blueprint” by the theorist,
and managed in the sense of a “grid” by the analyst and empiricist. So, an
implication of my research is that the module of the quartet of terms illustrates
the complexity of the relationships between the five role models.
The complexity of the relationship between the five role models is only
exemplified by the quartet of terms. In fact, the term “ideal model” points at
just one of the fourteen troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) (a-n) that I
found. However, the module of the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics)
is structurally determined by means of the troublesome matters in respect
of pragma-dialectics. And the module of the troublesome matters (A-H) is
structurally determined by means of the creation and use of the terms from
the four languages in argumentation research.
Reviewing my research, I can now point at potentials to optimize
argumentative reality in argumentation research: The troublesome matters
– which are independent from a certain approach in argumentation research
– and the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) facilitate intellectual
progress in the academic context. They certainly illustrate the worthiness of
the module of the four languages. I developed the layout of the four languages
288The “WIPO” is the World Intellectual Property Organization, an agency of the UN.
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(ideal, describing, actual and natural language) from a layout of three
languages (the former without natural language) which, in turn, I developed
from a distinction between two languages (without describing language).
The distinction between ideal language and actual language illustrates the
methodical gap in argumentation research. This gap can be bridged by
means of describing language. However, argumentation researchers, e. g.
pragma-dialecticians, employ terms that do not belong to any of the three
languages, hence the insight that they employ their natural language as well
(cf. “ideal model”).
Initially, the layout of the five components was introduced to integrate
normative with descriptive perspectives in argumentation research (vE90: 38),
I structurally determine the module of the five components by means of (the
management of) the methodical gap. The scaffold is a novel methodical
means to manage the methodical gap in the sense of the five role models.
It is a configuration of elements (εs), relationships (rs), and contexts (cs),
the methodical gap, the module of the four languages, the five components
and argumentative reality. It can be used to locate the modules. The quartet
of terms, for example, points at the aim of bridging the methodical gap by
means of describing language. Consequently, the first research question is
answered: How can modules be applied to optimize the management of the
methodical gap in argumentation research, particularly in order to arrive at
the pragma-dialectical purpose to optimize argumentative reality?
All in all, drawing the bow to Freeley and Steinberg (FS08: 210)
I researched the theory and practice of argumentation with the aim to
facilitate intellectual progress. To date there had not been findings on
pragma-dialectical research that related the methodical gap to the character of
the mediator. In order to optimize argumentative reality pragma-dialectically
I integrated the modules in the case study. Next, I present an example (cf.
table 5.1) of the integration of all the modules.
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F (g, j, l)!
5. usage declarative
“promotion” as the r
between ideal model
and stencil?
In managing the second standpoint (1.), particularly the issue of
correspondence, the authors talk about the matter of reasonableness in
pragma-dialectics (2.). When I show that, and how their discourse pays out
as the matter of the in-house dispute (3.-4.) it becomes apparent that my case
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study is, first and foremost, a contribution to the analytical-intuitive and the
practical component (pragma-dialectics).
Analytically, as a mediator I instantaneously reconstruct and evaluate
the discourse by means of describing language. “[W]ithout taking a stand
on the status of any issue [or standpoint, or contention]” (Jac02: 1410)
(cf. the empty spaces in table 5.1, 1.-3.) I spell out the troublesome
matter F (4.). The troublesome matter F may give rise to the troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics) g, j and l, it is thus relevant to three of the five
pragma-dialectical components.289
Practically, in line with my strategic goal to neutrally facilitate the
acceptance of the contention (3.) I instantaneously propose means to optimize
the discourse. Against the background of “the diagnostic power” of a
respective grid of critical discussion (m) I add the (neutral) usage declarative
(5.): Though intuitively, I refer to the troublesome matter and the troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics), and to the module of the quartet of terms and
facilitate a clarity formula with respect to turn 3. In line with dialectification
I hence facilitate a proper management of turn 4. Thus managing the
paradoxical role I am both a pragma-dialectical analyst and practitioner “in
a sense of the WIPO.”290 Actualizing a usage declarative which refers to
the quartet of terms turns out to be a means to appear neutral yet facilitate
a solution to the conflict. By respectively positioning the neutrally phrased
question (5.) it can have a leading quality in the discourse (cf. Jac02: 1411).291
So, there are also theoretical implications in the case study that are
relevant to the purposeful application of the modules, e. g. of the issues
and contentions, and of the troublesome matters and troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics). Lovenheim and Guerin – the former is also one the
authors of “Becoming a mediator,” a “Guide to Career Opportunities”
(LD04) – write: “In considering the evidence and statements of each
party, the mediator might find information that demonstrates potential holes
in a party’s argument” (LG04: 6/21). In respect of the potential issues
289So, in this example I made use of the modules of the four languages, issues and contentions, troublesome
matters, troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) and the five components.
290For instance, the reconstruction of the sort of standpoint – which is part of the analysis – facilitates that I
act in correspondence to “the nature of the dispute” (WIP09: 9), i. e. to manage the relevant issues and
contentions.
291So, in this example I made use of the modules of the definitions of strategy and strategic action, issues and
contentions, the quartet of terms, the ontological framework (usage declarative), the troublesome matters,
the troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics), the four meta-theoretical principles and the integration of role
models.
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the authors in the case study could manage fifteen troublesome matters
and twenty-four troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). However, with
respect to the actual issues they do manage only ten troublesome matters
and only three troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). Argumentative
reality in argumentation research can be optimized by means of a
mediator.292 Concerning myself with this very discourse suits the purpose
of pragma-dialectics.
Using the modules I concluded strategic actions of the mediator that were
unnoticed before: He refers to the meta-theoretical principles, he reminds
and prevents to forget in order “to talk about matters of the future rather
than matter of the past” (Aak03: 282). Also, he spells out examples. Based
on my integration of role models I accomplished to show in which sense
these strategic actions are means of a mediator who optimizes argumentative
reality against the background of the pragma-dialectical research program.
I answered the fourth research question: How can the module of the five
components in pragma-dialectics be applied purposefully and reflexively
to unwrap, and solve, paradigmatic conflicts in argumentation research,
particularly the conflict between Siegel and Biro (2008, 2010) and Garssen
and van Laar (2010)?
The case study illustrates the potential to optimize argumentative reality
pragma-dialectically. As educational tools (cf. FS08: 210) the modules
facilitate to enhance the argumentative competence of persons working in the
profession of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), such as mediators (cf.
GM08: 22-64). The very integration of role models illustrates the relevance
of the mediator’s argumentative competence. For instance, in the example
I elucidated the argumentative competence to position the usage declarative
as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. My findings can now
be purposefully used in the training of mediators: “Much of the practice of
mediation is formally trained” (Jac02: 1423).
However, students in social science, philosophy, or the Law, too, should be
taught the modules. For instance, in seminars at the university the mediator’s
task to “maintain an appearance of neutrality while managing the course and
outcome” of a discourse (Jac02: 1405) is relevant to students, too, when
they – reflection- and prescription-minded – prepare lectures or moderations
292I showed that facilitating in the discourse the acceptance of some – or parts – of the matters which correspond
to matters from the ontological framework for critical discussion (m) already facilitates to arrive at an actual
solution to the conflict.
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(cf. vEGSH02: 171-179). For a moderation that means, for instance, to
recognize the matters relevant to an argumentative attack (reflection) and
to be able to quickly respond in an adequate fashion (prescription), hence
they can make use of the module of the issues and contentions. The need
for their argumentative competence points to the question how to bridge the
gap between theory and practice by means of insights from argumentation
research. One of the answers is: by acting like the pragma-dialectical critical
designer of acceptance.
5.2 Suggestions for further research
In this section I elaborate how some of the findings can further be managed
inside and outside argumentation research. I particularly refer to the
methodical gap and to the five role models to spell out the relevance of certain
suggestions to any of the five components. With respect to the theoretical
component, however, I particularly focus on suggestions with respect to the
stencil. Chained to analytical, or analytical-intuitive, and practical research I
particularly spell out suggestions revolving the term strategy.
With respect to the management of the methodical gap the configuration
of the four languages and the five components – shown in the scaffold –
facilitates to depict different fashions of research in argumentation research.
Whereas I focused on a pragma-dialectical fashion of argumentation research
the findings from – not only the case study in – this dissertation can be used
in future research to spell out, e. g., an epistemic fashion of argumentation
research. It may be useful to reconsider the suggestion from my case study
to foster an integration of the pragma-dialectical with an epistemic approach.
However, such an integration calls for a consistent take on the methodical
gap and the five components. Research on the methodical gap and the
application of the scaffold facilitate to associate, dissociate, and integrate
different paradigms in my topography of argumentation research.
The methodical gap is thus relevant to future research in any of the
five components. Both the troublesome matters and troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) – and the various possible, both-way relationships
between the two – can be traced back to the management of the
methodical gap. Both the troublesome matters and troublesome matters
(pragma-dialectics) can be elaborated. Examples can be presented to illustrate
those troublesome matters, or troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics) that
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I have spelled out. Other troublesome matters may be added. Against
the background of the configuration of the four languages and the five
components in the scaffold research on troublesome matters and troublesome
matters (pragma-dialectics) will, apparently, facilitate to prevent obscurity
in any of the five components in the future. For instance, in their case
studies pragma-dialectical analysts can particularly spell out the role of their
intuition in order to do justice to the troublesome matter in pragma-dialectics
k, i. e. that the employment of intuition in an analysis is not spelled out.
Transparency to the matters facilitates clarity to the matters.
In order to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose by means of analyses I
spelled out one of the relationships between the translation criteria and the
pragma-dialectical strategies for an analyst. In doing so I put particular
emphasis on the role of intuition. The relevance of intuition brought on
the need to opt for a new label for the analytical component of the research
program: the analytical-intuitive component. Likewise, other matters relevant
to the pragma-dialectical research program, or other approaches, can be
related to one another to further the understanding of the respective fashion of
research. Eventually, such insights can be related to one another by means of
the topography of argumentation research, hence they facilitate an overview
of the state of the art – of different fashions – of argumentation research.
The concept of the five role models is, apparently, relevant to future
research in any of the five components. In particular, it is a means to relate
a particular fashion of research to the term strategy. Elaborating the strategic
actions of researchers in the various components is a means to demarcate
different approaches inside argumentation research, and thus to arrive at
clarity to the state of the art.
Just like I have integrated two of the five role models in a pragma-dialectical
fashion to pinpoint the paradoxical role of mediators against the background
of their strategic actions, researchers can aim at characterizing certain roles
and opt for the definition of strategy that I introduced. However, they can
depart from, e. g., an epistemic approach. Departing from an epistemic
fashion of argumentation research, will the paradoxical role of mediators also
be pinpointed by means of an integration of the strategic actions of the analyst
with those of the practitioner? If that is (not) the case: Which conclusions
can be drawn with respect to the association of, or dissociation between
the pragma-dialectical and the epistemic fashion of conducting research on
argumentation?
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I particularly made use of a pragma-dialectical paradigm to further the
insights into mediators’ strategic actions and suggested that my findings can
not only be employed inside argumentation research. By means of my concept
of strategy I have shown that pragma-dialectical role models facilitate to
optimize argumentative reality. I, for instance, concluded the strategic action
“to remind.” More strategic actions that are characteristic of a mediator who
acts in a pragma-dialectical fashion can be elaborated. The findings can be
employed to enhance the argumentative competence of mediators – e. g.
during their training – to fulfill the pragma-dialectical purpose. However,
irrespective of the particular fashion at stake, other paradigms can inspire
promising research results, too, to show how mediators actualize certain
(integrations of) forms of actions that characterize the five role models against
the background of conducting argumentation research in a particular fashion.
In that way the roles of persons in argumentative reality can be elucidated.
Research questions in argumentation research, and pragma-dialectics in
particular, can consequently point to the actualization of role models by
means of certain strategic actions: Are there other actual contexts than
sessions of mediation in which persons are faced with the management of
a “paradoxical” role, and can their role be explicated by means of strategic
actions against the background of the five components? Which other persons
than mediators can actualize the integration of the pragma-dialectical critical
analyst with the designer of acceptance, i. e. the pragma-dialectical critical
designer of acceptance? Judges, for instance, actualize similar actions
as mediators (cf. Fet17). However, examples of their respective strategic
goals, or of “concrete techniques fashioned” (cf. vEGJJ93: 138, my italics)
for them can be taken into account to arrive at a distinction between the
roles of judges and mediators. Hence, again, argumentation researchers can
enhance the argumentative competence and thus optimize the argumentative
performances, for example of both mediators and judges.
The concept of stencil can further be elaborated as the connection
between different role models, particularly those which make use of the
describing language. Apparently, such research will not be bound to a
particular fashion of argumentation research. By means of the character
of the pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance I illustrated the
management of the methodical gap by means of the framework of a stencil
critical discussion (m). Still, in which other sense can the management of the
methodical gap be illustrated (e. g. by which other character), and how does
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that sense particularly relate to a certain stencil of the very research program,
branch or field?
While Greco Morasso (cf. GM08: 18) spelled out some ten years ago that
sessions of mediation are progressively substituting the judicial management
of conflicts current statistics confirm that.293 At the same time this
development is politically fostered, as well.294 By elaborating the accordance
between matters – e. g. the rules – from critical discussion and – e. g. the
articles – from mediation I have started to elaborate the relationship between
functions of stencils and ideal models. Consequently – with a particular
relevance to purposeful future research in the theoretical component – I have
shown that sessions of mediation in accordance with the WIPO (WIP09) are
contexts that can be taken into account to optimize argumentative reality
pragma-dialectically. I suggested that one means of a mediator to optimize
argumentative reality is to analyze the discourse in a mediation session.
Therefore, pragma-dialectical theorists should make use of the “ontological
framework” which I have presented: My findings facilitate to build a stencil
of critical discussion (m).
The integration of terms facilitates to build apt blueprints for analyses in
the future. In order to facilitate analytical-intuitive research I integrated the
terms issue and contention into pragma-dialectics, against the background of
the exemplary context of mediation. Similarly argumentation researchers can
further the different philosophies, and theories in the various paradigms.
In future pragma-dialectical analytical-intuitive case studies of mediation
sessions the researchers may focus on strategic actions with respect to
article 8(a) from the WIPO: When persons are “represented or assisted,” in
which sense is such a representation, or assistance particularly relevant to
the very strategic actions that are actualized? Not only the actual parties
but also their “authorized” representatives can actualize speech acts that
correspond to the speech acts of critical discussion (m) (WIP09: 10). So,
in fact, the representatives can facilitate that the first-order conditions of
critical discussion (m) are employed strategically. The representatives can,
for example, request and actualize usage declaratives which may refer to
the application of any of the rules characterizing critical discussion: Based
on a usage declarative and in accordance with rule 12 there may be a
retraction of a particular commitment that has arisen from the procedure;
293Cf. e. g. Glößer et al. (GHK16).
294Cf. Europäisches Parlament (Eur17).
294
or, based on a usage declarative certain speech acts may be characterized
by the representative to fulfill a particular function in the procedure.295 So,
how do the representatives, and the relationships between the parties, the
mediator and the representatives thus facilitate that the persons involved in
(the management of) the interpersonal hostility resolve the actual difference
of opinion in a pragma-dialectical fashion?
However, theorists should build grids, of course, for analytical-intuitive
research on discourse from other actual contexts than sessions of mediation,
as well. Similar to the module of the terms of issues and contentions
argumentation researchers will be faced with questions like: Which are the
matters that are relevant to respectively building blueprints with respect to,
e. g., political interviews (And10), to commercial contexts like advertisements
(Goo09) or consultancy, or medical contexts with discourse between doctors
and patients (vP13), and how are those matters then to be managed in a certain
fashion of conducting argumentation research?296
For sake of facilitating practical research argumentation researchers should
aim at clarity to the matters. For example, theorists concern themselves
with different, e. g., characters and forms of action when they build different
blueprints. Clarity to different configurations of forms of actions facilitates
that argumentation researchers present different integrations of role models
which, hence, can be employed to strategically actualize a certain fashion
of research. A pragma-dialectical fashion, for instance, of managing role
models and their strategic actions should in the future always mean that the
four meta-theoretical principles of the research program are brought to bear
(figure 2.2, the scaffold (pragma-dialectics)).
However, practitioners may take into account research results from outside
the “study of verbal communication also known as ‘discourse analysis’”
(vEG04: 52), too. Recall, for instance, my case study in which Siegel and
Biro concern themselves with the example of racists in an election. What
the authors state refers to the pragma-dialectical second-order conditions, i. e.
psychological factors. Likewise, I suggested that managing the concept of
“conflict” calls for psychological research on human needs.
In particular, Aakhus writes that “[a]rgumentative strategy is the means
through which argumentation is made possible in the flow of communication,
295Rule 13 regulates the functionality of speech acts in critical discussion, e. g. that one speech act fulfills not
more than one function.
296For more examples of pragma-dialectical research in “various kinds of argumentative practices in the legal,
political, medical, and academic domains” cf. van Eemeren (vE15: 14).
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especially when the second and third order conditions for critical discussion
do not hold” (Aak03: 269). Psychologists like Rosenberg aim at facilitating to
“establish a flow of communication” (Ros05: 98), for example in the context
of conflict management. So, the relationship between pragma-dialectics and
non-violent communication is worthy to be elucidated, particularly against the
background of the context of mediation. Based on a proper management of
the terms in argumentation research and psychology – i. e. taking into account
different definitions of ideal terms, e. g. “attitude”297 – a pragma-dialectical
enhancement of the argumentative competence of persons can simultaneously
bring about an optimization of such elements, relationships and contexts (εs,
rs, and cs) which are particularly relevant to psychologists.
297The variable use of the term “attitude” in pragma-dialectics becomes apparent in van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (vEG84: 16, 50) where it is employed to, e. g., refer to a philosophy, or to speech act theoretical
matters. Apparently it is thus a matter which is troublesome. Psychological researchers are likely to facilitate
clarity to the matter (cf. e. g. AF77).
Appendix
List of terms: The module of four languages
These are relevant terms I used in the sense of ideal language. First, I list
relevant terms that pragma-dialecticians have used to date. In this dissertation
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These are relevant terms I used in the sense of describing language. First, I










– to manage the
methodical gap
– to optimize.
These are relevant terms I used in the sense of natural language. First, I list
relevant terms that pragma-dialecticians have used to date. In this dissertation




































































dispute.  (Depending on the parties’ choice,
arbitration may be preceded by mediation or
expert determination.) 
Expedit ed Arbi t rat ion: an arbit rat ion
procedure that is carried out in a short t ime
and at a reduced cost.  (Depending on 
the part ies’ choice, expedited arbitrat ion
may be preceded by mediat ion or expert
determinat ion.) 
Expert  Det erminat ion: a procedure in
w hich a technical, scient if ic or related
business issue betw een the part ies is
submit ted to one or more experts who
make a determinat ion on the matter.  The
determinat ion is binding, unless the parties
have agreed otherwise.  (Depending on the
parties’ choice, expert determination may be
preceded by mediat ion or follow ed by
(expedited) arbit rat ion.) 
Developed by leading experts in cross-border dispute
set t lement, these rules are w idely recognized 
as part icularly appropriate for disputes arising out 
of commercial transactions or relationships involving
intellectual property.  In addit ion, they contain provisions
on conf ident iality and technical and experimental
evidence that are of special interest to part ies to
intellectual property disputes.  The rules are available in
a number of languages.
The Center makes available a general overview of its
caseload as well as sanit ized examples of particular cases
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/caseload.html.
In administering disputes, the Center provides the
follow ing administrative services: 
Assistance to the parties in selecting and
appointing the mediator, arbitrator(s) or expert
if necessary, with reference to the Center’s
database of more than 1000 neutrals from











Introduction: WIPO ADR Procedures
Based in Geneva, Switzerland and part of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center (Center) is a leading
international dispute resolution service provider.  This
brochure contains the rules of  dispute resolut ion
procedures administered by the Center, namely, the
WIPO Mediation Rules, the WIPO Arbitration Rules, the
WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, and the WIPO Expert
Determination Rules.1 The Center offers clauses, rules
and neutrals for the follow ing alternat ive dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures:
Mediat ion: an informal procedure in which
a neutral intermediary, the mediator, assists
the parties in reaching a settlement of the
dispute.  (Depending on the parties’ choice,
mediation may be followed, in the absence
of a settlement, by arbitration, expedited
arbitration or expert determination.) 
Arbit rat ion: a binding procedure in which
the dispute is submitted to one or more
arbitrators who make a f inal decision on the
1 The WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules consist of the WIPO Arbitration
Rules modified in certain respects in order to ensure that the
arbitration can be conducted in a shortened time frame and at
reduced cost.  A table showing the differences between the two sets










Scope of Application of Rules 2
Commencement of the Mediation 3-5
Appointment of the Mediator 6-7
Representation of Parties and 
Participation in Meetings 8
Conduct of the Mediation 9-12
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(b) The Request for Mediation shall contain or be
accompanied by:
(i) the names, addresses and telephone, telefax, e-
mail or other communication references of the
parties to the dispute and of the representative
of the party f iling the Request for Mediation;
(ii) a copy of the Mediation Agreement; and
(iii) a brief statement of the nature of the dispute.
Art icle 4
The date of the commencement of the mediation shall
be the date on which the Request for Mediation is
received by the Center.
Art icle 5
The Center shall forthw ith inform the part ies 
in writ ing of the receipt by it of the Request for
Mediation and of the date of the commencement of 
the mediation.
Appointment of the M ediator
Art icle 6
(a) Unless the parties have agreed themselves on the
person of the mediator or on another procedure for
appointing the mediator, the mediator shall be
appointed by the Center after consultation w ith the
parties.
(b) The prospect ive mediator shall, by accept ing
appointment, be deemed to have undertaken to
make available suff icient  t ime to enable the
mediation to be conducted expeditiously.
Art icle 7













" Mediation Agreement"  means an agreement by the
parties to submit to mediation all or certain disputes
which have arisen or which may arise between them;  a
Mediation Agreement may be in the form of a mediation
clause in a contract or in the form of a separate contract;
" M ediator"  includes a sole mediator or all the
mediators where more than one is appointed;
" WIPO"  means the World Intellectual Property
Organization;
" Center"  means the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Center, a unit of the International Bureau of WIPO.
Words used in the singular include the plural and vice
versa, as the context may require.
Scope of Application of Rules
Art icle 2
Where a Mediation Agreement provides for mediation
under the WIPO Mediation Rules, these Rules shall be
deemed to form part of that Mediation Agreement.
Unless the parties have agreed otherw ise, these Rules as
in effect on the date of the commencement of the
mediation shall apply.
Commencement of the M ediation
Art icle 3
(a) A party to a Mediation Agreement that w ishes to
commence a mediation shall submit a Request for
Mediation in writ ing to the Center.  It shall at the
same time send a copy of the Request for Mediation
to the other party.
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dispute, the party's interests and contentions in
relation to the dispute and the present status of the
dispute, together w ith such other information and
materials as the party considers necessary for the
purposes of the mediation and, in particular, to
enable the issues in dispute to be identif ied.
(b) The mediator may at  any t ime during the
mediat ion suggest  that  a party provide such
addit ional information or materials as the mediator
deems useful.
(c) Any party may at any time submit to the mediator,
for consideration by the mediator only, written
information or materials which it considers to be
confidential.  The mediator shall not, w ithout the
written authorization of that party, disclose such
information or materials to the other party.
Role of the M ediator
Art icle 13
(a) The mediator shall promote the settlement of the
issues in dispute between the parties in any manner
that the mediator believes to be appropriate, but
shall have no authority to impose a settlement on
the parties.
(b) Where the mediator believes that any issues in
dispute between the parties are not susceptible to
resolution through mediation, the mediator may
propose, for the considerat ion of  the part ies,
procedures or means for resolving those issues which
the mediator considers are most likely, having regard
to the circumstances of the dispute and any business
relationship between the parties, to lead to the most
eff icient, least costly and most productive settlement
of those issues.  In particular, the mediator may so
propose:










Representation of Parties and Participation 
in M eetings
Art icle 8
(a) The parties may be represented or assisted in their
meetings w ith the mediator.
(b) Immediately after the appointment of the mediator,
the names and addresses of persons authorized to
represent a party, and the names and posit ions of the
persons who w ill be attending the meetings of the
parties w ith the mediator on behalf of that party,
shall be communicated by that party to the other
party, the mediator and the Center.
Conduct of the M ediation
Art icle 9
The mediation shall be conducted in the manner
agreed by the parties.  If, and to the extent that, the
parties have not made such agreement, the mediator
shall, in accordance w ith these Rules, determine the
manner in which the mediation shall be conducted.
Art icle 10
Each party shall cooperate in good faith w ith the
mediator to advance the mediation as expeditiously as
possible.
Art icle 11
The mediator shall be f ree to meet and to
communicate separately w ith a party on the clear
understanding that information given at such meetings
and in such communications shall not be disclosed to the
other party w ithout the express authorization of the
party giving the information.
Art icle 12
(a) As soon as possible after being appointed, the
mediator shall, in consultation w ith the parties,
establish a t imetable for the submission by each
party to the mediator and to the other party of a
statement summarizing the background of the
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a person concerning the meetings of the parties w ith 
the mediator shall be destroyed on the termination of
the mediation.
Art icle 17
Unless otherw ise agreed by the part ies, the
mediator and the part ies shall not  int roduce as
evidence or in any manner w hatsoever in any judicial
or arbit rat ion proceeding:
(i) any view s expressed or suggest ions made by a
party w ith respect  to a possible set t lement  of
the dispute;
(ii) any admissions made by a party in the course of
the mediation;
(iii) any proposals made or view s expressed by 
t he mediator;
(iv) the fact that a party had or had not indicated
willingness to accept any proposal for sett lement
made by the mediator or by the other party.
Termination of the M ediation
Art icle 18
The mediation shall be terminated:
(i) by the signing of a settlement agreement by the
parties covering any or all of the issues in dispute
between the parties;
(ii) by the decision of the mediator if , in the
mediator' s judgment, further efforts at
mediation are unlikely to lead to a resolution of
the dispute; or
(iii) by a written declaration of a party at any time
after attending the first meeting of the parties











(iii) the submission of last offers of sett lement by
each party and, in the absence of a settlement
through mediation, arbitration conducted on the
basis of those last offers pursuant to an arbitral
procedure in which the mission of the arbitral
tribunal is confined to determining which of the
last offers shall prevail; or
(iv) arbit rat ion in w hich the mediator w ill, w ith
the express consent  of  the part ies, act  as 
sole arbit rator, it  being understood that  the
mediator may, in the arbit ral proceedings, 




No recording of any kind shall be made of any
meetings of the parties w ith the mediator.
Art icle 15
Each person involved in the mediation, including, in
part icular, the mediator, the part ies and their
representatives and advisors, any independent experts
and any other persons present during the meetings of
the part ies w ith the mediator, shall respect the
confidentiality of the mediation and may not, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties and the mediator, use or
disclose to any outside party any information concerning,
or obtained in the course of, the mediation.  Each such
person shall sign an appropriate conf ident iality
undertaking prior to taking part in the mediation.
Art icle 16
Unless otherw ise agreed by the parties, each person
involved in the mediation shall, on the termination of 
the mediation, return, to the party providing it, any 
brief, document or other materials supplied by a party,
w ithout retaining any copy thereof.  Any notes taken by
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(d) If a party who has filed a Request for Mediation fails,
w ithin 15 days after a second reminder in writ ing
from the Center, to pay the administration fee, 
it shall be deemed to have w ithdrawn its Request 
for Mediation.
Fees of the M ediator
Art icle 22
(a) The amount and currency of the fees of the mediator
and the modalit ies and timing of their payment shall
be fixed by the Center, after consultation w ith the
mediator and the parties.
(b) The amount of the fees shall, unless the parties and
the mediator agree otherw ise, be calculated on the
basis of the hourly or, if  applicable, daily indicative
rates set out in the Schedule of Fees applicable on
the date of the Request for Mediation, taking into
account the amount in dispute, the complexity of the
subject matter of the dispute and any other relevant
circumstances of the case.
Deposits
Art icle 23
(a) The Center may, at the time of the appointment of
the mediator, require each party to deposit an equal
amount as an advance for the costs of  the
mediation, including, in particular, the estimated fees
of the mediator and the other expenses of the
mediation.  The amount of the deposit shall be
determined by the Center.
(b) The Center may require t he part ies t o make
supplementary deposits.
(c) If a party fails, w ithin 15 days after a second reminder
in writing from the Center, to pay the required
deposit, the mediation shall be deemed to be










(a) Upon the termination of the mediation, the mediator
shall promptly send to the Center a notice in writ ing
that the mediation is terminated and shall indicate
the date on which it terminated, whether or not the
mediation resulted in a settlement of the dispute
and, if so, whether the settlement was full or partial.
The mediator shall send to the parties a copy of the
notice so addressed to the Center.
(b) The Center shall keep the said notice of the mediator
confidential and shall not, w ithout the writ ten
authorization of the part ies, disclose either the
existence or the result of the mediation to any person.
(c) The Center may, however, include informat ion
concerning the mediation in any aggregate statistical
data that it  publishes concerning its act ivit ies,
provided that such information does not reveal the
identity of the part ies or enable the part icular
circumstances of the dispute to be identif ied.
Art icle 20
Unless required by a court of law or authorized in
writing by the parties, the mediator shall not act in any
capacity whatsoever, otherwise than as a mediator, in any
pending or future proceedings, whether judicial, arbitral
or otherwise, relating to the subject matter of the dispute.
Administration Fee
Art icle 21
(a) The Request for Mediation shall be subject to the
payment to the Center of an administration fee, the
amount of which shall be fixed in accordance w ith
the Schedule of Fees applicable on the date of the
Request for Mediation.
(b) The administration fee shall not be refundable.
(c) No action shall be taken by the Center on a Request




Suspension of Running of Limitation Period
under the Statute of Limitations
Art icle 27
The parties agree that, to the extent permitted by the
applicable law, the running of the limitation period
under the Statute of Limitations or an equivalent law
shall be suspended in relation to the dispute that is the
subject  of  the mediat ion f rom the date of  the
commencement of the mediation until the date of the









inform the parties and the mediator accordingly and
indicate the date of termination.
(d) After the termination of the mediation, the Center
shall render an accounting to the parties of any
deposits made and return any unexpended balance
to the parties or require the payment of any amount
owing from the parties.
Costs
Art icle 24
Unless the parties agree otherw ise, the administration
fee, the fees of the mediator and all other expenses of
the mediation, including, in particular, the required travel
expenses of the mediator and any expenses associated
with obtaining expert advice, shall be borne in equal
shares by the parties.
Exclusion of Liability
Art icle 25
Except in respect of deliberate wrongdoing, the
mediator, WIPO and the Center shall not be liable to any
party for any act or omission in connection w ith any
mediation conducted under these Rules.
Waiver of Defamation
Art icle 26
The part ies and, by accepting appointment, the
mediator agree that any statements or comments,
whether written or oral, made or used by them or their
representatives in preparation for or in the course of the
mediation shall not be relied upon to found or maintain
any action for defamation, libel, slander or any related
complaint, and this Article may be pleaded as a bar to
any such action.
List of Figures
1.1 The topography of argumentation research. . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 The methodical gap between ci and ca. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Four languages to manage the methodical gap
pragma-dialectically. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Philosopher facilitates pragma-dialectical research. . . . . . . 66
2.4 Strategy in critical discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.5 Three languages and functions of cis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.6 The methodical gap, tasks of role models and functions of cis. 99
2.7 The purpose of pragma-dialectical research as part of
argumentation research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
2.8 Examples of pragma-dialectical research strategies. . . . . . . 138
3.1 Strategists in critical discussion (m). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
3.2 Foci of the pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance:
example of the mediator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
306
List of Tables
2.1 Troublesome matters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.2 Troublesome matters (pragma-dialectics). . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.1 Definitions of clarity, acceptability and acceptance. . . . . . . 172
3.2 Accordance of matters from different ci. . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
3.3 Strategic goals of the mediator in managing clarity,
acceptability and acceptance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
5.1 Example of the integration of modules in the case study. . . . 287
307
Bibliography
[Aak03] M. Aakhus. Neither naïve nor critical reconstruction:
Dispute mediators, impasse, and the design of argumentation.
Argumentation, 17(3):265–290, 2003.
[AF77] I. Ajzen and M. Fishbein. Attitude-behavior relations:
A theoretical analysis and review of empirical research.
Psychological Bulletin, 84(5):888–918, 1977.
[Alf03] R.P. Alford. Leff’s account of the Aristotelian roots of the
Boethian theory of dialectical reasoning: A contemporary
reconsideration. In F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard,
and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, editors, Proceedings of the
Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation, pages 9–12, Amsterdam, 2003. Sic Sat.
[Amj07] B. Amjarso. Persuasiveness from a pragma-dialectical
perspective. In H.V. Hansen, C.W. Tindale, R.H. Johnson,
and J.A. Blair, editors, Dissensus and the Search For Common
Ground, pages 1–10, Windsor, ON, 2007. Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation.
[And10] C. Andone. Maneuvering strategically in a political interview:
analyzing and evaluating responses to an accusation of
inconsistency. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2010.
[BG10] G. Bisanz and G. Gerisch. Taktik. In Fußbal: Kondition -
Technik - Taktik und Coaching, pages 377–380. Meyer & Meyer
Verlag, Aachen, 2010.
[Car56] R. Carnap. The methodological character of theoretical




[Car86] R. Carnap. Drei Arten von Begriffen. In Einführung in die
Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften, pages 59–68. Ullstein,
Frankfurt (M)/ Berlin, 1986.
[Deu13] Deutscher Fußball-Bund (DFB). Fußball-Regeln, 2013/2014,
2013. Retrieved January 16, 2015, from http://www.dfb.de.
[Eur17] Europäisches Parlament. Angenommener Text: Umsetzung der
Mediationsrichtlinie (2008/52/EG), 2017. Retrieved November
05, 2017, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
[Fet01] E.T. Feteris. Argumentation in the field of law. In F.H. van
Eemeren, editor, Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory,
pages 201–225. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2001.
[Fet03] E.T. Feteris. The Rationality of Legal Discourse in Habermas’s
Discourse Theory. Informal Logic, 23(2):139–159, 2003.
[Fet17] E.T. Feteris. The role of the judge in legal proceedings: A
pragma-dialectical analysis. In F.H. van Eemeren and W. Peng,
editors, Contextualizing Pragma-Dialectics, pages 59–76. John
Benjamins, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, 2017.
[FS08] A.J. Freeley and D.L. Steinberg. Argumentation and Debate:
Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making. Cengage
Learning, Boston, 2008.
[Gar01] B. Garssen. Argument schemes. In F.H. van Eemeren, editor,
Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory, pages 81–100. Sic
Sat, Amsterdam, 2001.
[GHK16] U. Glößer, M. Hammes, and L. Kirchhoff. Konfliktmanagement
in der deutschen Wirtschaft – Entwicklungen eines
Jahrzehnts, 2016. Retrieved October 21, 2017, from
https://www.rewi.europa-uni.de.
[GM08] S. Greco Morasso. Argumentative and other communicative
strategies of the mediation practice. PhD thesis, University of
Lugano, 2008.
310
[Goo09] T. Goodnight. Strategic maneuvering in direct-to-consumer
drug advertising: Argument, contestation, and institutions. In
F.H. van Eemeren, editor, Examining Argumentation in Context:
Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering, pages 77–92. John
Benjamins, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, 2009.
[Gov99a] T. Govier. The poverty of formalism. In The Philosophy of
Argument, pages 83–103. Vale Press, Newport News, VA, 1999.
[Gov99b] T. Govier. What is a good argument? In The Philosophy
of Argument, pages 107–122. Vale Press, Newport News, VA,
1999.
[Gri75] H.P. Grice. Logic and conversation. In P. Cole and J.L.
Morgan, editors, Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts, pages
41–58. Academic Press, New York/ San Francisco/ London,
1975.
[GvL10] B. Garssen and J.A. van Laar. A pragma-dialectical
response to objectivist epistemic challenges. Informal Logic,
30(2):122–141, 2010.
[Ham70] C.L. Hamblin. Fallacies. Vale Press, Newport News, VA, 1970.
[Hou98] P. Houtlosser. Points of view. Argumentation, 12(3):387–405,
1998.
[Jac02] S. Jacobs. Maintaining neutrality in dispute mediation:
managing disagreement while managing not to disagree. Journal
of Pragmatics, 34(10-11):1403–1426, 2002.
[Joh88] H.W. Johnstone. Questions about philosophical argumentation:
Introduction. Argumentation, 2(2):153–155, 1988.
[Joh99] R.H. Johnson. The problem of truth for theories of
argument. In F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard, and
A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, editors, Proceedings of the Fourth
International Conference of the International Society for the
Study of Argumentation, pages 411–415, Amsterdam, 1999. Sic
Sat.
311
[Kan01] I. Kant. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik.
Meiner, Hamburg, 2001.
[Kuh06] A. Kuhr. Einige Aspekte der “Allgemeinen Psychotherapie”
nach Grawe. In M. Thielen, editor, 2. Berliner
Landespsychotherapeutentag: Tagungsbericht, pages 34–36,
Heidelberg, 2006. Psychotherapeutenverlag.
[Kve12] T. Kvernbekk. Argumentation in theory and practice: Gap or
equilibrium? Informal Logic, 32(3):288–305, 2012.
[LD04] P. Lovenheim and E. Doskow. Becoming a Mediator: Your
Guide to Career Opportunities. Nolo, Berkeley, 2004.
[LG04] P. Lovenheim and L. Guerin. Mediate, Don’t Litigate. Nolo,
Berkeley, 2004.
[Lum10] C. Lumer. Pragma-dialectics and the function of argumentation.
Argumentation, 24(1):41–69, 2010.
[OJ95] D.J. O’Keefe and S. Jackson. Argument quality and persuasive
effects: A review of current approaches. In S. Jackson, editor,
Argumentation and Values: Proceedings of the Ninth SCA/AFA
Conference on Argumentation, pages 88–92, Washington, 1995.
Speech Communication Association.
[O’K02] D.J. O’Keefe. Persuasion, attitudes, and actions. In Persuasion:
Theory and Research, pages 1–28. Sage, Thousand Oaks/
London/ New Delphi, 2002.
[Pin03] R.C. Pinto. Reasons. In F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A.
Willard, and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, editors, Proceedings of
the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation, pages 825–830, Amsterdam, 2003. Sic Sat.
[Pop05] K. Popper. Lesebuch: Ausgewählte Texte zur Erkenntnistheorie,
Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften, Metaphysik,
Sozialphilosophie. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005.
[POT69] C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric: A
Treatise on Argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press,
Notre Dame/ London, 1969.
312
[Ros05] M.B. Rosenberg. Nonviolent Communication: A Language of
Life. PuddleDancer Press, Encinitas, CA, 2005.
[RW14] C.S. Rabe and M. Wode. Basistechniken in der mediation. In
Mediation: Grundlagen, Methoden, rechtlicher Rahmen, pages
63–108. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg, 2014.
[SB08] H. Siegel and J. Biro. Rationality, reasonableness, and
critical rationalism: Problems with the pragma-dialectical view.
Argumentation, 22(2):191–203, 2008.
[SB10] H. Siegel and J. Biro. The pragma-dialectician’s dilemma: Reply
to Garssen and van Laar. Informal Logic, 30(4):457–480, 2010.
[Sea71] J.R. Searle. What is a speech act? In J.R. Searle, editor, The
Philosophy of Language, pages 39–53. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1971.
[Sea79] J.R. Searle. A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In Expression
and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, pages 1–29.
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979.
[SM10] K.A. Stewart and M.M. Maxwell. Review of the literature.
In Storied Conflict Talk: Narrative construction in mediation,
pages 11–43. John Benjamins, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, 2010.
[Tou58] S. Toulmin. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge University Press,
New York, 1958.
[Uni15] United Nations. The millennium development goals report,
2015. Retrieved August 20, 2017, from http://www.un.org.
[VBRG11] J. Visser, F. Bex, C. Reed, and B. Garssen. Correspondence
between the pragma-dialectical discussion model and the
argument interchange format. Studies in logic, grammar and
rhetoric, 23(36):189–224, 2011.
[vE90] F.H. van Eemeren. The study of argumentation as normative
pragmatics. An interdisciplinary journal for the study of
discourse, 10(1/2):37–44, 1990.
313
[vE95] F.H. van Eemeren. A world of difference: The rich state of
argumentation theory. Informal Logic, 17(2):144–158, 1995.
[vE01] F.H. van Eemeren. Fallacies. In F.H. van Eemeren, editor,
Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory, pages 135–164. Sic
Sat, Amsterdam, 2001.
[vE09] F.H. van Eemeren. Strategic manoeuvring between rhetorical
effectiveness and dialectical reasonableness. Studies in logic,
grammar and rhetoric, 16(29):69–91, 2009.
[vE10] F.H. van Eemeren. Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative
Discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of
argumentation. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2010.
[vE15] F.H. van Eemeren. Bingo! Promising Developments in
Argumentation Theory. In F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen,
editors, Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation
Theory, pages 3–25. Springer, Cham/ Heidelberg/ New York/
Dordrecht/ London, 2015.
[vEG82] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. The speech acts of
arguing and convincing in externalized discussions. Journal of
Pragmatics, 6(1):1–24, 1982.
[vEG84] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. Speech Acts in
Argumentative Discussions: A Theoretical Model for the
Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts of
Opinion. De Gruyter/ Foris Publications, Berlin/ Dordrecht,
1984.
[vEG88] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. Rules for argumentation
in dialogues. Argumentation, 2(4):499–510, 1988.
[vEG92] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. Analyzing and
evaluating argumentative discourse. In Argumentation,
Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical
Perspective, pages 93–102. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992.
[vEG94] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. Rationale for a
pragma-dialectical perspective. In F.H. van Eemeren and
314
R. Grootendorst, editors, Studies in Pragma-Dialectics, pages
11–28. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 1994.
[vEG95] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. The pragma-dialectical
approach to fallacies. In H.V. Hansen and R.C. Pinto,
editors, Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings, pages
130–144. Penn State Press, University Park, PA, 1995.
[vEG04] F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst. A Systematic Theory of
Argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
[vEG09a] F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen. The fallacies of composition
and division revisited. Cogency, 1(1):23–42, 2009.
[vEG09b] F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen. Problems of argumentation:
An introduction. In F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen,
editors, Pondering on Problems of Argumentation, pages xi–xxi.
Springer, Dordrecht, 2009.
[vEGJJ93] F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, S. Jackson, and S. Jacobs.
Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse. The University of
Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa/ London, 1993.
[vEGJJ97] F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, S. Jackson, and S. Jacobs.
Argumentation. In T.A. van Dijk, editor, Discourse as structure
and process, pages 208–229. Sage, London, 1997.
[vEGM09] F.H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, and B. Meuffels. Theoretical
background and organization of the study. In Fallacies and
Judgments of Reasonableness: Empirical Research Concerning
the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules, pages 1–30. Springer,
Dordrecht, 2009.
[vEGM12] F.H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, and B. Meuffels. The
extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory empirically
interpreted. In F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen, editors,
Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory, pages 323–343.
Springer, Dordrecht/ Heidelberg/ London/ New York, 2012.
315
[vEGSH96] F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, and A.F.
Snoeck Henkemans. Pragma-dialectics and critical
discussion. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst,
and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, editors, Fundamentals of
Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Background
and Contemporary Developments, pages 274–311. Erlbaum,
Mahwah, NJ, 1996.
[vEGSH02] F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, and A.F.
Snoeck Henkemans. Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation,
Presentation. Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2002.
[vEH02] F.H. van Eemeren and P. Houtlosser. Strategic maneuvering:
Maintaining a delicate balance. In F.H. van Eemeren and
P. Houtlosser, editors, Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp
and Woof of Argumentation Analysis, pages 131–159. Kluwer
Academic, Dordrecht, 2002.
[vEH03] F.H. van Eemeren and P. Houtlosser. The development of the
pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. Argumentation,
17(4):387–403, 2003.
[vEHSH07] F.H. van Eemeren, P. Houtlosser, and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans.
Argumentative Indicators in Discourse: A Pragma-Dialectical
Study. Springer, Dordrecht, 2007.
[vP13] L. van Poppel. Getting the vaccine now will protect you in the
future! A pragma-dialectical analysis of strategic maneuvering
with pragmatic argumentation in health brochures. PhD thesis,
University of Amsterdam, 2013.
[vR01] A. van Rees. The diagnostic power of the stages of critical
discussion in the analysis and evaluation of problem-solving
discussions. Argumentation, 15(4):457–470, 2001.
[vR03] A. van Rees. Pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of
problem-solving discussion. Argumentation, 17(4):465–479,
2003.
[Wal07] D. Walton. Media Argumentation: Dialectic, Persuasion, and
Rhetoric. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007.
316
[Wen92] J.W. Wenzel. Perspectives on argument. In W.L. Benoit,
D. Hample, and P.J. Benoit, editors, Readings in Argumentation,
pages 121–143. De Gruyter, Berlin, 1992.
[Wika] Wikipedia. Argumentation theory. Retrieved May 24, 2017,
from https://en.wikipedia.org.
[Wikb] Wikipedia. Strategie. Retrieved May 24, 2017, from
https://de.wikipedia.org.
[WIP] WIPO. What is mediation? Retrieved August 20, 2017, from
http://www.wipo.int.
[WIP09] WIPO. Wipo mediation rules. In World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), editor, WIPO Arbitration,
Mediation, and Expert Determination Rules and Clauses,
pages 1–17. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
Geneva/ New York, 2009.
[WJ99] S.L. Wolski and S. Jacobs. Presumptive reasoning and the
pragmatics of assent: The case of argument ad ignorantiam.
In F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard, and A.F.
Snoeck Henkemans, editors, Proceedings of the Fourth
International Conference of the International Society for the
Study of Argumentation, pages 877–879, Amsterdam, 1999. Sic
Sat.
[Zar05] D. Zarefsky. Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning
(Audiobook). The Teaching Company, Chantilly, VA, 2005.
Zusammenfassung
Diese sprachanalytische Untersuchung befasst sich zum Zweck der Schärfung
des argumentationsbezogenen Selbstverständnisses von Mediatoren mit
ihren strategischen Handlungen gemäß einer modular strukturierten
pragma-dialektischen philosophischen, theoretischen, analytischen,
empirischen und praktischen Argumentationsforschung (fünf Komponenten).
In Kapitel 2 wird die Dualität zwischen Theorie und Praxis der
Argumentation, d. h. die methodische Lücke zwischen Idealsprache
und Aktualsprache, durch die Ausarbeitung der internen Struktur der
fünf Komponenten im Rahmen der Einführung einer Beschreibungssprache
aus Relationsbegriffen für die Disziplin neuartig überbrückt. Die
Methode wird, exemplarisch, über die vier meta-theoretischen Prinzipien
für das pragma-dialektische Forschungsprogramm nutzbar gemacht. Es
entsteht zugleich eine komplexe Übersicht über den Forschungsstand
der Pragma-Dialektik. Das analytische Potenzial des Idealmodells
critical discussion wird vor dem Hintergrund einer Unterscheidung von
Theorietypen kritisch bewertet, die Mängel werden in Bezug auf die
Theorie-Praxis-Beziehung beseitigt.
In Kapitel 3 wird über eine Integration von critical discussion mit
Mediations-Regeln der Vereinten Nationen ein ontologischer Rahmen für
strategische Gesprächsanalysen entwickelt, z. B. anhand der Begriffe Konflikt
und Akzeptanz. Sodann wird eine Unterscheidung strategischer Handlungen
im Rahmen der fünf Komponenten genutzt, um zu einer Lokalisierung der
Komplexität der paradoxen Rolle von Mediatoren zu führen: Die zentralen
Anforderungen an ihre argumentative Kompetenz sowie antizipierbare
Strategien von Mediatoren als analytisch-intuitive Praktiker werden
funktional ersichtlich, nämlich im Umgang mit der Theorie-Praxis-Lücke als
pragma-dialektische kritische Designer von Akzeptanz.
In Kapitel 4 wird in einer zweifach reflexiven Fallstudie vorgeführt, wie auf
Grundlage dieser argumentativen Kompetenz durch die Nutzung der modular
strukturierten Forschungsergebnisse ein Flow von Kommunikation in der
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Praxis von Mediationssitzungen gesichert und damit zweckorientiert eine
Optimierung der argumentativen Realität in Konfliktmanagements erreicht
werden kann.
Strategische Handlungen zwischen Theorie der Argumentation (hier
beispielhaft an der Pragma-Dialektik) und alltäglicher Praxis zu bestimmen
bedeutet, die argumentative Kompetenz kontextabhängig schärfen und die
argumentative Performance in diversen Professionen optimieren zu können
(neben der Mediation auch z. B. in Change-Prozessen, Trainings, Coachings).
